feat(self-managed): support a pre-created LLM request-router TLS Secret - #966
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 12 included reviews per hour; 9 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe request router now supports ChangesTLS identity mode
Invocation tracing configuration
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The PR adds an existing-TLS-Secret mode that avoids stack-managed certificate issuance and mounts the operator-provided certificate. Automated render and lint checks pass, and no actionable merge-blocking risk remains after normal review. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Operator
participant SelfManagedStack
participant RouterHelmChart
participant TLSSecret
Operator->>SelfManagedStack: Set pki.mode and Secret settings
SelfManagedStack->>RouterHelmChart: Render existingSecret configuration
RouterHelmChart->>TLSSecret: Mount tls.crt and tls.key
RouterHelmChart-->>SelfManagedStack: Omit Certificate and issuer resources
Possibly related issues
Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In `@deploy/helm/llm-request-router/llm-request-router/templates/_helpers.tpl`:
- Around line 201-209: Update the TLS validation around the existingSecret
checks in _helpers.tpl so a configured tls.mountPath must match the directory
containing both tls.certPath and tls.keyPath, failing with a clear validation
error otherwise. Add a check case in check-pki-render.sh for conflicting custom
paths and assert that rendering reports the validation error.
In `@deploy/stacks/self-managed/global.yaml.gotmpl`:
- Around line 895-898: Update the existingSecret validation around
existingSecretDnsNames so any non-list dnsNames value fails, while list values
must also be empty; preserve the current error behavior for populated lists and
add a render test covering a scalar value such as router.example.com.
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deploy/helm/llm-request-router/README.mddeploy/helm/llm-request-router/llm-request-router/templates/_helpers.tpldeploy/helm/llm-request-router/llm-request-router/templates/deployment.yamldeploy/helm/llm-request-router/llm-request-router/values.yamldeploy/helm/llm-request-router/scripts/check-pki-render.shdeploy/stacks/self-managed/environments/base.yamldeploy/stacks/self-managed/global.yaml.gotmpldeploy/stacks/self-managed/helmfile.d/01-dependencies.yaml.gotmpldeploy/stacks/self-managed/tests/check-llm-pki-issuer.shdocs/user/llm-function-enablement.md
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Self-managed k3d QA at Result: existing-Secret router deployment and verified external trust passed. No #966 product failure found. I kept the previous QA router untouched. This run used a separate Exact-head build output: Native checks: The aggregate chart test failure is a pre-existing portability issue, not a #966 diff: the Makefile invokes a Bash-script ( Operator-created identity used by the runtime test: Direct chart and stack mode assertions: Cluster install and ownership output: The fresh Pylon client trusted only the external CA and completed the reverse QUIC handshake: Coverage note: this validates the router's externally owned identity, absence of stack-owned issuance, and a CA-verifying client handshake. I did not install/register a full NVCA compute plane or invoke an LLM function; that is the additional manual end-to-end path called out in the PR Testing section. Testing-section note: the claimed aggregate |
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QA follow-up at head Public-content check The PR description contains no internal infrastructure addresses, credentials, registry endpoints, or private references. No description edit was needed. Compute-plane installation and TLS handoff The generated registration values also contained the LLM router address and no private-key marker. LLM function invocation The full function create/deploy/invoke leg could not run because of pre-existing local control-plane and registry-policy constraints: A test-only Docker Hub credential was rejected by Docker Hub, so no credential or function was created. I did not read local registry credentials or publish a new image. Result: compute-plane registration, Helmfile install, active NVCA agent, and external CA bundle handoff passed. A real LLM worker handshake and invocation remain unverified due to those environment blockers. This does not contradict the PR Testing section, which says the manual compute-plane registration and LLM invocation path had not been run. |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@deploy/helm/llm-request-router/llm-request-router/templates/_helpers.tpl`:
- Around line 210-212: The TLS validation around tlsMountPath must reject
relative mount paths before accepting matching certificate and key directories;
require llmRequestRouter.tls.mountPath to begin with “/” while preserving the
existing directory-match validation. Extend check-pki-render.sh with a case
using a relative mount path such as tls and tls/... certificate/key paths,
asserting template rendering fails.
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deploy/helm/llm-request-router/llm-request-router/templates/_helpers.tpldeploy/helm/llm-request-router/scripts/check-pki-render.shdeploy/stacks/self-managed/global.yaml.gotmpldeploy/stacks/self-managed/tests/check-llm-pki-issuer.sh
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The LLM PKI profile always rendered a cert-manager Certificate when addons.llm.pki.enabled was true, so an operator who already issues the request-router server certificate had no supported way to mount it. Add an explicit existing-Secret identity mode at both layers: - llmRequestRouter.tls.mode selects certManager (default, unchanged) or existingSecret. existingSecret requires tls.secretName, tls.certPath, and tls.keyPath, and rejects certificate.enabled=true as mixed ownership. The guard runs from deployment.yaml because no Certificate renders in this mode. - addons.llm.pki.mode plumbs the same choice through the stack. existingSecret renders certificate.enabled=false, skips the OpenBao provisioning hook, and leaves the nvcf-pki release unresolved in the dependency state, so no cert-manager or issuer ownership is introduced. clusterIssuer.enabled, dnsNames, and allowedDomains only steer stack-managed issuance and now fail rendering in this mode. Worker trust is unchanged. The existing NVCA workload transport trust contract carries the public bundle and optional fingerprint, and its certificates-only validation already keeps the server private key off the compute plane. Render tests cover cert-manager mode, existing-Secret mode, mixed ownership, and each missing or conflicting value, in both the chart and the stack. The stack cases assert zero nvcf-pki declarations across the whole helmfile.d, reusing the cross-state helpers added in #951. Closes #947 Signed-off-by: Mike Camp <mcamp@nvidia.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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🎉 This PR is included in version helm-nvcf-llm-request-router-v1.9.0 🎉 The release is available on GitHub release Your semantic-release bot 📦🚀 |
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TL;DR
The self-managed LLM PKI profile always rendered a cert-manager
Certificatewhenaddons.llm.pki.enabledwas true, so an operator who already issues the request-router server certificate had no supported way to mount it. This adds an explicit existing-Secret identity mode: point the router at a pre-created TLS Secret, render noCertificate, and pull in no issuer or cert-manager ownership.Additional Details
The
llm-request-routerchart could technically already do this (certificate.enabled: falseplustls.secretName/certPath/keyPath), but the combination was implicit and unvalidated: a half-filledtlsblock silently dropped the volume and left the router on plaintext QUIC. The stack had no way to express it at all, becauseglobal.yaml.gotmplhardcodedcertificate.enabled: true.Chart layer:
llmRequestRouter.tls.modeselectscertManager(default, behavior unchanged) orexistingSecret.validateTlsIdentityhelper requirestls.secretName,tls.certPath, andtls.keyPathinexistingSecretmode, and rejectscertificate.enabled: trueas mixed ownership.deployment.yaml, notcertificate.yaml. NoCertificaterenders in this mode, so a guard living there would never run.tls.*fields are reused.Stack layer:
addons.llm.pki.modeplumbs the same choice through.existingSecretrenderscertificate.enabled: false, skips the OpenBao provisioning hook, and leaves thenvcf-pkirelease unresolved in the dependency state, so no cert-manager or issuer ownership is introduced andopenbao.enabled: falseis accepted.clusterIssuer.enabled,dnsNames, andallowedDomainsonly steer stack-managed issuance. They now fail rendering in this mode rather than being silently ignored, so a config that expects the stack to issue cannot be mistaken for one that expects the operator to.Worker trust is deliberately unchanged. The existing NVCA workload transport trust contract (
transportTls.trustMode/trustBundlePem/trustBundleFingerprint) already carries the public bundle and optional fingerprint, andassertCertificatesOnlyincontrolplaneprofile/profile.goalready rejects any non-CERTIFICATE PEM block. That is what satisfies "never copies the server private key to the compute plane", so this PR documents it instead of adding a parallel mechanism.Known limitations, both documented:
transportTlsempty here. Operators hand-author that block, exactly as they already do for an external issuer.For the Reviewer
Closest look:
deploy/stacks/self-managed/global.yaml.gotmplfor the mode branch and the four conflict guards.deploy/helm/llm-request-router/llm-request-router/templates/_helpers.tplforvalidateTlsIdentity, in particular the choice to invoke it fromdeployment.yaml.Two decisions worth a second opinion:
modeenum per layer reusing the existingtls.*fields, rather than a newexistingSecretsub-block that would give two ways to name the same Secret.dnsNamesandallowedDomainsinexistingSecretmode. The alternative was to ignore them, matching how the stack already ignoresallowedDomainsfor an external issuer. I chose the loud option because a leftoverdnsNameslist reads as "the stack still issues my certificate" and would otherwise go unnoticed until expiry.This branch is rebased on #956. It originally also gated the
nvcf-pkirelease in02-core, but #951 removed that declaration outright, so the entire02-coredelta is gone. The stack cases now reuse therender_list_all/expect_declared_allhelpers from #951 to assert zeronvcf-pkideclarations across the wholehelmfile.d, which supersedes a weaker core-state-only check that would have been vacuously true after #951.For QA
QA not needed. Render-level change with automated coverage; no runtime code paths changed.
Ran on
9a547116:New render cases, in the chart (
scripts/check-pki-render.sh) and the stack (tests/check-llm-pki-issuer.sh): cert-manager mode unchanged, existing-Secret mode mounts the operator Secret with both TLS paths and no--quic-insecure, mixed ownership, each missing required value, each conflicting value, and an unknown mode.I mutation-tested two guards to confirm the new assertions are not vacuous: leaking a
CertificateintoexistingSecretmode, and ungating the issuer release, each turn the suite red.Manual cluster validation has not been run. The end-to-end path worth exercising before release is: create a
kubernetes.io/tlsSecret innvcffrom a self-signed CA with a SAN coveringllm-request-router.nvcf.svc.cluster.local, install withmode: existingSecret, confirmkubectl get certificates -n nvcfis empty and noClusterIssuerwas created, then register a compute plane withtransportTls.trustMode: bundleand invoke an LLM function.Issues
Closes #947
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Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation