diff --git a/core/audit/audit.ts b/core/audit/audit.ts
index b55d3d8..d1f042a 100644
--- a/core/audit/audit.ts
+++ b/core/audit/audit.ts
@@ -70,6 +70,16 @@ export const SENSITIVE_ACTIONS = [
   "projection.activated",
   /** Administrative configuration was changed (or a change was refused). */
   "admin.config_changed",
+  /** A maintainer opened a scoped support-access session. */
+  "impersonation.session_started",
+  /** A maintainer closed a support-access session. */
+  "impersonation.session_ended",
+  /** A support-access session expired before the maintainer closed it. */
+  "impersonation.session_expired",
+  /** A permitted action ran inside a support-access session (or was refused). */
+  "impersonation.action",
+  /** A dangerous mutation was blocked inside a read-only support session. */
+  "impersonation.mutation_blocked",
   /** A delegated permission was granted (or a grant was refused). */
   "authorization.granted",
   /** A delegated permission was renewed (or a renewal was refused). */
diff --git a/core/impersonation/__tests__/audit-trail.test.ts b/core/impersonation/__tests__/audit-trail.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c67a2a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/impersonation/__tests__/audit-trail.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { getAuditTrail, type AuditAction } from "@/core/audit";
+import {
+  canExecuteAction,
+  clearImpersonationAuditTrail,
+  createImpersonationSession,
+  endImpersonationSession
+} from "../impersonation";
+import type { CreateImpersonationParams, ImpersonationSession } from "../types";
+
+const fixedNow = new Date("2026-10-18T10:00:00.000Z");
+const mockClock = () => new Date(fixedNow.getTime());
+const laterClock = () => new Date(fixedNow.getTime() + 16 * 60 * 1000);
+
+function session(overrides: Partial<CreateImpersonationParams> = {}): ImpersonationSession {
+  const result = createImpersonationSession({
+    maintainerId: "maintainer_alice",
+    targetUserId: "user_bob",
+    targetAddress: "GD5J...TEST",
+    reason: "Customer reported a sync failure",
+    clock: mockClock,
+    ...overrides
+  });
+  if (!result.ok) throw new Error(result.code);
+  return result.value;
+}
+
+function auditEvents(action: AuditAction) {
+  const page = getAuditTrail().query({ kind: "maintainer", id: "auditor" }, { action });
+  if (!page.ok) throw new Error(page.code);
+  return page.value.events;
+}
+
+describe("impersonation canonical audit trail", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    getAuditTrail().reset();
+    clearImpersonationAuditTrail();
+  });
+
+  it("records session creation with maintainer attribution and user target", () => {
+    const created = session();
+
+    const events = auditEvents("impersonation.session_started");
+    expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(events[0].actor).toEqual({ kind: "maintainer", id: "maintainer_alice" });
+    expect(events[0].scope).toBe("maintainer");
+    expect(events[0].target).toEqual({ kind: "user", id: "user_bob" });
+    expect(events[0].outcome).toBe("allowed");
+    expect(events[0].after?.sessionId).toBe(created.id);
+  });
+
+  it("records an allowed read action", () => {
+    const created = session();
+
+    const check = canExecuteAction(created, "ticket.view", { clock: mockClock });
+    expect(check.ok).toBe(true);
+
+    const events = auditEvents("impersonation.action");
+    expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(events[0].outcome).toBe("allowed");
+    expect(events[0].after?.action).toBe("ticket.view");
+  });
+
+  it("records a blocked dangerous mutation as a denied audit event", () => {
+    const created = session({ scopes: ["read:transfers"] });
+
+    const check = canExecuteAction(created, "ticket.transfer", { clock: mockClock });
+    expect(check.ok).toBe(false);
+
+    const events = auditEvents("impersonation.mutation_blocked");
+    expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(events[0].outcome).toBe("denied");
+    expect(events[0].errorCode).toBe("impersonation_denied");
+    expect(events[0].after?.action).toBe("ticket.transfer");
+  });
+
+  it("records expiry when an action is attempted after the deadline", () => {
+    const created = session();
+
+    const check = canExecuteAction(created, "ticket.view", { clock: laterClock });
+    expect(check.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!check.ok) expect(check.code).toBe("impersonation_session_expired");
+
+    const events = auditEvents("impersonation.session_expired");
+    expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(events[0].outcome).toBe("denied");
+    expect(events[0].after?.sessionId).toBe(created.id);
+  });
+
+  it("records session end", () => {
+    const created = session();
+
+    endImpersonationSession(created, "Resolved the customer issue", mockClock);
+
+    const events = auditEvents("impersonation.session_ended");
+    expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(events[0].outcome).toBe("allowed");
+    expect(events[0].after?.sessionId).toBe(created.id);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/core/impersonation/impersonation.ts b/core/impersonation/impersonation.ts
index 874f113..716c825 100644
--- a/core/impersonation/impersonation.ts
+++ b/core/impersonation/impersonation.ts
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  * - Elevated Confirmation: dangerous mutations require explicit tokens if configured.
  */
 
+import { recordAudit, type AuditAction } from '@/core/audit/audit';
 import { err, ok, type Result } from '@/core/result/result';
 import {
   ACTION_SCOPE_MAP,
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ import {
   DANGEROUS_MUTATIONS,
   ImpersonationAction,
   ImpersonationAuditEvent,
+  ImpersonationAuditEventType,
   ImpersonationBannerState,
   ImpersonationErrorCode,
   ImpersonationScope,
@@ -318,9 +320,34 @@ export function getImpersonationBannerState(
   };
 }
 
-/** Records an audit event to the append-only trail */
+const CANONICAL_AUDIT_ACTIONS: Record<ImpersonationAuditEventType, AuditAction> = {
+  session_started: 'impersonation.session_started',
+  session_ended: 'impersonation.session_ended',
+  session_expired: 'impersonation.session_expired',
+  action_performed: 'impersonation.action',
+  mutation_blocked: 'impersonation.mutation_blocked'
+};
+
+/** Records an audit event to the local trail and the canonical audit trail */
 function recordAuditEvent(event: ImpersonationAuditEvent): void {
   impersonationAuditTrail.push(Object.freeze(event));
+  recordAudit({
+    action: CANONICAL_AUDIT_ACTIONS[event.eventType],
+    actor: { kind: 'maintainer', id: event.maintainerId },
+    scope: 'maintainer',
+    target: { kind: 'user', id: event.targetUserId || 'unknown' },
+    reason: 'support_access',
+    outcome: event.outcome,
+    after: {
+      sessionId: event.sessionId,
+      eventType: event.eventType,
+      action: event.action ?? null,
+      reason: event.reason ?? null
+    },
+    at: event.timestamp,
+    correlationId: event.sessionId,
+    ...(event.outcome === 'denied' ? { errorCode: 'impersonation_denied' } : {})
+  });
 }
 
 /** Returns the recorded impersonation audit trail (read-only copy) */
diff --git a/docs/AUDIT.md b/docs/AUDIT.md
index 96054be..a7f8ea7 100644
--- a/docs/AUDIT.md
+++ b/docs/AUDIT.md
@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ cannot disagree about coverage:
 | `authorization.renewed`     | `core/authorizations/store.ts` (`renew`)      |
 | `authorization.revoked`     | `core/authorizations/store.ts` (`revoke`)     |
 | `authorization.cleaned_up`  | `core/authorizations/store.ts` (`cleanup`)    |
+| `impersonation.session_started` | `core/impersonation/impersonation.ts` (`createImpersonationSession`) |
+| `impersonation.session_ended` | `core/impersonation/impersonation.ts` (`endImpersonationSession`) |
+| `impersonation.session_expired` | `core/impersonation/impersonation.ts` (`canExecuteAction`) |
+| `impersonation.action` | `core/impersonation/impersonation.ts` (`canExecuteAction`) |
+| `impersonation.mutation_blocked` | `core/impersonation/impersonation.ts` (`canExecuteAction`) |
+
+See [Support access](./SUPPORT_ACCESS.md) for the session model, scopes,
+failure modes and rollback steps.
 
 ### Which lifecycle moves are audited
 
diff --git a/docs/SUPPORT_ACCESS.md b/docs/SUPPORT_ACCESS.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e901aa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/SUPPORT_ACCESS.md
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+# Support access (maintainer impersonation)
+
+## What this covers
+
+`core/impersonation/` gives maintainers a **time-bounded, scoped, audited**
+support session for debugging a user's issue. It builds on the session model
+introduced for issue #80 and closes the operational gaps in issue #229: every
+session event is now also written to the canonical, tamper-evident audit trail.
+
+The default posture is **read-only**. A session can inspect tickets, transfer
+history, events and diagnostics only when the corresponding scope was granted.
+Dangerous mutations are unavailable unless the session explicitly allow-lists
+them **and** the caller supplies an elevated confirmation token.
+
+## Guarantees
+
+| Property | Behaviour |
+| --- | --- |
+| Time bound | Default 15 minutes; minimum 1, maximum 60. Every action re-checks `expiresAt`. |
+| Scoped | Scopes default to `read:tickets`, `inspect:events`, `support:diagnostics`. Actions not mapped to a granted scope are refused. |
+| Read-only by default | `allowedMutations` is empty unless explicitly supplied. `ticket.transfer`, `ticket.redeem`, `ticket.burn`, `payout.withdraw`, `credential.rotate` and `event.cancel` are blocked. |
+| Elevated confirmation | Allow-listed dangerous mutations still require a token of at least 8 characters when `elevatedConfirmationRequired` is true (the default). |
+| User-safe notice | `getImpersonationBannerState()` returns the banner text, tone, remaining seconds, read-only flag and scopes. It never contains credentials. |
+| No bypass | Every start, end, expiry, allowed action and blocked mutation is written to the local append-only trail **and** to `core/audit`. |
+
+## Usage
+
+```ts
+import {
+  canExecuteAction,
+  createImpersonationSession,
+  endImpersonationSession,
+  getImpersonationBannerState
+} from "@/core/impersonation";
+
+const created = createImpersonationSession({
+  maintainerId: "maintainer_alice",
+  targetUserId: "user_bob",
+  targetAddress: "GD5J...TEST",
+  reason: "Customer reported a sync failure",
+  durationMinutes: 20,
+  scopes: ["read:tickets", "inspect:events"],
+  clock: () => new Date()
+});
+
+if (!created.ok) throw new Error(created.code);
+
+const check = canExecuteAction(created.value, "ticket.view");
+if (!check.ok) return showSupportError(check.code);
+
+const banner = getImpersonationBannerState(created.value);
+// banner.statusText -> "Impersonating user_bob (Read-Only)"
+
+const ended = endImpersonationSession(
+  created.value,
+  "Resolved the customer issue"
+);
+```
+
+For a scoped action, pass the session's scopes when creating it, and pass an
+elevated token only for an explicitly allow-listed mutation:
+
+```ts
+const elevated = canExecuteAction(session, "ticket.transfer", {
+  elevatedConfirmationToken: process.env.SUPPORT_CONFIRMATION_TOKEN
+});
+```
+
+## Audit trail
+
+Every impersonation event is mirrored into `core/audit` with:
+
+- **actor** `{ kind: "maintainer", id: maintainerId }`
+- **scope** `maintainer`
+- **target** `{ kind: "user", id: targetUserId }`
+- **reason** `support_access`
+- **correlationId** the impersonation session id
+- **outcome** `allowed` or `denied`
+
+| Local event | Canonical action |
+| --- | --- |
+| `session_started` | `impersonation.session_started` |
+| `session_ended` | `impersonation.session_ended` |
+| `session_expired` | `impersonation.session_expired` |
+| `action_performed` | `impersonation.action` |
+| `mutation_blocked` | `impersonation.mutation_blocked` |
+
+Refused actions are still recorded, with `outcome: "denied"` and
+`errorCode: "impersonation_denied"`. A maintainer can review a session:
+
+```ts
+import { getAuditTrail } from "@/core/audit";
+
+const page = getAuditTrail().query(
+  { kind: "maintainer", id: "auditor" },
+  { action: "impersonation.mutation_blocked", limit: 50 }
+);
+```
+
+The local trail remains available through `getImpersonationAuditTrail()`; the
+canonical event is the durable, cross-session record. The local trail is
+in-memory and per tab, so do not use it as the only evidence after a restart.
+
+## Edge cases and failure modes
+
+- **Clock skew** — expiry is compared against the injected clock. Hosts must
+  keep NTP in sync; a large backwards jump keeps a session alive longer than
+  intended. Pass a monotonic clock in long-lived jobs where possible.
+- **Expiry during work** — `canExecuteAction` checks the deadline before every
+  action. Do not start a long-running operation close to the deadline; the
+  next action will be refused even if the first one succeeded.
+- **Inactive or expired session** — returns `impersonation_session_inactive`
+  or `impersonation_session_expired`; the refusal is audited.
+- **Scope not granted** — returns `impersonation_scope_denied`; the refusal is
+  audited.
+- **Dangerous mutation** — returns `impersonation_mutation_blocked` unless the
+  action is in `allowedMutations`; if allow-listed but the confirmation token
+  is missing or shorter than 8 characters, returns
+  `elevated_confirmation_required`. Neither path mutates user state.
+- **Invalid request** — empty maintainer/target, a reason shorter than 5
+  characters, or a duration outside 1–60 minutes returns the corresponding
+  error before a session is created.
+- **Audit availability** — `recordAudit` is deliberately non-throwing. The
+  local trail is written first, so an action cannot silently bypass the local
+  evidence. If the canonical event is missing when reviewing a session, treat
+  that as an audit-pipeline incident and preserve the local trail while
+  investigating; do not delete either trail.
+- **Multiple tabs** — each tab has its own in-memory session and local trail.
+  Persist only the session id in tab-scoped storage; never persist the elevated
+  confirmation token. Use the canonical trail to reconcile activity across tabs.
+- **Read access** — a non-maintainer cannot read maintainer-scope audit events;
+  `getAuditTrail().query` returns `audit_denied`.
+
+## Rollback and recovery
+
+1. Call `endImpersonationSession()` for the affected session and discard the
+   in-memory object. Ending is audited even when the session already expired.
+2. Revoke the maintainer's account/role through the normal identity process;
+   do not rely on session expiry for access removal.
+3. Rotate the elevated confirmation token if one may have been exposed.
+4. Review `impersonation.session_started`, `impersonation.action`,
+   `impersonation.mutation_blocked`, `impersonation.session_expired` and
+   `impersonation.session_ended` in `core/audit` for the session id.
+5. If a dangerous mutation was allowed, verify the affected target through the
+   normal ledger/audit tooling. Do not edit or delete audit events.
+6. Clear any tab-scoped session id. `clearImpersonationAuditTrail()` is a test
+   utility and must not be called from production code.
+
+## Verification
+
+```bash
+npx vitest run core/impersonation
+npx vitest run core/audit
+```
+
+The impersonation suite covers duration bounds, scope checks, dangerous
+mutation blocking, elevated confirmation, expiry, banner state and the canonical
+audit mapping.
+
+See [Audit trail](./AUDIT.md) for the shared audit rules and export/read API.