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fix(channels): grade the delivered sequence so a split cannot rejoin a key - #13944

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What is the problem?

Supersedes #13889, and before it #13864, #13858, #13852, #13844, #13839, #13836,
#13828 and #13758. Each replacement exists for the
same mechanical reason: taking a review fix while staying inside the two-commit limit
needs the commits reshaped, and a reshaped branch cannot be published by a
fast-forward push. Cutting a fresh branch publishes the same two commits as a plain
create instead. No review had been left on either predecessor.

Six channel delivery paths cut model text on a length budget and scan each piece on its
own. A credential the cut severs matches nothing in either piece, so both are reported
clean and the reader rejoins the halves reading one message and then the next.

Five of the six already redact the whole buffer before splitting, and that closes a cut
that lands mid-line: the credential is one marker before any boundary can reach it. It
does not close a cut at a line boundary. Sealing a chunk trims the whitespace that
ended it, and the next chunk starts at the first character after that whitespace, so the
two halves end up flush against each other on screen while the whole text still holds the
break between them. That form is invisible to a scan of the text as written and to a scan
of either piece.

Why this issue matters to the user

The reader sees the key and nothing reports it. Because each piece scans clean, no
redaction notice is emitted and the delivery is recorded as a clean send: the operator has
no signal at all. This is the audit half of the problem, not only the disclosure half.

How our fix solves it

The boundary is where the defect lives, so the fix goes into the two shared splitters
rather than into six renderers. split_markdown_safe and chunk_utf8_bytes take an
optional redactor and, when given one, reduce the text before any boundary is chosen:

  1. the text is redacted against the rendered form first, via the existing
    redact_for_display, which closes a cut landing mid-line and the markup-hidden variant;
  2. the boundaries it then chooses are graded on the RENDERED SEQUENCE. A platform drops
    the whitespace at a message's edges, so the last visible character of one message sits
    against the first visible character of the next and a trailing newline separates
    nothing. Stripping every chunk's edges before the grade is what makes the predicate see
    what a reader sees, and it is what carries the guarantee to the byte splitter, which
    stores the break rather than trimming it.

The whole sequence, not each neighbouring pair, because a key needs no more than a narrow
budget to span three chunks: split a twenty-character key over four and every pair holds a
fragment matching nothing while the screen holds the key whole. The same gap swallows a
chunk that renders to nothing at all, which the lossless byte splitter can place between
the halves. A fragment is only ever part of a key, so no pair of neighbours can be asked
about it. Both readings joins_to_a_credential names are kept, and each is scanned once
over the joined text rather than per boundary, which is what keeps the search affordable --
measured at 10.5 ms against 160 ms on a 74 KB reply, so the ordinary path is 15 times
cheaper than a per-boundary grade.

When a boundary does rejoin a key the cut is MOVED before any text is given up. Candidate
budgets step back one at a time for the first 128 and exponentially after that; the dense
prefix is what stops a budget clean at 6997 being stepped over by a walk that jumps 4, 8,
16, and the exponential tail keeps the reach without a probe per byte. Worst case 1.49 s on
a 74 KB reply, below the 2.2 s a purely exponential walk cost with the old grade.

A STREAMING caller cannot use that search at all, and this is the sharpest thing the change
had to get right. Such a caller re-splits its growing body every frame and treats all but
the last chunk as delivered, which whatsapp/turn_renderer.py states as its own
requirement: chunk i never changes once chunk i+1 exists. A search that reads the whole
body breaks it -- appending ONE character moved a boundary under an already-sent message in
a measured case, and the final pass slices the new list from the delivered count, so the
span is duplicated or dropped with no way back. That leg therefore takes a prefix-stable
split: the text is redacted, and every boundary stays where the caller's own budget puts
it. The same search space that produced a revision produces none under it.

A boundary graded when a chunk SEALS says nothing about text that arrives afterwards, and that
is the sharpest case in the change. A chunk whose tail is a credential PREFIX matches nothing, so
every scan passes it and the message goes out; the characters completing the key arrive later and
the reader scrolling the two messages reads it whole while neither message holds it. A sent message
cannot be recalled, so both streaming legs remember the chunk they last showed and grade the next
thing shown against it, giving up exactly the leading span that completes the key -- everything
after that span is the reply as written, sliced rather than reassembled. Reproduced on the previous
head through the rotation itself: a buffer ending AKIA sealed, the rest of the key arrived, and
the key stood whole on screen; with the record in place it does not.

Prefix stability says nothing about whether a BOUNDARY is safe either, so the streaming renderer
grades each one against everything that follows before counting the chunk final, using
joins_to_a_credential, which main already has. That grade reads the RENDERED text, every
chunk's edges stripped, for the same reason the splitter's own predicate strips them: a
platform drops the whitespace at a message's edges, so a tail beginning with a tab separates
nothing once two messages sit on screen. Asking about the characters as stored approves
exactly that pair, and the case is reachable -- the splitter never strips leading whitespace
and a hard cut can leave a remainder starting with one. Both grades now answer the same
question about the same boundary, and a test pins that they agree. A chunk that does not pass stays in the
live bubble, where a later frame may still revise it; at finalization every chunk must go,
so the still-unsealed tail is repaired through repaired_for_delivery rather than held.

Only when no budget at or below the caller's cuts safely is text given up, and then only
the credential's own span. There is no wider fallback that strips a whole message: when no
span names the key, the splitter DECLINES TO CUT and returns the text whole. A boundary is
the only thing that rejoins a key across messages, so creating none is fail-closed, and it
costs the caller a chunk over its limit instead of costing the reader a reply stripped of
its whitespace and markup. A caller that bounds that chunk again has
repaired_for_delivery to grade what it produced. The span is found by SHRINKING -- a span known to collapse into
a key is trimmed from each end by half its width, the trim kept while what remains still
collapses into one -- so a message carrying two keys keeps the paragraphs between them. The
whitespace inside that span is closed up, which makes the key contiguous for the ordinary
redaction, and the loop returns only once the form with EVERY run removed reads clean. That
last condition is the promise to a caller that re-cuts these chunks under its own limit, and
it is why one grade at the end of such a caller is enough. For a key only the rendering
assembles, which no span of the literal text names, the answer is the canonical form -- the
one-directional trade redact_for_display already makes, giving up markup and keeping every
space and every break.

Grading chosen boundaries rather than every candidate is what keeps ordinary wrapped content
intact -- two lines that read as one key when glued are never joined by a cut, so they are
left exactly as written, and a fixture pins that.

The parameter is optional because a caller whose chunks land inside one message severs
nothing a reader can rejoin across messages. It is not optional for the seven paths that do
turn one chunk into one message: those are enumerated in the tests, and any splitter call
there that omits the redactor fails. The check walks the AST and counts both shapes,
including the four sites that hand the splitter to asyncio.to_thread as a reference --
a check reading direct calls only would see four of the eight sites and silently pass the
rest.

Per path, all eight call sites:

path call before now
slack/renderer.py:875 split_markdown_safe, offloaded no whole-buffer redaction at the cut passes _redact_all
webex/renderer.py:396 chunk_utf8_bytes display-safe via webex_display_safe line-boundary seam also closed
whatsapp/renderer.py:302 split_markdown_safe display-safe before the split line-boundary seam also closed
teams/renderer.py:383 split_markdown_safe, offloaded display-safe via _display_text line-boundary seam also closed
teams/renderer.py:743 split_markdown_safe, offloaded display-safe before the split line-boundary seam also closed
wecom/renderer.py:306 split_markdown_safe, offloaded display-safe before the split line-boundary seam also closed
dashboard/chat_mirror.py:588 split_markdown_safe display-safe before the split line-boundary seam also closed
telegram/renderer.py:413 split_markdown_safe no redaction at the cut, each segment redacted alone passes _default_redactor

WeCom's streaming push already picks a credential-safe offset for the frame it is about to
send, and that path is untouched.

Two legs needed more than the redactor argument, both found by review and both reproduced
before they were fixed.

Slack bounds the splitter's output AFTER it has been graded. A logical line placed whole
carries its fence scaffolding on top, so a chunk can exceed the limit, and chunk_text then
blind-slices it and each slice is posted as its own message -- an ungraded boundary at the
very last step. _split_for_slack now grades that final sequence through the new
repaired_for_delivery and repairs it when it rejoins a key. One grade suffices because the
repair is only returned once its fully-collapsed form reads clean, which the tests check by
re-cutting the repaired text at five different caps.

FIVE paths have a HARD cap, and the splitter's fail-closed answer collides with all of them. When no
budget cuts without rejoining a key the splitter declines to cut and answers with the text
whole, which costs the caller a chunk over its budget; this client truncates a larger payload,
so the answer's tail would go with no notice. Each now bounds and grades EACH CHUNK on its own
through one shared bounded_for_delivery, which applies the budget BEFORE it grades. That order
is the point: the splitter's fail-closed answer is a list of ONE chunk, a one-element list holds
no boundary, and a grade asked about it reports that nothing rejoins -- so the oversized chunk
would travel on unbounded, which is the very case the bound exists for. Cutting to the budget
first makes the grade see the sequence the transport will really deliver. A chunk already inside
the budget is returned unchanged, so the pass is free. Re-cutting a repair needs no redactor and
must NOT take one, since a credential-aware re-cut could decline to cut and leave the budget
unmet. Webex, Teams, WeCom, the dashboard mirror and Telegram all run it; a test walks those five
and fails if any sends the splitter's answer unbounded, another asserts no chunk exceeds the byte
cap, and a third that ordinary text still comes back whole.

A repair is made on the text its caller HOLDS, never on a rebuilt sequence. The chunk list is
graded and never reassembled, because its concatenation is not the reply: sealing a chunk outside
a fence trims the whitespace that ended it, so a join deletes a break at every seam, and a fence
spanning a seam contributes its synthetic closer while the next chunk opens with the reopener, and
the two meet as one longer delimiter run that reads as a NEW fence -- after which the rest of the
message renders as code. Measured on the previous head: four chunks of a five-break source joined
to two breaks, and a fenced body whose source held only three-backtick runs produced a six-backtick
one. So each chunk is its own repair subject, the boundaries between chunks stay the splitter's own
where the whole source was available, and the one seam no splitter call covers -- Telegram's, between
two blocks it cut separately -- is repaired from the body that function holds.

Webex was the one path that kept the grade on the loop thread. Its final answer calls the
byte splitter directly inside on_done, and with no cut clean the search and the span repair
hold that thread for seconds -- long enough for the liveness watchdog to exit the gateway and
take every other channel's in-flight turn with it. It now offloads like the others. A
test walks all seven paths and fails if any of them stops handing its splitter call to a
thread, and Telegram carries a stricter version of that check described below.

The span repair is also bounded now. Its passes were capped only by the number of whitespace
runs in the text, and each pass costs a logarithmic number of whole-text redactions, so a
reply whose every break split a key-shaped token would cost thousands of them and the send
would never finish. The cap is the same constant the budget search uses, and past it the
answer is to decline to cut, which gives up nothing.

The dashboard mirror's backfill composed its units inline on the loop thread. An imported
history row carries no size cap, the grade redacts and rescans each candidate boundary, and
the liveness watchdog exits the process after seconds of loop silence -- so one large row
could terminate the gateway. The units are now composed inside asyncio.to_thread, the same
offload the Slack twin already uses and this handler already uses for its selection read.

Telegram was the remaining path whose cut chose boundaries on length alone. It rotates: a
segment that outgrows one message is split, every chunk but the last is sealed as its own
message, and the redaction runs per segment -- so the halves of a severed key are redacted in
neither message while the reader scrolling the two reads it whole. Reproduced at the channel's
own 400-character budget floor: the plain cut hands the key over, the credential-aware cut
moves the boundary instead and every character still ships.

Three things that leg needed beyond the argument.

It asks for no prefix-stable mode, and the reason is a structural difference from the
WhatsApp streaming leg: a rotation REPLACES the buffer with the retained tail, so text
already sealed is never part of a later cut. That is the bookkeeping whose absence is the
residual below, and Telegram has it.

Its rendered budget is enforced by measuring the real HTML and shrinking the source budget,
which means the cut is made more than once; each candidate answer now runs the shared bound,
so a declined cut cannot reach the client's own truncation with the reply's tail inside it.

Its table-aware path cuts each block on its own, so a boundary BETWEEN two blocks belongs to
no single cut and was graded by none of them. The assembled sequence is graded once at the end,
against the body that function holds. Every block is also redacted BEFORE it enters the list,
which the grade requires: the sequence reading is sound only on chunks already a fixed point of
its own scan, and a table run bypasses the splitter, so without it a cell holding a whole
credential fires the repair for something no seam severed -- measured on the previous head, that
cost the message its **bold** and its `code` and collapsed the table and the prose into
one message. The reachable case is a table whose last cell ends its line followed by prose, and a
fixture pins both halves of it: the per-block pair is shown to hand the key over, the
function's answer is shown not to.

Four call sites on that channel run the cut from a coroutine, and a scan on the gateway's
event loop is what the liveness watchdog exits the process for. All four now hand their work
to a thread. The file-wide check here is stricter than the one the other six paths get: "one
offload exists somewhere in the file" is satisfied while three sites stay on the loop, so the
Telegram check walks every coroutine's own body -- nested closures excluded, since those are
themselves what gets offloaded -- and fails if any of them calls a scanning splitter directly.

The redaction-tag tally on WhatsApp's finalization is fixed rather than deferred, which the
last round recorded as advisory. That pass repairs the unsealed tail and sends the repair, but
the notice counted the pre-repair chunk list, so a reply whose only placeholder came from the
repair announced none. The branch now re-points the list the notice reads at the sequence it
actually sends.

What tests we did

test/test_split_credential_boundary.py, 116 passed and 5 skipped, every run scoped with
an explicit -n0:

  • the seam, measured rather than assumed: the fixture's cut is shown to fall between the
    halves of a key, the two pieces are shown to scan clean individually, and the joined
    sequence is shown to hold the key;
  • a key spanning three and four chunks, where every neighbouring pair reads clean, on both
    splitters and across five narrow budgets;
  • a chunk that renders to nothing placed between the halves by the lossless splitter;
  • a key inside a link, which the canonicalised join loses to the label and only the
    per-side reading sees;
  • the dense probe: a budget off the doubling ladder is reached, asserted on the probe order;
  • the terminal, on text no budget can cut safely: the prose around the span survives byte
    for byte, every break and delimiter is kept, two keys keep the paragraph between them,
    the fully-collapsed form of the result reads clean, and the wider flush is shown to keep
    neither -- plus the end-to-end case through the byte splitter, where all seven breaks
    survive;
  • the post-bounding grade: a blind slice is shown to reopen the seam, the repair fires, a
    clean sequence needs none, and the repair stays safe when re-cut at five caps;
  • structural checks that the Slack path runs that grade and that the mirror composes its
    units in a thread;
  • prefix stability, which is the streamed-reply case: the searching path is shown to revise
    an already-sealed chunk after a single appended character, the stable path is shown not to
    across seven append lengths, and the stable path is shown to still redact;
  • structural checks that the streaming renderer asks for the stable split, grades its seam
    and repairs its tail, and that no global whitespace flush remains in the module;
  • all seven delivery paths, asserting each hands its splitter call to a thread, so none of
    them can put the grade back on the event loop, plus the stricter Telegram check that no
    coroutine in that file calls a scanning splitter directly;
  • the repair loop's bound, asserting the constant is in force;
  • the hard cap on all four capped paths: none of them sends the splitter's answer unbounded,
    no chunk exceeds the byte cap, and ordinary text is returned whole;
  • a SINGLE oversized chunk, the shape a one-element grade skips: it is cut inside the budget,
    every character still ships, a key across one of the new boundaries is still caught, and
    text already inside the budget is returned untouched;
  • the seam's edge whitespace: the stored reading is shown to approve a tab-separated pair
    the reader sees whole, the rendered reading to refuse it, and the two grades to agree;
  • Telegram's rotation at its real budget floor: the plain cut is shown to hand the reader
    the key, the credential-aware cut to move the boundary instead, every character to still
    ship, the bounded splitter to carry the same guard, a declined cut to stay inside the
    budget, and ordinary prose to come back unchanged;
  • Telegram's table-aware seam, with its own control: the per-block sequence is shown to
    rejoin the key and the function's answer is shown not to;
  • the sealed prefix, end to end: the sealed chunk is shown to be clean on its own, the pair to
    hand the reader the key, the offset to cover only the completing span, the repair to close the
    seam and to keep every character after it, and the rotation itself to stop handing it over;
  • that the repair is made on the source and not on the join: a source whose join loses breaks
    keeps them in the repair, and both its paragraph breaks survive;
  • the bound's own grade, on a blind slice INSIDE one chunk, which is the boundary no splitter
    call saw;
  • Telegram's table run: the key never reaches the screen, the message keeps its markup, and the
    table still seals as its own message;
  • structural checks that both streaming legs offload the repair and record what they sent, that
    each of WhatsApp's two send paths does so rather than one, and that the notice counts the
    sequence that shipped;
  • one channel end to end, through the function WhatsApp's client sends from, asserting on
    the frames it would deliver;
  • backward compatibility: prose and a table row are returned byte for byte with a redactor
    passed, so existing callers are unaffected.

Mutation proof, twenty-three ways, each against a pristine copy kept outside the repo and each
verified by hash to have applied and been restored, with a passing control before and after.
Eight cover this round: rebuilding the repair from the join fails 1, making the sent-tail offset
always answer clean fails 4, grading the flattened sequence again in the shared bound fails 1 and
in Slack fails 1, dropping Telegram's repair against its sealed predecessor fails 1, letting its
table blocks in unredacted fails 2, and dropping WhatsApp's repair fails 1 while dropping its
record fails 1. Three of those measured weak tests first and are the reason for three of the new
cases: the shared bound, WhatsApp's repair and WhatsApp's record each failed NOTHING under a
structural check that only asked whether the file mentioned the guard somewhere. Three cover the streaming and terminal
work: stopping the renderer from asking for the stable split fails 1, making the stable mode
fall back to the search fails 2, and sealing without grading the seam fails 1. Four cover the
grade and the repair. Dropping the redactor from one of the
seven call sites fails the enumeration test. Replacing the dense probe with a doubling walk
fails the two probe-order cases. Sending the terminal straight to the wider flush fails the
end-to-end case, where the breaks drop from seven to zero. Widening the repair's span to the
whole text fails four cases, including the two-key one. A fifth mutation, dropping one of the
grade's two readings, initially failed NOTHING -- that gap is what the link case was added
for, and it now fails.

Regression on the rebased tree, each file scoped with -n0: test_teams_renderer.py 22 passed,
test_wecom_renderer.py 33 passed, test_telegram.py 331 passed,
test_telegram_parity.py 360 passed, test_options_cap_contract.py 71 passed,
test_channel_control_tag_strip.py 39 passed, test_credential_redaction_notice.py
27 passed, test_redaction_mirror_parity.py 10 passed, test_whatsapp.py 26 passed,
test_messaging_split.py 138 passed,
test_channel_table_rendering.py 82 passed (the reassembly invariant the byte splitter
documents), test_chat_mirror.py 82 passed, test_display_split_safety.py 50 passed,
test_whatsapp_renderer.py 46 passed, test_whatsapp_turn_renderer.py 39 passed,
test_security_posture.py 53 passed, test_slack_renderer.py 73 passed,
test_webex_renderer.py 34 passed. Gates: black, isort, flake8, mypy on the changed files,
and the comment-history gate, all clean.

messaging/split.py is listed in NON_EGRESS_REDACTION_MODULES with the reason the
display-safety module gives: it applies a redactor its caller injects, owns no output, and
the modules calling it are the registered sinks.

The fixture uses the AWS-documented example key the repo's own display-safety tests
already use, so no new credential shape is introduced.

Any other suggestions on the work

This does NOT close the issue, and the issue stays open on purpose. Five of the six delivery
paths it names are closed end to end, and Telegram -- a seventh path beyond the six, which
seals splitter chunks as separate messages the same way -- is closed here too: every boundary they choose is graded, and the
enumeration test fails if any of them stops passing a redactor. The sixth, WhatsApp's
streaming leg, keeps the graded cut but carries a residual that is present on current main
independently of this change -- that leg re-renders a growing reply on every frame while
treating earlier messages as delivered, so a delivery tracked by a count cannot notice when
an earlier message would be rendered differently. Closing it properly means grading a
boundary against what is already on screen, which is the channel-neutral work in #13494, not
something this change can reach. The residual is recorded on #13743 rather than a duplicate
issue. What it does NOT add is predecessor bookkeeping at each point a message stops
being editable -- a streaming leg that has already delivered a message cannot re-cut it, so
that piece has to be graded against what is already on screen. The channel-neutral
primitives for that are in #13494 and are not on main yet, so this change reuses only what
main already has and touches none of the files that PR owns. That bookkeeping belongs to a
follow-up once #13494 lands, not to the six paths this issue is about.

Two things found while measuring, worth recording. The splitter has callers beyond the six
paths named in the issue: discord/renderer.py (five calls), telegram/renderer.py,
feishu/client.py, messaging/renderer.py and teams/session_resume.py. Discord seals
splitter chunks as separate messages and carries the same open seam; that file belongs to
#13494, which is rewriting it with the predecessor primitives, so it is stage-two scope here
by construction and this PR does not touch it. Telegram carried the same seam and is closed
here: its rotation discards sealed text from the buffer, so it needs none of the predecessor
primitives and can be fixed with what main already has.
Feishu, the shared renderer and the Teams resume path are unchanged, and none of them
belongs to #13494. Their own code answers whether their chunks become separate messages
rather than leaving it open: feishu/client.py sends every chunk as its own reply to the
same inbound anchor, and chunk_for_transport hands its parts to callers that send them
one message at a time. Neither passes a redactor, so the seam is open on those legs too.
They sit outside this stage by scope, not by another PR's ownership. And the issue's per-file grade was measured by grepping for the new primitives'
names, which cannot see that five of the six paths already close the mid-line cut by
redacting the whole buffer first; the line-boundary seam is what was actually open at all
of them.

Two advisory findings are recorded rather than fixed. The spec below is one. The other asks that
the enumeration of delivery paths be DERIVED by walking every module rather than curated, and that
Discord and Feishu then pass a redactor too; the reviewer marks it advisory itself, on the grounds
that its remedy lands in files this change does not touch, and that is the disposition taken here.
The tally finding from the previous round is fixed: the notice now counts the sequence that
shipped.

One review finding is recorded rather than fixed. The owning spec,
docs/system-specs/modules/messaging.md, still calls the Webex splitter lossless and the
character splitter free of modes, and the redactor ladder falsifies both. That file belongs
to #13494, which this change deliberately does not touch, so the correction travels with the
follow-up that lands after it rather than creating a conflict here.

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: enumeration test, added in this PR as
test_split_credential_boundary.py::TestEveryDeliveryPathIsEnumerated.

Pattern: a text is cut on a length budget and then scanned one piece at a time, so the scan
runs after the boundary is chosen and cannot see what the cut separated.

The shape generalises past credentials: any check that reads one piece of a text the caller
will deliver in several is blind to whatever the boundary split. It resists a purely
syntactic rule, because "these chunks each become their own message" is not visible at the
call site -- which is why the enforceable half is an enumeration: the delivery paths are
listed, and every splitter call in them must pass a redactor. The list is checked in both
directions, so a path that stops reaching a splitter fails rather than passing by having
nothing left to check, and the AST pass counts the offloaded asyncio.to_thread shape as
well as the direct call.

Refs #13743

Six delivery paths cut model text on a length budget and scan each piece
on its own. A key the cut severs matches nothing in either piece, so both
are reported clean, and the reader rejoins the halves reading one message
and then the next. The per-piece scan emits no notice, so the operator
sees a clean send.

Five of those paths already redact the whole buffer before splitting,
which closes a mid-line hard cut. It cannot close a cut at a line
boundary: sealing a chunk trims the whitespace that ended it, so the two
halves sit flush against each other on screen while the whole text still
holds the break between them, invisible to a scan of the text as written
and to a scan of either piece.

The shared splitters now take the redactor themselves. split_markdown_safe
and chunk_utf8_bytes reduce the text before any boundary is chosen: the
form the platform renders, and the form the seal's trim produces once
every break is collapsed. A credential visible in either is a marker
before a boundary can land inside it. The parameter stays optional, so a
caller whose chunks stay inside one message is unaffected, and an
enumeration test over the six delivery paths fails when any splitter call
there omits it.

Refs #13743
Grade the boundaries the ladder chooses, one at a time, rather than every
break at once. A scan of all of them together answers a wider question than
any cut asks: two lines that read as one key when glued would cost the message
every break and its markup, though no cut ever joins them. Wrapped content in a
fence is that shape.

The grade reads the RENDERED pair. A platform drops the whitespace at a
message's edges, so the last visible character of one message sits against the
first visible character of the next: neither a trailing newline nor a trailing
space separates anything. That is also what carries the guarantee to the byte
splitter, which stores the whitespace rather than trimming it -- lossless where
it is kept, invisible where it is shown.

The repair moves the CUT before it gives up any text. Budgets step back
exponentially and every candidate is verified, so a key straddling a boundary
ends up whole inside one chunk with every character and every break intact,
where the space between its halves is on screen and the scanner's own reading
of such text stands. Only when no budget at or below the caller's cuts safely
is the whitespace flushed and the text redacted -- every run, because the
whitespace a cut consumes can be a single space -- and that result is graded as
well, since a repair returned without a grade is a repair nobody checked.
Flushing every run is deliberately wider than one cut produces: that width is
what lets a caller bound the chunks again under its own platform limit without
a grade of its own.

The splitter applies a caller's redactor, so it is classified in
security_posture's NON_EGRESS_REDACTION_MODULES. It owns no output; the modules
that call it are the registered sinks. Same reason display_safety.py sits
there, and the posture drift guard fails without the entry.

Refs #13743
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Design Review (Fable 5) — 🟡 CONCERNS

Design-level review of 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62 — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS/CONCERNS are advisory.

Design-Verdict: CONCERNS

Same-severity credential seams stay open on Feishu, chunk_for_transport callers and Teams resume, tracked nowhere durable — only this PR's prose records them.

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[DESIGN-REVIEWED] 032ee34

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First Principles Review (Fable 5) — 🟡 CONCERNS

Premise-level review of 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62 — why this exists and whether the shipped surface is the smallest honest version. Updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS/CONCERNS are advisory.

First-Principles-Verdict: CONCERNS

Discord and Feishu still seal ungraded splitter chunks as separate messages — the exact defect this fix closes on seven sibling paths.

Not justified as shipped

  • Item 1 — point patch, 2 counted unfixed siblings: grepped split_markdown_safe|chunk_utf8_bytes|chunk_text\( across src/kiro_crew; discord/renderer.py seals each splitter chunk as its own message from five redactor-less sites (941, 962, 966, 1219, 1244, with per-segment _redact_transformed — the per-piece scan the description names as the defect) and feishu/client.py:213 sends each chunk as its own reply; "Six channel delivery paths cut model text on a length budget" undercounts them, and DELIVERY_PATHS omits both, so the gate cannot catch them.
    Clears when: both callers pass the redactor and join DELIVERY_PATHS, or a linked issue records the deferral.
  • Item 9 — duplicate of src/kiro_crew/messaging/split.py:bounded_for_delivery: Slack's _bounded closure is the same cut→grade→re-cut loop with cut=chunk_text; the 5 other capped callers use the shared helper, Slack alone re-spells it and needs its own bespoke test.
    Subtraction: delete the inline loop in slack/renderer.py _bounded; call bounded_for_delivery(chunks, SLACK_MSG_LIMIT - reserve, _redact_all, chunk_text) and fold test_the_slack_path_runs_that_grade into test_every_capped_caller_runs_the_bound.
    Clears when: the deletion is made.

What this change ships

Inventory (10 items) — 8 justified

Intent: FIX — a credential severed by a message-length cut must never read whole across adjacent messages while every scan reports a clean send.

  1. A key split across two messages at a line/space boundary is redacted or the cut moved, on Slack, Teams, Telegram, Webex, WeCom, WhatsApp and the dashboard mirror — point patch: 2 unfixed siblings (Discord, Feishu)
  2. When no budget cuts safely, the text ships whole or with only the key's own span collapsed — justified
  3. Hard-capped transports re-cut that fail-closed whole answer back inside the cap — justified
  4. Streaming channels give up the span completing a key begun in an already-sent message — justified
  5. WhatsApp holds an unclean-boundary chunk in the live bubble instead of sealing it — justified
  6. The redaction notice now counts placeholders a seam repair introduced — justified
  7. Telegram table cells are redacted before the split rather than at seal — justified
  8. Splitter work moves off the event loop at seven sites — justified
  9. Slack re-implements the shared re-bound loop inline — duplicate of src/kiro_crew/messaging/split.py:bounded_for_delivery
  10. A new AST gate pins that every enumerated delivery path passes a redactor and offloads the grade — justified

[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] 032ee34

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GPT 5.6 Review — 🔴 changes requested (blocking)

GPT 5.6 found at least one blocking issue that must be resolved before merging 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62. 1 of 1 blocking finding(s) are security-class and were withheld from adjudication, so the blocking verdict stands.

This comment is updated in place on each push.

BLOCKING -- src/kiro_crew/telegram/renderer.py:1563 -- upload-hold seals leave the seam guard using a stale predecessor
sent = self._sent_tail
Over-limit reply ending AKIA before hidden image markup -> upload-hold seals without updating _sent_tail -> the next bubble renders the remainder as a complete credential.
Anchor: backend-security-controls
Fix: update _sent_tail after each upload-hold seal.
[BLOCK-MERGE] 032ee34
[GPT-REVIEWED] 032ee34

Adjudication (Opus 5) — is blocking on each finding proportionate?

UNBOUNDED (credential exposure across a seam) — the upload-hold branch seals every chunk of raw[:spans[0][0]] and returns without ever assigning _sent_tail (src/kiro_crew/telegram/renderer.py:1434-1441), so the only writer of that field remains the length-rotation path at :1502; the tail's live frame then grades against the stale value at :1563/:1571, and the seal path (:1882) carries no seam guard of its own.
Conditions are ordinary for this feature: uploads capability + upload root (:1681), a buffer over one message but under 4× (:1427), and a key whose completing characters sit after an image reference that hide_local_refs removes from the rendered tail (src/kiro_crew/messaging/outbound_files.py:629) — no timing contradiction, and the model's own text is the input. Recovery: none; both bubbles are already delivered.
Remedy is a single assignment inside the existing loop, so there is no residual-risk argument to pre-draft.

[ADJUDICATION] 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62 total=0 uphold=0 downgrade=0
[GPT-ADJUDICATED] 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62

[ADJUDICATION-FENCED] 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62 fenced=1 flagged=0
UPHOLD-FENCED F1 src/kiro_crew/telegram/renderer.py:1563 -- The upload-hold branch at :1434-1441 never updates `_sent_tail`, so the tail is graded against a stale predecessor at :1563 under conditions (uploads enabled, an image reference mid-reply, a key completed after the hidden markup) that are plausible in real operation.
[GPT-ADJUDICATED-FENCED] 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override gpt 032ee346afd3bc009e0d3517cbf0985967a23b62: <one-sentence reason>

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 25, 2026
@chenmingwei23

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Superseded by #13968 after exact readback: the replacement is based directly on current main, has exactly two commits, preserves the predecessor file set, uses Refs #13743 with no closing reference, and names this PR as its predecessor. Closing this PR unmerged; no approval or merge performed.

@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention label Sep 25, 2026
@bolichen97
bolichen97 deleted the fix/cross-delivery-redaction-13743-v10 branch November 6, 2026 07:26
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