claw: fix_claim -- a TRI CLAW fix earns TRI credit claims only through VerifiedPayout's rules #10886

What

The owner's direction for TRI CLAW: shared compute fixes the system's bugs, and the work is paid in TRI.

TRI CLAW already produces the evidence for such a fix:

• lab_receipt.t27: whether a hand-run lab check is evidence about the patch;
• red_origin.t27: whether a red check is the PR's own or master's;
• mut_known.t27: whether a sweep has no new survivor.

No spec yet turns that evidence into a payment claim. Without one, every reward would be decided by hand, which is the case specs/verified/payout.t27 exists to prevent: "no verified result, no normal reward".

Change (t27 only)

New specs/claw/fix_claim.t27 (module ClawFixClaim). It imports VerifiedPayout and restates none of its rules. For one TRI CLAW fix, it returns the claims the fix earns, one per payment kind:

• BOUNTY, to the author of the fix. It uses bounty_payable(closes_task, merged, verified, already_paid). The fix is verified only when:
  • lab_receipt passes;
  • the red it fixes is inherited, not the fix's own break.
• PROVIDER_FEE, to whoever ran the lab check. It uses receipt_award(run_admitted, attributable_fresh, agrees_with_run). A receipt that disagrees with the admitted run is slashed.
• VERIFIER_FEE, to an independent reproducer. It needs attestation_level >= ATT_REPRODUCED. The verifier must be neither the author nor the provider.
• EXECUTOR_FEE, to the agent run that made the fix, with the same verified gate as the bounty.

Anti-gaming rules

• No pay for fixing your own break. A fix for a red that red_origin calls the PR's own earns no bounty.
• No self-verification. A verifier who is also the author or the provider earns no fee.
• Each payment once. A claim already paid is not paid again.
• Unknown means none. An unknown kind, origin or verdict earns nothing. When in doubt, nothing is claimed.

What it does not claim (FACTS.md section 6, FINANCE_AND_COMPLIANCE.md section 3)

• Claims are ledger credit, not transfers (CREDIT_TRANSFERABLE is false).
• Any value flow needs value_flow_allowed, which requires a device-bound identity.
• The TON chain of record is still DESIGN: no contract, vault or bridged token exists. The spec therefore returns a claim, never a payment.
• No price, no return and no promise of income for compute. Only the founder, Dmitrii Vasilev, mints.

Success Criteria

• Every claim path goes through a VerifiedPayout function, with no rule copied.
• Each of the four anti-gaming rules has a negative-control test.
• On the lab:
  • t27c and t27b pass every test with 0 vacuous;
  • the module's own mutation sweep has no new survivor (mut_known);
  • seal --verify and the duplicate-body scan are clean.

Refs #10885 (lab_receipt, red_origin, mut_known), #8613 (payment kinds).

User Scenarios

• Given a TRI CLAW fix with a passing lab receipt, an inherited red origin, and no prior payment, when the fix is merged and verified, then the system returns a BOUNTY claim for the fix author and an EXECUTOR_FEE claim for the agent run.
• Given a lab receipt that disagrees with the admitted run, when the provider fee is evaluated, then the receipt is slashed and no PROVIDER_FEE claim is returned.
• Given a verifier who is also the fix author, when the verifier fee is evaluated, then no VERIFIER_FEE claim is returned.

Requirements

• FR-001: The module ClawFixClaim in specs/claw/fix_claim.t27 MUST import VerifiedPayout and MUST NOT restate any of its rules.
• FR-002: For a single TRI CLAW fix, the module MUST return claims for BOUNTY, PROVIDER_FEE, VERIFIER_FEE, and EXECUTOR_FEE, each using the corresponding VerifiedPayout function.
• FR-003: A BOUNTY claim MUST require lab_receipt pass, inherited red origin (not the fix's own break), merged status, and not already paid.
• FR-004: A PROVIDER_FEE claim MUST require admitted run, attributable fresh receipt, and agreement with the run; a disagreeing receipt MUST be slashed.
• FR-005: A VERIFIER_FEE claim MUST require attestation_level >= ATT_REPRODUCED and the verifier MUST be neither the author nor the provider.
• FR-006: An EXECUTOR_FEE claim MUST use the same verified gate as the BOUNTY claim.
• FR-007: The module MUST enforce all four anti-gaming rules: no pay for fixing own break, no self-verification, each payment once, unknown means none.
• FR-008: All returned claims MUST be ledger credit only (CREDIT_TRANSFERABLE false) and MUST NOT represent transfers or payments.

Success Criteria

• t27c specs/claw/fix_claim.t27 exits with exit 0 and produces 0 vacuous tests.
• t27b specs/claw/fix_claim.t27 exits with exit 0 and produces 0 vacuous tests.
• Mutation sweep on specs/claw/fix_claim.t27 reports no new survivors (mut_known passes).
• seal --verify on specs/claw/fix_claim.t27 exits with exit 0.
• Duplicate-body scan on specs/claw/fix_claim.t27 exits with exit 0.
• Four negative-control tests exist, one for each anti-gaming rule, all passing.

Boundary

• specs/claw/fix_claim.t27
• specs/verified/payout.t27
• specs/hosting/credit.t27
• specs/docs/chapters/rules.t27
• specs/port/scripts/tri_loop/claims.t27
• docs/system/rules.md
• scripts/tri_loop/claims.py