fix(sandbox): preserve workbench output provenance (#8485)

* fix(sandbox): preserve workbench output provenance

* fix(sandbox): preserve boundary compatibility

Author: icecrasher321

apps/sim/lib/credentials/secret-values.test.ts

@@ -16,13 +16,11 @@ import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
 
 vi.mock('@/lib/core/security/encryption', () => encryptionMock)
 const mockEncryptSecret = encryptionMockFns.mockEncryptSecret
-const mockDecryptSecret = encryptionMockFns.mockDecryptSecret
 vi.mock('@/lib/credentials/environment', () => credentialsEnvironmentMock)
 
 import {
   deletePersonalSecret,
   deleteWorkspaceSecret,
-  readWorkspaceSecretValues,
   setWorkspaceSecret,
   updateWorkspaceSecretMetadata,
 } from '@/lib/credentials/secret-values'
@@ -116,51 +114,6 @@ describe('secret value storage', () => {
   })
 })
 
-describe('readWorkspaceSecretValues', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    resetDbChainMock()
-    mockDecryptSecret.mockImplementation(async (encrypted: string) => ({
-      decrypted: `decrypted:${encrypted}`,
-    }))
-  })
-
-  it('decrypts only the requested names and omits absent or undecryptable ones', async () => {
-    queueTableRows(schemaMock.workspaceEnvironment, [
-      {
-        id: 'env-1',
-        variables: {
-          VISIBLE_KEY: 'encrypted-visible',
-          BROKEN_KEY: 'encrypted-broken',
-          OTHER_KEY: 'encrypted-other',
-        },
-      },
-    ])
-    mockDecryptSecret.mockImplementation(async (encrypted: string) => {
-      if (encrypted === 'encrypted-broken') throw new Error('cannot decrypt')
-      return { decrypted: `decrypted:${encrypted}` }
-    })
-
-    await expect(
-      readWorkspaceSecretValues({
-        workspaceId: 'workspace-1',
-        names: ['VISIBLE_KEY', 'BROKEN_KEY', 'MISSING_KEY'],
-      })
-    ).resolves.toEqual({ VISIBLE_KEY: 'decrypted:encrypted-visible' })
-    expect(mockDecryptSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('encrypted-other')
-  })
-
-  it('never reads an inherited prototype member for a missing key', async () => {
-    queueTableRows(schemaMock.workspaceEnvironment, [
-      { id: 'env-1', variables: { OTHER_KEY: 'encrypted-other' } },
-    ])
-
-    await expect(
-      readWorkspaceSecretValues({ workspaceId: 'workspace-1', names: ['constructor', 'toString'] })
-    ).resolves.toEqual({})
-    expect(mockDecryptSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
-  })
-})
-
 /**
  * The row-queue mocks resolve whatever was queued regardless of the predicate, so
  * the only way to pin a WHERE clause is to read the condition tree the `eq`/`and`

apps/sim/lib/credentials/secret-values.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { db } from '@sim/db'
 import { credential, environment, workspaceEnvironment } from '@sim/db/schema'
 import { generateId } from '@sim/utils/id'
 import { and, eq } from 'drizzle-orm'
-import { decryptSecret, encryptSecret } from '@/lib/core/security/encryption'
+import { encryptSecret } from '@/lib/core/security/encryption'
 import { lockPersonalEnvMap, lockWorkspaceEnvMap } from '@/lib/credentials/env-locks'
 import {
   createWorkspaceEnvCredentials,
@@ -17,44 +17,6 @@ export interface SecretMutationResult {
   updatedAt: Date
 }
 
-/**
- * Decrypts the stored values for the requested workspace secret names.
- *
- * Exists for exactly one read path: rows a workspace marked visible (unredacted),
- * whose values already print into every run log the caller can open. Every other
- * secret read stays metadata-only — callers gate on the flag BEFORE asking. A
- * name that is absent or fails to decrypt is omitted rather than failing the
- * batch, since the value is optional on the wire.
- */
-export async function readWorkspaceSecretValues(params: {
-  workspaceId: string
-  names: readonly string[]
-}): Promise<Record<string, string>> {
-  if (params.names.length === 0) return {}
-
-  const [row] = await db
-    .select({ variables: workspaceEnvironment.variables })
-    .from(workspaceEnvironment)
-    .where(eq(workspaceEnvironment.workspaceId, params.workspaceId))
-    .limit(1)
-  const variables = (row?.variables as Record<string, string> | null) ?? {}
-
-  const values: Record<string, string> = {}
-  await Promise.all(
-    params.names.map(async (name) => {
-      const encrypted = Object.hasOwn(variables, name) ? variables[name] : undefined
-      if (!encrypted) return
-      try {
-        const { decrypted } = await decryptSecret(encrypted)
-        values[name] = decrypted
-      } catch {
-        // Omitted from the result; the caller's wire shape treats the value as optional.
-      }
-    })
-  )
-  return values
-}
-
 /** Stores one workspace secret without decrypting any existing value. */
 export async function setWorkspaceSecret(params: {
   workspaceId: string

apps/sim/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/execution-observer.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 import { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks'
+import type { DurableSecretProvenance } from '@/lib/execution/durable-secret-provenance'
 import type { SessionProcessIdentity } from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/session-process'
 
 interface SandboxExecutionObserver {
-  sessionInputsSafe?(): boolean
+  sessionInputProvenance?(): boolean | DurableSecretProvenance
   hold(work: Promise<unknown>): void
   unsettled(processId?: string): void
   claimProcess?(process: SessionProcessIdentity): Promise<void>
@@ -49,20 +50,25 @@ export async function prepareSandboxSessionAccess(
 }
 
 /** The trusted tool adapter supplies current input evidence while preserving execution ownership. */
-export function observeSandboxSessionInputs<T>(safe: () => boolean, execute: () => T): T {
+export function observeSandboxSessionInputs<T>(
+  safe: () => boolean | DurableSecretProvenance,
+  execute: () => T
+): T {
   const current = executionObserver.getStore()
   return executionObserver.run(
     {
       hold: (work) => current?.hold(work),
       unsettled: (id) => current?.unsettled(id),
       ...current,
-      sessionInputsSafe: safe,
+      sessionInputProvenance: safe,
     },
     execute
   )
 }
 
-/** Unobserved arbitrary code cannot certify scratch files as safe. */
-export function sandboxSessionInputsSafe(): boolean {
-  return executionObserver.getStore()?.sessionInputsSafe?.() === true
+/** Trusted input evidence is sampled immediately before the machine receives the bytes. */
+export function sandboxSessionInputProvenance(): DurableSecretProvenance {
+  const value = executionObserver.getStore()?.sessionInputProvenance?.()
+  if (typeof value === 'object') return value
+  return value === true ? { status: 'exact', entries: [] } : { status: 'unknown' }
 }

apps/sim/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/index.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import {
   prepareSandboxSessionAccess,
   reportUnsettledSandboxProcess,
   retainSandboxExecution,
-  sandboxSessionInputsSafe,
+  sandboxSessionInputProvenance,
 } from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/execution-observer'
 import { withSandboxFilePublication } from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/file-publication'
 import {
@@ -55,7 +55,10 @@ import {
   SESSION_SANDBOX_IDLE_MS,
 } from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/session'
 import { sessionCommandPath } from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/session-cli'
-import { recordSessionFileInput } from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/session-file-provenance'
+import {
+  readSessionSecretProvenance,
+  recordSessionFileInput,
+} from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/session-file-provenance'
 import { withSandboxSessionLock } from '@/lib/execution/remote-sandbox/session-lock'
 import type {
   CreateSandboxOptions,
@@ -842,6 +845,18 @@ async function provisionWithinBudget(
   throwIfAborted(signal)
 }
 
+/** Confidentiality checks also run on provider failures, before their diagnostics can escape. */
+async function acceptSessionOutputHistory(
+  session: SandboxSessionRequest | undefined,
+  machine: { providerId: SandboxProviderId; sandboxId: string }
+): Promise<void> {
+  if (!session) return
+  const provenance = await readSessionSecretProvenance(session.key, machine)
+  if (session.acceptOutputProvenance) await session.acceptOutputProvenance(provenance)
+  else if (provenance.status !== 'exact' || provenance.entries.length > 0)
+    throw new Error('Workbench output withheld because its secret provenance is unavailable')
+}
+
 async function executeInSandboxWithinBudget(
   // The budget wrapper always injects the signal; the required-signal type states that
   // invariant instead of a cast hiding it.
@@ -887,13 +902,13 @@ async function executeInSandboxWithinBudget(
     // the finally below. Dependencies land before the inputs so user code and its
     // mounts always see a complete environment.
     //
-    if (req.session)
+    if (lease.session && req.session)
       await recordSessionFileInput(
         req.session.key,
         { providerId: created.providerId, sandboxId },
-        sandboxSessionInputsSafe() &&
-          !req.session.unprovenancedInputs &&
-          !Object.keys(selected?.envs ?? {}).length
+        req.session.unprovenancedInputs || Object.keys(selected?.envs ?? {}).length
+          ? { status: 'unknown' }
+          : (req.session.inputProvenance?.() ?? sandboxSessionInputProvenance())
       )
     await provisionWithinBudget(sandbox, selected, signal)
     await writeSandboxInputs(sandbox, req.sandboxFiles, {
@@ -1025,8 +1040,15 @@ async function executeInSandboxWithinBudget(
     if (cost && billableOutputError) {
       attachTrustedSandboxOutputCost(billableOutputError, cost)
     }
-    await privateInputFiles?.cleanup()
-    await lease.release()
+    try {
+      await privateInputFiles?.cleanup()
+      await lease.release()
+    } finally {
+      await acceptSessionOutputHistory(lease.session ? req.session : undefined, {
+        providerId: created.providerId,
+        sandboxId,
+      })
+    }
   }
 }
 
@@ -1076,13 +1098,13 @@ async function executeShellInSandboxWithinBudget(
     // Inside the try so a failed install or mount still releases the sandbox via
     // the finally below. The install shares the caller's budget rather than adding
     // to it — see the note in `executeInSandbox`.
-    if (req.session)
+    if (lease.session && req.session)
       await recordSessionFileInput(
         req.session.key,
         { providerId: created.providerId, sandboxId },
-        sandboxSessionInputsSafe() &&
-          !req.session.unprovenancedInputs &&
-          !Object.keys(selected?.envs ?? {}).length
+        req.session.unprovenancedInputs || Object.keys(selected?.envs ?? {}).length
+          ? { status: 'unknown' }
+          : (req.session.inputProvenance?.() ?? sandboxSessionInputProvenance())
       )
     await provisionWithinBudget(sandbox, selected, signal)
     await writeSandboxInputs(sandbox, req.sandboxFiles, {
@@ -1192,8 +1214,15 @@ async function executeShellInSandboxWithinBudget(
     if (cost && billableOutputError) {
       attachTrustedSandboxOutputCost(billableOutputError, cost)
     }
-    await privateInputFiles?.cleanup()
-    await lease.release()
+    try {
+      await privateInputFiles?.cleanup()
+      await lease.release()
+    } finally {
+      await acceptSessionOutputHistory(lease.session ? req.session : undefined, {
+        providerId: created.providerId,
+        sandboxId,
+      })
+    }
   }
 }