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fix(core): hardening follow-ups (symlink policy, supply chain, TODO triage) - #63
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Summary
Hardening follow-ups from the fork audit, split into logical commits.
1. Archive extraction symlink policy
path_guard::remove_escaping_symlinkssweeps a directory for symlinks whose resolved target escapes the install root (canonicalize for existing targets, lexical fallback for dangling links, no traversal of linked dirs).pipeline::sweep_extraction_symlinksruns afterextract_rar,extract_iso,extract_archiveandinnoextract: escaping links are unlinked and the step fails with an actionable error; links resolving inside the install dir (legit Linux releases) are kept.docs/implementation/archive-symlink-policy.md.path_guardtests + 3pipelinetests.2. cargo-deny breadth
security.ymlcargo-deny job now uses the same 7-crate matrix as cargo-audit (cli,torrential,desktop/src-tauri,libraries/{droplet,droplet_types,libarchive,native_model}), discovering the rootdeny.toml; lockfiles are generated for the vendored crates like cargo-audit already does.AGPL-3.0-only(12 crates were missing a license field).deny.toml:unmaintained = "workspace"(transitive Tauri/GTK unmaintained stack stays a weekly cargo-audit signal) + scopedRUSTSEC-2025-0141ignore forbincode, a direct dep of the vendorednative_model.chacha20 0.10.1 -> 0.10.2indesktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock.docs/implementation/rust-supply-chain-policy.md.3. Upstream docs correction
upstream-pr1/2docs androadmap-status.mdnow point at the real open PRs #497 (upstream-pr/platform-stability) and #498 (upstream-pr/generic-plugin-spi); stale duplicateupstream/pr{1,2}-*branches (commit536e63ac) are noted only, not deleted.4. TODO triage (real fixes)
session/index.ts), viaisEventso headers-only callers are unaffected.writeWithPermissionsrefuses to overwrite unless the caller passesallowOverwrite; thePOST /api/v1/object/[id]update endpoint opts in explicitly.FsObjectBackend::writetruncates before writing so shorter payloads can't leave stale trailing bytes. New unit tests for the overwrite policy.If-None-Matchcaching, optionalGITHUB_TOKEN, and 403/429 rate-limit responses log the reset time and return instead of failing the task.cloud_savesresolver: unreadable/undiscoverable save paths are skipped with a warning instead of panicking onunwrap.(TODO)markers fromuser.recent(en_us/de).5. Input backend honesty
supported_backends()now reports onlyNullBackend;Uinput/ViGEmstay in the enum as documented, not-yet-implemented API surface (noInputBackendimpl exists).6. Docs honesty
OverlaySlotSPI claim; the overlay slot names are registered inClientPluginManagerbut nothing mounts them.ChunkFetcher).Verification
pnpm --filter drop run test-> 13/13 files (incl. new objectHandler tests)pnpm --filter drop run typecheck-> cleanpnpm --filter drop run lint-> clean (0 errors; pre-existing warnings unchanged)cargo +nightly test --manifest-path desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml -p cloud_saves -p input-> 14 + 6 passedpath_guardtests run standalone (8/8) becausecargo test -p processcannot link GTK/WebKit on this box;cargo +nightly check --manifest-path desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml --tests -p processcompiles cleancargo deny check-> ok (advisories/bans/licenses/sources) for all 7 cratesrustfmt --checkclean on touched Rust filesDeliberately left out
object:updateendpoint (explicit opt-in) — the audit asked to preserve intended update behavior; all other paths are create-only.cargo test -p processlocal link failure is an environment limitation documented in AGENTS.md, not a code issue.