qqqide is a portable AI IDE for Windows 7–11 (x64). This repository is its client runtime source (see README for the component map and what is intentionally not in-tree). We care about security and welcome good-faith reports.

Only the current release line is supported (version shown at the bottom-left of the app / as the id in versions.json). Older portable packs: best effort.

• Preferred: open a private report via GitHub Security Advisories ("Security" tab → "Report a vulnerability") on this repository.
• Alternative: email 29492511@qq.com with subject [SECURITY].
• Please include: affected version, a description, and a minimal reproduction if possible.

We are a small team; we aim to acknowledge within a few business days and will coordinate disclosure with you. Please do not open public issues for security problems.

A four-layer desktop system:

The application runs with the privileges of the current user and manages the files the user opens and edits — treat it like a developer tool, not a sandbox for untrusted code.

• Updates are full-package, Ed25519-signed; the public key is embedded in the launcher binary; signature verification has no bypass path.
• Downloads are hash-verified (SHA-512 manifests + archive CRC) and resume-safe.
• Installation is an atomic swap at startup; any verification failure rejects the update and keeps the previous version running.
• Executable components (Python, ffmpeg, git, …) ship inside the package or come from the signed update channel; there is no side-channel code download.

• All windows are created with contextIsolation: true and nodeIntegration: false.
• setWindowOpenHandler denies every new-window request (external links go to the user's browser); will-navigate is origin-pinned. Both are registered before any window exists (hardenWebContents in shell/shutdown.ts).
• Page-level permissions (camera, microphone, geolocation, notifications, …) are denied by default via paired session handlers. The only allowlist is three user-gesture-driven capabilities used by first-party UI — clipboard read, clipboard write and fullscreen.
• The payload is served from the app's own origin/protocol; pages declare a Content-Security-Policy meta tag.

• Text encoding machine (BOM/UTF-8/GBK aware) with atomic writes (tmp + rename) — no torn writes.
• An opt-in local scanner (secret-guard / the dsecret goods) detects and can redact well-known credential formats (cloud keys, tokens, private-key blocks) in files before they are committed.
• State lives in the app folder / OS app-data folder; nothing is uploaded unless the user triggers a sync feature explicitly (see PRIVACY.md).

• Electron 22.3.27 (Chromium 108) is pinned on purpose to keep Windows 7 SP1 support. Upstream no longer patches that Chromium line. We compensate with the defenses above and keep the entire update channel strictly signed. A dual-track package (modern engine for modern Windows, frozen legacy for Win7) is under evaluation.
• Because the runtime loads local content (file previews, media, frames on a custom protocol), the windows run with webSecurity: false and sandbox: false, and the app's own CSP includes unsafe-inline / unsafe-eval for the hot-reloadable local scripts. ELECTRON_DISABLE_SECURITY_WARNINGS is enabled deliberately — documented here so it is not mistaken for an accident. contextIsolation and the navigation deny-listing remain enforced.
• Terminals (kmd, qmd) execute what the user types, with user privileges — by design.

We will not pursue legal action against researchers who act in good faith, avoid privacy violations and data destruction, and give us reasonable time to fix an issue before disclosure.