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Fix/1530 1531 1545 1546 - #1647
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… approvals - vault: validate_strategy_response rejects the zero strategy address, asset tokens with more than 30 decimals and values outside 0..=MAX_STRATEGY_VALUE; harvested Korean yield is bounded and rebalance checks the target strategy's deposit delta with StrategyValidator (Junirezz#1530) - permissions: MultiSignerValidator returns VaultError, uses Map-backed sets for duplicate / membership checks and calls require_auth on every approver; require_governance_threshold picks the signer set without auth so each approver signs once (Junirezz#1531) - fix pre-existing compile errors in rounding.rs, total_assets, the wasm zero-address check and vault lib tests so the tests run Closes Junirezz#1530 Closes Junirezz#1531
Same repairs as the OpenAPI branch: decode base64-encoded healthProbe.ts and apiKeyAuth.ts, drop duplicated merge blocks in eventOutbox, idempotency, apiError, pagination, tracing, outboxPoller, vaultEndpoints and routes/vaults, fix the @yieldvault/api-schemas dependency name, sync the lockfile and remove a trailing comma in the root package.json.
- prisma/postgres-type-mapping.json maps every PostgreSQL NUMERIC / JSONB / TIMESTAMPTZ / DATE column to its Prisma (SQLite) field or null - scripts/check-type-mapping.js (npm run db:check-types) fails when a divergent column is unmapped, a mapped column/field disappears, or a Prisma type no longer matches; runs in Backend Governance CI - src/numericColumns.ts: NUMERIC(38, 18) string encoding with 38-digit Decimal precision, plus precision and drift tests - docs/DB_TYPE_MAPPING.md Closes Junirezz#1546
Move route handlers out of the 5.6k-line src/index.ts into feature routers: - routes/vault.ts: vault summary / metrics / APY / health (legacy, v1, v2) - routes/transactions.ts: transaction exports and admin backfill - routes/webhooks.ts: webhook verification, /api/v1/webhooks and /admin/webhooks/* (incl. deduplication) - routes/exports.ts: /admin/exports/* and /admin/reports/exports/* - routes/admin.ts: remaining /admin/* operational endpoints - routes/shared.ts: helpers and the health cache used by several modules Handler bodies are moved verbatim. index.ts (now ~880 lines) keeps the middleware stack, health/ops routes and startup wiring, and mounts the routers where the routes used to be registered, so the effective route table, handler chains and ordering of overlapping routes are unchanged; the full Jest suite gives identical per-test results before and after. Closes Junirezz#1545
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| router.post('/admin/reports/exports/manifests/:id/verify', validateApiKey, validate({ params: IdParamSchema, body: ChecksumVerifyBodySchema }), async (req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| const checksum = String(req.body?.checksum || '').trim(); | ||
| if (!checksum) { | ||
| res.status(400).json({ | ||
| error: 'Bad Request', | ||
| status: 400, | ||
| message: 'checksum is required', | ||
| }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| const result = await verifyExportManifestChecksum(String(req.params.id), checksum); | ||
| if (!result.manifest) { | ||
| res.status(404).json({ | ||
| error: 'Not Found', | ||
| status: 404, | ||
| message: 'Export manifest not found', | ||
| }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| res.status(200).json({ | ||
| match: result.match, | ||
| manifest: result.manifest, | ||
| timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), | ||
| }); | ||
| }); |
| const walletAddress = | ||
| typeof req.query.walletAddress === 'string' ? normalizeWalletAddress(req.query.walletAddress) : undefined; | ||
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| const apiKeyMatch = authHeader.match(/^ApiKey\s+(.+)$/i); |
| }; | ||
| } | ||
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| const bearerMatch = authHeader.match(/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i); |
| * POST /api/v1/webhooks — authenticated clients register an HTTPS callback | ||
| * instead of polling for transaction/vault events. | ||
| */ | ||
| apiV1WebhookRoutes.post('/webhooks', requireAuth, validate({ body: WebhookRegisterSchema }), (req: Request, res: Response) => { |
| } | ||
| }); | ||
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| apiV1WebhookRoutes.get('/webhooks', requireAuth, validate({ query: PaginationQuerySchema }), (req: Request, res: Response) => { |
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| router.post('/webhooks/verify', validate({ body: WebhookVerifyBodySchema }), (req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| const { secret, payload, signature } = req.body || {}; | ||
| if (typeof secret !== 'string' || !secret.trim()) { | ||
| res.status(400).json({ | ||
| error: 'Bad Request', | ||
| status: 400, | ||
| message: 'secret is required and must be a non-empty string', | ||
| }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| if (typeof payload === 'undefined') { | ||
| res.status(400).json({ | ||
| error: 'Bad Request', | ||
| status: 400, | ||
| message: 'payload is required', | ||
| }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| const computedSignature = createWebhookSignature(secret, payload); | ||
| const verified = | ||
| typeof signature === 'string' && signature.length > 0 | ||
| ? verifyWebhookSignature(secret, payload, signature) | ||
| : null; | ||
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| res.status(200).json({ | ||
| algorithm: 'HMAC-SHA256', | ||
| signature: computedSignature, | ||
| verified, | ||
| }); | ||
| }); |
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| router.post('/admin/webhooks/:id/verify', validateApiKey, validate({ params: IdParamSchema }), async (req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| try { | ||
| const endpoint = await verifyWebhookEndpoint(req.params.id); | ||
| if (!endpoint) { | ||
| res.status(404).json({ | ||
| error: 'Not Found', | ||
| status: 404, | ||
| message: 'Webhook endpoint not found', | ||
| }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| await recordAdminAuditLog(req, 'webhook.verify', endpoint.verificationStatus === 'verified' ? 200 : 422, { | ||
| endpointId: endpoint.id, | ||
| verificationStatus: endpoint.verificationStatus, | ||
| lastVerificationError: endpoint.lastVerificationError, | ||
| }); | ||
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| res.status(endpoint.verificationStatus === 'verified' ? 200 : 422).json({ | ||
| message: | ||
| endpoint.verificationStatus === 'verified' | ||
| ? 'Webhook endpoint verified' | ||
| : 'Webhook endpoint verification failed', | ||
| endpoint, | ||
| }); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| res.status(500).json({ | ||
| error: 'Internal Server Error', | ||
| status: 500, | ||
| message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Failed to verify webhook endpoint', | ||
| }); | ||
| } | ||
| }); |
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| router.post('/api/v1/webhooks/verify', validate({ body: WebhookVerifyBodySchema }), (req: Request, res: Response) => { | ||
| const { secret, payload, signature } = req.body || {}; | ||
| if (typeof secret !== 'string' || !secret.trim()) { | ||
| res.status(400).json({ | ||
| error: 'Bad Request', | ||
| status: 400, | ||
| message: 'secret is required and must be a non-empty string', | ||
| }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| if (typeof payload === 'undefined') { | ||
| res.status(400).json({ | ||
| error: 'Bad Request', | ||
| status: 400, | ||
| message: 'payload is required', | ||
| }); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| const computedSignature = createWebhookSignature(secret, payload); | ||
| const verified = | ||
| typeof signature === 'string' && signature.length > 0 | ||
| ? verifyWebhookSignature(secret, payload, signature) | ||
| : null; | ||
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| res.status(200).json({ | ||
| algorithm: 'HMAC-SHA256', | ||
| signature: computedSignature, | ||
| verified, | ||
| }); | ||
| }); |
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🚀 Overview
This Pull Request delivers comprehensive smart contract security hardening, automated database schema drift validation, and Express router refactoring for Junirezz/YieldVault-RWA:
validate_strategy_response(rejecting zero-address strategies, asset tokens exceeding 30 decimals, and strategy valuations outsideMultiSignerValidatorto return typedVaultErrorvariants, enforces Sorobanapprover.require_auth()cryptographic signatures per signer, and replacesprisma/postgres-type-mapping.json), documents numeric precision constraints (docs/DB_TYPE_MAPPING.md), adds high-precision decimal helpers (src/numericColumns.ts), and wires an automated CI schema drift check (npm run db:check-types).backend/src/index.tsinto isolated feature routers (routes/vault.ts,transactions.ts,webhooks.ts,exports.ts,admin.ts,shared.ts) with zero route table or middleware chain behavioral drift.🔑 Linked Issues
🛠️ Summary of Changes
🛡️ 1. Strategy Valuation Bounds & Consistency (
contracts/vault/src/) (#1530)validate_strategy_responsenow explicitly validates against zero-address strategy targets, asset token decimalsMAX_STRATEGY_VALUE(returningVaultError::MathOverflow).MAX_STRATEGY_VALUE,MAX_STRATEGY_VALUE + 1,i128::MAX,total_assetsevaluations.🔐 2. Multi-Signer Authentication & Set-Based Dedup (
contracts/vault/src/permissions.rs) (#1531)approver.require_auth()per signer to ensure authorization payloads cannot be spoofed.GovernanceThresholdNotMeterrors with specificVaultError::InvalidGovernanceThresholdandVaultError::DuplicateVotevariants.🗄️ 3. Postgres/Prisma Type Mapping & Drift Check (
backend/) (#1546)prisma/postgres-type-mapping.jsonanddocs/DB_TYPE_MAPPING.mdmapping every Postgres nativeDECIMAL,JSONB, andTIMESTAMPTZcolumn to its corresponding Prisma field.npm run db:check-types(running in the Backend Governance CI pipeline) to verify schema alignment without requiring an active database instance.src/numericColumns.tsand unit tests ensuring Decimal.js default precision caps (20 digits) are extended to handle full 38-digit integer and 18-decimal Postgres precision without truncation.🧩 4. Express Monolith Router Decomposition (
backend/src/) (#1545)index.tsfrom ~5,600 to ~880 lines by extracting handlers into:routes/vault.ts: Vault management endpoints.routes/transactions.ts: Deposit/withdrawal flows.routes/webhooks.ts: Off-chain and bridge webhook event handlers.routes/exports.ts: Report generation routes.routes/admin.ts: Administrative and impersonation routes.routes/shared.ts: Shared middleware and route utility helpers.📁 Key Files Touched
contracts/vault/src/lib.rscontracts/vault/src/permissions.rsapprover.require_auth(), map-based dedup, and granularVaultErrorreturns.backend/src/index.tsbackend/src/routes/vault.ts,transactions.ts,webhooks.ts,exports.ts,admin.ts,shared.ts).backend/prisma/postgres-type-mapping.jsonbackend/docs/DB_TYPE_MAPPING.mdbackend/src/numericColumns.ts🧪 Verification Logs
cargo test -p vault). Existing baseline test failures onmain(36 tests) remain unchanged.npm run db:check-typespassed cleanly.