diff --git a/quest/m0/ci/README.md b/quest/m0/ci/README.md index 700b5b7d160..b7fd13f40ca 100644 --- a/quest/m0/ci/README.md +++ b/quest/m0/ci/README.md @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ The historical samples locate candidates; they are not controlled benchmarks. ## Required +- [Read-only pull-request CI](/quest/m0/ci/read-only-secrets.md) - write secrets and publisher identities reach only protected branches and tags, never a pushed branch - [Land main through quest land](/quest/m0/ci/land.md) - one self-hosted runner tests every queued PR as a squash chain and fast-forwards `main` to the longest passing prefix - [Measure the parallel frontend](/quest/m0/ci/nightly-levers.md) - a pinned nightly's parallel frontend, adopted only if the numbers beat its risks; Cranelift is ruled out - [Verify the R2 Rust cache](/quest/m0/ci/mbx-r2-verify.md) - measure the hosted Nightly jobs' hits, restore time, and expiry once the bump lands diff --git a/quest/m0/ci/read-only-secrets.md b/quest/m0/ci/read-only-secrets.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dfa4bc8d78e --- /dev/null +++ b/quest/m0/ci/read-only-secrets.md @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +# [S] Keep pull-request CI read-only + +## Goal + +A workflow on any branch other than a protected one gets only read-only +credentials: a read-only `GITHUB_TOKEN`, no write-capable repository or +organization secrets, and no OIDC identity that a publisher trusts. Write +credentials live only in environments whose deployment policy allows +protected branches or tags. Agents and the kix.quest App push branches to +this repository itself, where GitHub hands a branch's workflows the +repository's secrets. So this is what keeps code nobody has reviewed away +from publishing and infrastructure credentials. + +## Plan + +Decided 2026-10-28 (maintainer, in kixelated/quest's +[trust audit](https://github.com/kixelated/quest/pull/264)): enrolled +repositories keep pull-request CI read-only rather than kix shielding CI +behind forks. moq-dev/moq is a kix pilot repository, so it should pass +kix's [read-only CI check](https://github.com/kixelated/quest/blob/main/quest/m0/kix/ci-read-only.md) +before contributors are invited. + +Found on 2026-10-28 from the settings API (the default workflow token is +already `read`): + +- **Repository-level secrets** reach every branch's workflows: + `CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN`, `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN`, `DOCKER_USERNAME`, + `DOCKER_PASSWORD`, `MAVEN_CENTRAL_USERNAME`, `MAVEN_CENTRAL_PASSWORD`, + `SIGNING_KEY`, `SIGNING_PASSWORD`, `WINGET_TOKEN`, `R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, + `R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `R2_ACCOUNT_ID`, `GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY`, + `CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN`, `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, `META_MODEL_API_KEY`, + `APP_ID`, `APP_PRIVATE_KEY`, `MBX_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID` and + `MBX_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`. Move each write-capable one into an environment + limited to the branches or tags whose workflows use it (`main`, `release`, + or release tags). Keep at repository level only those that can't write. +- **Organization secrets** visible here: `APP_CLIENT_ID`, `APP_ID`, + `APP_PRIVATE_KEY` and `DISCORD_WEBHOOK`. The App key can write, so remove + this repository's access to the organization secret and supply the key only + through a protected environment. Gating the jobs that mint its token is not + enough: any branch can add a workflow that reads a visible secret. +- **`pub.dev` and `pypi`** have no secrets, presumably OIDC trusted + publishing, and no deployment branch policy. So a branch's workflow can + claim either environment and get an identity the registry may trust. Limit + both to the release branch or tags. +- **`MBX_R2_*` on pull requests**: confirm that the repository-level pair is a + read-only credential, not just mbx's read-only mode, since + [Verify the R2 Rust cache](/quest/m0/ci/mbx-r2-verify.md) reports + "effective read-only" on release pull requests. Writes belong to the + `cache-write` pair, which is already limited to protected refs. +- **`can_approve_pull_request_reviews` is on**, so a workflow's token can + approve a pull request. Turn it off unless a workflow needs it. +- Moving a secret needs its value, so the maintainer does that part. Agents + can change workflows, environment policies and workflow permissions, but + only with the maintainer's agreement. +- Verify by pushing a branch with a throwaway workflow that prints which + secrets are non-empty (never their values), then delete the branch. + +## Related + +- [Land main through quest land](/quest/m0/ci/land.md) - its gate credential also belongs in a protected environment