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feat(acp): onboard Qoder as a known ACP backend, not yet selectable - #15038

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Problem / Motivation

Goal: Kiro Crew knows the Qoder CLI as an ACP backend it can name, install-check and describe, without yet offering it as a choice, so the follow-up that makes it selectable starts from a measured wire contract instead of a guess.

Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (qodercli --acp, a flag its --help does not list), which makes it a natural fit for the single-binary shape opencode, goose and deepseek already use. #13803 asks for it as a backend. Today a policy author cannot name it, the install probe cannot tell an operator what is missing, and a session persisted against it would be recorded as a kiro session.

Making it selectable is a separate decision: the automation on #13803 routed the roadmap question to a human, and two things that decide the tool-approval gate are still unmeasured (below). This PR lands everything that does not depend on those answers.

Why it matters

  • Operators and edition authors can deny, label and install-check qoder today, and the backend status endpoint returns a row for it, which the existing Agent Backend panel renders (it already handles a backend it has not heard of). The host-contract column says plainly what has and has not been measured.
  • The wire facts captured against a real binary (auth handshake, modes/configOptions, the permission round trip) are committed as a replayable corpus, so the selectability work is measured against a fixed record.
  • Nothing about a Qoder session can reach a user before its tool calls are proven to reach Kiro Crew's security gate.

Not a goal

  • Making Qoder selectable, or adding it to BASELINE_SELECTABLE_BACKENDS.
  • Naming a tool-gate routing mechanism. It is an explicit Routing.UNVERIFIED.
  • Declaring a credential leaf. Where qodercli login stores its login was not located, and a leaf written from documentation fences a path nobody checked.
  • Deciding capability-set memberships (session MCP array, meta identity, eviction, compaction, resume). Each is an opt-in claim and none is measured.
  • Any frontend change.

What changed (motivation → approach → change)

Approach. The docs (harness-onboarding.md) already describe a KNOWN-but-unrouted harness: register_selectable_backend refuses an UNVERIFIED routing, so KNOWN is not enough to reach the switch. Qoder takes that path rather than borrowing a neighbour's mechanism.

What the binary does (qodercli 1.1.17, driven live).

  • session/new is refused with -32000 Authentication required until the client sends authenticate for qodercli-login.
  • It then returns modes (default "Prompts for approval", acceptEdits, bypassPermissions, plan), models, and configOptions for mode, model and reasoning_effort.
  • In default mode a mutating shell command raises session/request_permission (options proceed_always_and_save, proceed_once, cancel), and answering cancel stops it. A read-only command ran with no request.

Change.

  • agent_sdk/backends.py: ACP_BACKEND_QODER in ACP_BACKENDS_KNOWN and POLICY_ID_BY_BACKEND; one ACP_BACKEND_LAUNCH row (qodercli --acp, QODERCLI_BIN, npm i -g @qoder-ai/qodercli), which the shared resolver, install probe and gate label read; an explicit Routing.UNVERIFIED row. It is left out of every capability set and out of the baseline.
  • acp/client.py: an _is_qoder spawn arm that resolves the launch and then refuses, so the id cannot fall through to the kiro-cli arm and run under the wrong identity.
  • acp/types.py, providers/acp.py, acp_backends.py: provider label, is_qoder_backend, re-exports.
  • agent_sdk/host_auth.py: an auth declaration with no credential leaf and no signed_out_signature (the harness's text is the SDK's generic prefix, which goose's auth answer also carries).
  • providers/mirrors/registry.py: MCP projection no-channel, naming the channel that would have to be measured.
  • Docs and evidence: a Qoder column in all nine buckets of agent-host-contract.md; a "Worked example: the Qoder harness" in harness-onboarding.md with the checklist that makes it selectable; a live frame corpus (test/fixtures/acp_frames/qoder/handshake-live.jsonl, turn-live.jsonl, ids scrubbed) and its README row.
  • Test harness: acp_launch_capture gained REFUSED_AT_SPAWN_BACKENDS so the launch golden records a refusing harness's refusal; test_acp_deepseek_backend::test_no_known_backend_is_unverified now expects exactly {qoder}.

No frontend file changes: the existing Agent Backend panel renders the new row from the status endpoint.

Backwards compatibility

Compatible: this adds one known id and rejects, renames or removes nothing. A config.json naming qoder already degrades to the default backend with a log, before and after this PR, because the id is not selectable.

Tests

  • test/test_acp_qoder_backend.py (new): the id is known but not offered; a config naming it degrades to the default; policy id and provider label resolve; the launch record (qodercli --acp, override variable, install command, protocol version); routing reads UNVERIFIED and INDETERMINATE; no credential leaf is claimed; the MCP projection is no-channel; the install probe names the binary and command; register_selectable_backend refuses it and leaves both registries untouched.
  • Frame replay: qoder/handshake-live and qoder/turn-live with committed snapshots; test_every_backend_covers_the_required_frame_kinds reaches all seven classes live.
  • Updated pins: test_acp_launch_goldens (a refused entry), test_agent_backend_editable (NOT_SHIPPED_SELECTABLE names qoder with the reason), test_agent_sdk_capabilities, test_agent_sdk_backend_install, test_acp_backend_kas (exactly one predicate holds), test_compaction_other_backends (UNCLASSIFIED), test_cli_doctor (no-channel set), test_agent_host_contract_parity.
  • Ran the ~50 test files that enumerate backends or the corpus. All pass except 52 test_acp_runtime.py KAS-readiness tests, which fail identically on unmodified origin/main on the author's macOS machine (event-loop errors), so they are not caused by this change; CI is the gate for them. Also clean: black, isort, flake8, mypy --platform linux on the touched sources, and the black, subprocess-encoding, harness-parity and agent-SDK-boundary gates.

Manual verification

Driven against a real qodercli 1.1.17 (logged in), with a small script speaking JSON-RPC over stdio: initialize, authenticate, session/new, session/set_config_option, and a default-mode prompt on the free Flash model in which the session/request_permission was answered with cancel. The corpus fixtures are slices of those recordings.

Still to be measured, and the reason this PR does not make it selectable:

  1. Whether an allow rule in the operator's own Qoder settings can pre-approve a call so that no session/request_permission is raised.
  2. Where qodercli login stores its login (to declare the credential leaf).
  3. A stdio MCP mount round trip, and each capability-set decision.

Related Issues

Refs #13803

Checklist

  • At most two commits (one is the norm), with a Conventional Commits title (feat|fix|docs|style|refactor|perf|test|chore|ci|build|revert: ...)
  • Existing tests pass and new tests added for new functionality
  • Self-review completed; code follows project style guidelines
  • Documentation updated (if applicable)
  • No secrets, credentials, or internal references in the diff

Contribution License Agreement

@github-actions github-actions Bot added fork Pull request from a fork (external contributor) readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Sep 29, 2026
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dwu96 commented Sep 29, 2026

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👋 Hi! This PR is currently in draft status. Workflow runs won't be auto-approved until it's marked as ready for review.

When you're ready, click "Ready for review" and the workflows will be approved on the next cycle automatically.

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dwu96 commented Sep 29, 2026

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👋 Hi! This PR is currently in draft status. Workflow runs won't be auto-approved until it's marked as ready for review.

When you're ready, click "Ready for review" and the workflows will be approved on the next cycle automatically.

@atomsbaza
atomsbaza marked this pull request as ready for review September 29, 2026 16:14
@atomsbaza
atomsbaza requested a review from a team as a code owner September 29, 2026 16:14
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Sep 29, 2026
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github-actions Bot commented Sep 29, 2026 •

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Design Review (Opus 5.5, fork) — ✅ PASS

Design-level review of 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c via the fork AI-review pipeline — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS/CONCERNS are advisory.

Design-Verdict: PASS

Before merge, check that the Agent Backend panel shows the new qoder row as not selectable and offers no switch to it. No rendered evidence is attached.

[DESIGN-REVIEWED] 13441ff

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] ec4a966b859d42168f73cf87e97ac7855108877fb0a13a7421264f16126710d1

That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 1 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh over the same inputs; if it differs, the description or that evidence changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from either is unproven.

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First Principles Review (Opus 5.5, fork) — 🟡 CONCERNS

Premise-level review of 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c via the fork AI-review pipeline — why this exists and whether the shipped surface is the smallest honest version. Updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS/CONCERNS are advisory.

First-Principles-Verdict: CONCERNS

is_qoder_backend has zero consumers in src/ and exists only to mirror its siblings, and the undeclared DORMANT_BACKENDS export has one consumer and one member.

Not justified as shipped

  • Item 6 — zero consumers: it is copied from is_pi/goose/deepseek_backend (grepping is_(deepseek|goose|pi)_backend in src/ finds 3 definitions and 0 call sites). Its only reader is test_acp_backend_kas.
    Subtraction: delete AcpProvider.is_qoder_backend and its line in test_acp_backend_kas.py.
    Clears when: a src/ call site reads it, or it is deleted.
  • Item 7 — undeclared, one consumer, generalized: the description never mentions DORMANT_BACKENDS. It is a new exported set with one member (qoder) and one src/ reader (ACP_BACKEND_PROCESS_NAMES).
    Clears when: the description declares it, or it shrinks to a private name next to ACP_BACKEND_PROCESS_NAMES.

What this change ships

Inventory (10 items) — 8 justified

Intent: let operators and policy authors name, deny and install-check Qoder (#13803) without it being selectable yet. ADDITION.

  1. Policy rules can name and deny qoder — justified
  2. A Qoder row shows in the backend status endpoint and Agent Backend panel — justified
  3. The install probe reports a missing qodercli and how to install it — justified
  4. A spawn that names qoder refuses instead of running as kiro-cli — justified
  5. Sessions persist under the qoder provider label — justified
  6. New is_qoder_backend provider property — zero consumers
  7. The orphan reclaim never signals a qodercli process, via a new DORMANT_BACKENDS set — undeclared
  8. A sign-in remedy is declared with no credential leaf — justified
  9. MCP projection no-channel (the registry requires one per known backend) — justified
  10. Live frame corpus and the onboarding worked-example doc — justified

[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] 13441ff

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] af0cfcb8a75b2d14c17721b0c762a305cafb5e0ac0542cc587cec098f8bd740f

That sha256 names the PR description this verdict read. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh; if it differs, the description changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from the description is unproven.

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GPT 6.1 Review (fork) — 🔴 changes requested (blocking)

Reviewed 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c via the fork AI-review pipeline; updated in place on each push.

Adjudication upheld 1 of 1 blocking finding(s); those must be resolved before merging.

BLOCKING -- test/test_pid_lifecycle.py:5050 -- Dormant exclusions weaken universal PID lifecycle ratchets
missing = sorted(ACP_BACKENDS_KNOWN - set(ACP_BACKEND_PROCESS_NAMES) - DORMANT_BACKENDS); if backend in DORMANT_BACKENDS: continue
Qoder’s known launch row without a process-name entry -> both checks exclude it -> the registry omission that fails the original assertions now passes.
Anchor: a-ratchet-may-only-tighten
Fix: Restore both universal assertions and register Qoder’s launch-derived process name instead of exempting dormant backends.

[BLOCK-MERGE] 13441ff
[GPT-REVIEWED] 13441ff

Adjudication (Opus 5.5) — is blocking on each finding proportionate?

Not weighed on harm. F1 is anchored to a-ratchet-may-only-tighten, which carries blocking: true at AUTOSDE.yaml:784-785, so the rule decides the verdict.
Confirmed in the patch: the universal process-name assertion now subtracts DORMANT_BACKENDS (patch line 1491), and the launch/process-name agreement loop skips dormant backends with continue (patch lines 1503-1504). Both are exemption sets carved out of universal ratchets in a test the diff touches, which is the pattern the rule flags.
The exemption is derived from the routing row and pinned by a separate test (patch lines 1353-1358), but under the rule that is not grounds to downgrade.

[ADJUDICATION] 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c total=1 uphold=1 downgrade=0
UPHOLD F1 test/test_pid_lifecycle.py:5050 reason=autosde-blocking-rule
[GPT-ADJUDICATED] 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c

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Opus 5.5 Review (fork) — ✅ no blocking findings

Reviewed 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c via the fork AI-review pipeline; updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.

[OPUS-REVIEWED] 13441ff

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 29, 2026
@atomsbaza
atomsbaza force-pushed the feat/qoder-acp-backend branch from db2ee2b to 173b5db Compare September 30, 2026 17:03
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Pushed 173b5db18 (single commit, rebased onto current main; the agent-host-contract.md conflict was in bucket 1's first row, resolved by keeping main's text and re-adding the Qoder cell).

Fixed (both reviewers' findings were real and verified against the diff):

  • harness-onboarding.md and the test_acp_qoder_backend.py docstring said no fixture corpus was committed while this commit ships one. The lead-in now points at test/fixtures/acp_frames/qoder/, and "What makes it selectable" step 6 is reduced to the re-record, the measured cells and the baseline flip.
  • test/acp_launch_capture.py: the REFUSED_AT_SPAWN_BACKENDS block had been spliced into RUNTIME_ONLY_BACKENDS's doc comment; it now sits below that assignment.

Not changed — First Principles item 9 (is_qoder_backend, zero src/ consumers): the property is what test_acp_backend_kas.py::TestBackendPredicates::test_exactly_one_predicate_holds_for_every_known_backend needs. That test is parametrized over ACP_BACKENDS_KNOWN and asserts exactly one is_<id>_backend predicate holds per known id, so deleting the property makes the [qoder] case fail (none would hold) rather than removing dead code. The review notes the same symmetry for is_pi, is_goose and is_deepseek, which also have no src/ consumer. Dropping it would mean loosening that invariant for every harness, which is outside this PR's goal; I'd rather a maintainer decide that separately than have this PR change the test's contract.

Design Review's open point (does the Agent Backend panel render a non-selectable row) is covered by the existing AgentBackendTab.test.tsx case "renders a complete detail for a backend the panel has never heard of"; this PR adds no frontend code.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge and removed merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Sep 30, 2026
@atomsbaza
atomsbaza force-pushed the feat/qoder-acp-backend branch from 173b5db to 000ea24 Compare October 1, 2026 14:56
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 1, 2026
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever force-pushed the feat/qoder-acp-backend branch from 7a81b24 to 13441ff Compare October 4, 2026 07:02
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Rebased onto main (8ae5dff -> efd0181) to clear the merge conflict in docs/system-specs/modules/agent-host-contract.md. CI re-running.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge and removed readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 4, 2026

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Requesting changes on head 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c. Thanks for measuring this against a real qodercli before writing anything; the wire corpus and the honest UNVERIFIED routing row make this easy to follow.

What I checked: at this head the Qoder suite plus every test file that lists backends (test_acp_qoder_backend, test_acp_deepseek_backend, test_acp_backend_kas, test_agent_sdk_capabilities, test_agent_sdk_backend_install, test_compaction_other_backends, test_agent_backend_editable, test_acp_launch_goldens, test_pid_lifecycle, test_cli_doctor, test_agent_host_contract_parity) passes locally on Python 3.12, 1076 tests. It cannot merge as it stands, for these reasons:

  1. Rebase needed. The branch is 839 commits behind main and conflicts in acp/client.py, test/acp_launch_capture.py, agent-host-contract.md and harness-onboarding.md. This is more than a mechanical rebase. #17214 moved per-host launch out of AcpClient._spawn's if/elif chain into a ProcessAdapter per host under acp/harness/, looked up through process_adapter_for. The _is_qoder spawn arm that resolves and then refuses has to be redone in that shape. One option is an adapter, or the process_adapter_for lookup, that refuses qoder explicitly, so the id still cannot fall through to the kiro-cli arm. Please keep a test that pins the refusal after the move.

  2. Blocking ratchet finding is still open. test_pid_lifecycle.py subtracts DORMANT_BACKENDS from test_every_registered_backend_has_a_process_name and skips it in test_the_self_served_names_come_from_the_launch_table, which loosens two universal assertions (the a-ratchet-may-only-tighten rule, upheld as blocking). Either give qoder a real ACP_BACKEND_PROCESS_NAMES entry and show it does not widen what the orphan reclaim will signal, then drop DORMANT_BACKENDS, or keep the exemption and get an explicit maintainer override that cites your reasoning (Crew never spawns an UNVERIFIED backend, so no tracked PID can be qodercli).

  3. CI on this head is red. The GPT review lane is blocking (item 2) and PR Readiness is failing. The Backend Tests failures on Linux shards 1/3 and Windows shards 1/3 are in test_chat_handlers_composition_contract and test_review_repair_routing_skill. This PR does not touch either file and both pass locally at this head, so they look like base drift that the rebase should clear. Please confirm they are green after you push.

Smaller, non-blocking: the First Principles note on DORMANT_BACKENDS being an undeclared exported set goes away if item 2 removes it. Otherwise, please mention it in the description.

I'll review again when the head moves.

atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 13, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 13, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
@atomsbaza

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Superseded by #19245. That PR makes Qoder selectable behind the measured, pinned approval gate that this one left open (the permission-rule and sign-in measurements this PR deferred are done there), so this one is closed in its favour. Refs #13803.

@atomsbaza atomsbaza closed this Oct 13, 2026
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention label Oct 13, 2026
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 13, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 23, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 23, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 24, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
atomsbaza added a commit to atomsbaza/KiroCrew that referenced this pull request Nov 8, 2026
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.

Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
  --permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
  --dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
  (current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
  prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
  history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
  stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.

Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.

Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.

Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.

Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
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