diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/.zcode-plugin/plugin.json b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/.zcode-plugin/plugin.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8429ab2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/.zcode-plugin/plugin.json
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "name": "cloudflare-clef",
+  "version": "0.3.0",
+  "description": "Decision evaluation on Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF / CLEF Flash, exposed as the MCP tool clef_evaluate. Credentials are DPAPI-encrypted at rest. Images attach by absolute local file path or embedded data URL. Protocol layer ported verbatim from the MIT-licensed OpenClaw plugin openclaw-cloudflare-clef 0.1.3.",
+  "description_i18n": {
+    "en": "Decision evaluation on Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF / CLEF Flash, exposed as the MCP tool clef_evaluate. Credentials are DPAPI-encrypted at rest. Images attach by absolute local file path or embedded data URL. Protocol layer ported verbatim from the MIT-licensed OpenClaw plugin openclaw-cloudflare-clef 0.1.3.",
+    "zh-CN": "基于 Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF / CLEF Flash 的结构化决策评测 MCP 工具 clef_evaluate，凭据经 DPAPI 加密落盘。图片支持绝对路径本地文件或内嵌 data URL 两种挂载方式。协议层逐字节移植自 MIT 许可的 OpenClaw 插件 openclaw-cloudflare-clef 0.1.3。"
+  },
+  "author": { "name": "Ported from OpenClaw openclaw-cloudflare-clef 0.1.3" },
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "cloudflare-clef": {
+      "command": "node",
+      "args": ["${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/server/launch.mjs"]
+    }
+  }
+}
diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/README.md b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd2fa79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# Cloudflare CLEF Decisions (ZCode plugin)
+
+[中文文档](./README_CN.md)
+
+Ported from the OpenClaw decision-provider plugin `openclaw-cloudflare-clef` (0.1.3): structured decision evaluation (boolean / choice / score) on Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF-family models, returning per-question answers with calibrated probabilities instead of free-text guesses.
+
+- The protocol layer (`server/protocol.mjs`) is **byte-identical** to the original; all 15 protocol unit tests pass.
+- The OpenClaw host integration is rewritten as a ZCode **MCP stdio server** (zero npm dependencies) exposing the tool `clef_evaluate`.
+- Credentials are **DPAPI-encrypted at rest** — no plaintext on disk — filling the gap left by ZCode not shipping a secret store like OpenClaw's.
+
+## Prerequisites (Cloudflare side)
+
+1. **Account ID**: Cloudflare dashboard → Workers & Pages overview, right side; 32 hex characters.
+2. **API Token**: dashboard avatar → My Profile → API Tokens → Create Token, permission **Workers AI → Run**, scoped to your account.
+
+## Credentials (DPAPI-encrypted store, recommended)
+
+Run once in PowerShell from the plugin directory (interactive, token input hidden):
+
+```powershell
+powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File server\store-secret.ps1
+```
+
+Both values are stored DPAPI-encrypted at `%USERPROFILE%\.zcode\secrets\cloudflare-clef.json`, **bound to the current Windows user** — the file is useless if copied to another machine or account, and no plaintext ever touches the disk. Re-run to rotate; delete the file to revoke.
+
+Then **fully quit and restart ZCode**. Startup chain: `launch.mjs` decrypts the two values via PowerShell and injects them into the process environment (MCP traffic never passes through PowerShell), then loads the server.
+
+Alternative: set user-level environment variables `CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID` / `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN` (plaintext in the registry; not recommended). Real environment variables take precedence over the encrypted store.
+
+Node.js ≥ 22 must be on PATH.
+
+**Honest security boundary**: DPAPI protects against file exfiltration (backups, cloud sync, copied disks), not against other processes running as the same Windows user (Windows has no stronger non-interactive local option). Credentials and submitted evidence are never logged; logs additionally redact token/secret/api-key-style keys by pattern.
+
+## Cost
+
+- Workers Free is recommended: 10,000 Neurons per UTC day, hard platform limit when exhausted; the free allowance is shared with other Workers AI usage on the account.
+- Workers Paid also includes the free allowance but bills beyond it; this plugin does not change your plan and does not guarantee zero spend on Paid accounts.
+- Official pricing as of 2026-10-20: CLEF Flash 3,455 Neurons / M input tokens; CLEF 21,818 / M. Input-only billing.
+
+## Usage
+
+After installation, ask the agent to call `clef_evaluate`, for example:
+
+```json
+{
+  "model": "clef-flash",
+  "state": "Cargo not yet telex-released, ETA tomorrow, needs origin-port follow-up.",
+  "questions": {
+    "urgent": { "type": "boolean", "instructions": "Is this urgent?" },
+    "route": { "type": "choice", "criteria": { "customs": "Customs clearance", "ocean": "Ocean freight" } },
+    "severity": { "type": "score", "criteria": ["None", "Moderate", "Critical"] }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Returns `{model, answers, usage}`; answers are keyed by the original question ids, choice/score include full probability distributions, boolean returns `probabilityTrue`. Omitting `model` uses `clef-flash`.
+
+Images in state attach three ways: embedded data URLs, `{content_type,base64}` objects, or **absolute local file paths** (`.png/.jpg/.jpeg/.webp`; the string must be exactly the file path). Path-form images are read from disk by the server and embedded as `[image #N]` — chat models cannot reliably emit large base64 blobs, so prefer paths for real screenshots. A missing path or a file over 4 MiB returns a clear unsupported-input error.
+
+## Translation and boundaries (same as the original)
+
+- boolean → noul → probabilityTrue; choice keeps all probabilities; score index objects become arrays.
+- Question and option ids are remapped on the wire (Chinese and slashes allowed) and restored in results.
+- Request URL is fixed to `api.cloudflare.com` (SSRF excluded by construction), redirects disabled; 55 s timeout; MCP request cancellation supported.
+- No retries, no background polling, no fallback to paid models; 429 surfaces a rate-limit error (with retry-after hint).
+- Text/JSON evidence plus up to 4 images (PNG/JPEG/WebP, 4 MiB each, 8 MiB total, 16 MP limit); absolute-path image files referenced in state are read from local disk at evaluation time (png/jpg/jpeg/webp only, must exist, ≤ 4 MiB).
+- Conservative input budget: UTF-8 bytes + 1,024 + 128 per alternative ≤ 24,000 (adapter-side approximation, not a vendor tokenizer).
+- Response bodies are read with a 1 MiB cap.
+
+## Verification
+
+`node --test server/protocol.test.mjs` covers protocol translation and rejection of malformed responses (15/15 passing). MCP handshake, tools/list, missing-credential guidance, and the DPAPI store→decrypt→call chain (including a real request and 401 mapping) were smoke-tested. **Live end-to-end verification with valid credentials is pending** — after installing and storing credentials, the first real call is that verification.
+
+## Sources
+
+- https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers-ai/models/clef-flash/
+- https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers-ai/models/clef/
+- https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers-ai/platform/pricing/
diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/README_CN.md b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/README_CN.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cc7aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/README_CN.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# Cloudflare CLEF 决策评测（ZCode 插件）
+
+移植自 OpenClaw decision-provider 插件 `openclaw-cloudflare-clef`（0.1.3）：用 Cloudflare Workers AI 的 CLEF 系列模型做结构化决策评测（boolean / choice / score），返回带校准概率的答案，而不是让聊天模型自由发挥。
+
+- 协议层（`server/protocol.mjs`）与原插件**逐字节一致**，15 个协议单测全部通过。
+- OpenClaw 宿主集成层改写为 ZCode 的 **MCP stdio server**（零 npm 依赖），以工具 `clef_evaluate` 暴露。
+- 凭据用 **Windows DPAPI 加密落盘**，静态存储无明文——弥补 ZCode 没有 OpenClaw secret store 的空缺。
+
+## 安装前置（Cloudflare 侧）
+
+1. **Account ID**：Cloudflare 仪表盘 → Workers & Pages 概览页右侧，32 位十六进制。
+2. **API Token**：仪表盘右上角头像 → My Profile → API Tokens → Create Token，权限选 **Workers AI → Run**（作用域限定到你的账户）。
+
+## 凭据配置（DPAPI 加密存储，推荐）
+
+在 PowerShell 里运行插件目录下的 `server\store-secret.ps1`（交互式输入，Token 不回显）：
+
+```powershell
+powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<插件安装目录>\server\store-secret.ps1"
+```
+
+凭据以 DPAPI 密文存于 `%USERPROFILE%\.zcode\secrets\cloudflare-clef.json`，**绑定当前 Windows 用户**——文件被拷到别的机器或别的账户无法解密，磁盘上任何时刻都没有明文。轮换凭据就重跑一次脚本；删除该文件即吊销。
+
+之后**完全退出并重启 ZCode**。插件启动链路：`launch.mjs` 启动时经 PowerShell 解密两条凭据注入本进程环境变量（MCP 通信完全不经过 PowerShell），再加载 server。
+
+替代方案：也可以设用户级环境变量 `CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID` / `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN`（明文落注册表，不推荐）；两者同时存在时优先用加密文件。
+
+需要 Node.js ≥ 22 在 PATH 中（本机已确认 v26.12.1 可用）。
+
+**安全边界（如实说明）**：DPAPI 防的是文件泄露、备份、网盘同步；当前 Windows 用户下的进程仍可解密（Windows 本地无更强的免交互方案）。凭据与提交的证据永不写日志，日志另有按 `token/secret/api-key` 键名的自动脱敏。
+
+## 费用
+
+- 建议 Workers Free：10,000 Neurons/UTC 日免费，用尽后平台硬限制；免费量与账户内其他 Workers AI 用量共享。
+- Workers Paid 同样有免费量，但超额收费；本插件不改变账户套餐，不保证 Paid 账户零支出。
+- 2026-10-20 官方价：CLEF Flash 3,455 Neurons / M input tokens；CLEF 21,818 Neurons / M input tokens。仅按输入计价。
+
+## 用法
+
+安装后在会话中让模型调用 `clef_evaluate`，例如：
+
+```json
+{
+  "model": "clef-flash",
+  "state": "货物尚未电放，ETA 明天，需要联系起运港。",
+  "questions": {
+    "是否紧急/urgent": { "type": "boolean", "instructions": "Is this urgent?" },
+    "route": { "type": "choice", "criteria": { "关务/customs": "Customs clearance", "海运/ocean": "Ocean freight" } },
+    "severity": { "type": "score", "criteria": ["None", "Moderate", "Critical"] }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+返回 `{model, answers, usage}`；答案以原始问题 id 为键，choice/score 附带完整概率分布，boolean 返回 `probabilityTrue`。`model` 省略时用 `clef-flash`。
+
+state 中的图片有三种挂载方式：内嵌 data URL、`{content_type,base64}` 对象，或**绝对路径本地文件**（`.png/.jpg/.jpeg/.webp`，字符串须精确等于文件路径）。路径方式由 server 读盘嵌入并以 `[image #N]` 占位——聊天模型无法可靠生成大段 base64，实际截图请优先用路径；路径不存在或超过 4 MiB 会返回明确的 unsupported-input 错误。
+
+## 翻译与边界（与原插件一致）
+
+- boolean → noul → probabilityTrue；choice 保留全部概率；score 的索引对象转数组。
+- 重新映射问题与选项 ID，允许中文、斜杠等标识，恢复结果原 ID。
+- 请求 URL 固定为 `api.cloudflare.com`（构造上排除 SSRF），禁止重定向；55 秒超时；支持 MCP 请求取消。
+- 无重试、无后台轮询、无收费模型自动回退；429 返回限流错误（含 retry-after 提示）。
+- 支持文本/JSON 证据，最多 4 张图片（PNG/JPEG/WebP，单张 4 MiB、合计 8 MiB、16 MP 上限）；state 中以绝对路径引用的本地图片文件会在评测时被读取（仅 png/jpg/jpeg/webp，文件须存在且 ≤ 4 MiB）。
+- 保守输入预算：UTF-8 字节 + 1,024 + 每候选 128 ≤ 24,000（接入侧近似保护，非厂商 tokenizer 精确计算）。
+- 响应体读取上限 1 MiB。
+
+## 验证
+
+`node --test server/protocol.test.mjs` 验证协议转换与拒绝异常响应（15/15 通过）。已另做 MCP 握手、tools/list、无凭据指引、DPAPI 存取全链路（含真实请求与 401 映射）冒烟测试。**未做真实凭据端到端验证**——安装并存储凭据后，首次调用即是端到端验证。
+
+## 来源
+
+- https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers-ai/models/clef-flash/
+- https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers-ai/models/clef/
+- https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers-ai/platform/pricing/
diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/index.mjs b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/index.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eda2559
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/index.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Cloudflare CLEF decision evaluation as a ZCode MCP tool.
+// Ported from the OpenClaw cloudflare-clef decision provider: the OpenClaw host
+// seams (registerDecisionProvider, secret store, guarded fetch) are replaced by
+// a dependency-free stdio MCP server with credentials from environment variables.
+
+import { statSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { extname, isAbsolute } from "node:path";
+
+import { encodeBatch, decodeResponse, UnsupportedInput, InvalidResponse } from "./protocol.mjs";
+
+const SERVER_NAME = "cloudflare-clef";
+const SERVER_VERSION = "0.3.0";
+const ACCOUNT_PATTERN = /^[a-fA-F0-9]{32}$/;
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 55_000;
+const MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
+
+const TOOL = {
+  name: "clef_evaluate",
+  description:
+    "Evaluate structured decision questions against supplied evidence using Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF " +
+    "(stronger) or CLEF Flash (faster/cheaper). Returns per-question answers with calibrated probabilities " +
+    "instead of free-text guesses. Use for triage/routing/severity judgments over a concrete state. " +
+    "Question types: boolean (optional criteria {true,false}); choice (criteria map of 2-255 " +
+    "label→description entries); score (criteria array of 2-10 ordered level names, rated 0..n-1). " +
+    "state may be any JSON evidence and may attach up to 4 images as data:image/png|jpeg|webp;base64 URLs, " +
+    "{content_type,base64} objects, or absolute local file paths (.png/.jpg/.jpeg/.webp) that this server " +
+    "reads from disk and embeds on the caller's behalf.",
+  inputSchema: {
+    type: "object",
+    additionalProperties: false,
+    required: ["questions"],
+    properties: {
+      model: {
+        type: "string",
+        enum: ["clef", "clef-flash"],
+        default: "clef-flash",
+        description: "CLEF model to run. Omit for clef-flash (faster, cheaper).",
+      },
+      state: {
+        description:
+          "The evidence to evaluate, as arbitrary JSON (string, array or object). May attach up to 4 images " +
+          "as data URLs, {content_type,base64} objects, or absolute local file paths (.png/.jpg/.jpeg/.webp) " +
+          "which the server reads and embeds; remaining text budget is ~24k bytes.",
+      },
+      questions: {
+        type: "object",
+        minProperties: 1,
+        maxProperties: 64,
+        description:
+          "Map of question id → question. Ids may be any string (Chinese, slashes OK) and are echoed " +
+          "back in the answers. Example: {\"urgent\": {\"type\": \"boolean\", \"instructions\": \"Is this urgent?\"}}",
+        additionalProperties: {
+          type: "object",
+          additionalProperties: true,
+          required: ["type"],
+          properties: {
+            type: { type: "string", enum: ["boolean", "choice", "score"] },
+            instructions: { type: "string", description: "Optional evaluation instruction; each type has a default." },
+            criteria: {
+              description:
+                "boolean: optional {true, false} descriptions. choice: required map of 2-255 label→description. " +
+                "score: required array of 2-10 ordered level names.",
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+};
+
+class ImagePathError extends Error {}
+
+const IMAGE_MIME_BY_EXTENSION = { ".png": "image/png", ".jpg": "image/jpeg", ".jpeg": "image/jpeg", ".webp": "image/webp" };
+const MAX_PATH_IMAGE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+// Chat models cannot reliably emit megabytes of Base64 inside tool arguments,
+// so exact absolute paths to existing local image files are resolved here into
+// data URLs before encoding; every other string passes through untouched.
+function resolveImagePaths(value) {
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    const mime = IMAGE_MIME_BY_EXTENSION[extname(value).toLowerCase()];
+    if (mime === undefined || !isAbsolute(value)) return value;
+    let info;
+    try {
+      info = statSync(value);
+    } catch {
+      throw new ImagePathError(`${value}: image file not found; pass an absolute path to an existing local file`);
+    }
+    if (!info.isFile()) throw new ImagePathError(`${value}: not a regular file`);
+    if (info.size > MAX_PATH_IMAGE_BYTES) throw new ImagePathError(`${value}: exceeds the 4 MiB per-image limit`);
+    return `data:${mime};base64,` + readFileSync(value).toString("base64");
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(resolveImagePaths);
+  if (value !== null && typeof value === "object") {
+    // Null-prototype output keeps untrusted "__proto__" keys as plain data.
+    const out = Object.create(null);
+    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value)) out[key] = resolveImagePaths(item);
+    return out;
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+function credentials() {
+  const accountId = typeof process.env.CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID === "string" ? process.env.CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID : "";
+  const apiToken = typeof process.env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN === "string" ? process.env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN : "";
+  return { accountId, apiToken, ok: ACCOUNT_PATTERN.test(accountId) && apiToken.trim().length > 0 };
+}
+
+function errText(message) {
+  return { isError: true, content: [{ type: "text", text: message }] };
+}
+
+function okText(text) {
+  return { content: [{ type: "text", text }] };
+}
+
+function setupMessage() {
+  return "cloudflare-clef is not configured: run the plugin's server/store-secret.ps1 once to store " +
+    "DPAPI-encrypted credentials (or set CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID / CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN as user " +
+    "environment variables), then fully restart ZCode.";
+}
+
+async function cancelBody(response) {
+  try { await response.body?.cancel(); } catch {}
+}
+
+// Cap successful response bodies too; never log submitted evidence or raw error bodies.
+async function readTextLimited(response, limit) {
+  const reader = response.body.getReader();
+  const chunks = [];
+  let total = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+    if (done) break;
+    total += value.byteLength;
+    if (total > limit) {
+      try { await reader.cancel(); } catch {}
+      throw new Error("Response body exceeds the adapter's read limit");
+    }
+    chunks.push(Buffer.from(value));
+  }
+  return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8");
+}
+
+async function evaluate(callId, args) {
+  const { accountId, apiToken, ok } = credentials();
+  if (!ok) return errText(setupMessage());
+
+  const model = args?.model === "clef" ? "clef" : "clef-flash";
+  let state = args?.state;
+  let request;
+  try {
+    if (state !== undefined) state = resolveImagePaths(state);
+    request = encodeBatch({ state, questions: args?.questions }, model);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof UnsupportedInput || e instanceof ImagePathError) return errText(`unsupported-input: ${e.message}`);
+    throw e;
+  }
+
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  activeCalls.set(callId, controller);
+  try {
+    // Fixed api.cloudflare.com URL by construction: no user-controlled hosts, no redirects.
+    const response = await fetch(
+      "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/" + accountId + "/ai/run/@cf/cloudflare/" + model,
+      {
+        method: "POST",
+        redirect: "error",
+        signal: controller.signal,
+        headers: { Authorization: "Bearer " + apiToken, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+        body: request.body,
+      }
+    );
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      await cancelBody(response);
+      if ([401, 403].includes(response.status)) return errText(`authentication failed (HTTP ${response.status}): check the API token's Workers AI Run permission and account scope`);
+      if (response.status === 429) {
+        const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get("retry-after"));
+        const suffix = Number.isFinite(retryAfter) && retryAfter >= 0 ? `; retry after up to ${Math.min(retryAfter, 60)}s` : "";
+        return errText(`rate-limited (HTTP 429)${suffix}`);
+      }
+      if ([400, 413, 422].includes(response.status)) return errText(`unsupported-input: Cloudflare rejected the request (HTTP ${response.status})`);
+      return errText(`transport: Cloudflare API returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
+    }
+    const text = await readTextLimited(response, MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES);
+    let raw;
+    try { raw = JSON.parse(text); } catch { return errText("invalid-response: response was not valid JSON"); }
+    const result = decodeResponse(raw, request);
+    return okText(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof InvalidResponse) return errText("invalid-response: Cloudflare's decision payload failed validation");
+    if (controller.signal.aborted) return errText("transport: request timed out or was cancelled");
+    return errText(`transport: ${e && e.message ? e.message : "request failed"}`);
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+    activeCalls.delete(callId);
+  }
+}
+
+// --- Minimal dependency-free MCP stdio server (newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0). ---
+
+const activeCalls = new Map();
+
+function send(message) {
+  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(message) + "\n");
+}
+
+function handleRequest(msg) {
+  const { method, params, id } = msg;
+  if (method === "initialize") {
+    send({
+      jsonrpc: "2.0",
+      id,
+      result: {
+        protocolVersion: typeof params?.protocolVersion === "string" && params.protocolVersion ? params.protocolVersion : "2024-11-05",
+        capabilities: { tools: { listChanged: false } },
+        serverInfo: { name: SERVER_NAME, version: SERVER_VERSION },
+      },
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (method === "ping") {
+    send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, result: {} });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (method === "tools/list") {
+    send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, result: { tools: [TOOL] } });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (method === "tools/call") {
+    if (params?.name !== TOOL.name) {
+      send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, error: { code: -32602, message: `Unknown tool: ${String(params?.name)}` } });
+      return;
+    }
+    evaluate(id, params.arguments ?? {}).then(
+      (result) => send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, result }),
+      (e) => send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, error: { code: -32603, message: e && e.message ? e.message : "Internal error" } })
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+  send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, error: { code: -32601, message: `Method not found: ${method}` } });
+}
+
+function handleLine(line) {
+  let msg;
+  try { msg = JSON.parse(line); } catch { return; }
+  if (!msg || typeof msg !== "object" || msg.jsonrpc !== "2.0" || typeof msg.method !== "string") return;
+  if (msg.id === undefined || msg.id === null) {
+    if (msg.method === "notifications/cancelled") {
+      // Cancellation is best-effort: only an in-flight fetch has an aborter wired.
+      const controller = activeCalls.get(msg.params?.requestId);
+      if (controller) controller.abort();
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  handleRequest(msg);
+}
+
+let buffer = "";
+process.stdin.setEncoding("utf8");
+process.stdin.on("data", (chunk) => {
+  buffer += chunk;
+  let index;
+  while ((index = buffer.indexOf("\n")) >= 0) {
+    const line = buffer.slice(0, index);
+    buffer = buffer.slice(index + 1);
+    if (line.trim()) handleLine(line);
+  }
+});
+process.stdin.on("end", () => {
+  // Drain in-flight tool calls before exiting; the per-call timeout is the backstop.
+  const exitWhenIdle = () => { if (activeCalls.size === 0) process.exit(0); };
+  exitWhenIdle();
+  setInterval(exitWhenIdle, 100);
+});
+process.stdin.resume();
diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/launch.mjs b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/launch.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70dcf22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/launch.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Entry point: decrypt DPAPI-protected credentials into the environment, then run the
+// MCP server in-process. MCP stdio traffic never passes through PowerShell; only two
+// short ciphertexts do, at startup. Existing real environment variables win, so the
+// secrets file stays optional.
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+
+const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+const secretPath = join(homedir(), ".zcode", "secrets", "cloudflare-clef.json");
+
+const psQuote = (value) => "'" + String(value).replace(/'/g, "''") + "'";
+
+function haveEnv(name) {
+  return typeof process.env[name] === "string" && process.env[name].length > 0;
+}
+
+function decryptStored(protectedString) {
+  // ConvertTo-SecureString without -Key uses DPAPI CurrentUser scope: the ciphertext
+  // only decrypts for the Windows user that ran store-secret.ps1 on this machine.
+  const script = [
+    "$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'",
+    "function U($s){$p=ConvertTo-SecureString -String $s;" +
+      "$b=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($p);" +
+      "try{[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringBSTR($b)}" +
+      "finally{[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ZeroFreeBSTR($b)}}",
+    "U " + psQuote(protectedString),
+  ].join("; ");
+  const result = spawnSync("powershell", ["-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-ExecutionPolicy", "Bypass", "-Command", script], {
+    encoding: "utf8",
+    windowsHide: true,
+    timeout: 15_000,
+  });
+  const value = (result.stdout ?? "").trim();
+  return result.status === 0 && value ? value : null;
+}
+
+function loadStoredCredentials() {
+  if (!haveEnv("CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID") || !haveEnv("CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN")) {
+    if (existsSync(secretPath)) {
+      let stored;
+      try { stored = JSON.parse(readFileSync(secretPath, "utf8")); } catch { stored = null; }
+      if (stored && typeof stored.accountId === "string" && typeof stored.apiToken === "string") {
+        const accountId = decryptStored(stored.accountId);
+        const apiToken = decryptStored(stored.apiToken);
+        if (accountId && apiToken) {
+          process.env.CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID = accountId;
+          process.env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN = apiToken;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+loadStoredCredentials();
+await import("./index.mjs");
diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/protocol.mjs b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/protocol.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ee0691
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/protocol.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+
+/** SDK-free translation of OpenClaw's decision contract to CLEF's System One API. */
+export class UnsupportedInput extends Error {}
+export class InvalidResponse extends Error {}
+const own = (o,k) => Object.hasOwn(o,k);
+const object = x => x !== null && typeof x === "object" && !Array.isArray(x);
+const probability = x => typeof x === "number" && Number.isFinite(x) && x >= 0 && x <= 1;
+const fail = () => { throw new InvalidResponse("Invalid CLEF decision response"); };
+const MAX_IMAGES = 4;
+const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+const MAX_TOTAL_IMAGE_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
+const MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = 16_000_000;
+const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 13 * 1024 * 1024;
+const CONTEXT_BUDGET = 24_000;
+const MAX_IMAGE_TOKENS = 1024;
+const MAX_BASE64_LENGTH = 4 * Math.ceil(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES / 3);
+const BASE64_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+const invalidImage = () => { throw new UnsupportedInput("Invalid or unsupported image data"); };
+const validateDimensions = (width,height) => {
+  if (!width || !height || width * height > MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS)
+    throw new UnsupportedInput("Image exceeds CLEF's 16 megapixel limit or has invalid dimensions");
+};
+
+// Inspect container headers without expanding pixel data. This bounds memory and
+// checks the documented pixel limit; the service still performs full decoding.
+function imageDimensions(bytes, contentType) {
+  let width, height;
+  if (contentType === "image/png") {
+    const signature = Buffer.from("89504e470d0a1a0a", "hex");
+    if (bytes.length < 33 || !bytes.subarray(0,8).equals(signature) ||
+        bytes.readUInt32BE(8) !== 13 || bytes.toString("ascii",12,16) !== "IHDR") invalidImage();
+    width = bytes.readUInt32BE(16); height = bytes.readUInt32BE(20);
+    validateDimensions(width,height);
+    let offset = 8, sawData = false, sawEnd = false;
+    while (offset + 12 <= bytes.length) {
+      const length = bytes.readUInt32BE(offset);
+      if (length > bytes.length - offset - 12) invalidImage();
+      const type = bytes.toString("ascii",offset + 4,offset + 8);
+      if (offset !== 8 && type === "IHDR") invalidImage();
+      if (type === "IDAT") sawData = true;
+      if (type === "IEND") {
+        if (length !== 0 || !sawData || offset + 12 !== bytes.length) invalidImage();
+        sawEnd = true; break;
+      }
+      offset += length + 12;
+    }
+    if (!sawEnd) invalidImage();
+  } else if (contentType === "image/jpeg") {
+    if (bytes.length < 4 || bytes[0] !== 0xff || bytes[1] !== 0xd8) invalidImage();
+    let offset = 2, sawScan = false;
+    while (offset < bytes.length) {
+      if (bytes[offset++] !== 0xff) invalidImage();
+      while (offset < bytes.length && bytes[offset] === 0xff) offset++;
+      if (offset >= bytes.length) invalidImage();
+      const marker = bytes[offset++];
+      if (marker === 0xd9 || marker === 0x00 || marker === 0xd8) invalidImage();
+      if (marker === 0x01 || (marker >= 0xd0 && marker <= 0xd7)) continue;
+      if (offset + 2 > bytes.length) invalidImage();
+      const length = bytes.readUInt16BE(offset);
+      if (length < 2 || length > bytes.length - offset) invalidImage();
+      if ([0xc0,0xc1,0xc2,0xc3,0xc5,0xc6,0xc7,0xc9,0xca,0xcb,0xcd,0xce,0xcf].includes(marker)) {
+        if (length < 8) invalidImage();
+        height = bytes.readUInt16BE(offset + 3); width = bytes.readUInt16BE(offset + 5);
+        validateDimensions(width,height);
+      }
+      if (marker === 0xda) {
+        if (width === undefined || bytes.lastIndexOf(Buffer.from([0xff,0xd9])) < offset + length) invalidImage();
+        sawScan = true; break;
+      }
+      offset += length;
+    }
+    if (!sawScan) invalidImage();
+  } else if (contentType === "image/webp") {
+    if (bytes.length < 20 || bytes.toString("ascii",0,4) !== "RIFF" ||
+        bytes.toString("ascii",8,12) !== "WEBP" || bytes.readUInt32LE(4) + 8 !== bytes.length) invalidImage();
+    let offset = 12, sawImage = false, canvas;
+    while (offset + 8 <= bytes.length) {
+      const type = bytes.toString("ascii",offset,offset + 4), length = bytes.readUInt32LE(offset + 4);
+      const start = offset + 8;
+      if (length > bytes.length - start || start + length + (length & 1) > bytes.length) invalidImage();
+      if (type === "VP8X") {
+        if (length !== 10) invalidImage();
+        canvas = [bytes.readUIntLE(start + 4,3) + 1, bytes.readUIntLE(start + 7,3) + 1];
+        validateDimensions(...canvas);
+      } else if (type === "VP8 ") {
+        if (length < 10 || bytes[start + 3] !== 0x9d || bytes[start + 4] !== 0x01 || bytes[start + 5] !== 0x2a) invalidImage();
+        width = bytes.readUInt16LE(start + 6) & 0x3fff; height = bytes.readUInt16LE(start + 8) & 0x3fff;
+        validateDimensions(width,height);
+        sawImage = true;
+      } else if (type === "VP8L") {
+        if (length < 5 || bytes[start] !== 0x2f) invalidImage();
+        const bits = bytes.readUInt32LE(start + 1);
+        width = (bits & 0x3fff) + 1; height = ((bits >>> 14) & 0x3fff) + 1;
+        validateDimensions(width,height);
+        sawImage = true;
+      } else if (type === "ANMF") {
+        if (length < 16) invalidImage();
+        validateDimensions(bytes.readUIntLE(start + 6,3) + 1,bytes.readUIntLE(start + 9,3) + 1);
+        sawImage = true;
+      }
+      offset = start + length + (length & 1);
+    }
+    if (offset !== bytes.length || !sawImage) invalidImage();
+    if (canvas) [width,height] = canvas;
+  } else invalidImage();
+  validateDimensions(width,height);
+  return {width,height};
+}
+
+function decodeImageBase64(value, totalBytes) {
+  // Reject excessive encodings before copying or allocating their decoded bytes.
+  if (value.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES) throw new UnsupportedInput("Image exceeds CLEF's 4 MiB limit");
+  const encoded = value.replace(/[\t\r\n ]/g, "");
+  if (encoded.length > MAX_BASE64_LENGTH) throw new UnsupportedInput("Image exceeds CLEF's 4 MiB limit");
+  if (!encoded || !/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/.test(encoded)) invalidImage();
+  const pad = encoded.endsWith("==") ? 2 : encoded.endsWith("=") ? 1 : 0;
+  const chars = encoded.length - pad, remainder = chars % 4;
+  if (remainder === 1 || (pad && (encoded.length % 4 !== 0 || pad !== 4 - remainder))) invalidImage();
+  const last = BASE64_ALPHABET.indexOf(encoded[chars - 1]);
+  if ((remainder === 2 && (last & 15)) || (remainder === 3 && (last & 3))) invalidImage();
+  const size = Math.floor(chars * 3 / 4);
+  if (size > MAX_IMAGE_BYTES) throw new UnsupportedInput("Image exceeds CLEF's 4 MiB limit");
+  if (totalBytes + size > MAX_TOTAL_IMAGE_BYTES) throw new UnsupportedInput("Images exceed CLEF's 8 MiB total limit");
+  const canonical = pad ? encoded : encoded + "=".repeat((4 - remainder) % 4);
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(canonical, "base64");
+  if (bytes.length !== size) invalidImage();
+  return {canonical,bytes};
+}
+
+export function encodeBatch(batch, model, checkpoint = () => {}) {
+  checkpoint();
+  if (!["clef","clef-flash"].includes(model) || !object(batch) || !object(batch.questions))
+    throw new UnsupportedInput("Unsupported model or questions");
+  const entries = Object.entries(batch.questions);
+  if (!entries.length || entries.length > 64) throw new UnsupportedInput("CLEF accepts 1–64 questions");
+  // Images are transported separately from text, with 1-based references in
+  // the original context. Traverse only fields actually sent to CLEF.
+  const images = [];
+  let totalImageBytes = 0, textBytes = 0;
+  const accountText = value => {
+    textBytes += Buffer.byteLength(value,"utf8");
+    if (textBytes > CONTEXT_BUDGET)
+      throw new UnsupportedInput("Evidence exceeds this adapter's conservative context budget");
+    return value;
+  };
+  const addImage = (contentType, encoded, asObject, requireExactEnd = false) => {
+    checkpoint();
+    contentType = contentType.toLowerCase();
+    if (!["image/png","image/jpeg","image/webp"].includes(contentType)) invalidImage();
+    if (images.length >= MAX_IMAGES) throw new UnsupportedInput("CLEF accepts at most 4 images");
+    const {canonical,bytes} = decodeImageBase64(encoded,totalImageBytes);
+    checkpoint();
+    imageDimensions(bytes,contentType);
+    // Only use the whitespace-folded interpretation when it consumes the
+    // complete JPEG; otherwise trailing prose could be mistaken for Base64.
+    if (requireExactEnd && contentType === "image/jpeg" &&
+        (bytes[bytes.length-2] !== 0xff || bytes[bytes.length-1] !== 0xd9)) invalidImage();
+    totalImageBytes += bytes.length;
+    images.push(asObject ? {content_type:contentType,base64:canonical} : `data:${contentType};base64,${canonical}`);
+    return `[image #${images.length}]`;
+  };
+  const transform = (x) => {
+    checkpoint();
+    if (typeof x === "string") {
+      if (x.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES + CONTEXT_BUDGET)
+        throw new UnsupportedInput("Evidence exceeds CLEF's size limits");
+      // Preserve the previously supported standalone, line-wrapped Base64
+      // form, while retaining prose that follows a complete data URL.
+      const start = x.search(/\S/), end = x.trimEnd().length;
+      const whole = start < 0 ? null : /^data:image\/([A-Za-z0-9.+-]+);base64,([A-Za-z0-9+/=\s]+)$/i.exec(x.slice(start,end));
+      if (whole && /\s/.test(whole[2])) {
+        let reference;
+        try { reference = addImage("image/" + whole[1],whole[2],false,true); }
+        catch (e) { if (!(e instanceof UnsupportedInput)) throw e; }
+        if (reference !== undefined) return accountText(x.slice(0,start) + reference + x.slice(end));
+      }
+      const prefix = /data:image\/([A-Za-z0-9.+-]+);base64,/gi;
+      let match, cursor = 0, result = "";
+      while ((match = prefix.exec(x)) !== null) {
+        const data = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+/.exec(x.slice(prefix.lastIndex,prefix.lastIndex + MAX_BASE64_LENGTH + 1));
+        if (!data) invalidImage();
+        result += x.slice(cursor,match.index) + addImage("image/" + match[1],data[0],false);
+        cursor = prefix.lastIndex + data[0].length;
+        prefix.lastIndex = cursor;
+      }
+      return accountText(cursor ? result + x.slice(cursor) : x);
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(x)) {
+      if (x.length > CONTEXT_BUDGET / 2) throw new UnsupportedInput("Evidence exceeds this adapter's conservative context budget");
+      return x.map(transform);
+    }
+    if (x !== null && typeof x === "object") {
+      const keys = Object.keys(x);
+      if (keys.length > CONTEXT_BUDGET / 4) throw new UnsupportedInput("Evidence exceeds this adapter's conservative context budget");
+      if (own(x,"content_type") && own(x,"base64") &&
+          typeof x.content_type === "string" && /^image\//i.test(x.content_type)) {
+        if (typeof x.base64 !== "string") invalidImage();
+        const reference = addImage(x.content_type,x.base64,true);
+        if (keys.length === 2) return accountText(reference);
+        const o = Object.create(null);
+        for (const k of keys) { accountText(k); o[k] = k === "base64" ? accountText(reference) : transform(x[k]); }
+        return o;
+      }
+      const o = Object.create(null);
+      for (const k of keys) { accountText(k); o[k] = transform(x[k]); }
+      return o;
+    }
+    return x;
+  };
+  // State images precede question images in the array; all placeholders use the
+  // same order. JSON member order is not required by the CLEF API.
+  const state = transform(batch.state);
+  const questions = Object.create(null), mapping = [];
+  let alternatives = 0;
+  for (const [id,qRaw] of entries) {
+    checkpoint();
+    if (!object(qRaw)) throw new UnsupportedInput("Unsupported question type");
+    const q = {type:qRaw.type};
+    const wireId = "q" + mapping.length;
+    const instructions = transform(qRaw.instructions ?? (
+      q.type === "boolean" ? "Does the supplied state satisfy the true criterion rather than the false criterion?" :
+      q.type === "choice" ? "Choose the best matching criterion for the supplied state." :
+      "Rate the supplied state on the ordered criteria from lowest to highest."
+    ));
+    if (q.type === "boolean") {
+      if (qRaw.criteria) q.criteria = transform(qRaw.criteria);
+      questions[wireId] = {type:"noul", instructions, ...(q.criteria ? {criteria:q.criteria}: {})};
+      mapping.push({id,wireId,q}); alternatives += 2;
+    } else if (q.type === "choice") {
+      const keys = Object.keys(qRaw.criteria ?? {});
+      if (keys.length < 2 || keys.length > 255) throw new UnsupportedInput("CLEF accepts 2–255 choices");
+      const criteria = Object.create(null);
+      keys.forEach((key,i) => { criteria["c"+i] = {label:transform(key), description:transform(qRaw.criteria[key])}; });
+      questions[wireId] = {type:"choice",instructions,criteria};
+      mapping.push({id,wireId,q,keys}); alternatives += keys.length;
+    } else if (q.type === "score") {
+      if (!Array.isArray(qRaw.criteria) || qRaw.criteria.length < 2 || qRaw.criteria.length > 10 || qRaw.criteria.some(v=>v===null))
+        throw new UnsupportedInput("CLEF accepts 2–10 non-null score criteria");
+      q.criteria = transform(qRaw.criteria);
+      questions[wireId] = {type:"score",instructions,criteria:q.criteria};
+      mapping.push({id,wireId,q}); alternatives += q.criteria.length;
+    } else throw new UnsupportedInput("Unsupported question type");
+  }
+  const textPayload = {model,state,questions};
+  // Binary images are visual tokens, not the Base64 characters used on the wire.
+  // Reserve Cloudflare's documented upper bound of 1,024 tokens per image.
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(textPayload),"utf8") + 1024 + 128*alternatives + MAX_IMAGE_TOKENS*images.length > CONTEXT_BUDGET)
+    throw new UnsupportedInput("Evidence exceeds this adapter's conservative context budget");
+  const payload = {model,...(images.length ? {images}: {}),state,questions};
+  checkpoint();
+  const body = JSON.stringify(payload);
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(body,"utf8") > MAX_BODY_BYTES)
+    throw new UnsupportedInput("Request exceeds CLEF's 13 MiB body limit");
+  checkpoint();
+  return {payload,body,mapping};
+}
+export function decodeResponse(envelope, request) {
+  if (!object(envelope) || envelope.success === false) return fail();
+  const raw = own(envelope,"result") ? envelope.result : envelope;
+  if (!object(raw) || typeof raw.model !== "string" || raw.model !== request.payload.model ||
+      !object(raw.answers) || Object.keys(raw.answers).length !== request.mapping.length) return fail();
+  const answers = Object.create(null);
+  for (const {id,wireId,q,keys} of request.mapping) {
+    if (!own(raw.answers,wireId)) return fail();
+    const a = raw.answers[wireId];
+    if (!object(a)) return fail();
+    if (q.type === "boolean") {
+      if (a.type !== "noul" || !probability(a.noul)) return fail();
+      answers[id] = {type:"boolean",probabilityTrue:a.noul};
+    } else {
+      if (a.type !== q.type || !object(a.probabilities)) return fail();
+      const expected = q.type === "choice" ? keys.map((_,i)=>"c"+i) : q.criteria.map((_,i)=>String(i));
+      if (Object.keys(a.probabilities).length !== expected.length ||
+          expected.some(k=>!own(a.probabilities,k) || !probability(a.probabilities[k]))) return fail();
+      const p = expected.map(k=>a.probabilities[k]);
+      if (Math.abs(p.reduce((s,v)=>s+v,0)-1) > 0.03) return fail();
+      if (a.confidence !== undefined && !probability(a.confidence)) return fail();
+      const confidence = a.confidence === undefined ? {} : {confidence:a.confidence};
+      if (q.type === "choice") {
+        const index = expected.indexOf(a.choice);
+        if (index < 0) return fail();
+        answers[id] = {type:"choice",choice:keys[index],probabilities:Object.fromEntries(keys.map((k,i)=>[k,p[i]])),...confidence};
+      } else {
+        if (typeof a.score !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(a.score) || a.score < 0 || a.score > q.criteria.length-1) return fail();
+        answers[id] = {type:"score",score:a.score,probabilities:p,...confidence};
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  const result = {model:raw.model,answers};
+  if (raw.usage !== undefined) {
+    if (!object(raw.usage)) return fail();
+    const usage = {};
+    for (const [wire,key] of [["input_tokens","inputTokens"],["output_tokens","outputTokens"]]) {
+      const value = raw.usage[wire];
+      if (value !== undefined) {
+        if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value) || value < 0) return fail();
+        usage[key] = value;
+      }
+    }
+    result.usage = usage;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/protocol.test.mjs b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/protocol.test.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1a78da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/protocol.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import {randomFillSync} from "node:crypto";
+import {deflateSync} from "node:zlib";
+import {encodeBatch,decodeResponse,UnsupportedInput,InvalidResponse} from "./protocol.mjs";
+const batch = {
+ state:"货物尚未电放，ETA 明天，需要联系起运港。",
+ questions:{
+  "是否紧急/urgent":{type:"boolean",instructions:"Is this urgent?",criteria:{true:"ETA within 2 days with pending release",false:"No near-term impact"}},
+  route:{type:"choice",instructions:"Choose a team",criteria:{"关务/customs":"Customs clearance","海运/ocean":"Ocean freight and cargo release"}},
+  severity:{type:"score",instructions:"Rate severity",criteria:["None","Moderate","Critical"]}
+ }
+};
+const MiB = 1024 * 1024;
+const pngSignature = Buffer.from("89504e470d0a1a0a","hex");
+const crcTable = Uint32Array.from({length:256},(_,n) => {
+ let c=n;
+ for (let i=0;i<8;i++) c=(c>>>1)^((c&1)?0xedb88320:0);
+ return c>>>0;
+});
+function pngChunk(type,data) {
+ const out=Buffer.alloc(data.length+12);
+ out.writeUInt32BE(data.length,0); out.write(type,4,"ascii"); data.copy(out,8);
+ let crc=0xffffffff;
+ for (let i=4;i<out.length-4;i++) crc=crcTable[(crc^out[i])&255]^(crc>>>8);
+ out.writeUInt32BE((crc^0xffffffff)>>>0,out.length-4);
+ return out;
+}
+function png(width,height,{targetSize,noise=false}={}) {
+ const rowBytes=noise ? width*3 : Math.ceil(width/8), stride=rowBytes+1;
+ const pixels=Buffer.alloc(stride*height);
+ if (noise) { randomFillSync(pixels); for (let i=0;i<height;i++) pixels[i*stride]=0; }
+ const header=Buffer.alloc(13);
+ header.writeUInt32BE(width,0); header.writeUInt32BE(height,4);
+ header[8]=noise?8:1; header[9]=noise?2:0;
+ const first=[pngSignature,pngChunk("IHDR",header),pngChunk("IDAT",deflateSync(pixels))];
+ const end=pngChunk("IEND",Buffer.alloc(0));
+ if (targetSize !== undefined) {
+  const current=first.reduce((n,b)=>n+b.length,0)+end.length;
+  assert.ok(targetSize>=current+12);
+  // A valid private ancillary chunk makes exact byte boundaries reproducible.
+  first.push(pngChunk("caNd",Buffer.alloc(targetSize-current-12,65)));
+ }
+ return Buffer.concat([...first,end]);
+}
+const jpeg = Buffer.from("/9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAQAAAAAAAAD/2wBDAAMCAgICAgMCAgIDAwMDBAYEBAQEBAgGBgUGCQgKCgkICQkKDA8MCgsOCwkJDRENDg8QEBEQCgwSExIQEw8QEBD/2wBDAQMDAwQDBAgEBAgQCwkLEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBD/wAARCAACAAMDAREAAhEBAxEB/8QAFAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACP/EABQQAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD/xAAVAQEBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHCf/EABQRAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD/2gAMAwEAAhEDEQA/ADoDFU3/2Q==","base64");
+const webp = Buffer.from("UklGRjwAAABXRUJQVlA4IDAAAADQAQCdASoDAAIAAgA0JaACdLoB+AADsAD+8MQL/yC5YXXI1/8gP+QH/ID/+PIAAAA=","base64");
+const webpLossless = Buffer.from("UklGRhwAAABXRUJQVlA4TA8AAAAvAkAAAAcQ/Y/+ByKi/wEA","base64");
+const webpExtended = Buffer.from("UklGRmIAAABXRUJQVlA4WAoAAAAQAAAAAgAAAQAAQUxQSAcAAAAAAAAAAP8AAFZQOCA0AAAA0AEAnQEqAwACAAIANCWoAnRHAGSAA1AA/vDECsfS3YM0j/x//NEUzuhMfhH/NEUzugAAAA==","base64");
+const dataUrl = (type,bytes) => `data:image/${type};base64,${bytes.toString("base64")}`;
+const imageBatch = state => ({state,questions:{q:{type:"boolean",instructions:"?"}}});
+function response() {
+ return {success:true,result:{model:"clef-flash",answers:{
+  q0:{type:"noul",noul:0.97},
+  q1:{type:"choice",choice:"c1",probabilities:{c0:0.08,c1:0.92},confidence:0.8},
+  q2:{type:"score",score:1.7,legend:{"0":"None","1":"Moderate","2":"Critical"},probabilities:{"0":0.1,"1":0.1,"2":0.8},confidence:0.7}
+ },usage:{input_tokens:410,output_tokens:0}}};
+}
+test("vendor System One fixture preserves probabilities, score order, unicode identifiers and usage",()=>{
+ const req=encodeBatch(batch,"clef-flash");
+ assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(req.payload.questions),["q0","q1","q2"]);
+ assert.equal(req.payload.questions.q0.type,"noul");
+ const r=decodeResponse(response(),req);
+ assert.deepEqual(r.answers["是否紧急/urgent"],{type:"boolean",probabilityTrue:0.97});
+ assert.equal(r.answers.route.choice,"海运/ocean");
+ assert.deepEqual(r.answers.route.probabilities,{"关务/customs":0.08,"海运/ocean":0.92});
+ assert.deepEqual(r.answers.severity.probabilities,[0.1,0.1,0.8]);
+ assert.deepEqual(r.usage,{inputTokens:410,outputTokens:0});
+});
+test("reject missing probabilities, nonfinite scores and foreign choices instead of inventing certainty",()=>{
+ const req=encodeBatch(batch,"clef-flash");
+ for (const mutate of [
+  r=>{delete r.result.answers.q0;},
+  r=>{r.result.answers.q0.noul=1.1;},
+  r=>{r.result.answers.q1.choice="unlisted";},
+  r=>{r.result.answers.q1.probabilities.c0=0.9;},
+  r=>{r.result.answers.q2.score=Infinity;},
+  r=>{delete r.result.answers.q2.probabilities["1"];},
+  r=>{r.result.model="other";}
+ ]) { const r=response(); mutate(r); assert.throws(()=>decodeResponse(r,req),InvalidResponse); }
+});
+test("reject oversized evidence and unsupported score rubrics before network I/O",()=>{
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch({...batch,state:"x".repeat(24576)},"clef-flash"),UnsupportedInput);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch({state:"x",questions:{s:{type:"score",criteria:Array(11).fill("x")}}},"clef"),UnsupportedInput);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(batch,"not-a-clef-model"),UnsupportedInput);
+});
+test("round-trips untrusted map keys without object prototype mutation",()=>{
+ const criteria=JSON.parse('{"__proto__":"A","constructor":"B"}');
+ const b={state:"x",questions:JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"type":"choice","criteria":{"__proto__":"A","constructor":"B"}}}')};
+ const req=encodeBatch(b,"clef-flash");
+ const r=decodeResponse({model:"clef-flash",answers:{q0:{type:"choice",choice:"c0",probabilities:{c0:0.8,c1:0.2}}}},req);
+ assert.equal(r.answers["__proto__"].choice,"__proto__");
+ assert.equal(Object.getPrototypeOf(r.answers),null);
+ assert.equal(Object.prototype.polluted,undefined);
+});
+
+test("extracts real PNG, JPEG and WebP images and preserves text and metadata",()=>{
+ const pngUrl=dataUrl("png",png(2,2)), webpUrl=dataUrl("webp",webp);
+ const input={state:{caption:`Compare ${pngUrl} with ${webpUrl}.`,
+   photo:{content_type:"image/jpeg",base64:jpeg.toString("base64"),shipment_id:"GN42",description:"front"},
+   text:{content_type:"text/plain",base64:"SGVsbG8=",description:"retain"}},
+  questions:{q:{type:"boolean",instructions:"Do they match?"}}};
+ const req=encodeBatch(input,"clef-flash");
+ assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(req.payload),["model","images","state","questions"]);
+ assert.deepEqual(req.payload.images,[pngUrl,webpUrl,{content_type:"image/jpeg",base64:jpeg.toString("base64")}]);
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state.caption,"Compare [image #1] with [image #2].");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state.photo.base64,"[image #3]");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state.photo.shipment_id,"GN42");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state.photo.description,"front");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state.photo.content_type,"image/jpeg");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state.text.content_type,"text/plain");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state.text.base64,"SGVsbG8=");
+ const plain=encodeBatch(imageBatch("data:text/plain;base64,SGVsbG8="),"clef-flash");
+ assert.equal("images" in plain.payload,false);
+ assert.equal(plain.payload.state,"data:text/plain;base64,SGVsbG8=");
+});
+
+test("normalizes line-wrapped standalone Base64 and preserves surrounding prose",()=>{
+ const image=png(2,2), canonical=dataUrl("png",image);
+ const folded=image.toString("base64").match(/.{1,24}/g).join("\r\n");
+ const req=encodeBatch(imageBatch(`  data:image/png;base64,${folded}  `),"clef");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state,"  [image #1]  ");
+ assert.deepEqual(req.payload.images,[canonical]);
+ const trailing=encodeBatch(imageBatch(`${dataUrl("jpeg",jpeg)} and keep this text`),"clef");
+ assert.equal(trailing.payload.state,"[image #1] and keep this text");
+});
+
+test("passes an actual 2 MiB PNG without counting its Base64 as text",()=>{
+ const image=png(900,800,{noise:true});
+ assert.ok(image.length>2*MiB && image.length<4*MiB);
+ const req=encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("png",image)),"clef-flash");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.images.length,1);
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state,"[image #1]");
+ assert.ok(Buffer.byteLength(req.body)>2*MiB);
+});
+
+test("allows four images and rejects the fifth before sending",()=>{
+ const image=dataUrl("png",png(1,1));
+ assert.equal(encodeBatch(imageBatch(Array(4).fill(image)),"clef").payload.images.length,4);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(Array(5).fill(image)),"clef"),/at most 4 images/);
+});
+
+test("enforces individual and aggregate decoded byte limits",()=>{
+ const tiny=png(1,1), max=png(1,1,{targetSize:4*MiB});
+ const oversized=png(1,1,{targetSize:4*MiB+1});
+ const underMax=png(1,1,{targetSize:4*MiB-tiny.length+1});
+ const maxUrl=dataUrl("png",max);
+ assert.equal(encodeBatch(imageBatch(maxUrl),"clef").payload.images.length,1);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("png",oversized)),"clef"),/4 MiB/);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("png",Buffer.alloc(4*MiB+2))),"clef"),/4 MiB/);
+ const total=encodeBatch(imageBatch([maxUrl,maxUrl]),"clef");
+ assert.equal(total.payload.images.length,2);
+ assert.ok(Buffer.byteLength(total.body)<=13*MiB);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch([maxUrl,dataUrl("png",underMax),dataUrl("png",tiny)]),"clef"),/8 MiB/);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch("x".repeat(13*MiB+1)),"clef"),/context budget/);
+});
+
+test("enforces 16 megapixels for PNG, JPEG and extended WebP",()=>{
+ assert.equal(encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("png",png(4000,4000))),"clef").payload.images.length,1);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("png",png(4001,4000))),"clef"),/16 megapixel/);
+ const jpegTooLarge=Buffer.from(jpeg), sof=jpegTooLarge.indexOf(Buffer.from([0xff,0xc0]));
+ assert.ok(sof>=0); jpegTooLarge.writeUInt16BE(4000,sof+5); jpegTooLarge.writeUInt16BE(4001,sof+7);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("jpeg",jpegTooLarge)),"clef"),/16 megapixel/);
+ const webpTooLarge=Buffer.from(webpExtended), vp8x=webpTooLarge.indexOf("VP8X");
+ assert.ok(vp8x>=0); webpTooLarge.writeUIntLE(4000,vp8x+12,3); webpTooLarge.writeUIntLE(3999,vp8x+15,3);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("webp",webpTooLarge)),"clef"),/16 megapixel/);
+ const frameTooLarge=Buffer.from(webpExtended), frame=frameTooLarge.indexOf("VP8 ");
+ assert.ok(frame>=0); frameTooLarge.writeUInt16LE(5000,frame+14); frameTooLarge.writeUInt16LE(4000,frame+16);
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("webp",frameTooLarge)),"clef"),/16 megapixel/);
+ for (const image of [webp,webpLossless,webpExtended])
+  assert.equal(encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl("webp",image)),"clef").payload.images.length,1);
+});
+
+test("rejects malformed Base64, unsupported image types and mismatched or incomplete files",()=>{
+ for (const image of [
+  "",
+  "",
+  "",
+  dataUrl("png",jpeg),
+  "",
+  {content_type:"image/jpeg",base64:"Zm9v"},
+  {content_type:"image/png",base64:"https://example.com/image.png"}
+ ]) assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(image),"clef"),UnsupportedInput);
+ const unpadded=jpeg.toString("base64").replace(/=+$/,"");
+ const req=encodeBatch(imageBatch({content_type:"image/jpeg",base64:unpadded}),"clef");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.images[0].base64,jpeg.toString("base64"));
+ assert.equal(encodeBatch(imageBatch("https://example.com/image.png"),"clef").payload.state,"https://example.com/image.png");
+});
+
+test("rejects truncated image containers as unsupported input",()=>{
+ for (const [type,image] of [["png",png(2,2)],["jpeg",jpeg],["webp",webpExtended]]) {
+  for (let length=0;length<image.length;length++) {
+   assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(dataUrl(type,image.subarray(0,length))),"clef"),UnsupportedInput);
+  }
+ }
+});
+
+test("extracts only sent fields and keeps state and question references in array order",()=>{
+ const a=dataUrl("png",png(1,1)), b=dataUrl("webp",webp), c=dataUrl("jpeg",jpeg);
+ const input={state:`State ${a} end`,questions:{q:{type:"choice",instructions:`Inspect ${b}!`,
+  criteria:{yes:`Shown in ${c}`,no:"No"},metadata:{unused:Array(5).fill(a)}}}};
+ const req=encodeBatch(input,"clef");
+ assert.deepEqual(req.payload.images,[a,b,c]);
+ assert.equal(req.payload.state,"State [image #1] end");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.questions.q0.instructions,"Inspect [image #2]!");
+ assert.equal(req.payload.questions.q0.criteria.c0.description,"Shown in [image #3]");
+ assert.equal("metadata" in req.payload.questions.q0,false);
+});
+
+test("extracts image choice labels while returning the original choice key",()=>{
+ const image=dataUrl("png",png(1,1));
+ const input={state:"Choose a picture",questions:{q:{type:"choice",instructions:"Choose",criteria:{[image]:"picture",none:"no picture"}}}};
+ const req=encodeBatch(input,"clef");
+ assert.deepEqual(req.payload.images,[image]);
+ assert.equal(req.payload.questions.q0.criteria.c0.label,"[image #1]");
+ const result=decodeResponse({model:"clef",answers:{q0:{type:"choice",choice:"c0",probabilities:{c0:0.9,c1:0.1}}}},req);
+ assert.equal(result.answers.q.choice,image);
+ assert.equal(result.answers.q.probabilities[image],0.9);
+});
+
+test("reserves image tokens in the text context and checks encoding deadlines",()=>{
+ const image=dataUrl("png",png(1,1));
+ assert.doesNotThrow(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch("x".repeat(21000)),"clef-flash"));
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch({text:"x".repeat(21000),images:Array(4).fill(image)}),"clef-flash"),/context budget/);
+ let checks=0;
+ assert.throws(()=>encodeBatch(imageBatch(image),"clef",()=>{if (++checks===3) throw new Error("deadline");}),/deadline/);
+});
diff --git a/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/store-secret.ps1 b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/store-secret.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebec1db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external_plugins/cloudflare-clef/server/store-secret.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# One-time credential setup for the cloudflare-clef plugin.
+# Stores the Cloudflare Account ID and API token DPAPI-encrypted (bound to the current
+# Windows user) at %USERPROFILE%\.zcode\secrets\cloudflare-clef.json.
+# Re-run to rotate credentials; delete that file to revoke them.
+# Interactive by default; -AccountId/-Token parameters enable non-interactive automation.
+param(
+  [string]$AccountId,
+  [string]$Token
+)
+$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
+
+$secretPath = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE ".zcode\secrets\cloudflare-clef.json"
+
+# Non-interactive automation via environment variables: preferred over
+# -Token/-AccountId parameters, which are visible in the process command line.
+if (-not $AccountId -and $env:CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID) { $AccountId = $env:CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID }
+if (-not $Token -and $env:CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN) { $Token = $env:CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN }
+if (-not $AccountId) { $AccountId = Read-Host "Cloudflare Account ID (32 hex characters)" }
+if (-not $Token) {
+  $tokenSecure = Read-Host "Cloudflare API Token (input hidden)" -AsSecureString
+} else {
+  $tokenSecure = ConvertTo-SecureString $Token -AsPlainText -Force
+}
+
+if ($AccountId -notmatch '^[a-fA-F0-9]{32}$') { throw "Account ID must be exactly 32 hex characters (got: $AccountId)." }
+if ($tokenSecure.Length -eq 0) { throw "API token must not be empty." }
+
+$encAccount = ConvertFrom-SecureString (ConvertTo-SecureString $AccountId -AsPlainText -Force)
+$encToken = ConvertFrom-SecureString $tokenSecure
+
+$dir = Split-Path -Parent $secretPath
+New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $dir | Out-Null
+@{ accountId = $encAccount; apiToken = $encToken } |
+  ConvertTo-Json -Compress |
+  Set-Content -LiteralPath $secretPath -Encoding ASCII
+
+# Round-trip check: the same Windows user must be able to decrypt what was just written.
+$check = Get-Content -LiteralPath $secretPath -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json
+ConvertTo-SecureString -String $check.apiToken | Out-Null
+ConvertTo-SecureString -String $check.accountId | Out-Null
+
+Write-Host "Stored DPAPI-encrypted credentials at $secretPath"
+Write-Host "(Bound to this Windows user; the file is useless if copied to another machine or user account.)"
+Write-Host "Restart ZCode so the plugin's MCP server picks them up."
diff --git a/marketplace.json b/marketplace.json
index c7f09a0..c356225 100644
--- a/marketplace.json
+++ b/marketplace.json
@@ -1443,6 +1443,34 @@
         "mcp",
         "verification"
       ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "cloudflare-clef",
+      "source": "./external_plugins/cloudflare-clef",
+      "displayName": "Cloudflare CLEF Decisions",
+      "displayName_i18n": {
+        "en": "Cloudflare CLEF Decisions",
+        "zh-CN": "Cloudflare CLEF 决策评测"
+      },
+      "description": "Decision evaluation on Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF / CLEF Flash, exposed as the MCP tool clef_evaluate. Credentials are DPAPI-encrypted at rest. Images attach by absolute local file path or embedded data URL. Protocol layer ported verbatim from the MIT-licensed OpenClaw plugin openclaw-cloudflare-clef 0.1.3.",
+      "description_i18n": {
+        "en": "Decision evaluation on Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF / CLEF Flash, exposed as the MCP tool clef_evaluate. Credentials are DPAPI-encrypted at rest. Images attach by absolute local file path or embedded data URL. Protocol layer ported verbatim from the MIT-licensed OpenClaw plugin openclaw-cloudflare-clef 0.1.3.",
+        "zh-CN": "基于 Cloudflare Workers AI CLEF / CLEF Flash 的结构化决策评测 MCP 工具 clef_evaluate，凭据经 DPAPI 加密落盘。图片支持绝对路径本地文件或内嵌 data URL 两种挂载方式。协议层逐字节移植自 MIT 许可的 OpenClaw 插件 openclaw-cloudflare-clef 0.1.3。"
+      },
+      "version": "0.3.0",
+      "author": {
+        "name": "TriDefender",
+        "url": "https://github.com/TriDefender"
+      },
+      "category": "developer-tools",
+      "keywords": [
+        "cloudflare",
+        "workers-ai",
+        "clef",
+        "decision",
+        "triage",
+        "mcp"
+      ]
     }
   ]
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}