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Threat Model — tole

Status: initial version (2026-09-12), mapped against the OWASP Agentic/LLM Top 10 checklist (issue #72). Every item resolves to control (where it lives) / gap (tracked) / N/A (with rationale).

Assets

Asset Where Notes
Provider API key TOLE_/OPENAI_* env Never persisted; scrubbed from wire errors/messages
Session logs (JSONL) sessions dir Full transcript incl. tool results — local only
Job logs <workspace>/tole-jobs/ Child stdout/stderr, attacker-influenceable content
Workspace files --workspace dir (default cwd) Readable AND writable by the model via tools
Host env of child processes inherited by spawned commands See ENV-1
Subprocess execution authority run_command / job_start / git / gh The model chooses argv within argv-split + jail rules

Trust boundaries

  1. Provider responses → context. The model's output becomes intent entries; tool args are argv-validated but otherwise untrusted.
  2. Tool results → context. File contents, job logs, command stdout flow back into the transcript and are sent to the provider. A malicious workspace file or a compromised job subprocess can inject instructions here (OWASP: prompt injection).
  3. Workspace → filesystem. File tools jail to --workspace (component-validated, TOCTOU-safe walk, #68); run_command/job_start run with cwd jailed but FULL process authority — the jail bounds cwd, not capability.
  4. Child env. Spawned commands inherit the host environment by default.

OWASP Agentic/LLM Top-10 mapping

OWASP item Status Where / rationale
Prompt injection (direct/indirect) control + documented residual Tool results on the wire are wrapped in TOOL_RESULT_BEGIN/END fences with inner fence markers neutralized (this fix); secrets scrubbed (E11). Residual: an injected instruction inside data can still steer the model — no framework fully solves this; delimiters + user-visible tool audit lines (what: …) limit blast radius.
Insecure output handling control Same fence treatment; result sizes capped (read_file 1 MiB cap, run_command 4000/2000 chars, job_poll 8 KiB window).
Excessive agency / tool misuse control (defense-in-depth) + documented residual Primary control: the per-call approval gate (every non-ReadOnly spawn needs consent). Secondary: check_destructive_argv blocklist refuses headline catastrophic patterns (teardown tools, recursive rm escaping the workspace, wrapper-nested variants) in BOTH run_command and job_start. The blocklist is best-effort by nature — wrapper/interpreter bypasses (sudo apt ..., timeout 5 dd ..., find / -delete, python -c rmtree) are expected and accepted residual risk; a real argv sandbox is a different product and explicitly out of scope.
Sensitive data disclosure (env) gap → fixed here (ENV-1) Children now inherit a scrubbed env: any var whose name contains API_KEY, _SECRET, _TOKEN, or PASSWORD is removed (GITHUB_TOKEN kept for gh/git auth — documented trade-off).
Supply chain (deps) control Cargo Audit + Trivy FS Scan required by rulesets on every PR and push.
Resource exhaustion control + fixed here (JOB-2) Provider 120 s timeout, subprocess 30 s ceiling, step budget 32, loop guard, read caps; job logs are read via bounded windows on poll (never a whole-log load). Since the 2026-09-18 scan triage, a ReadOnly poll no longer rewrites the log file — runaway log disk growth is bounded by the job's lifetime and clearing a runaway log is an operator action.
Session/message tampering control Append-only JSONL, CAS state transitions, seq monotonicity, torn-line recovery with truncation (#68); compaction never drops entries.
Injection via config control (MCP shipped) .cora.yaml/session headers are owner-controlled. MCP servers (#74) add an untrusted surface: server-supplied tool metadata is never trusted for risk tier (everything is Write → approval gate), tool results flow through the same fence/scrub path as native results, and the connection env is scrubbed. Residual: a malicious MCP server controls its own tool descriptions (model-visible) — treat server config as operator trust.
Identity & authz of sub-agents N/A tole v0 is single-agent, single-tenant. MCP servers are external tools, not sub-agents.
Human oversight control Risk-tiered approval gate (every non-ReadOnly call; Destructive never auto-allowed), #68 closed the replay-without-consent hole.

Deliberate limitations (documented, not fixed)

  • GITHUB_TOKEN stays in child env — gh/git push auth needs it; the token can therefore be read by any command the model runs. Mitigating context: the model already holds provider credentials for its own API calls by necessity; both are operator-scoped secrets on a single-operator host.
  • Workspace width is the operator's choice — --workspace / is technically possible and a terrible idea; the flag validates existence, not sanity. Documented in CONTRIBUTING.
  • Symlink swap inside tole-jobs/ — requires a local attacker with write access to the operator's workspace, at which point host compromise is already achieved. Jobs dirs are created 0700 to reduce exposure; no further control planned.
  • Injection residual (above) — fences are a mitigation, not immunity; the model must still treat fenced content as data.

Follow-ups (filed)

  • Per-call Destructive classification heuristics (from RC-1) — needs a design discussion before code.
  • MCP (#74, SHIPPED): stdio client live; trust-model extensions applied (metadata never trusted for risk, scrubbed env, fenced results). Remaining MCP surface: HTTP/SSE transport, server auth, resource subscriptions — each re-opens this document.