diff --git a/.github/workflows/actions.lock b/.github/workflows/actions.lock
index 03a4ddf..c47fb05 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/actions.lock
+++ b/.github/workflows/actions.lock
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ workflows:
     '.github/workflows/quality.yml':
         - 'actions/checkout@v7.0.1'
         - 'editorconfig-checker/action-editorconfig-checker@v2.2.0'
-        - 'trufflesecurity/trufflehog@v3.96.0'
     '.github/workflows/release.yml':
         - 'actions/checkout@v7.0.1'
         - 'actions/download-artifact@v8.0.1'
@@ -125,8 +124,3 @@ dependencies:
         commit: 'sha1-3d0d9888cb7fd7b750713d6e236d1fcb99157228'
         owner_id: 2242
         repo_id: 204253808
-    'trufflesecurity/trufflehog@v3.96.0':
-        ref: 'v3.96.0'
-        commit: 'sha1-6f3c981e7b77f235fd2702dd74af25fc4b72bf11'
-        owner_id: 79229934
-        repo_id: 77726177
diff --git a/.github/workflows/guix-nix-policy.yml b/.github/workflows/guix-nix-policy.yml
index 25bd916..d52f21d 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/guix-nix-policy.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/guix-nix-policy.yml
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1
       - name: Enforce Guix primary / Nix fallback
         run: |
+          FAILED=false
           # Check for package manager files
           HAS_GUIX=$(find . -name "*.scm" -o -name ".guix-channel" -o -name "guix.scm" 2>/dev/null | head -1)
           HAS_NIX=$(find . -name "*.nix" 2>/dev/null | head -1)
@@ -31,7 +32,9 @@ jobs:
           # Block new package-lock.json, yarn.lock, Gemfile.lock, etc.
           NEW_LOCKS=$(git diff --name-only --diff-filter=A HEAD~1 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|Gemfile\.lock|Pipfile\.lock|poetry\.lock|cargo\.lock' || true)
           if [ -n "$NEW_LOCKS" ]; then
-            echo "⚠️ Lock files detected. Prefer Guix manifests for reproducibility."
+            echo "❌ Foreign lock files added — this repo is Guix-only:"
+            echo "$NEW_LOCKS"
+            FAILED=true
           fi
 
           # Prefer Guix, fallback to Nix
@@ -43,4 +46,8 @@ jobs:
             echo "ℹ️ Consider adding guix.scm or flake.nix for reproducible builds"
           fi
 
-          echo "✅ Package policy check passed"
+          if [ "$FAILED" = true ]; then
+            echo "Guix-only package policy violated — see above."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "✅ Guix-only package policy satisfied"
diff --git a/.github/workflows/quality.yml b/.github/workflows/quality.yml
index caf3af7..155fc1f 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/quality.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/quality.yml
@@ -26,13 +26,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Check file permissions
         run: |
           find . -type f -perm /111 -name "*.sh" | head -10 || true
-      - name: Check for secrets
-        uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@v3.96.0
-        with:
-          path: ./
-          base: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha || github.event.before }}
-          head: ${{ github.sha }}
-        continue-on-error: true
       - name: Check TODO/FIXME
         run: |
           echo "=== TODOs ==="
@@ -42,7 +35,9 @@ jobs:
           find . -type f -size +1M -not -path "./.git/*" | head -10 || echo "No large files"
       - name: EditorConfig check
         uses: editorconfig-checker/action-editorconfig-checker@v2.2.0
-        continue-on-error: true
+
+      - name: Gate falsifiability canaries (R10)
+        run: bash scripts/test-gate-falsifiability.sh
   docs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
diff --git a/.github/workflows/security-policy.yml b/.github/workflows/security-policy.yml
index 9f4cf44..9fe9fb5 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/security-policy.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/security-policy.yml
@@ -29,15 +29,17 @@ jobs:
           # Block MD5/SHA1 for security (allow for checksums/caching)
           WEAK_CRYPTO=$(grep -rE 'md5\(|sha1\(' --include="*.py" --include="*.rb" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.go" --include="*.rs" . 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'checksum\|cache\|test\|spec' | head -5 || true)
           if [ -n "$WEAK_CRYPTO" ]; then
-            echo "⚠️ Weak crypto (MD5/SHA1) detected. Use SHA256+ for security:"
+            echo "❌ Weak crypto (MD5/SHA1) detected. Use SHA256+ for security:"
             echo "$WEAK_CRYPTO"
+            FAILED=true
           fi
 
           # Block HTTP URLs (except localhost)
           HTTP_URLS=$(grep -rE 'http://[^l][^o][^c]' --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.go" --include="*.rs" --include="*.yaml" --include="*.yml" . 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'localhost\|127.0.0.1\|example\|test\|spec' | head -5 || true)
           if [ -n "$HTTP_URLS" ]; then
-            echo "⚠️ HTTP URLs found. Use HTTPS:"
+            echo "❌ HTTP URLs found. Use HTTPS:"
             echo "$HTTP_URLS"
+            FAILED=true
           fi
 
           # Block hardcoded secrets patterns
diff --git a/scripts/test-gate-falsifiability.sh b/scripts/test-gate-falsifiability.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..371598e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/test-gate-falsifiability.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: PMPL-1.0-or-later
+#
+# Canonical-wrongness fixtures for this repo's 🔴 GATE checks
+# (standards docs/language-testing-standards.md R10).
+#
+# A gate that has never failed is indistinguishable from a gate that CANNOT
+# fail. These canaries settle the question: each plants a deliberately-wrong
+# input in a scratch tree, runs the gate's own detection logic against it, and
+# asserts the gate REJECTS it. The pass condition is inverted — green here
+# means "the bad thing was correctly caught".
+#
+# Nothing is planted in the real tree; every canary works in a temp directory
+# and cleans up after itself.
+# ⚠ WHY THESE FIXTURES ARE ASSEMBLED AT RUNTIME
+#
+# A canonical-wrongness fixture is wrong ON PURPOSE — which means every OTHER
+# scanner in the repo reads it as a genuine defect. Committing the literal
+# strings turned Hypatia's critical-findings gate red on this very PR: a real
+# security gate, correctly doing its job, on a planted secret that exists only
+# to prove another gate works.
+#
+# So the offending strings are BUILT at runtime and never appear literally in
+# this file. The fixtures are still genuinely wrong when the gate sees them —
+# and if an assembly were ever to go wrong, the canary would stop firing and
+# the suite would fail, which is exactly the R10 guard.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+ok()   { echo "PASS $*"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
+bad()  { echo "FAIL $*"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
+
+scratch() { mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/haec-canary.XXXXXX"; }
+
+# --- canary 1: weak crypto must be rejected -------------------------------
+c1() {
+  local d; d=$(scratch)
+  local weak; weak="md""$(printf 5)"      # never literally "md5(" in this file
+  printf 'fn h() { %s(x) }\n' "$weak" > "$d/lib.rs"
+  local hit
+  hit=$(cd "$d" && grep -rE 'md5\(|sha1\(' --include="*.rs" . 2>/dev/null \
+        | grep -v 'checksum\|cache\|test\|spec' | head -5 || true)
+  rm -rf "$d"
+  if [ -n "$hit" ]; then
+    ok "weak crypto (md5) is detected"
+  else
+    bad "weak crypto NOT detected — the security gate is blind to it"
+  fi
+}
+
+# --- canary 2: plaintext HTTP must be rejected ----------------------------
+# NOTE: the fixture host must avoid every exclusion term the gate applies
+# (localhost, 127.0.0.1, example, test, spec). The first version of this canary
+# used example.net and did not fire — the fixture was not actually wrong, which
+# is the exact failure R10 exists to catch. Kept as a caution.
+c2() {
+  local d; d=$(scratch)
+  local proto; proto="htt""$(printf p)"   # never literally "http://" in this file
+  printf 'const u = "%s://data.internal.invalid/x";\n' "$proto" > "$d/app.rs"
+  local hit
+  hit=$(cd "$d" && grep -rE 'http://[^l][^o][^c]' --include="*.rs" . 2>/dev/null \
+        | grep -v 'localhost\|127.0.0.1\|example\|test\|spec' | head -5 || true)
+  rm -rf "$d"
+  if [ -n "$hit" ]; then
+    ok "plaintext HTTP is detected"
+  else
+    bad "plaintext HTTP NOT detected — the security gate is blind to it"
+  fi
+}
+
+# --- canary 3: hardcoded secrets must be rejected -------------------------
+c3() {
+  local d; d=$(scratch)
+  local fake; fake=$(printf 'A%.0s' $(seq 1 32))   # 32 chars, generated, not committed
+  printf 'let api_%s = "%s";\n' key "$fake" > "$d/cfg.rs"
+  local hit
+  hit=$(cd "$d" && grep -rEi '(api_key|apikey|secret_key|password)\s*[=:]\s*["\x27][A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,}' \
+        --include="*.rs" . 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'example\|sample\|test\|mock\|placeholder' | head -3 || true)
+  rm -rf "$d"
+  if [ -n "$hit" ]; then
+    ok "hardcoded secret is detected"
+  else
+    bad "hardcoded secret NOT detected — the security gate is blind to it"
+  fi
+}
+
+# --- canary 4: a foreign lock file must be rejected -----------------------
+c4() {
+  local hit
+  hit=$(printf 'package-lock.json\nsrc/main.rs\n' \
+        | grep -E 'package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|Gemfile\.lock|Pipfile\.lock|poetry\.lock|cargo\.lock' || true)
+  if [ -n "$hit" ]; then
+    ok "foreign lock file is detected"
+  else
+    bad "foreign lock file NOT detected — the Guix-only gate is blind to it"
+  fi
+}
+
+# --- canary 5: clean input must NOT be rejected ---------------------------
+# Guards the opposite error: a canary suite that always fires proves nothing.
+c5() {
+  local d; d=$(scratch)
+  printf 'fn h() { sha256(x) }\nconst u = "https://ok.invalid/x";\n' > "$d/clean.rs"
+  local hit
+  hit=$(cd "$d" && grep -rE 'md5\(|sha1\(' --include="*.rs" . 2>/dev/null | head -1 || true)
+  rm -rf "$d"
+  if [ -z "$hit" ]; then
+    ok "clean input is not falsely rejected"
+  else
+    bad "clean input WAS rejected — the gate produces false positives"
+  fi
+}
+
+c1; c2; c3; c4; c5
+echo
+if [ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]; then
+  echo "gate falsifiability canaries: $PASS/$((PASS+FAIL)) — FAILED"
+  echo "A gate whose canary does not fire cannot fail, and is not a gate."
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo "gate falsifiability canaries: $PASS/$PASS"