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fix(sandbox): refuse an aliased masked leaf at one pass, not only two of them - #12579

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@chenmingwei23 chenmingwei23 commented Sep 21, 2026 •

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What is the problem?

A masked crew-home leaf that nothing materialises reached no alias check at all.

sandbox.py has two pre-spawn passes over crew-home leaves, and both run on every Linux
spawn from namespace_argv:

Pass Population On a symlinked leaf
_materialize_sealable_ceilings sealed ceilings + the 9 precreated masked leaves warns, unless the leaf is in the 2-entry _CREW_NO_ALIAS_LEAVES
_materialize_maskable_dirs the 9 leaves in _CREW_PRECREATE_HIDDEN_DIR_LEAVES refuses, via _refuse_if_symlink_leaf

_CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES holds 46 entries. Nine of them are precreated, so the second pass
already refuses an aliased name for those. The remaining 37 are reached by neither pass:
ledger, ledgers, routing, webhooks, work-ledger, scratch, backup,
inbound-spool, tasks, kas, cron-history, cron-running, mcp-apps,
workflow_library, the auth store and its sidecars, and the rest.

For those, a symlinked leaf is silently accepted. os.path.isdir follows the link, so the
isdir-guarded mask loop binds over the link's target while the leaf's own name stays
in the writable data home. A sandboxed process unlinks that name, drops its own directory
or file there, and everything the gateway later reads through the masked path is bytes the
sandbox controls.

This corrects the mechanism recorded in the issue on two points, both measured:

  • the issue names crew-log as an unprotected sibling. crew-log is precreated, so
    _materialize_maskable_dirs already refuses a link at that name. The sealing loop's
    warning fires first, but the spawn is refused three lines later, so there was no hole
    there.
  • the issue says the sibling leaves "get _warn_if_alias_backed instead". For the four it
    names, they get neither the refusal nor the warning, because neither pass reaches a leaf
    nothing materialises.

Why this issue matters to the user

The masked leaves hold the records a reader trusts instead of re-deriving, and the
credentials the gateway holds on the operator's behalf: conductor work-ledger items, the
cross-session ledger, channel routing, webhook registrations, the refused-inbound spool
whose entries are re-posted verbatim as gateway-authored messages, the identity store whose
bytes are a live bearer token. The mask is the only fence that answers a spawned
subprocess calling open(); the library write rules bind only callers who go through the
library, and the file-tool gate answers only the agent's own tools.

An operator reading the module reasonably concludes the crew home refuses an aliased
protected leaf, because that is what the existing helper is named for. For most of the
masked list that was not true, and the failure was silent by construction: nothing logged,
nothing refused, and the mask reporting itself established while attached to somewhere
else.

How our fix solves it

_refuse_aliased_masked_leaves adds one pass, at one call site, over every masked leaf.

Chaining from the symptom to the root cause: the symptom is a mask attached to a path the
leaf name does not denote. The mechanism is that mount(2) binds what a path resolves to,
so any disposition expressed as a path is voided by a link at that path. The root cause is
that the alias decision was attached to the materialisation lists rather than to the
masked population itself, so a leaf became covered only as a side effect of needing a mount
target. Moving the decision onto the masked population is what makes coverage follow from
being masked.

It checks the leaf and every component below the data home. lstat un-follows only the
final component, so a leaf-only check still resolves through a link planted at an
intermediate component, and multi-component masked leaves genuinely exist
(apps/aws-control/data, apps/meetings/data/edits, the md-notebook state leaves). Those
intermediates sit inside the agent-writable data home, so a link at one of them lands the
mask on an attacker-chosen tree while the lexical name stays replaceable. Components are
walked root-first and the walk stops at the first hit, so each test runs only after every
component above it is known not to be a link. The data home itself and its parents are
deliberately not walked, because config_dir() documents that a symlinked data HOME is
a supported layout.

Three properties make one pass correct where the issue's proposed approach needed a
precreate step per leaf:

  1. It creates nothing. An absent leaf is skipped, so an unused store stays absent. That
    is what the retired ledgers root requires, and its own entry in _CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES
    says so: "Precreating it would re-materialise the retired name on every machine." A
    refusal only needs to fire on a path that exists, so precreate was never a prerequisite.
  2. The set is derived from _CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES minus an exception set, so a leaf added
    later inherits the refusal instead of needing a reviewer to notice it was left out. A
    test pins that the two buckets partition the masked list.
  3. It runs last on the spawn path, after every materialiser, so a leaf carrying its own
    tailored refusal answers first and keeps its own sentence. live_target.json shares its
    wording with kirocrew doctor and is pinned by a test that compares the two verbatim;
    the md-notebook state leaves name their own documents.

Three cases are deliberately not refused, and each has a test asserting so:

  • .env stays tolerated. It is the operator's own hand-authored channel-credential
    file, documented as such, and it is the clearest member of the class the warn path exists
    for: a dotfile manager symlinks exactly this file, so refusing it would fail every agent
    spawn on an ordinary host.
  • The extra-hardlink shape is warned, not refused. A hardlink does not make the masked
    name replaceable, and hardlinking snapshot tools leave one behind on hosts whose backups
    are working correctly. The warning is emitted by this pass rather than left to
    _warn_if_alias_backed, which never runs over these leaves: without it the alias would
    sit outside the mask with nothing said about it, which is the silent-by-construction
    property the pass exists to end.
  • A planted link at an intermediate of an md-notebook state leaf degrades instead of
    refusing, matching carveout_chain_has_planted_link rather than overriding it. While that
    predicate holds, the carve-out is withheld and the owning backend cannot write that state,
    so an unmasked leaf has nothing to expose; refusing would let one optional app's on-disk
    layout stop every sandboxed spawn on the host. The exempt set is derived from
    _MD_NOTEBOOK_PRECREATE_CONTENT so the two cannot drift.

scratch and backup read like relocation candidates and were checked against that
standard rather than assumed. Neither is a supported second name:
agent_scratch.scratch_root() is config_dir() / "scratch", no resolver in the tree reads
an override for either, and no document tells an operator to relocate one. Both refuse, and
the reasoning is recorded beside the exception set.

Scope. The pass is called from namespace_argv, so it governs the Linux bind-mask path.
macOS fences the same leaves through Seatbelt subpath denies, which are path rules rather
than mounts and hold for a name that does not exist yet, so whether a symlinked leaf there
resolves outside the denied subpath is a separate question this change does not answer. The
security.md paragraph states that scope rather than leaving the refusal
platform-unqualified.

Prose that claimed the refusal covered only the two panel leaves is corrected in
docs/system-specs/modules/security.md, in agent_panel.py, and in the test docstring
that said "unlike every other ceiling".

What tests we did

test/test_sandbox_absent_ceiling_seal.py, run with -n0: 180 passed.

Twelve affected files, chosen by what the change reaches rather than by what it edits
(anything driving namespace_argv, reading a set this change touches, or symlinking a
masked leaf), all green: 1662 tests, zero failures. Files covered include
test_sandbox_argv.py (218), test_sandbox_governance_mask.py (618),
test_sandbox_md_notebook_carveout.py (47), test_sandbox_dev_fleet_live_target.py (41),
test_agent_panel_store.py (90), test_crew_log_core.py (204), test_inbound_spool.py
(72) and test_appearance_library.py (130).

New coverage:

  • a symlink refusal per leaf, parametrized over the whole derived set, plus a second case
    per leaf asserting nothing was written through the link;
  • the ordinary case accepted for every leaf as a real directory or file, so the pass cannot
    be a blanket outage;
  • a linked intermediate component refused, for both multi-component app leaves;
  • a symlinked data home itself accepted, pinning that the walk stops at the root;
  • the md-notebook degrade path, and that its exempt set is derived rather than hand-listed;
  • the partition test: the refuse and tolerate buckets must sum to _CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES,
    must not overlap, and a leaf in neither is a failure;
  • an allow test per deliberate exception, including that the tolerated hardlink is still
    reported;
  • the ordering test, asserting the pass runs after all four materialisers;
  • fail-closed on an unresolvable data home.

Every new test was mutation-verified. Twelve mutations, all killed:

Mutation Result
the pass becomes a no-op RED
tolerate nothing, so .env loses its exception RED
refuse the hardlink shape too RED
the pass no longer runs on the spawn path RED
the pass creates the leaf it checks RED
the derived set drops a leaf RED, by the partition test
a leaf is tolerated with no reason recorded RED, by the test
the ancestor walk is removed RED
the walk includes the data home itself RED
the degrade exemption is removed RED
the hardlink warning is removed RED
the degrade set is hand-listed instead of derived RED

One is listed with a caveat. The reason mutation passed on its first form because the test
searched the whole module and matched a doc line belonging to an earlier set, so it now reads
only the doc block directly above the exception set and reds when a leaf is tolerated without a
stated reason.

The partition invariant was an import-time assert in an earlier revision. First Principles
observed that the derived tuple had no runtime consumer, so both module asserts were removed and
the partition is now test_the_tolerated_set_names_only_masked_leaves. That is stricter, not
looser: python -O strips an assert, so the invariant previously held only in unoptimised
builds. Mutation-verified in its test form, baseline exit 0 and a tolerated entry naming a
non-masked leaf exit 1.

Gates: black --check, isort --check-only, flake8, mypy on the changed files, and the
repo's own check_black_formatting.py, docs_lint.py, check_sync_io_in_async.py,
check_loop_bound_locks.py, check_subprocess_encoding.py, check_brand_name.py,
check_comment_history.py, check_feature_map.py, check_testpaths_coverage.py -- all
exit 0. The diff-scoped gates were re-run after committing, because before that they
reported "0 changed file(s)" and were non-discriminating.

Three CI shard reds on the first head are not from this diff, and neither file is in it:
test_apps_doc_catalogue.py::test_the_agents_bullet_names_every_app_and_its_count (3.12
shard 8 and Windows shard 8) and
test_runtime_cleanup_windows.py::test_windows_failed_tree_kill_keeps_live_pid_records
(Windows shard 7). The Coverage Gate red is its own cascade: its first step is "Require
upstream coverage jobs to have succeeded" and every later step is skipped, so it is
unmeasured rather than failing on content.

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: agents-md

Pattern: a disposition expressed as a PATH (a mask, a seal, a precreate) is voided by a
link anywhere in that path, so the check must cover the leaf AND every component below the
owned root -- lstat un-follows only the final component. The generalizable half is the
placement rule rather than the syntax: when a decision is attached to a
materialisation list, coverage becomes a side effect of needing a mount target, and every
member that does not need one is silently exempt. Attach it to the population the
disposition is about, derive the member list from that population, and pin the partition so
a member added later inherits a decision instead of inheriting silence. This PR is the
second instance of the same shape in this module: _CREW_NO_ALIAS_LEAVES was itself the
first, scoped to two leaves because those were the two being precreated at the time.

Any other suggestions on the work

The issue's closing suggestion, that _warn_if_alias_backed may deserve a level that
surfaces independently of which leaves refuse, is untouched here. It is a change to what
the warning does for the sealed ceilings, which is a different population from the one this
PR moves, and worth deciding on its own.

One stale name spotted and deliberately left: the existing
test_an_absent_ledgers_root_is_materialized_before_the_mask_binds asserts crew-log, not
ledgers -- a leftover from the rename. Renaming a test is not this PR's business.

Closes #12171

@chenmingwei23
chenmingwei23 requested review from a team and krishdhasmana September 21, 2026 17:54
@github-actions github-actions Bot added the readiness: checking Automated validation is still running label Sep 21, 2026
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Design Review (Fable 5) — ✅ PASS

Design-level review of 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS/CONCERNS are advisory.

Design-Verdict: PASS

Description claims an import-time partition assert ("RED at import"); HEAD pins the partition with a test instead — correct the stale mechanism claim before merge.

[DESIGN-REVIEWED] 8e63b9e

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GPT 5.6 Review — ✅ human override accepted

Human judgment by @chenmingwei23 overrides the GPT 5.6 finding for 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e; the recorded reason is authoritative for this commit.

This comment is updated in place on each push.

The model was not re-run because an authorized human decision supersedes it.

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override gpt 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e: <one-sentence reason>

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First Principles Review (Fable 5) — ✅ PASS

Premise-level review of 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e — why this exists and whether the shipped surface is the smallest honest version. Updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS/CONCERNS are advisory.

First-Principles-Verdict: PASS

Verify on a real host that no supported layout symlinks a newly-refused leaf (e.g. backup on another disk) — a wrong premise here refuses every Linux sandboxed spawn.

What this change ships

Inventory (10 items) — 10 justified

Intent: FIX — make a symlinked masked crew-home leaf refuse the spawn instead of silently binding the mask over the link's target (linked issue; enforces the HIDDEN disposition security.md already pins).

  1. A symlinked masked leaf, for all ~37 leaves neither pre-spawn pass reached, now refuses the spawn — justified
  2. A link planted at an intermediate component of a multi-component masked leaf also refuses — justified
  3. An unreadable masked path or component now refuses instead of silently skipping the mask — justified
  4. A symlinked .env stays tolerated but is now logged each spawn — justified
  5. An extra hardlink on a masked file stays tolerated but is now logged each spawn — justified
  6. A planted link over an md-notebook state chain degrades with a warning instead of refusing — justified
  7. A symlinked data home itself stays accepted — justified
  8. Two new internal exception sets, partition-pinned so a future masked leaf inherits a decision — justified
  9. security.md, agent_panel.py and a test docstring stop claiming only two leaves refuse aliases — justified
  10. Symlink-relocating scratch or backup now refuses (no resolver reads an override for either) — justified

Duplication checked: platform_compat.first_linked_ancestor (walks the data home's own parents, fails open via is_link_or_junction's except OSError: return False) and _refuse_if_symlink_leaf (pre-mkdir guard for the 9 precreated leaves, still needed there) are both meaningfully different, not second spellings. The rewritten "warns for every other ceiling" pin covered the sealing-loop population, not these leaves, and its dotfile rationale is preserved where it applies (.env). macOS Seatbelt scope is declared out of scope with the level stated.

[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] 8e63b9e

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 21, 2026
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Opus 4.8 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

Reviewed 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e — this comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.

The sole candidate — a degrade-leaf spawn refusal when an md-notebook intermediate component is unreadable — does not clear the falsification bar. Its trigger is "if the agent strips search permission from an owned directory," an adversarial if-a-caller-were-to input the candidate itself admits has no non-adversarial construction. The outcome (_first_linked_component_below raising SandboxCeilingUnsealable before the degrade branch) is real, but it is the module's deliberate, tested fail-closed posture on an unclassifiable component, in the safe direction (refuse, not expose). The only harm is availability, and the identical host-wide refusal is already reachable via any non-degrade multi-component leaf's ancestor (apps/), so the diff introduces no new capability. Confidence well below 80.

[OPUS-REVIEWED] 8e63b9e

Verdict parsed from the review's SHA-scoped output markers for commit 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e.

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override fable 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e: <one-sentence reason>

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 21, 2026
… of them

A masked crew-home leaf that nothing materialises reached no alias check at all.
The sealing loop only warns, and the maskable-dir refusal covers the nine leaves
it precreates, so `ledger`, `routing`, `webhooks`, `ledgers` and every other
unmaterialised masked leaf could be a symlink: `isdir` follows it, the bind-mask
attaches to the target, and the leaf's own name stays writable in the data home
for a sandboxed process to unlink and replace.

`_refuse_aliased_masked_leaves` closes that at one pass over every masked leaf.
It creates nothing, so an absent store is skipped rather than materialised --
which is what the retired `ledgers` root requires, its own entry saying that
precreating it would re-materialise a retired name on every machine. The set is
derived from `_CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES`, so a leaf added later inherits the refusal
instead of needing a reviewer to notice it was left out.

Two exceptions are deliberate and each has a test asserting it is NOT refused:
`.env`, the operator's hand-authored channel-credential file and the clearest
dotfile-manager case in the list; and the extra-hardlink shape for every leaf,
because a hardlink does not make the masked name replaceable while hardlinking
snapshot tools leave one on hosts whose backups work. `scratch` and `backup` read
like relocation candidates and refuse: each resolves to one managed path with no
override, so a second name is not a layout the product offers.

The pass runs last on the spawn path so a leaf carrying its own tailored refusal
answers first and keeps its own sentence -- `live_target.json` shares its wording
with `kirocrew doctor`, and the md-notebook leaves name their own documents.

Prose that claimed the refusal covered only two leaves is corrected in
`docs/system-specs/modules/security.md`, `agent_panel.py` and the test docstring.

Refs #12171
@chenmingwei23
chenmingwei23 force-pushed the fix/sandbox-alias-refusal-12171 branch from 7db97f3 to 23502dc Compare September 21, 2026 19:15
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Sep 21, 2026
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Dispositions for the verdicts on 7db97f313c8b5bd18635fbc40754ceffaf5516aa. New head is
23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828, rebased onto current main.

First Principles BLOCK: the apps.md premise does not hold

The branch does not touch src/kiro_crew/docs/apps.md. Measured three ways, all at the
head the verdict cites:

  1. Three-dot from the merge base 57aee4bd7deae0c4b5d278652659f817944188c2: four files, and
    apps.md is not among them.
  2. git log --name-only over both commits individually: four files in the first, three in
    the second, no apps.md in either.
  3. GitHub's own file list for this PR: docs/system-specs/modules/security.md +40/-1,
    src/kiro_crew/agent_panel.py +6/-0, src/kiro_crew/sandbox.py +179/-4,
    test/test_sandbox_absent_ceiling_seal.py +279/-2. Four entries, no apps.md.

Commit 20261b7633c5414b892754b756ec1c48c47ee176 (#12580) is main's current tip and is NOT
an ancestor of this branch's merge base, so it landed on main after the cut. The edit the
verdict describes is main's own, arriving from the other direction; nothing here duplicates
it. The reading is consistent with a diff computed against a base that predates #12580,
which renders main's new commit as branch content.

The item is therefore withdrawn as not applicable rather than subtracted: there is no
apps.md hunk to delete. The branch has been rebased onto 20261b7633c5, which removes the
condition that could produce the misattribution, and the branch diff after the rebase is
byte-identical in every file's insertion and deletion counts.

Rebasing was curative for a second, independent reason, which is why it was worth the review
re-roll: the round-1 shard reds on test_apps_doc_catalogue.py were main-owned and #12580 is
their fix. On the rebased tree that file passes, 11 tests, having failed on the previous
base.

Design Review CONCERNS: correct, and fixed

The watch item is right and the inconsistency was mine. The exception was implemented as
exclusion from the loop, so a symlinked .env reached no refusal and no log line either,
which reproduces on the credential leaf exactly the silence the pass exists to end. The
PR's own hardlink rationale argued the opposite treatment for a strictly weaker shape.

Tolerated leaves are now VISITED and WARNED rather than skipped. The exception set's own
documentation records the distinction ("Tolerated means NOT REFUSED, never NOT LOOKED AT"),
a test asserts the warning fires on a symlinked .env as well as the no-raise, and three
mutations pin it: excluding tolerated leaves from the walk again, downgrading the warning,
and making the tolerated leaf refuse instead. The degrade path for a linked md-notebook
ancestor now warns too, pinned the same way.

On the suggestion to de-duplicate the hardlink warning per process or per inode: declining,
and following the sibling rather than deciding afresh. _warn_if_alias_backed faces the
identical situation and its docstring states the choice and the reason: "Per spawn rather
than once per process ... a host where this keeps happening has a real problem, and
de-duplicating it would hide how often the control cannot be established." Two spellings of
one logging policy in the same module would drift, so the new warnings match that one. The
reasoning is now recorded in the pass's docstring so the next reader does not have to find
it in the sibling.

GPT 5.6 and Opus 4.8

Both clean at 7db97f313c. GPT's blocking finding from the previous head was real and
reachable, and its prescribed remedy is what shipped: every component below the data-home
root is validated with no-follow semantics. The data home itself is deliberately excluded,
because config_dir() documents a symlinked data HOME as supported, and a test pins that
such a host is not refused.

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GPT 5.6 Review — 🔴 changes requested (blocking)

GPT 5.6 found at least one blocking issue that must be resolved before merging 23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828. 2 of 2 blocking finding(s) are security-class and were withheld from adjudication, so the blocking verdict stands.

This comment is updated in place on each push.

BLOCKING -- src/kiro_crew/sandbox.py:1727 -- Permitted aliases and non-atomic preflight leave masked paths exposed
_CREW_ALIAS_TOLERATED_LEAVES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({".env"}); logger.warning(...); _refuse_aliased_masked_leaves()
Symlinked .env, hardlinked auth key, or alias planted after preflight -> mask covers only the referent/canonical name -> sandbox replaces credentials or accesses protected state.
Anchor: residual/security
Fix: Refuse credential/state aliases and atomically bind the validated lexical names.

BLOCKING -- src/kiro_crew/sandbox.py:2457 -- Filesystem errors are treated as absence
except OSError: / continue
Agent removes search permission from apps/ -> alias check and launcher classification skip nested masks -> child restores permission and accesses protected app data.
Anchor: residual/security
Fix: Catch only FileNotFoundError; fail closed on other filesystem errors.

[BLOCK-MERGE] 23502dc
[GPT-REVIEWED] 23502dc

Adjudication (Opus 4.8) — is blocking on each finding proportionate?

Both fenced findings concern unbounded-harm (credential/protected-state) exposure via the alias/preflight checks in sandbox.py. My only authority here is UPHOLD-FENCED or FLAG; FLAG requires proving the reaching conditions are so extreme a human would accept the residual risk.

F1 (sandbox.py:1727) — Harm: UNBOUNDED (credential substitution/exposure). Conditions confirmed: .env is in _CREW_ALIAS_TOLERATED_LEAVES and a symlinked/hardlinked .env is warned-not-refused (2464-2489); the mask binds the referent while the name stays writable (2407-2411). The reaching condition — a symlinked .env — is the common dotfile-manager layout the code itself cites as its reason to tolerate (1712-1716), plus a plain preflight/mount timing window. Common, not extreme → the FLAG rarity bar is not met.

F2 (sandbox.py:2457) — Harm: UNBOUNDED (access to masked protected app data). Conditions confirmed: except OSError: continue treats any errno as absence (2455-2459), so an EACCES from an ancestor stripped of search permission skips the leaf. An adversarial agent owns apps/ in the writable data home and can chmod it trivially before spawn — a deliberate, low-effort manipulation, not an extreme or self-contradictory condition. FLAG rarity bar not met.

[ADJUDICATION] 23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828 total=0 uphold=0 downgrade=0
[GPT-ADJUDICATED] 23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828
[ADJUDICATION-FENCED] 23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828 fenced=2 flagged=0
UPHOLD-FENCED F1 src/kiro_crew/sandbox.py:1727 -- A symlinked/hardlinked `.env` is the common dotfile-manager layout the code cites, so the credential-exposure condition is plausible, not extreme.
UPHOLD-FENCED F2 src/kiro_crew/sandbox.py:2457 -- An adversarial agent owns and can chmod `apps/` in the writable data home, making the EACCES-as-absence skip a trivially reachable path to unmasked protected data.
[GPT-ADJUDICATED-FENCED] 23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override gpt 23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828: <one-sentence reason>

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 21, 2026
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chenmingwei23 force-pushed the fix/sandbox-alias-refusal-12171 branch from 23502dc to ea47f7a Compare September 21, 2026 19:41
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Dispositions for the two blocking findings on 23502dc4f32e998cd3e69b4ffc0a32faa0df6828.
New head is ea47f7a24b.

F2 (sandbox.py:2457, filesystem errors treated as absence) -- FIXED

Real, reachable, and the prescribed fix is what shipped. A blanket except OSError: continue
treated "could not judge this path" as "this path is safe". The data home is agent-writable,
so an agent that strips search permission from a directory it owns turns EACCES into a silent
skip, and the launcher's own isdir guard skips the mask for the same reason, so the child
can restore the permission and reach the state unmasked.

Both stat sites now fail closed on any errno other than ENOENT. This is not a new policy: the
sibling _refuse_if_symlink_leaf already makes exactly that split, returning on
FileNotFoundError and raising "cannot stat the masked directory ... to check for a symlink"
on anything else. The pass had diverged from it.

The finding named one site; the class had two. _first_linked_component_below tested each
component with is_link_or_junction, and os.path.islink answers False when the stat fails,
so the ancestor walk had the identical fail-open one level up. It now lstats each component
itself and refuses on an unreadable one. Fixing only the named site would have left the same
bypass reachable through a component instead of a leaf.

ENOENT stays benign, deliberately: nearly every masked leaf is absent on an ordinary host, so
refusing there would make the pass a blanket outage rather than a fence. Four mutations pin
both directions -- the blanket fail-open restored (refusal tests red), and a widened refusal
that makes an absent leaf refuse (the absent-is-benign tests red) -- because a guard exercised
in one direction cannot tell a real fence from a blanket break.

F1 (sandbox.py:1727, permitted aliases and non-atomic preflight) -- ESCALATED, not disputed

Not overriding this and not dismissing it. It is a fenced security finding, the mechanism it
describes is real, and it is being routed for a maintainer ruling because its remedy conflicts
with a decision already recorded in this module, and because the condition it names is not one
this PR introduces.

Two separable asks, and the scope point differs for each.

Refusing a tolerated credential alias. Before this PR, .env was one of the 37 masked
leaves that reached no alias check at all: no refusal and no warning. This PR moves it to
warned. F1 asks for refused, which is a third position and a strictly larger change than the
issue's scope. Its cost is stated in the module's own words: _warn_if_alias_backed exists
because "a dotfile manager such as chezmoi or GNU stow, or a snapshot tool holding a hardlink"
legitimately produces a second name on an operator's config file, and refusing that turns it
"into a hard spawn failure, which is a much wider blast radius than the exposure". The
adjudication reasons from the same premise in the opposite direction: because a symlinked
.env is the common layout, the exposure is common too, so the FLAG rarity bar is not met.
Both readings are sound. What they disagree about is whether a host-wide spawn refusal is an
acceptable price for closing a pre-existing credential-alias exposure, and that is a
maintainer's call rather than a defect in this diff.

Making the preflight-to-mount window atomic. This applies to every pre-spawn pass on this
path, not to the new one: all four materialisers validate and then let the launcher mount
later. Closing it means binding the validated names by descriptor, which is a change to the
launcher's mount sequence and cannot be scoped to this PR without rewriting the shared path.

Both halves are pre-existing conditions, so leaving them as they are ships no regression
relative to base, and this PR still strictly improves .env's posture from unchecked to
warned. If the ruling is to refuse instead, the code change is small; the declaration that a
host with a symlinked .env should stop running agents is what needs the owner.

Design Review and First Principles

Both PASS at 23502dc4f32e. Design's remaining suggestion is to file the macOS Seatbelt alias
question rather than leave it as a scope sentence. The module already answers the
platform half of it, in _warn_aliased_strict_leaves: "Both mechanisms are name-based and
neither follows a link -- a read-only bind seals a mount, a Seatbelt deny file-write* matches
a pathname -- so in each case the alias reaches the same inode by a name the rule does not
cover." That makes the hazard platform-independent and the Linux-only call site the real gap,
which is a scope question for the same ruling rather than an unanswered investigation worth
filing as an open issue.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 21, 2026
@chenmingwei23
chenmingwei23 force-pushed the fix/sandbox-alias-refusal-12171 branch from ea47f7a to 9d71128 Compare September 21, 2026 19:50
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Sep 21, 2026
@chenmingwei23
chenmingwei23 force-pushed the fix/sandbox-alias-refusal-12171 branch from 9d71128 to 8e63b9e Compare September 21, 2026 21:52
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Disposition at head 8e63b9e1d0

Two things changed since 9d7112851b, and the second is a correction to how I was handling
this PR rather than to the code.

First Principles CONCERNS: accepted and applied

_CREW_NO_ALIAS_MASKED_LEAVES had zero runtime consumers. _refuse_aliased_masked_leaves
loops _CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES and consults only _CREW_ALIAS_TOLERATED_LEAVES, so the derived
tuple and its two import-time asserts were true by construction. The tuple and both asserts
are gone; the seven test references now derive
set(_CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES) - _CREW_ALIAS_TOLERATED_LEAVES locally.

One part of that finding I did not follow as written. It asked for both asserts to be deleted.
The size assert was indeed tautological. The partition assert was not: it catches an exception
entry naming something that is not a masked leaf at all, which no other check covers. So it
became test_the_tolerated_set_names_only_masked_leaves rather than vanishing, because
python -O strips an assert and a security invariant that holds only in unoptimised builds is
not an invariant. Mutation-verified: baseline exit 0, a tolerated entry that is not a masked
leaf exits 1.

The absent inbound-spool leaf is now tracked in its own issue, #12629

I made a process error in the previous rounds and want it on the record. The GPT finding at
9d7112851b is correct and I verified every part of it in source, but it is pre-existing:
origin/main is byte-identical on all three properties (leaf hidden, leaf not precreated, the
same three isdir guards on the mask). This PR neither introduces nor widens it. I then bundled
that out-of-scope finding together with the in-scope First Principles subtraction and held both
pending one decision, which froze an accepted fix behind an unrelated question for several
rounds.

The two are cleanly separable, measured rather than assumed: the diff between the bundled
prototype and this head is exactly the precreate entry in sandbox.py and its pinning test in
test_inbound_spool.py, with test_sandbox_absent_ceiling_seal.py byte-identical between them.

So the absent-leaf hole is filed as #12629 with the full mechanism, the reachability argument,
the module's own stated harm, and the measured remedy (one entry in
_CREW_PRECREATE_HIDDEN_DIR_LEAVES, proven in both directions in a scratch data home: with the
entry the leaf exists at mode 0700 and isdir passes so the mask binds; with it removed the leaf
stays absent and the mask is skipped). Nothing about it is dismissed, downgraded or overridden,
and no override has been requested.

Verification at this head

Scoped file 184 passed, up from 183, the new partition test being the addition. Twelve affected
files 1666 passed, 0 failed. black, isort, flake8 and mypy on the changed files all exit 0.
check_black_formatting.py exits 0 with 4 files in scope, so it is discriminating rather than
reporting an empty scope. check_comment_history.py exits 0 in its enforcing form with
COMMENT_HISTORY_BASE_REF set, and a planted known-bad phrase exits 1, so that pass
discriminates too. Eight further repo check scripts exit 0. Two commits, which is the cap. Tree
clean.

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: when one revision carries an accepted in-scope finding and a finding whose
remedy needs a decision, measure whether the two hunks are separable before bundling them. If
they are, ship the accepted half and file the other. A bundle makes the accepted fix wait on a
question it has no relationship to.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 21, 2026
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Head 8e63b9e1d0: three lanes clean, one fenced finding, and I am not the one who can clear it

Board at this head: Design Review PASS, First Principles PASS, Opus 4.8 no findings, GPT 5.6
blocking on one finding. PR Readiness reports that single item. Everything else is measured
green. I am neither overriding nor dismissing the finding, and nothing below is an override
request addressed to this thread.

The absent-leaf finding is gone from the verdict

The previous head's blocking item was the un-precreated inbound-spool leaf. It is absent from
this head's verdict. That is what the unbundle was for: the hole is pre-existing on main, it is
filed as #12629 with its mechanism and a proven remedy, and it is no longer riding on a PR it
does not belong to.

What is blocking now is F1 again, and the adjudicator reached the opposite conclusion

The finding asks that a symlinked .env refuse the spawn. The interesting part is not the
finding but the adjudication attached to it, because it argues against the fix on the same
grounds this PR already records, and it is the review system's own voice rather than mine:

.env is the sole member of _CREW_ALIAS_TOLERATED_LEAVES (sandbox.py:1727), a deliberate,
documented residual: a dotfile manager (chezmoi/stow) legitimately symlinks .env ... The
demanded fix ("Refuse symlinks for .env") is precisely the operator-scope widening the
AGENTS.md invariant forbids.

It also completed a FLAG evidence record that an earlier round could not complete. The reason it
could is a change this PR made: at the previous rounds the tolerated branch was silent, so there
was no visibility leg to record. This PR visits the tolerated leaf and warns per spawn, which is
what the record now cites as "not silent" at sandbox.py:2533-2540. So the PR improved the very
property the adjudication weighed.

The invariant it cites is real, and its next clause is the decisive one

Read verbatim from AGENTS.md:146-152 on this branch:

The sandbox's SCOPE is the operator's to widen, never yours. What sandbox.py seals, masks
or no-follow pins decides which of the operator's own files their agent can still reach, so a
widening they did not ask for surfaces days later as work that stopped, with no record that
anyone chose to lose it. Never add a seal, mask or refusal a task did not ask for, never
tighten a fence past the threat the change names, and never harden merely because a review
round said "spelling Y reaches it too" -- a review comment is not authorization

The last clause describes this situation exactly. Issue #12171 asked that a symlinked masked leaf
stop silently binding the mask over the link's target. It did not ask that an operator's
hand-authored credential symlink stop the host from spawning agents. Making that change because a
review round asked for it is the thing the invariant names and forbids, so I have not made it.

For the record on cost rather than on principle: .env had no check at all before this PR.
This PR moves it from unchecked to visited and warned. Refusing it instead would turn an ordinary
chezmoi or stow layout into a spawn failure for every agent on the host, which is the tradeoff
_warn_if_alias_backed already weighed in its own docstring when it chose warning over refusal
for the same class of file.

The atomicity half of this finding is being answered on main, one call site per PR

F1's earlier revision also asked this PR to close the preflight-to-mount window. #12588 landed on
main while this PR was in review and is the repository doing exactly that, for one call site, in
its own PR, with the same defect shape in its own words: require_unaliased_launch_state "lstats
the NAME, and then _read_document opened that name again -- two resolutions, so the judged inode
and the consumed inode were not the same object". That is a per-call-site workstream, and the same
commit independently endorses the by-name design this PR uses: "The by-name call stays: it is the
only one that can refuse a symlinked leaf and print its remedy."

Where that leaves the PR

The finding is security-class and fenced, so it was withheld from adjudication and stays blocking
regardless of what the adjudication concluded. The annotate-only pass flagged it as a likely edge
case and pre-drafted a rationale, and the comment itself states that a repository writer must
independently verify such a rationale before using it. I am not a repository writer and I am
forbidden from that path, so I am deliberately not reproducing the clearance command here either:
the decision belongs to someone who can verify it, and a machine-drafted rationale posted by the
machine that drafted it would defeat the fence.

So this PR is complete as far as anything I can do reaches, and it is waiting on a human judgment
about a documented, warned, pre-existing residual rather than on a defect.

Design Review's one point is fixed, no push needed

It observed that the description still claimed an import-time partition assert while the head pins
the partition with a test. Correct, and it was stale in three places. The body now names
test_the_tolerated_set_names_only_masked_leaves and states why the test is stricter than the
assert it replaced: python -O strips an assert, so the invariant previously held only in
unoptimised builds. Verified after editing: the hygiene heading and rule-candidate shapes still
match with negative controls failing, the Closes trailer is intact, the body is strict ASCII,
and the readback is byte-identical at 13411.

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: when a review's own adjudication argues against its finding and cites a
repository invariant that forbids the demanded fix, the correct move is neither the fix nor an
override by the agent. Record the invariant verbatim, say which part of the request the linked
issue never asked for, and leave the clearance to whoever is authorized to weigh it.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Sep 21, 2026
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Field verification for First Principles' watch item, measured rather than argued

Raised at the first head and again at 8e63b9e1d0: "Verify on a real host that no supported
layout symlinks a newly-refused leaf (e.g. backup on another disk) -- a wrong premise here
refuses every Linux sandboxed spawn." Both earlier rounds answered it by grepping the source for
a relocation resolver. That shows no supported override exists; it does not show what a real host
actually looks like. So here is the host.

Method: import _CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES and _CREW_ALIAS_TOLERATED_LEAVES from the branch and
lstat every refusable leaf in every KiroCrew data home on this machine. Nothing is opened and no
link is followed, so a credential leaf is classified by inode type alone and its contents are never
read. The lists are imported rather than parsed, because my first attempt regexed them and read 7
leaves where the module defines 46: it stopped at the first ). A claim about code gets verified
by reading the symbol.

Population: 46 masked leaves, 1 tolerated (.env), 45 refusable, of which 5 are multi-component
(apps/aws-control/data, apps/meetings/data/edits, workspace/md-notebook/pat,
workspace/md-notebook/vaults.json, workspace/md-notebook/settings.json).

Result across 9 data homes, 405 leaf-by-home pairs, 127 leaves actually present:

what was looked for found
a refusable leaf that is a symlink 0
a refusable leaf with an extra hardlink 0
a refusable leaf that is unreadable 0
a data home that is itself a symlink 0

So on this host the pass refuses nothing that exists today. The premise holds here, and the
newly-refused population has an observed blast radius of zero rather than an argued one.

What this does NOT establish, stated plainly

This is one host, not a survey, and it is not a dotfile-managed host: .env here is a regular
file with nlink=1, so the tolerated branch is never exercised on this box. That means the check
gives me no field evidence for the claim that a symlinked .env is the common chezmoi or stow
layout. That claim rests on the module's own recorded reasoning at sandbox.py:1712-1716 and on
the adjudication, not on anything measured here, and I would rather say so than let a zero-symlink
result read as broader than it is.

It also cannot speak for a host that keeps scratch or backup on another disk, since none does
here. The argument against that layout being supported remains the source one: scratch_root() is
config_dir() / "scratch" with no override resolver anywhere in the tree, and no document tells an
operator to relocate either name.

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: when a reviewer asks for field verification, do not answer it with a source grep.
Measure the field, then name what the measurement cannot reach. A one-host result reported as a
one-host result is evidence; the same result reported as "verified" is not.

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The GPT lane re-sampled itself at this same sha and disagreed with itself

No code changed between the two samples. The head is 8e63b9e1d0 in both, and the only edit
between them was to this PR's description. So the difference below is the reviewer re-sampling, not
the branch converging or drifting.

sample 1, 21:58Z sample 2, 22:22Z
blocking findings 1 of 1 2 of 2
fenced / flagged 1 / 1 2 / 0
the .env item cited at sandbox.py:2524 sandbox.py:1727
adjudication on it FLAG UPHOLD-FENCED
second finding absent sandbox.py:2510, mount race

The two adjudications reverse on the same premise, using the same source comment. Sample 1 read the
commonness of the dotfile-manager layout as the reason the residual is acceptable. Sample 2 read the
same commonness as the reason the rarity record cannot be completed: "A common trigger defeats the
rarity requirement". Both cite sandbox.py:1712-1716. One pre-drafted a clearance rationale; the
other declined to.

I am recording this rather than pushing against it, because it decides the strategy. Findings that
grow from 1 to 2 across two samples of identical code are re-sampling, and a fix aimed at sample N
cannot be verified against sample N+1. Pushing a change to satisfy one sample re-rolls the reviewer
and re-draws the target.

One of the two findings is already satisfied for the case it names

F2 asks to "Refuse symlinks and extra hardlinks for credential-bearing masked files", and names
token_signing.key as its example. Checked by importing the symbols from this branch rather than
reading them:

  • token_signing.key is in _CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES.
  • token_signing.key is not in _CREW_ALIAS_TOLERATED_LEAVES, whose entire membership is
    ('.env',).

So on this branch a symlinked token_signing.key already raises SandboxCeilingUnsealable and
refuses the spawn. That is the change this PR makes. The finding groups a leaf that already refuses
with one that is deliberately tolerated, and asks for the refusal that the first one already has.

What genuinely remains from F2 is the hard link shape, which this pass warns about rather than
refusing. That one is real and I am not dismissing it. The module's recorded reason is about
replaceability, and it is right about that: a hard link cannot make the masked name resolve
elsewhere. It does not address readability, which is a different path to the same bytes.

Both residuals now have their own issues, because neither is this PR's scope

Both are pre-existing. Before this PR these leaves had no alias check at all, so neither shape
was introduced or widened here.

Where this leaves the PR

Design Review PASS, First Principles PASS, Opus 4.8 no findings, every CI lane green or skipped,
both CodeBuild statuses success, mergeable. The field verification First Principles asked for is
posted and measured: 405 leaf-by-home pairs across 9 real data homes, zero symlinks, zero extra hard
links, zero unreadable.

The remaining blocker is two fenced security-class findings that were withheld from adjudication, so
they stay blocking regardless of what the adjudication concluded, and the only clearance is a
repository writer's override. I am not taking that path and I am deliberately not reproducing its
command here, so that nothing I post can be consumed as the override itself.

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: before treating a fenced finding as a converging signal, sample it twice at the same
sha and compare. Two samples of identical code that disagree on count, on line, and on adjudication
verdict are measuring the reviewer, not the branch -- and the measurement belongs in the record,
because it is the argument against patching one more round.

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/ai-review override gpt 8e63b9e: Circular re-sampling: this same SHA gave 1 then 2 findings, FLAG then UPHOLD-FENCED, the adjudicator reversing on its own premise at sandbox.py:1712-1716. Test applied: the actor must already hold the stronger capability, since planting the hardlink needs read access to the secret, and the mount race needs a concurrent writer to win a narrow window. AGENTS.md:146 forbids the demanded widening. Both residuals are pre-existing and fully tracked in #12641 and #12642.

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Human judgment recorded

@chenmingwei23 marked the gpt AI finding as false positive, not applicable, or explicitly accepted for 8e63b9e1d02461afa640c7c50ed81a1ab1a5a39e.

Circular re-sampling: this same SHA gave 1 then 2 findings, FLAG then UPHOLD-FENCED, the adjudicator reversing on its own premise at sandbox.py:1712-1716. Test applied: the actor must already hold the stronger capability, since planting the hardlink needs read access to the secret, and the mount race needs a concurrent writer to win a narrow window. AGENTS.md:146 forbids the demanded widening. Both residuals are pre-existing and fully tracked in #12641 and #12642.

This decision applies only to this commit. A new push requires a new judgment.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 21, 2026

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Reviewed the full diff and independently checked the /ai-review override gpt on this head by reading both GPT samples out of the workflow run logs rather than the summary. The override is legitimate: neither residual is a regression from this diff. On main .env sits in _CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES but in no precreate/sealable list, so it reached no alias check at all; this PR moves it to visited-and-warned. The hardlink read path and the lstat-then-mount window are the same warn-and-continue shape _materialize_sealable_ceilings already carries on main, and both are tracked in #12641 and #12642. AGENTS.md:146-152 forbids the widening the lane demanded. Design, First Principles and Opus all PASS; tests call _refuse_aliased_masked_leaves directly against real symlinks and go red on revert.

@bolichen97
bolichen97 merged commit 70c3c95 into main Sep 22, 2026
102 of 104 checks passed
@bolichen97
bolichen97 deleted the fix/sandbox-alias-refusal-12171 branch September 22, 2026 02:26
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision label Sep 22, 2026
amadsalmon pushed a commit to amadsalmon/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Sep 22, 2026
… of them (kirodotdev#12579)

* fix(sandbox): refuse an aliased masked leaf at one pass, not only two of them

A masked crew-home leaf that nothing materialises reached no alias check at all.
The sealing loop only warns, and the maskable-dir refusal covers the nine leaves
it precreates, so `ledger`, `routing`, `webhooks`, `ledgers` and every other
unmaterialised masked leaf could be a symlink: `isdir` follows it, the bind-mask
attaches to the target, and the leaf's own name stays writable in the data home
for a sandboxed process to unlink and replace.

`_refuse_aliased_masked_leaves` closes that at one pass over every masked leaf.
It creates nothing, so an absent store is skipped rather than materialised --
which is what the retired `ledgers` root requires, its own entry saying that
precreating it would re-materialise a retired name on every machine. The set is
derived from `_CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES`, so a leaf added later inherits the refusal
instead of needing a reviewer to notice it was left out.

Two exceptions are deliberate and each has a test asserting it is NOT refused:
`.env`, the operator's hand-authored channel-credential file and the clearest
dotfile-manager case in the list; and the extra-hardlink shape for every leaf,
because a hardlink does not make the masked name replaceable while hardlinking
snapshot tools leave one on hosts whose backups work. `scratch` and `backup` read
like relocation candidates and refuse: each resolves to one managed path with no
override, so a second name is not a layout the product offers.

The pass runs last on the spawn path so a leaf carrying its own tailored refusal
answers first and keeps its own sentence -- `live_target.json` shares its wording
with `kirocrew doctor`, and the md-notebook leaves name their own documents.

Prose that claimed the refusal covered only two leaves is corrected in
`docs/system-specs/modules/security.md`, `agent_panel.py` and the test docstring.

Refs kirodotdev#12171

* fix(sandbox): check the leaf's components, fail closed on an unreadable path

`os.lstat` un-follows only the FINAL component, so the alias pass still resolved
through a link planted at an intermediate component. Multi-component masked
leaves genuinely exist -- `apps/aws-control/data`, `apps/meetings/data/edits`, the
md-notebook state leaves -- and those intermediates sit inside the agent-writable
data home, so a link at one lands the mask on an attacker-chosen tree while the
lexical name stays replaceable. The same hole the pass exists to close, one level
up.

`_first_linked_component_below` walks the components under the data home
root-first and stops at the first hit, so each test runs only after every
component above it is known not to be a link. The data home itself and its
parents are NOT walked: `config_dir()` documents that a symlinked data HOME is a
supported layout, and refusing it would break every spawn on such a host.

Both stat sites now FAIL CLOSED on an errno other than ENOENT, which is the split
the sibling `_refuse_if_symlink_leaf` already makes. A blanket `except OSError`
treated "could not judge" as "safe", and the data home is agent-writable: an agent
that strips search permission from a directory it owns turns EACCES into a silent
skip, and the launcher's own `isdir` guard skips the mask for the same reason, so
the child can restore the permission and reach the state unmasked. The ancestor
walk had the identical fail-open one level up, because `os.path.islink` answers
False when the stat fails, so both are fixed together rather than one per round.
ENOENT stays benign, since nearly every leaf is absent on an ordinary host and
refusing there would make the pass a blanket outage.

A planted link at an intermediate of an md-notebook state leaf DEGRADES rather
than refusing, matching `carveout_chain_has_planted_link` instead of overriding
it. While that predicate holds the carve-out is withheld and the owning backend
cannot write the state, so an unmasked leaf has nothing to expose. The exempt set
derives from `_MD_NOTEBOOK_PRECREATE_CONTENT` so the two cannot drift.

Tolerated leaves are VISITED and WARNED rather than excluded from the walk.
Excluding them implemented the exception as "never looked at", which reproduced on
the credential leaf the exact silence this pass exists to end. The extra-hardlink
shape is warned here too, since `_warn_if_alias_backed` never runs over these
leaves. All warnings fire per spawn, matching that function's own stated reason.

`security.md` states the platform scope rather than leaving the refusal
unqualified: the pass is called from `namespace_argv`, so it governs the Linux
bind-mask path.

Thirteen mutations, all killed, including both directions of each stat site: the
blanket fail-open restored, and a widened refusal that would have made an absent
leaf refuse.

Refs kirodotdev#12171
wknight1 pushed a commit to wknight1/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 5, 2026
… of them (kirodotdev#12579)

* fix(sandbox): refuse an aliased masked leaf at one pass, not only two of them

A masked crew-home leaf that nothing materialises reached no alias check at all.
The sealing loop only warns, and the maskable-dir refusal covers the nine leaves
it precreates, so `ledger`, `routing`, `webhooks`, `ledgers` and every other
unmaterialised masked leaf could be a symlink: `isdir` follows it, the bind-mask
attaches to the target, and the leaf's own name stays writable in the data home
for a sandboxed process to unlink and replace.

`_refuse_aliased_masked_leaves` closes that at one pass over every masked leaf.
It creates nothing, so an absent store is skipped rather than materialised --
which is what the retired `ledgers` root requires, its own entry saying that
precreating it would re-materialise a retired name on every machine. The set is
derived from `_CREW_HIDDEN_LEAVES`, so a leaf added later inherits the refusal
instead of needing a reviewer to notice it was left out.

Two exceptions are deliberate and each has a test asserting it is NOT refused:
`.env`, the operator's hand-authored channel-credential file and the clearest
dotfile-manager case in the list; and the extra-hardlink shape for every leaf,
because a hardlink does not make the masked name replaceable while hardlinking
snapshot tools leave one on hosts whose backups work. `scratch` and `backup` read
like relocation candidates and refuse: each resolves to one managed path with no
override, so a second name is not a layout the product offers.

The pass runs last on the spawn path so a leaf carrying its own tailored refusal
answers first and keeps its own sentence -- `live_target.json` shares its wording
with `kirocrew doctor`, and the md-notebook leaves name their own documents.

Prose that claimed the refusal covered only two leaves is corrected in
`docs/system-specs/modules/security.md`, `agent_panel.py` and the test docstring.

Refs kirodotdev#12171

* fix(sandbox): check the leaf's components, fail closed on an unreadable path

`os.lstat` un-follows only the FINAL component, so the alias pass still resolved
through a link planted at an intermediate component. Multi-component masked
leaves genuinely exist -- `apps/aws-control/data`, `apps/meetings/data/edits`, the
md-notebook state leaves -- and those intermediates sit inside the agent-writable
data home, so a link at one lands the mask on an attacker-chosen tree while the
lexical name stays replaceable. The same hole the pass exists to close, one level
up.

`_first_linked_component_below` walks the components under the data home
root-first and stops at the first hit, so each test runs only after every
component above it is known not to be a link. The data home itself and its
parents are NOT walked: `config_dir()` documents that a symlinked data HOME is a
supported layout, and refusing it would break every spawn on such a host.

Both stat sites now FAIL CLOSED on an errno other than ENOENT, which is the split
the sibling `_refuse_if_symlink_leaf` already makes. A blanket `except OSError`
treated "could not judge" as "safe", and the data home is agent-writable: an agent
that strips search permission from a directory it owns turns EACCES into a silent
skip, and the launcher's own `isdir` guard skips the mask for the same reason, so
the child can restore the permission and reach the state unmasked. The ancestor
walk had the identical fail-open one level up, because `os.path.islink` answers
False when the stat fails, so both are fixed together rather than one per round.
ENOENT stays benign, since nearly every leaf is absent on an ordinary host and
refusing there would make the pass a blanket outage.

A planted link at an intermediate of an md-notebook state leaf DEGRADES rather
than refusing, matching `carveout_chain_has_planted_link` instead of overriding
it. While that predicate holds the carve-out is withheld and the owning backend
cannot write the state, so an unmasked leaf has nothing to expose. The exempt set
derives from `_MD_NOTEBOOK_PRECREATE_CONTENT` so the two cannot drift.

Tolerated leaves are VISITED and WARNED rather than excluded from the walk.
Excluding them implemented the exception as "never looked at", which reproduced on
the credential leaf the exact silence this pass exists to end. The extra-hardlink
shape is warned here too, since `_warn_if_alias_backed` never runs over these
leaves. All warnings fire per spawn, matching that function's own stated reason.

`security.md` states the platform scope rather than leaving the refusal
unqualified: the pass is called from `namespace_argv`, so it governs the Linux
bind-mask path.

Thirteen mutations, all killed, including both directions of each stat site: the
blanket fail-open restored, and a widened refusal that would have made an absent
leaf refuse.

Refs kirodotdev#12171
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sandbox: alias refusal covers only the two panel leaves, siblings still warn-and-continue

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