[ple1155n-cmyk]

Fixes #8

Problem & Threat Model

Previously, initialize in contracts/yield_vault/src/lib.rs only validated that DataKey::Config was not set, without checking caller authorization. On a freshly deployed vault instance, an attacker/front-runner observing contract creation could front-run initialization and supply their own address as admin. Because the admin controls critical operations like pause and unpause with no recovery/replacement mechanism, this vulnerability allowed complete contract capture.

Solution

• contracts/yield_vault/src/lib.rs: Enforced admin.require_auth() at the start of initialize. The designated admin must cryptographically authorize initialization, preventing front-runners from installing an admin address they do not control.
• contracts/yield_vault/README.md: Documented the initialization security guarantee requiring admin authorization.
• docs/deployment/testnet.md: Updated deployment documentation to reflect that the front-running caveat is resolved.

Test Coverage

Added unit tests covering the front-running and authentication paths:

1. initialize_panics_without_admin_auth: Asserts panic when called without valid authorization.
2. initialize_requires_admin_auth_before_metadata_validation: Asserts authorization is verified before metadata validation logic.
3. initialize_rejects_unauthorized_front_runner: Confirms an unauthorized attacker's transaction fails when attempting to front-run initialization.

Verification

• Contract test suite: pnpm run contract:test (16/16 passed).
• Static analysis: pnpm run contract:clippy (passed with -D warnings, 0 warnings).