From b44105818c49a637cd0ea2a245eb781aed06b7d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Curley Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 14:50:59 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] quest: record 2026-11-04 /quest-unblock decisions and clear resolved waits Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- quest/m0/ci/five-minutes.md | 6 +- quest/m0/ci/publish-release-only.md | 7 +++ quest/m0/ffi-shutdown-backport.md | 7 +++ quest/m1/bench-ci.md | 14 ++++- quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md | 12 ++-- quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md | 6 +- quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md | 72 +++++++--------------- quest/m1/crates-trusted-publisher.md | 11 ++-- quest/m1/lite07-finalize.md | 6 +- quest/m2/usage-settings-once.md | 12 ++-- quest/m2/usage-unknown-env.md | 14 ++--- 12 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) create mode 100644 quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md diff --git a/quest/m0/ci/five-minutes.md b/quest/m0/ci/five-minutes.md index abefcb69674..721d52bedb1 100644 --- a/quest/m0/ci/five-minutes.md +++ b/quest/m0/ci/five-minutes.md @@ -134,7 +134,9 @@ What remains: - Admission still makes the measured net route exceed 5 minutes despite its command taking 227 s. The 2026-10-29 admission decision above remains with moq-dev/quest. -- Repeat the default FFI route after the Gradle fix lands, without the override. +- Repeat the default FFI route without the override; the Gradle fix + ([moq-dev/moq#7632](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7632)) merged + 2026-11-04. - Keep the dependency-build and cache work with [hakari](/quest/m0/ci/hakari.md). Decided 2026-10-30 (user): defer parallel Rust lint until that quest lands, then measure it. The slow-tests reduction @@ -148,8 +150,6 @@ What remains: - moq-dev/quest: admission must keep the whole gate inside the worker's cache window; repeat the net measurement after its admission work lands. -- moq-dev/moq: [moq-dev/moq#7632](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7632) - must land before repeating the default FFI measurement without `GRADLE_CMD`. ## Related diff --git a/quest/m0/ci/publish-release-only.md b/quest/m0/ci/publish-release-only.md index 18ae4405fae..e7143de7624 100644 --- a/quest/m0/ci/publish-release-only.md +++ b/quest/m0/ci/publish-release-only.md @@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ What remains is the maintainer's, in order: 2. Then drop `main` from `publish`'s deployment policy, and remove `DISCORD_WEBHOOK` and `CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN` from `publish`. +Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): ✅ cut the combined patch +release on `release` soon, once [moq-dev/moq#7596](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7596)'s +remaining ports and [moq-dev/moq#7680](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7680) +are ready, and merge `main` into `release` for the next minor line +separately, later. Not chosen: one combined cut that merges `main` first, or +neither this week. + Public API: none. Wire: none. ## Related diff --git a/quest/m0/ffi-shutdown-backport.md b/quest/m0/ffi-shutdown-backport.md index 997790a31f0..100d5c10820 100644 --- a/quest/m0/ffi-shutdown-backport.md +++ b/quest/m0/ffi-shutdown-backport.md @@ -52,6 +52,13 @@ publishes 0.1.1 and exercises the unproven path in [A Dart tag publishes unattended](/quest/m2/release/dart-publish.md). Decided 2026-10-30 (maintainer): push it during the combined cut, not before. +Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): ✅ cut the combined patch +release on `release` soon, once [moq-dev/moq#7596](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7596)'s +remaining ports and [moq-dev/moq#7680](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7680) +are ready, and merge `main` into `release` for the next minor line +separately, later. Not chosen: one combined cut that merges `main` first, or +neither this week. + Public API: none. Wire: none. ## Related diff --git a/quest/m1/bench-ci.md b/quest/m1/bench-ci.md index 9ba42a82795..31f08b5e366 100644 --- a/quest/m1/bench-ci.md +++ b/quest/m1/bench-ci.md @@ -9,11 +9,21 @@ runs on the hosted ARM runners, and a deliberately slowed bench fails the job. ## Waiting -- Maintainer: dispatch the Nightly runs on `main` below (A/A and slowed - bench); agents never dispatch Nightly. Check each run's `paired.json`. +- Maintainer: dispatch the slowed-bench Nightly run below. Agents never + dispatch Nightly; the 2026-11-04 authorization covered the two A/A runs only. +- moq-dev/moq: read the two A/A runs' `paired.json` (the `bench-rust*` + artifacts): [41921320690](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/actions/runs/41921320690) + and the second A/A run dispatched after it finished (`gh run list --repo + moq-dev/moq --workflow nightly.yml --event workflow_dispatch`). ## Plan +Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): ✅ authorize one-time agent +dispatch of the two A/A Nightly runs on `main`, with `bench-base` set to each +run's own commit. Not chosen: the maintainer dispatching them, or skipping. +Nightly's concurrency group cancels an in-progress run, so the second was +dispatched after the first finished. + - A/A: dispatch Nightly on `main` with `bench-base` set to the run's own commit, at least twice. Read each paired group's `paired.json` (the `bench-rust*` artifacts, or `bench/paired.json` on the site): the spread of diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md index a8c03177191..1081ef7d1af 100644 --- a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md @@ -41,7 +41,11 @@ Decided with the maintainer, 2026-10-13: - An origin declares its own routing identity, fresh per process or tab restart and shared across its live sessions. It is unverified. Decided 2026-11-02 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): no key proof is planned; if a use case needs a provable identity, moq-lite-07's - route identity becomes a public key, independent of P2P. Receiver-stamped + route identity becomes a public key, independent of P2P. Decided 2026-11-04 + (maintainer, /quest-unblock): scoped forgery is that use case. A peer proves + a route key once per announce stream, and its own identity derives from it + ([Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md)). + Receiver-stamped per-session identities were dropped 2026-10-26 (maintainer): in a mesh, two relays stamping their sessions from one origin forward its routes as two identities a third relay cannot recognize as one. Keep administrative @@ -51,9 +55,9 @@ Decided with the maintainer, 2026-10-13: qualified when its publish grant is scoped, and stays bare when it is unscoped, so a forger only damages routes inside its own scope. (Decided 2026-10-14; own identities included 2026-10-26, since they are no longer - proven.) How a scoped peer's identities are keyed waits on the maintainer in - [Route session integration](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md): the - issuer-qualified subject key was dropped 2026-11-02 (maintainer). + proven.) The issuer-qualified subject key was dropped 2026-11-02 + (maintainer); since 2026-11-04 a scoped peer's identities are keyed by the + route key it proves ([Route session integration](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md)). - Matching explicit epochs authorize resume. Epochless changes retain Restart and fresh resolution; neither node identity nor a healthy alternate grants permission to splice content. diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md index 886301305be..6eeee8b0934 100644 --- a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md @@ -87,7 +87,10 @@ The wire sketch is in [wire](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/wire.md); the bull shared across its live sessions, decided 2026-10-13. It is unverified. Decided 2026-11-02 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): peer grants are dropped and no key proof is planned; a provable identity, if a use case needs one, makes this route - identity a public key, independent of P2P. + identity a public key, independent of P2P. Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, + /quest-unblock): scoped forgery is that use case; a peer proves a route key + once per announce stream and its own identity derives from that key + ([Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md)). Decided 2026-10-26 (maintainer): receivers do not stamp a fresh identity per session. In a mesh, two relays stamping their sessions from one origin forward its routes as two identities a third relay cannot recognize as @@ -496,6 +499,7 @@ benchmarks. - [lite-07 route wire](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/wire.md) - lite-07 and the draft carry ROUTE, ANNOUNCE_FLOOR, ROUTE_REQUEST, and path-less ANNOUNCE - [Route session integration](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md) - one router per origin node drives the origin and every lite-07 announce stream +- [Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md) - a peer proves a route key once per announce stream, and its forwarded identities are qualified by it - [Announcement availability](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/availability.md) - announcements report availability, and a let-go is offline rather than END, in Rust and JS - [js/net route layer](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/js.md) - `js/net` encodes, decodes, and resolves the route layer - [Route layer acceptance](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/acceptance.md) - forwarding fixtures ported and the model deleted, incident fixtures, end-to-end checks, and benchmarks diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9c1dfccf48e --- /dev/null +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# [M] Scoped peers prove a route key + +## Goal + +A lite-07 peer proves a route key once per announce stream. The requester +sends a nonce in ANNOUNCE_REQUEST, and the publisher's ANNOUNCE_OK carries its +public key and a signature over that nonce, bound to the session. A relay +files a proven peer's own routing identity, a u64 derived from its key, bare. +Every identity that peer forwards goes under a key qualified by the proven +key, so a scoped peer that forges or inflates another origin's identity only +affects claims inside its own grant. A peer that proves nothing gets a +per-session key. This lands in lite-07 before the cut. + +## Plan + +Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock), from the keying question in +[Route session integration](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md). +This reverses the 2026-10-25 and 2026-11-02 decisions that no identity proof +gates the lite-07 cut. Options shown for each: + +- Proof timing: ✅ before the lite-07 cut. Not chosen: an issuer-named route + label in the grant now with the proof after the cut, or a per-session key. +- Where a relay's key comes from: ✅ a key file. An operator gives all its + relays the same file, so two separate relays (the l1/l2 two-uplink fixture, + `scoped_delivery_through_two_uplinks_reaches_one_key`) fail over as one key. + A relay without a file generates one. The own identity stays fresh per + restart as H(key, per-process salt), as `restart_reusing_identity_is_refused` + requires. Not chosen: a fresh key per process. +- Browsers: ✅ prove with WebTransport's `exportKeyingMaterial(label, context, + outputLength)` where the browser exposes it, detected at session setup (no + runtime fallback); otherwise unproven with a per-session key. As of + 2026-11-04 only Firefox ships it (spec-matching from Firefox 160); Chrome has + an Intent to Prototype and Safari nothing. Tabs do not forward routes, so an + unproven tab loses little. Not chosen: browsers never proven, or signing the + nonce with the dialed server name and role. +- Identity on the wire: ✅ ROUTE keeps its u64 node ID, the first 64 bits of + H(key, salt), so the router's `Id` type and ROUTE stay as they are. Not + chosen: the full 32-byte key in each ROUTE. + +Binding: a bare nonce can be relayed (a peer passes another relay's signed OK +off as its own), so the signature covers the session too. Rust uses the TLS +exporter (`rs/moq-quic` already exposes one); browsers use +`exportKeyingMaterial`. Settle the exact signed transcript (nonce, exporter +output, role, a domain label) and record it in the draft. + +Cost, estimated 2026-11-04: about 16 bytes of nonce in ANNOUNCE_REQUEST and +about 90 bytes of key and signature in ANNOUNCE_OK, no extra round trip, and +one Ed25519 sign and verify per announce stream rather than per route update. + +Reuse: `rs/moq-crypto`'s `sign::PublicKey` and `SecretKey::load_or_generate`, +backed by `rind` Ed25519, and `js/crypto`'s WebCrypto Ed25519 signing. +moq-crypto's `sign` feature depends on moq-net, so either moq-net calls `rind` +directly or the key type moves to a lower crate. Decide which in the PR. + +Public API: moq-net gains the proof on announce streams; moq-relay and +moq-tokio gain a route key file option. Wire: ANNOUNCE_REQUEST and ANNOUNCE_OK +change in lite-07 and its draft. + +## Related + +- [Route session integration](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md) - files identities under the key this proves +- [lite-07 route wire](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/wire.md) - the announce messages this extends +- [P2P](/quest/m2/p2p/README.md) - its roster id is already planned as a public key diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md index 3855c8f8e22..66b61648f7a 100644 --- a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md @@ -96,57 +96,27 @@ epoch. The route layer's own origin-node identity, with its seqno and revision, stays separate ("keep administrative identity and broadcast epoch separate", in the epic). -## Waiting - -- Maintainer: how a scoped peer's routing identities are keyed. The router - takes the key from the caller (`Scope::qualify`), so nothing else waits on - it. Recommendation: (1), a route label carried in the grant. - - What the key is for. Every origin declares a routing identity: an opaque - number nobody verifies. A peer admitted under a scoped grant (say it may - publish only `acme/**`) could declare a victim's identity. One route - serves every claim of an identity, so the forgery would capture the - victim's claims outside `acme/`, and its seqno would outlive it - (`forged_identity_hijacks_claims_outside_the_forgers_scope`). So a relay - files every identity a scoped peer sends under a qualified key, derived - from something about that peer and the identity, and counts claims under - the key only inside the grant. The question is what that something is. - It must stay the same across token refresh, be shared by one operator's - sessions so losing one uplink fails over instead of restarting readers - (`scoped_delivery_through_two_uplinks_reaches_one_key`), differ between - operators, and work for sessions admitted with no token (public rules, - mTLS certificates, or a third-party auth server). - - Why not the credential subject: `hash(subject, id)` was decided - 2026-10-15 and dropped by the maintainer 2026-11-02, together with - refusing scoped tokens that carry no subject; the implementation is in - [moq-dev/moq@453e1ec](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/commit/453e1ece7c5435ee19541cfc2e9bbe0b6fbc430e). - It existed only for tokens, so token-less admission had no key. Rejected - earlier: the grant's pattern union, which refresh and withdrawal change - and two uplinks need not share, and the connection root, which two scoped - operators under one root would share. - - Example: operator Acme runs a local relay L with uplinks to CDN relays C1 - and C2. Each admits L with a token scoped to `acme/**`, refreshed hourly. - - 1. A route label carried in the grant. Whoever issues it names it: a - token claim such as `route: "acme"`, a public rule's entry, or an mTLS - mapping. The key hashes the label with the identity in its own domain. - Both of Acme's tokens say `acme`, so C1 and C2 file L's origins under - one key, refresh keeps it, and losing C1 fails over through C2. - Another operator's label differs. A grant with no label gets a - per-session key, as in (2). Costs a grant field in `moq-auth`, - `js/auth`, and the docs, and issuers must not hand two operators one - label. - 2. A per-session key, with nothing to configure. L's sessions to C1 and - C2 get two keys, so losing C1 restarts the readers it served onto C2's - key instead of failing over, and so does a refresh that reconnects. - Simplest; gives up the two-uplink fixture. - 3. A key the relay operator configures per scoped remote, such as C1 and - C2 both mapping admissions under `acme/**` to `acme`. No grant change, - but every CDN relay's configuration must agree, and it names patterns - rather than who connected, so two operators admitted under one pattern - share a key. +Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): a scoped peer's identities +are keyed by a route key the peer proves, specified in +[Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md). +A proven peer's own identity is derived from its key and stays bare; every +identity it forwards is qualified under its proven key. A peer that proves no +key gets a per-session key. `Scope::qualify` still takes the key from the +caller, so this quest does not wait on the proof. Options shown: + +- ✅ A route key the peer proves once per announce stream, before the lite-07 cut +- A route label carried in the grant (the earlier recommendation), with the + proven key added after the cut +- A per-session key now +- A key the relay operator configures per scoped remote + +Research behind it: proving a neighbor's own key cannot remove qualification, +since a public key is public and a scoped peer could still forward a victim's +key with an inflated seqno; origin-signed routes still leave cost lies and +blackholing, at the price of per-update signatures and expiry refreshes. Keyed +by a proven key, every remaining attack stays inside the forger's grant, with +no grant field, no issuer-coordinated labels, and support for token-less +admission. ## Required diff --git a/quest/m1/crates-trusted-publisher.md b/quest/m1/crates-trusted-publisher.md index 34141873a4b..0ae39050f41 100644 --- a/quest/m1/crates-trusted-publisher.md +++ b/quest/m1/crates-trusted-publisher.md @@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ Delete this quest once every crate has one. ## Waiting -- Maintainer: add the trusted publisher in each crate's crates.io settings, - after a first publish by token for the crates not yet on crates.io (listed - under Plan). Settings pages need a crates.io login, so check with a - `release-rs.yml` run that publishes through OIDC. +- Maintainer: after the next release publishes kio-macros, moq-c, + moq-congestion, moq-crypto, moq-ice, moq-quic, and moq-rtsp by token, add + their trusted publishers the same way. Settings pages need a crates.io + login, so check with a `release-rs.yml` run that publishes through OIDC. ## Plan @@ -39,3 +39,6 @@ moq-quic, moq-rtsp. moq-crypto became publishable in [moq-dev/moq#7733](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7733). `CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN` is revoked only after all of them have one. Settings pages need a crates.io login, so the check is a `release-rs.yml` run publishing through OIDC. + +Done 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): all 31 published crates have +the trusted publisher. Only the 7 unpublished crates remain. diff --git a/quest/m1/lite07-finalize.md b/quest/m1/lite07-finalize.md index d1c7c6b9eda..a57e3f2dfbe 100644 --- a/quest/m1/lite07-finalize.md +++ b/quest/m1/lite07-finalize.md @@ -36,7 +36,11 @@ grants and metadata-only subscriptions do not gate it: neither is clustering stability. Both are additive and, per the freeze policy, target whichever lite wip is current when they land. Decided 2026-10-25: no routing identity proof gates the cut, and lite-07 routing identities stay declared and unverified -(2026-11-02: peer grants are dropped and no key proof is planned). Decided 2026-10-26 +(2026-11-02: peer grants are dropped and no key proof is planned). Reversed +2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): a peer proves a route key once per +announce stream before the cut, through +[Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md) in +[Routes and announces](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md). Decided 2026-10-26 (maintainer): receivers do not stamp per-session identities either, since that splits one origin into several identities across a relay mesh. diff --git a/quest/m2/usage-settings-once.md b/quest/m2/usage-settings-once.md index e9697761fe4..853fffe7333 100644 --- a/quest/m2/usage-settings-once.md +++ b/quest/m2/usage-settings-once.md @@ -9,13 +9,6 @@ declaring every merged flag a second time) are deleted after a bump. Source presence, precedence, deprecated-name rejection, and provenance keep working. CLI behavior and wire are unchanged. -## Waiting - -- jdx/usage: a usage-rs release ships - [jdx/usage#1608](https://github.com/jdx/usage/issues/1608). Check the issue - and usage-rs releases. If upstream declines, delete this quest and keep the - drift test. - ## Plan Filed 2026-11-02 (maintainer-approved, /quest-unblock), building on the @@ -27,6 +20,11 @@ Today `usage::Cli` and `usage::Config` reject each other's attributes, and Propose inferring those from the field so one declaration serves both. If upstream declines, delete this quest and keep the drift test. +Shipped 2026-11-03 (checked 2026-11-04, /quest-unblock): usage-lib +[7.2.0](https://github.com/jdx/usage/releases/tag/v7.2.0) lets derive flags +declare their own settings ([jdx/usage#1610](https://github.com/jdx/usage/pull/1610), +closing jdx/usage#1608). + ## Related - [Upstream unknown-env option in usage-rs](/quest/m2/usage-unknown-env.md) - another jdx/usage ask; file both together if both are approved diff --git a/quest/m2/usage-unknown-env.md b/quest/m2/usage-unknown-env.md index 1a11a62bee1..d2194b7db8f 100644 --- a/quest/m2/usage-unknown-env.md +++ b/quest/m2/usage-unknown-env.md @@ -8,15 +8,15 @@ refuses unknown flags. Once a release ships it, bump usage-rs and replace `moq_tokio::cli::check_env` with the option. The option needs a way to accept names read outside the spec, such as `moq_video::ENV`. -## Waiting - -- jdx/usage: a usage-rs release ships - [jdx/usage#1607](https://github.com/jdx/usage/issues/1607). Check the issue - and usage-rs releases. If upstream declines, delete this quest and keep the - `check_env` helper. - ## Plan Filed 2026-11-02 (maintainer-approved, /quest-unblock). No existing issue or release covered it; the closest, clap's declined `env_prefix`, builds names from a prefix, which this does not. + +Shipped 2026-11-03 (checked 2026-11-04, /quest-unblock): usage-lib +[7.2.0](https://github.com/jdx/usage/releases/tag/v7.2.0) adds the opt-in +`unknown_env` node ([jdx/usage#1609](https://github.com/jdx/usage/pull/1609), +closing jdx/usage#1607), with derive syntax +`#[usage(unknown_env(prefix = "MOQ_", allow(...)))]` for names read outside +the spec. From db6fc2a0a41aa36d1e92f789cfeccc07edb5c313 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Curley Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 15:05:27 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] quest: qualify a proven peer's own identity; keep the second A/A dispatch pending Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- quest/m1/bench-ci.md | 15 +++++++++------ quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md | 3 ++- quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md | 3 ++- quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/quest/m1/bench-ci.md b/quest/m1/bench-ci.md index 31f08b5e366..d2d41824766 100644 --- a/quest/m1/bench-ci.md +++ b/quest/m1/bench-ci.md @@ -11,18 +11,21 @@ runs on the hosted ARM runners, and a deliberately slowed bench fails the job. - Maintainer: dispatch the slowed-bench Nightly run below. Agents never dispatch Nightly; the 2026-11-04 authorization covered the two A/A runs only. -- moq-dev/moq: read the two A/A runs' `paired.json` (the `bench-rust*` - artifacts): [41921320690](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/actions/runs/41921320690) - and the second A/A run dispatched after it finished (`gh run list --repo - moq-dev/moq --workflow nightly.yml --event workflow_dispatch`). +- moq-dev/moq: once A/A run + [41921320690](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/actions/runs/41921320690) + finishes, dispatch the second A/A run under the same authorization + (`gh workflow run nightly.yml --ref main -f bench-base=`; as of + 2026-11-04 it is not dispatched yet), then read both runs' `paired.json` (the + `bench-rust*` artifacts). Find the second with `gh run list --repo + moq-dev/moq --workflow nightly.yml --event workflow_dispatch`. ## Plan Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): ✅ authorize one-time agent dispatch of the two A/A Nightly runs on `main`, with `bench-base` set to each run's own commit. Not chosen: the maintainer dispatching them, or skipping. -Nightly's concurrency group cancels an in-progress run, so the second was -dispatched after the first finished. +Nightly's concurrency group cancels an in-progress run, so the second is +dispatched only after the first finishes. - A/A: dispatch Nightly on `main` with `bench-base` set to the run's own commit, at least twice. Read each paired group's `paired.json` (the diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md index 1081ef7d1af..7561462e69b 100644 --- a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/README.md @@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ Decided with the maintainer, 2026-10-13: key proof is planned; if a use case needs a provable identity, moq-lite-07's route identity becomes a public key, independent of P2P. Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): scoped forgery is that use case. A peer proves - a route key once per announce stream, and its own identity derives from it + a route key once per announce stream, its own identity derives from it, and + every identity it sends while scoped is qualified under it ([Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md)). Receiver-stamped per-session identities were dropped 2026-10-26 (maintainer): in a mesh, diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md index 6eeee8b0934..7793203f1fe 100644 --- a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md @@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ The wire sketch is in [wire](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/wire.md); the bull planned; a provable identity, if a use case needs one, makes this route identity a public key, independent of P2P. Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): scoped forgery is that use case; a peer proves a route key - once per announce stream and its own identity derives from that key + once per announce stream, its own identity derives from that key, and every + identity it sends while scoped is qualified under it ([Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md)). Decided 2026-10-26 (maintainer): receivers do not stamp a fresh identity per session. In a mesh, two relays stamping their sessions from one origin diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md index 9c1dfccf48e..3d39fee6050 100644 --- a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md @@ -5,11 +5,15 @@ A lite-07 peer proves a route key once per announce stream. The requester sends a nonce in ANNOUNCE_REQUEST, and the publisher's ANNOUNCE_OK carries its public key and a signature over that nonce, bound to the session. A relay -files a proven peer's own routing identity, a u64 derived from its key, bare. -Every identity that peer forwards goes under a key qualified by the proven -key, so a scoped peer that forges or inflates another origin's identity only -affects claims inside its own grant. A peer that proves nothing gets a -per-session key. This lands in lite-07 before the cut. +files every identity a scoped, proven peer sends, its own included (the +2026-10-26 rule in [Routes and announces](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/README.md)), +under H(domain, proven key, id), so a scoped peer that forges or inflates +another origin's identity only affects claims inside its own grant. Relays +that share one key file present an origin under the same qualified key +whichever of them carries it, so a reader of relay l1's own broadcast fails +over through sibling l2 when l1's direct uplink is lost. Unscoped peers stay +bare, and a scoped peer that proves nothing gets a per-session key. This lands +in lite-07 before the cut. ## Plan @@ -37,6 +41,13 @@ gates the lite-07 cut. Options shown for each: H(key, salt), so the router's `Id` type and ROUTE stay as they are. Not chosen: the full 32-byte key in each ROUTE. +Own identity, settled in review of +[moq-dev/moq#7919](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7919): it is qualified +like any other, not filed bare. Filed bare, l1's own origin would reach c1 as +its bare id but c2 (through l2) as a qualified key, so the two would not fail +over to each other. Extend the two-uplink fixture so l1 serves its own +broadcast and loses its direct uplink, and the reader fails over through l2. + Binding: a bare nonce can be relayed (a peer passes another relay's signed OK off as its own), so the signature covers the session too. Rust uses the TLS exporter (`rs/moq-quic` already exposes one); browsers use diff --git a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md index 66b61648f7a..c006ea8c030 100644 --- a/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md +++ b/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/session.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ separate", in the epic). Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer, /quest-unblock): a scoped peer's identities are keyed by a route key the peer proves, specified in [Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m1/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md). -A proven peer's own identity is derived from its key and stays bare; every -identity it forwards is qualified under its proven key. A peer that proves no +Every identity a scoped, proven peer sends, its own included, is qualified +under its proven key, so relays sharing a key file fail over as one. A peer that proves no key gets a per-session key. `Scope::qualify` still takes the key from the caller, so this quest does not wait on the proof. Options shown: