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fix(guard): judge find -exec commands and literal expanded program names (#455) - #465
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…mes (#455) The hard rules now judge the words after -exec/-execdir/-ok/-okdir, up to \; ';' or {} +, as a command, so `find . -exec sudo id \;` is denied. The split reuses the stage walk's -exec cut. An expansion that is a whole word and prints a bare program name ($(printf NAME), $(echo NAME), `echo NAME`, ${X:-NAME} and friends) is replaced by that name before judging, as is eval of a literal echo/printf. The name counts only in command position, so `echo $(printf sudo)` and `grep ${X:-sudo} f` stay allowed. Expansions that need evaluating ($X, $(cat f), format strings, echo -n) are out of scope and pinned by tests. Bumps to 10.2.26. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Zj1PCfsSSJgzLxi32jvde
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📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughThe guard now evaluates commands extracted from ChangesHard-rule command coverage
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change extends the guard to judge commands inside Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change strengthens command checks without adding execution privileges. Existing authorization-scope limitations remain, and complete enforcement across the newly recognized forms has not been established. Retained concerns Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @src/omind/guard.py:
- Around line 3987-3999: Add a test for _find_exec_commands with two -exec
actions in the same segment, where the second is “-exec grep sudo {} +”; verify
the detected command is the second action rather than the earlier one.
- Around line 4003-4027: Update _EVAL_LITERAL_RE so the words capture and
trailing whitespace cannot both consume the same characters, preventing
excessive backtracking on unterminated eval fragments. Preserve the supported
quoted and unquoted literal-word forms, including allowed whitespace.
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BACKLOG.mdCHANGELOG.mdpyproject.tomlsrc/omind/__init__.pysrc/omind/guard.pytests/test_guard.py
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Source excerpt: The version is declared in three places that must stay in lockstep — `pyproject.toml`, `src/omind/__init__.py`, and `uv.lock` — and a test asserts `__version__` matches `pyproject.toml`, so a release can't leave one behind.
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pyproject.tomlsrc/omind/__init__.pyCHANGELOG.md
Source excerpt: This file and the GitHub **[Issues tab](https://github.com/CryptoJones/omind/issues)** are two views of the same list and must stay in sync.
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BACKLOG.md
🪛 ast-grep (0.45.3)
src/omind/guard.py
[warning] 4013-4019: Regex pattern passed to re is built from a non-literal (variable, call, concatenation, or f-string) value. If that value is attacker-controlled it can introduce a malicious pattern with catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS). Use a hardcoded literal pattern, or validate/escape untrusted input with re.escape() and bound the regex complexity before compiling.
Context: re.compile(
r'(?<![^\s;&|(])(?P<dq>"?)(?:' r"\$\([ \t]*(?:echo|printf)[ \t]+" + _literal_name("a") + r"[ \t]*\)" r"|[ \t](?:echo|printf)[ \t]+" + _literal_name("b") + r"[ \t]`"
r"|${\w+:?[-=]" + _literal_name("c") + r"}"
r")(?P=dq)(?=[\s;&|)]|\Z)"
)
Note: [CWE-1333] Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity.
(redos-non-literal-regex-python)
🪛 markdownlint-cli2 (0.23.2)
CHANGELOG.md
[warning] 12-12: Headings should be surrounded by blank lines
Expected: 1; Actual: 0; Below
(MD022, blanks-around-headings)
🔇 Additional comments (5)
tests/test_guard.py (1)
3536-3614: LGTM!CHANGELOG.md (1)
10-12: LGTM!BACKLOG.md (1)
82-89: LGTM!pyproject.toml (1)
3-3: LGTM!src/omind/__init__.py (1)
5-5: LGTM!
EM review: changes requested (Flatline Roundtable: HAL9000, Cortana, TheDixieFlatline)The Must fix
Should fix
Tests
Version: at push time, set it one patch above origin/main. Main is 10.2.25; #466 (#460) may take 10.2.26 first. Proudly Made in Nebraska. Go Big Red! 🌽 https://xkcd.com/2347/ |
- _EVAL_LITERAL_RE matches each blank run one way only (words are
blank-separated non-blank runs; the in-quote blanks match only when
quoted), so `eval "$(echo ` plus a long blank run is linear, not cubic.
- Each find action's command is its own subject, so one command's opt-in
never covers another's sudo.
- The expanded text is searched again, one level deep: $(printf bash) -c,
${X:-sh} -c and $(printf find) . -exec are judged.
- ${X:+NAME} and ${X+NAME}; eval of backticks, of "\$(...)" and with
blanks inside the quotes; echo -n/-e/-E, printf --, a path or
command/builtin as the printer.
- find stages only: every -exec/-execdir/-ok/-okdir word, quoted or not,
starts a candidate command, so a primary's value or a quoted action word
cannot hide one. mytool -ok sudo x stays an argument.
- Stdin-script words get the literal expansion too.
- Tests: deny table under POSIX and Windows tokenizing, the benign list
under both, per-command opt-in, fail-open when either new search raises,
and linear-time pins at 10,000 and 100,000.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Zj1PCfsSSJgzLxi32jvde
Fixer response to the EM review (eb2156e)All six must-fix items, all three should-fix items, and the test requests are done. The probe prints Must fix
Should fix
Tests
Gates
Version
Proudly Made in Nebraska. Go Big Red! 🌽 https://xkcd.com/2347/ |
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EM merge for #455. Reviewed by the Flatline Roundtable (HAL9000, Cortana, TheDixieFlatline), plus one fix round. Probes on the final head (
Each Documented out of scope (would need real evaluation): All 23 CI jobs are green. Releasing as 10.2.26. Proudly Made in Nebraska. Go Big Red! 🌽 https://xkcd.com/2347/ |
1 participant
Summary
The hard rules now judge two command-indirection forms they used to skip (#455).
find -exec/-execdir/-ok/-okdir\;,';',";"or{} +, are judged as a command.find . -exec sudo id \;is denied._program_stagesalready cuts a segment at each action (rules: #413 shell-site walker gaps (heredoc piped to bash regression, interpreter heredoc exec, cd ~user raise, env -C, quadratic find -exec chains) #432/fix(rules): close five #413 shell-site walker gaps (#432) #446). A stage that shares its segment's end with the stage before it is an-execcommand. Its text is taken from the action word on, so wrappers (-exec env sudo id) and an opt-in assignment are read the way the hard rules read any other command. The new subject is added in_local_shell_subjects, which meansbash -cbodies get it too.find . -name sudo,find . -exec grep sudo {} +,find . -exec echo sudo \;,find . -exec ls {} \; -name sudoandfind -exec sed -i s/sudo/x/ {} +.Expansion forms: option (a), clear shapes only
$(printf NAME),$(echo 'NAME'),`echo NAME`, and${X:-NAME}(also-,=,:=). Any of these may be double-quoted as one word. Each one is replaced by NAME, and the result becomes an extracodesubject. The same applies toevalof a literalecho/printf.echo $(printf sudo),grep ${X:-sudo} f,echo '$(printf sudo) id',${EDITOR:-vi} fileandeval "$(ssh-agent -s)"all stay allowed.X=sudo; $X id,$(cat f) id,$(printf '%s' sudo) id,$(echo -n sudo) idandeval "$(cat f)". Judging any of these would mean evaluating the expansion.I stayed out of
decide, the deadline layer and the filesystem lookups (#460).False-positive impact
WRAPPED_BENIGN_COMMANDS,BENIGN_STDIN_OPERAND_COMMANDS, the wrapper-cluster benign list) are unchanged and pass.x=$(printf sudo)was already denied on main before this change. That is a pre-existing false positive from the assignment skip, and this PR does not touch it.Test evidence
test_hard_rules_judge_find_exec_and_expanded_programs, with 28 commands each tokenized both POSIX and Windows style, andtest_hard_rules_leave_find_args_and_unread_expansions_alone, with 23 commands. With the two new helpers stubbed out, 54 of the 56 deny cases fail. The other two (bash -c 'find . -exec sudo id \;'and its Windows twin) were already denied through the opaque-site path.probe453.py: thefindrow now printsok. Every other row keeps its result, including the knownFP allow 'source <(grep -v sudo .env)'.perf446.py: hard rules 0.00 to 0.01 s.probe459.py: unchanged, at most 0.02 s. Adversarial cases timed the same with the helpers on and off: 2,000-exec sudoclauses took 0.036 s against 0.029 s, and 5,000$(printf sudo) id;took 0.147 s against 0.131 s.ruff check .: clean.mypy src: clean.pytest -q: 3621 passed, 12 skipped.Version 10.2.26. BACKLOG line moved to Done.
Closes #455
Proudly Made in Nebraska. Go Big Red! 🌽 https://xkcd.com/2347/
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