Add 11 IAM privilege escalation paths: cross-account trust, boundary bypass, Identity Center, deny removal - #29
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…missions boundary bypass, Identity Center escalation, deny policy removal
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Thanks for this contribution @paramanandmallik. I will review! Adding the paths that encompass permissions boundary bypasses was def on my to-do list, so thanks for getting that part started! |
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Thanks for the quick response. |
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@sethsec Hi Seth, Do we have any update on this PR? |
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Hi @paramanandmallik! Sorry for the crazy delay on this. I had a few deadlines that I was driving towards that prevented me from giving this PR the time it needs. I think a few of these paths are 100% easy decisions, but a few will require me to change the definition of what a path is or to make more sub-catagories. but the good news is that im getting much closer towards handling this PR! |
This PR adds 11 new privilege escalation paths spanning four categories that are currently unrepresented or underrepresented in the library.
The existing pathfinding.cloud collection covers same-account AssumeRole and various PassRole combinations well, but has gaps in cross-account trust abuse scenarios. This contribution adds three STS paths documenting how roles can be compromised when trust policies lack ExternalId conditions, use wildcard principals, or when an attacker can rewrite trust policies via iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy to inject self-trust. These are among the most common real-world misconfigurations found in multi-account AWS environments.
The library also had no coverage of permissions boundary bypass techniques. The three new IAM paths (iam-022 through iam-024) document how boundaries can be deleted or replaced with permissive policies, restoring the full unconstrained permissions of a principal whose policies were always broader than the boundary allowed. These are particularly relevant because many organizations rely on boundaries as their primary privilege containment mechanism.
Identity Center (SSO) escalation is an entirely new category for the library. The three sso-admin paths document how attackers with SSO management permissions can create new admin permission sets, attach AdministratorAccess to existing permission sets, or inject inline admin policies — gaining organizational-wide access through the SSO portal.
Finally, two paths document deny policy removal as an escalation vector. When organizations use attached deny policies as guardrails rather than SCPs, an attacker with DetachUserPolicy or DeleteUserPolicy can remove those guardrails and re-enable previously-blocked escalation paths.
All 11 files pass validate-schema.py and include full exploitation steps (awscli), attack visualizations with conditional branching, actionable remediation guidance with SCP examples, and proper discovery attribution.