diff --git a/quest/m2/cluster-routing/federation.md b/quest/m2/cluster-routing/federation.md index 118ea5ebf64..8172c1b5cad 100644 --- a/quest/m2/cluster-routing/federation.md +++ b/quest/m2/cluster-routing/federation.md @@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ affects its own scope (decided 2026-10-14; see [Routes and announces](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/README.md)). Decided 2026-11-04 (maintainer): those identities are keyed by the route key the peer proves, read from a key file the local relay's uplinks share ([Route session -integration](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/session.md), [Scoped peers prove -a route key](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md)). Without a key, a +integration](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/session.md)). Without a key, a scoped forger declaring a victim's id captures claims outside its scope (`forged_identity_hijacks_claims_outside_the_forgers_scope`). The scope itself (`hash(scope, id)`) was rejected 2026-10-15, and the grant's issuer-qualified @@ -69,5 +68,4 @@ Rust/JS parity. Run `just check`, `just test interop --all`, and `just drafts ch ## Related - [Route health](/quest/m5/route-health/README.md) - epoch-only detection of stalled delivery on still-open links -- [Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md) - the key this connection's identities are qualified under - [Routing guide](/quest/m1/routing-guide.md) - runnable operator setup after integration diff --git a/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/README.md b/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/README.md index a73b38b918b..f11c48a24d6 100644 --- a/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/README.md +++ b/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/README.md @@ -161,8 +161,7 @@ the bullets below are the contract it carries. keyed by the route key the peer proves, so relays configured with the same key file fail over as one; a scoped peer that proves no key, such as one on qmux, gets a per-session key - ([session integration](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/session.md), - [Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md)). + ([session integration](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/session.md)). The router takes the key from the caller (`Scope::qualify`). - Decided 2026-10-14: qualified keys carry a marker every relay recognizes, and a scoped connection forwarding an already qualified identity has that @@ -532,7 +531,6 @@ benchmarks. ## Required -- [Scoped peers prove a route key](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md) - records the session proof decision and implementation - [Route session integration](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/session.md) - one router per origin node drives the origin and every lite-07 announce stream - [Announcement availability](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/availability.md) - announcements report availability, and a let-go is offline rather than END, in Rust and JS - [js/net route layer](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/js.md) - `js/net` encodes, decodes, and resolves the route layer diff --git a/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md b/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md deleted file mode 100644 index 87f26a4f37d..00000000000 --- a/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/proof.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -# [M] Scoped peers prove a route key - -## Goal - -A lite-07 peer proves a route key once per session in SETUP. A relay files -every identity a scoped, proven peer sends, its own included, under -H(domain, proven key, id). Relays sharing a key file fail over as one; -unscoped peers stay bare and unproven scoped peers get a per-session key. -Proof production and verification are implemented by this PR; filing belongs -to [Route session integration](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/session.md). - -## Plan - -✅ Decided 2026-11-05 (maintainer, /quest-plan): prove the route key once per -session in lite-07 SETUP parameter 0x8, without a nonce, and keep the node's -own identity a random u64. This supersedes the 2026-11-04 bullets requiring -proof per announce stream, a nonce in ANNOUNCE_REQUEST, a proof in -ANNOUNCE_OK, and H(key, per-process salt) for the own identity. The signature -already covers TLS exporter output unique to the session, so a nonce adds -nothing. A session has one key, so proving it once in SETUP costs less than -per announce stream. A peer cannot verify H(key, per-process salt), making -it equivalent to random. ROUTE retains its u64 identity. - -The other five choices in the PR remain as made: - -- The own identity stays a fresh random u64, as decided above. -- moq-net calls rind directly; moq-crypto's sign feature depends on moq-net, - so moving one key type into another crate adds unnecessary machinery. -- The key lives on origin::Config. The relay's --cluster-route-key file - covers accepted and dialed sessions; moq-tokio needs no additional flag. -- qmux currently provides no exporter and proves nothing. This is an - implementation limitation, not a prohibition on TLS bindings. -- Browsers prove a per-page WebCrypto key when their transport exposes - exportKeyingMaterial, without adding a public JS API. - -The 2026-11-04 choices to ship before the lite-07 cut, share a relay key -file, qualify the proven peer's own identity, and retain u64 ROUTE identities -stand. A missing key file is generated; without a configured file, a relay -generates a fresh key on startup. - -The signed transcript is ASCII `moq-lite route key`, one role byte (0 client, -1 server), and 32 bytes from exporter label `EXPORTER-moq-lite-route-key` -with empty context. The proof is the 32-byte public key plus 64-byte -signature. No ANNOUNCE_OK proof body is needed by this draft or implementation; -[lite-07 route wire](https://github.com/moq-dev/moq/pull/7764) owns its message changes. - -## Related - -- [Route session integration](/quest/m2/cluster-routing/routes/session.md) - files identities under the proven key