diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish.yml b/.github/workflows/publish.yml
index e26a02d..7c8cd57 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/publish.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/publish.yml
@@ -17,9 +17,13 @@ env:
   CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
 
 jobs:
+  # THREAT[TM-RELEASE-001]: Only publishing jobs exchange OIDC for short-lived credentials.
   publish-fetchkit:
     name: Publish fetchkit
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      id-token: write
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
         with:
@@ -52,14 +56,21 @@ jobs:
           fi
           echo "Version verified: $TAG_VERSION"
 
+      - name: Authenticate with crates.io
+        id: auth
+        uses: rust-lang/crates-io-auth-action@c6f97d42243bad5fab37ca0427f495c86d5b1a18 # v1.0.5
+
       - name: Publish fetchkit to crates.io
         run: cargo publish -p fetchkit --locked
         env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ steps.auth.outputs.token }}
 
   publish-fetchkit-cli:
     name: Publish fetchkit-cli
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      id-token: write
     needs: publish-fetchkit
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
@@ -73,7 +84,11 @@ jobs:
       - name: Wait for crates.io index update
         run: sleep 30
 
+      - name: Authenticate with crates.io
+        id: auth
+        uses: rust-lang/crates-io-auth-action@c6f97d42243bad5fab37ca0427f495c86d5b1a18 # v1.0.5
+
       - name: Publish fetchkit-cli to crates.io
         run: cargo publish -p fetchkit-cli --locked
         env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ steps.auth.outputs.token }}
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 1bb071f..7d3d4ec 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ Workflows:
 - `.github/workflows/publish.yml` - Publishes to crates.io on GitHub Release or manual dispatch
 
 Requirements:
-- `CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN` secret must be configured in repo settings
+- Configure crates.io Trusted Publishing for both crates: GitHub owner `everruns`, repository `fetchkit`, workflow `publish.yml`, no environment. Publishing jobs exchange OIDC for short-lived tokens; no repository publisher secret is used.
 
 Note: `fetchkit-python` is not published to crates.io (`publish = false`). Python release automation is not configured in this repo yet.
 
diff --git a/knowledge/log.md b/knowledge/log.md
index 1a240e1..8ddaa1e 100644
--- a/knowledge/log.md
+++ b/knowledge/log.md
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 # Fetchkit Knowledge Update Log
 
+## 2026-10-25
+
+* **Publishing authentication**: Bind both Rust crates to GitHub OIDC in `publish.yml`; publishing jobs use short-lived tokens from a pinned official auth action, with no legacy secret fallback. Document recovery from current main with the original immutable release source tag and actual registry consumer verification.
+
 ## 2026-10-23
 
 * **Release 0.6.0**: Replace the temporary Markkit git override with registry minimum 0.1.1; require Tokio 1.54.1 for RUSTSEC-2026-0386. Publish both Rust crates with `--locked`. The minor bump reflects public `FetchOptions` changes already accumulated since 0.5.0; see the changelog migration notes.
diff --git a/knowledge/operations/release-process.md b/knowledge/operations/release-process.md
index e9ee9e6..768cebd 100644
--- a/knowledge/operations/release-process.md
+++ b/knowledge/operations/release-process.md
@@ -129,9 +129,37 @@ cargo build --workspace --exclude fetchkit-python --release
 
 ### Authentication
 
-- GitHub Actions publishing requires `CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN`
+- Both published crates have crates.io GitHub Trusted Publishers bound to owner
+  `everruns`, repository `fetchkit`, workflow `publish.yml`, without an environment.
+- Only the two publishing jobs have `id-token: write`; both retain `contents: read`.
+  The pinned `rust-lang/crates-io-auth-action` exchanges their OIDC identities for
+  short-lived credentials and revokes them when the jobs finish.
+- `CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN` is populated from the auth step's output, not from a
+  repository secret. Existing legacy secrets are unused; this change does not
+  revoke or replace credentials or require trusted-publishing-only enforcement.
+- Publisher bindings authorize this workflow persistently. Repository maintainers
+  who can change/run it are part of the publishing trust boundary.
 - Manual release preparation may require GitHub CLI auth for PR creation and merge steps
 
+### Retrying an Existing Release
+
+Before retrying, check both crates.io versions and the immutable release tag SHA.
+Never move the tag or increment the version to work around an authentication failure.
+If only the authentication workflow changed after tagging, dispatch the workflow
+from `main` while retaining the original source tag:
+
+```bash
+gh workflow run publish.yml --ref main -f release_tag=v0.6.0
+```
+
+Both publishing jobs check out the supplied release tag. Running the workflow at
+an old tag instead would also select that tag's old authentication implementation.
+After successful upload, verify registry version/checksum/source revision, a fresh
+library consumer, and `cargo install fetchkit-cli --version '=0.6.0' --locked`.
+A GitHub Release or successful package build alone does not prove publication.
+If one crate is already published, do not rerun its upload blindly; resume only the
+remaining failed publishing job after checking the registry state.
+
 ### Operator Responsibilities
 
 - Human reviews and merges the release PR
diff --git a/knowledge/security/threat-model.md b/knowledge/security/threat-model.md
index 5365c3c..b4a01c6 100644
--- a/knowledge/security/threat-model.md
+++ b/knowledge/security/threat-model.md
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Verified in this review:
 | TM-LEAK | Information Leakage | Error messages, metadata exposure, timing |
 | TM-CONV | Content Conversion | HTML parsing abuse, injection via converted content |
 | TM-AUTH | Bot Authentication | Signing key exposure, replay, signature scope |
+| TM-RELEASE | Release Authentication | Publisher credential leakage and workflow identity |
 
 ### Managing Threat IDs
 
@@ -542,6 +543,25 @@ None — all previously open threats have been mitigated.
 | Authority-scoped signatures | TM-AUTH | Signature covers `@authority`; per-host binding |
 | Graceful signing failure | TM-AUTH | Signing errors logged, request proceeds unsigned |
 
+## Release Authentication (TM-RELEASE-001)
+
+**Threat**: A leaked long-lived CI publisher secret permits unauthorized crate
+publication outside the intended repository workflow.
+
+**Mitigation**: Both crates trust only GitHub repository `everruns/fetchkit`, workflow
+`publish.yml`, without an environment. Only its two publish jobs request an OIDC
+identity, exchanged by a pinned official action for a short-lived crates.io token.
+The action revokes that token when the job completes; the old repository secret
+is not read. Publishing retains the release-tag source checkout and `--locked`.
+
+**Trust boundary**: Maintainers able to modify/run that workflow retain publishing
+authority. Existing crate ownership, API-token policy, and credentials are unchanged;
+trusted-publishing-only enforcement is not enabled by this change.
+
+**Verification**: Workflow lint, exact-head CI, registry metadata/source checks, and
+consumer/CLI installation after publication. An auth failure must stop publication;
+there is no fallback to an unrelated credential.
+
 ## References
 
 - [Fetchkit Tool Contract](../foundations/tool-contract.md) — public tool behavior and security controls