TON minter (tri_minter.fc) and src/trinet/mint_authority.zig must enforce t27 mint_authority.t27: only account 6774813 mints, for verified work or a posted bounty, inside the schedule #915

Context

Owner decision, 2026-10-11 (Dmitrii Vasilev, GitHub gHashTag, account id 6774813), translated:
"Forbid anyone except me, gHashTag / Dmitrii Vasilev, to issue $TRI tokens. I am the solo founder.
Other developers earn $TRI through a win-win game I design."

The rule is now a spec in gHashTag/t27: specs/trinet/mint_authority.t27 (see gHashTag/t27#8932,
PR gHashTag/t27#8934), and specs/trinet/tri-bridge.t27 v3 answers KEY_CUSTODY_AND_ATTESTOR_SET for
MINT (MINT_KEY_HOLDER 6774813). The hosts here must enforce the same rule.

What must hold in contracts/ton/tri_minter.fc and src/trinet/mint_authority.zig

A mint is accepted only when ALL hold (t27 mint_check, reason codes MR_*):

1. the minter is account 6774813 (MR_NOT_AUTHORITY otherwise; the investor and every contributor
   have no mint right);
2. the signing key is a K_MINT_KEY (kind 5) bound to 6774813 by t27 specs/network/identity.t27
   binding_valid: a merged PR that account authored, or a signature by his earlier signing key.
   A key of any other account is refused even when validly bound to it (MR_KEY_NOT_AUTHORITY);
3. the Ed25519 signature verifies over the exact mint_message bytes: t27-tri-mint-v1, then
   minter, network (CAIP-2), chain, nonce, recipient, amount, kind, evidence, one
   line each, '\n'-terminated, decimal numbers;
4. chain is TON (1) and the network is the contract's own (testnet ton:-3 vs mainnet ton:-239);
5. the nonce is above every accepted nonce; the (kind, evidence id) was never minted;
6. the evidence is a quorum-admitted (t27 specs/network/quorum.t27, one vote per operator),
   verified, referenced run fee, or a payable bounty within its posted amount;
7. the amount fits t27 specs/network/pool.t27's emission cap and halving at the running total
   (a run fee's share of the grant), and the schedule's cap is within CAP_MTRI.

Acceptance

• Both hosts are generated from, or checked against, the vectors of mint_authority.t27 (the six
  tests and the fixture keys/signatures MX_* there; seeds are public test seeds).
• No second mint path: any key other than the founder's MINT_KEY is refused by the contract
  itself, not only by the off-chain oracle.
• Nothing is deployed with a real key until the founder binds his MINT_KEY by his own PR in t27
  identity.t27 and publishes the schedule (SCHEDULE_BASE_RATE / SCHEDULE_HALVING_EVERY).

Filed from gHashTag/t27#8932; this repository was not edited by that work.