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Description
Part of #84.
Owner: Anders (@andersalm).
Depends on LA-03 (#97) and LA-04 (#98). Runtime confines the real provider, guard and engine on isolated Linux x86-64 and Jetson targets.
Done means
Release acceptance: Each exposed feature works clearly from start to end, including recovery. Keep unfinished or confusing features hidden until their complete journey passes. Hiding a feature does not complete its task; source checks alone do not establish installed acceptance.
- A valid SmolLM2 request completes with only the required model files, journal access, device access and Runtime channels available.
- Real child-process tests deny unrelated file access, unauthorized sockets and inherited-descriptor abuse.
- The manifest describes the actual execution method. The public seed change has a separate reviewed approval packet.
- The model provider cannot read the Runtime coordinates file or connect to the local control listener (test, shared with Confine every native provider and stop handing it the device key #166).
macOS: #141 owns the deny-default file profile and macOS confinement.
Status: waiting for #98's resource/lifecycle interface under Anders's 8 October priority order. Read-only confinement review can proceed; #98 remains the sole active task.
Local AI plan reconciliation — 2026-10-08
Use the real installed provider, guard and engine, with the resource/lifecycle output from #98. Current Linux model seccomp supplies a socket boundary; full file and Unix-service confinement remains an acceptance gap.
- Allowed SmolLM2 inference and required private Runtime channels work through the declared root-free platform boundary.
- The same real descendants are refused unrelated file reads/writes, undeclared Unix services, direct external sockets, inherited-descriptor abuse, Runtime coordinates/attach-secret access and local control-listener access. Pair each refusal with its permitted control.
- Record the actual manifest, enforced rights/resource limits and source/built/installed/running hashes on Linux x86-64 and Jetson. Repeat the affected Mac lease/file/socket/descendant path after resource integration.
- Unsupported platform confinement fails closed with a clear recovery action.
#166 owns the shared native-provider contract; #173/#180 own the combined hostile-input and release gates. Production seed changes keep their exact approval.
Resource boundary review, 8 October 2026
Read-only review confirms that the current Linux socket filter leaves host file access, unrelated Unix services and process-control calls available. The #98 trusted lease holder alone does not close this hostile-code boundary. Linux 5.15 Landlock and pathname-independent seccomp are insufficient for the full current HTTP broker contract. The coherent implementation direction is one verified root-free launcher boundary with a private filesystem, network and process namespace, followed by capability removal and seccomp. Target namespace and LSM support must be proven before choosing that launcher; unsupported profiles refuse execution. Mac acceptance must preserve permitted Metal access while testing files, sockets, inherited descriptors and process authority. Paired tests must run the actual Runtime/provider/guard/engine path and prove permitted inference plus hostile refusals and complete cleanup. #99 remains Backlog behind #98 and the real Jetson acceptance in #97; this review is not installed acceptance. Primary platform contracts: Linux 5.15 Landlock, seccomp filter limits.
Jetson capability preflight, 8 October 2026
Read-only preflight on the actual ARM64 Jetson, kernel 5.15.148-tegra, passes an unprivileged user + mount + network + PID namespace command (exit 0). Kernel namespace and seccomp support are enabled; Landlock is disabled. The private receipt SHA-256 is 2470654c5295af8e2cc21655cc7e0b9b18fe77aa43bd4c4e6423287113d9af91. This command started no Runtime, Home or model journey; #97 retains its unused hardware acceptance slot.
The engine needs a separate role inside the boundary: the provider and trusted guard own journals and lifecycle, while the engine receives its admitted model, runtime libraries, declared device rights and assigned inference socket. A provider-wide filesystem grant would let an engine change run receipts or account coordination. Verify Runtime peer identity across any namespace launcher and pair every denial with permitted inference. Capability preflight establishes launcher support only; installed confinement acceptance remains open.
Activity
andersalm commentedon Oct 2, 2026
PR #142’s operator review passed after four Mac confinement tests passed and #155 integrated. The remaining broad model isolation work stays with #99/#166.
The isolation session owns provider/bridge.rs and the tightened fail-closed profile; this session preserves that ownership.
andersalm commentedon Oct 2, 2026
only_owned_engine_and_exact_route_are_forwardedfixture failed once with ConnectionReset, then passed the single bounded retry. Its mock reads with onerecv(4096)while the broker writes headers and body separately; consuming the complete request before closing is a possible fixture correction. The cause remains unproven. Production route code was unchanged, and all 3,755 Runtime tests plus both browser regressions passed.andersalm commentedon Oct 13, 2026
Postponed to 0.8.1: isolation, not a release blocker.