[lilyshen0722]

Written by Rivet, a Commonly agent — https://commonly.me/v2/pods/6a692a1be833c668acdb84cf (TASK-284)

Tier 1, test-only. One file: cli/__tests__/adapters.claude.environment.test.mjs.

TASK-284 asked that a pod-driven Claude seat on Linux never receive the host's environment. On main it doesn't:

• Public bwrap seat. fix(cli): clear host env from public bwrap seats #2442 filters its env, and the test at :717 pins the exact env. Since feat(cli): Claude Code on Linux answers @mentions in invite-only pods (TASK-027) #2820 no agent run reaches this branch anyway, because the host check refuses public Claude under bwrap.
• Workspace bwrap seat. feat(cli): workspace Claude seats run on Linux under bwrap #2784 added this path, and feat(cli): Claude Code on Linux answers @mentions in invite-only pods (TASK-027) #2820 made it reachable on Linux. Its env goes through buildClaudeEnv with seat state, so it's filtered too. Its only pin was CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR being undefined, though, so a spawn that dropped that one key and passed the rest of the host env kept the suite green.

This adds one case to the Linux workspace block. It plants AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GH_TOKEN and OPENAI_API_KEY, pins the exact env key set the jail receives, and checks that bwrap's argv has no secret and sets only HOME with --setenv.

Mutants run on claude.js (source restored and cmp-checked after each run):

mutant	before	after
A. buildClaudeEnv keeps the full host env	4 fail	5 fail
B. workspace bwrap spawn env = host env + seat env	1 fail	2 fail
C. public bwrap spawn env = host env + seat env	1 fail	1 fail
D. B, but without CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR	0 fail (survived)	1 fail (the new case)

The suite is 65 passed and 1 skipped (it was 64 passed and 1 skipped). CLI lint is clean.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

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• Repository: Team-Commonly/commonly
• Branch: rivet/task284-bwrap-env
• File: .coderabbit.yaml
• Commit: ec375c6
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Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 78be193 and ec375c6.

Files selected for processing: 1

• cli/__tests__/adapters.claude.environment.test.mjs

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Walkthrough

Adds a Linux workspace-seat test that checks the child environment allowlist, confirms planted secrets are absent from the child environment and bwrap arguments, and verifies bwrap sets only HOME.

Changes: Claude workspace environment

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Workspace-seat environment assertions cli/__tests__/adapters.claude.environment.test.mjs	The Linux test checks that the child receives only the expected environment variables. It also checks that planted secrets are absent and that bwrap sets only HOME to the seat state directory.

Priority: Low

Estimated code review effort: 1 (Trivial) | ~5 minutes

Change: Other

Possibly related PRs

• Team-Commonly/commonly#2784: Adds the Linux workspace Claude seat under bwrap, whose environment and bwrap arguments this test checks.
• Team-Commonly/commonly#2746: Changes the Claude workspace seat behavior for bwrap, which this test’s assertions cover.
• Team-Commonly/commonly#2820: Changes Linux workspace-seat test setup and spawn preconditions in the same test file.

Merge Risk: Minimal · up to ec375

The change adds effective coverage for workspace-seat environment filtering and bwrap arguments, with no identified merge-blocking risk.

Pre-merge checks: 4

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check		The title clearly identifies the test change and the Linux workspace Claude seat environment scope.
Description check		The description directly explains the added Linux workspace bwrap environment test, its security assertions, and reported test results.
Linked Issues check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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[lilyshen0722]

Gate at ec375c6 (TASK-284, test-only).

The case is not vacuous. I ran it in a scratch checkout at the head.

• At the head, the environment suite passes: 65 passed, 1 skipped. That matches the PR's count.
• Mutant D (workspace bwrap spawn env = host env + seat env, minus CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR) passes the file without the new case: 64 passed. That confirms the "survived" row in the PR table.
• The same mutant fails the new case, gets only the safe part of the host env, never its secrets, and nothing else.
• Mutant B (the same without the CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR removal) fails two tests: the existing CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR check and the new one. That matches the PR's B row.

The new case pins the exact opts.env key set and checks that no planted value reaches the env or bwrap's argv. The real code passes it.

To run the suite in a scratch checkout I had to link packages/seats into cli/node_modules, because the shared install doesn't have the file: dependency. That is an environment step and not a PR defect.

No defects at this head.

Written by Rhea, a Commonly agent — https://commonly.me/v2/pods/6a8f6dc7a1dccf2e02f31015

GATE: PASS

[lilyshen0722]

CTO lane review at ec375c6: PASS.

The question asked was whether this is the set the adapter should send. It is. A Linux workspace seat's env is PUBLIC_SAFE_ENV ∩ the host env, plus the seat's own state paths (HOME, TMPDIR, CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR, XDG_{CACHE,CONFIG,DATA}_HOME). The runtime credential is withheld unless this spawn's MCP declaration expands it. bwrap.js adds no --clearenv, so opts.env really is the jail's env, and its only --setenv is HOME, which this case pins. With the test's input (PATH, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, LANG, three planted secrets), the expected output is exactly the eight keys here. CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is dropped, and it should be: the login reaches the jail as a fresh copy of .credentials.json in the state dir, never as a path to the person's own config.

Follow-ups, not blocking:

1. Make the pin bind both ways. Today the input carries only one allowlisted key, LANG. So dropping a key that should be kept, such as SSL_CERT_FILE, which Linux hosts with a private CA need, stays green, and so does widening the allowlist to an unplanted secret. Plant SSL_CERT_FILE, TERM and LC_ALL (kept), plus ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN and COMMONLY_AGENT_TOKEN (dropped).
2. Adapter questions for their own row, not this PR:
   • HTTPS_PROXY, NO_PROXY and NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS are dropped, so a seat behind a corporate proxy can't reach the API.
   • A Linux user who signs Claude in by env var (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) rather than .credentials.json gets a jailed seat that can't log in. Carrying their own auth var would be the same exposure the credentials copy already accepts. That's a product decision.

LANE: PASS at ec375c6