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Security: Murillofilho86/protondrive4linux

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

protondrive4linux is an unofficial, community-maintained client — not affiliated with or endorsed by Proton AG. All account authentication, encryption, and storage are handled entirely by the official proton-drive CLI; this project only orchestrates it.

Scope

In scope: the sync engine, the CLI, the GUI, the watcher, packaging (PKGBUILD, .deb, .rpm), and the release/update pipeline in this repository.

Out of scope: the proton-drive CLI itself, and Proton's servers/infrastructure. Report those to Proton directly at security.protonmail.com or via their own bug bounty program — a report filed here about the official CLI's internals will just be redirected.

Supported versions

Only the latest release is supported. This project is pre-1.0 and does not maintain security backports to older versions — please upgrade before reporting an issue that may already be fixed.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository (Security tab → Report a vulnerability). This reaches the maintainer directly and privately.

Include, where relevant:

  • What you found and why it's a security issue (not just a bug).
  • Steps to reproduce, or a minimal example.
  • The version/commit you tested against.
  • Whether you believe user data (synced files, credentials, local baseline state) is at risk.

What to expect

This is a solo/community-maintained project without a dedicated security team or SLA. As a best-effort target: an acknowledgment within a week, and a fix or mitigation plan communicated before any public disclosure. Please give a reasonable amount of time to address the issue before disclosing it publicly.

Verifying a release

Every release artifact (.deb, .rpm, source and binary tarballs) is signed with a GPG signing subkey dedicated to this project — separate from any personal key, so it can be rotated or revoked without affecting anything else. See docs/contributing/RELEASE_SIGNING.md for the full key-management model.

Master key fingerprint: 67A9CE00271C5DE87557AC76BBA104838E512C30 Signing subkey fingerprint: D2D1405C5D85E6268EED6CE2FA5BDA1DD50C980D (expires 2027-09-13 — renewed periodically per the runbook; verify against the current docs/keys/*.asc if this looks stale)

gpg --import docs/keys/protondrive4linux-release.asc
gpg --verify protondrive4linux_X.Y.Z_amd64.deb.asc protondrive4linux_X.Y.Z_amd64.deb

A Good signature from "protondrive4linux release signing ..." confirms the artifact matches what this project's CI actually built and published — not just that the download didn't get corrupted in transit (which is all the GitHub-published SHA-256 checksum alone proves).

The key and CI wiring exist as of this commit; signing only actually runs once RELEASE_SIGNING_READY is turned on (see docs/contributing/RELEASE_SIGNING.md). Anything released before the first tag with a .asc attached is checksum-only.

Known, already-documented risk areas

SECURITY_AUDIT.md records the due-diligence audit of the code this project forked from, including what was found and fixed. docs/roadmap/M2-supply-chain.md tracks what's still open (notably: releases aren't cryptographically signed yet, only checksummed — the in-app updater is disabled until that's addressed). If your report overlaps with something already tracked there, it's still worth reporting — confirmation that a known gap is actually exploitable is useful.

There aren't any published security advisories