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Design Review (Opus 5.5, fork) — ✅ PASSDesign-level review of Design-Verdict: PASS Before merge, check that the Agent Backend panel shows the new [DESIGN-REVIEWED] 13441ff Description read[DESCRIPTION-READ] ec4a966b859d42168f73cf87e97ac7855108877fb0a13a7421264f16126710d1 That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 1 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with |
First Principles Review (Opus 5.5, fork) — 🟡 CONCERNSPremise-level review of First-Principles-Verdict: CONCERNS
Not justified as shipped
What this change shipsInventory (10 items) — 8 justifiedIntent: let operators and policy authors name, deny and install-check Qoder (#13803) without it being selectable yet. ADDITION.
[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] 13441ff Description read[DESCRIPTION-READ] af0cfcb8a75b2d14c17721b0c762a305cafb5e0ac0542cc587cec098f8bd740f That sha256 names the PR description this verdict read. Recompute it with |
GPT 6.1 Review (fork) — 🔴 changes requested (blocking)Reviewed Adjudication upheld 1 of 1 blocking finding(s); those must be resolved before merging. BLOCKING -- test/test_pid_lifecycle.py:5050 -- Dormant exclusions weaken universal PID lifecycle ratchets [BLOCK-MERGE] 13441ff Adjudication (Opus 5.5) — is blocking on each finding proportionate?Not weighed on harm. F1 is anchored to |
Opus 5.5 Review (fork) — ✅ no blocking findingsReviewed |
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Pushed Fixed (both reviewers' findings were real and verified against the diff):
Not changed — First Principles item 9 ( Design Review's open point (does the Agent Backend panel render a non-selectable row) is covered by the existing |
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cruisercohen
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Requesting changes on head 13441ff8d869f8620c5270a963f9b4281018b56c. Thanks for measuring this against a real qodercli before writing anything; the wire corpus and the honest UNVERIFIED routing row make this easy to follow.
What I checked: at this head the Qoder suite plus every test file that lists backends (test_acp_qoder_backend, test_acp_deepseek_backend, test_acp_backend_kas, test_agent_sdk_capabilities, test_agent_sdk_backend_install, test_compaction_other_backends, test_agent_backend_editable, test_acp_launch_goldens, test_pid_lifecycle, test_cli_doctor, test_agent_host_contract_parity) passes locally on Python 3.12, 1076 tests. It cannot merge as it stands, for these reasons:
-
Rebase needed. The branch is 839 commits behind
mainand conflicts inacp/client.py,test/acp_launch_capture.py,agent-host-contract.mdandharness-onboarding.md. This is more than a mechanical rebase. #17214 moved per-host launch out ofAcpClient._spawn's if/elif chain into aProcessAdapterper host underacp/harness/, looked up throughprocess_adapter_for. The_is_qoderspawn arm that resolves and then refuses has to be redone in that shape. One option is an adapter, or theprocess_adapter_forlookup, that refusesqoderexplicitly, so the id still cannot fall through to the kiro-cli arm. Please keep a test that pins the refusal after the move. -
Blocking ratchet finding is still open.
test_pid_lifecycle.pysubtractsDORMANT_BACKENDSfromtest_every_registered_backend_has_a_process_nameand skips it intest_the_self_served_names_come_from_the_launch_table, which loosens two universal assertions (thea-ratchet-may-only-tightenrule, upheld as blocking). Either giveqodera realACP_BACKEND_PROCESS_NAMESentry and show it does not widen what the orphan reclaim will signal, then dropDORMANT_BACKENDS, or keep the exemption and get an explicit maintainer override that cites your reasoning (Crew never spawns anUNVERIFIEDbackend, so no tracked PID can beqodercli). -
CI on this head is red. The GPT review lane is blocking (item 2) and PR Readiness is failing. The Backend Tests failures on Linux shards 1/3 and Windows shards 1/3 are in
test_chat_handlers_composition_contractandtest_review_repair_routing_skill. This PR does not touch either file and both pass locally at this head, so they look like base drift that the rebase should clear. Please confirm they are green after you push.
Smaller, non-blocking: the First Principles note on DORMANT_BACKENDS being an undeclared exported set goes away if item 2 removes it. Otherwise, please mention it in the description.
I'll review again when the head moves.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (`qodercli --acp`). This makes it a selectable
harness whose every tool call must reach Kiro Crew's gate, or the session is
refused or stopped.
Routing: a new `Routing.PINNED_ASK_RULE`. qodercli exposes no resolved-config
read-back, so the guarantee is argv-pinned and runtime-witnessed instead of
verified:
- spawn argv pins `--settings {"permissions":{"ask":["*"],"defaultMode":"default"}}
--permission-mode default --strict-mcp-config` (never --allowed-tools,
--dangerously-skip-permissions or --config-dir);
- exact measured-version gate (1.1.67 only; anything else is refused);
- default-mode read-back on open/restore and a mid-session mode tripwire
(current_mode_update and the mode config option);
- unasked-tool-call tripwire keyed by toolCallId: an executing frame needs a
prior ALLOW answer for that call, armed by the first live prompt so replayed
history cannot trip it;
- allow_always is never selected and a refused one is recorded as a denial;
- QODER_* variables that can relocate config/home or set permissions are
stripped from the child env; the PID reclaim requires the `--acp` argv token.
Models: Thinking effort and the model write go through session config options.
The picker lists the models the harness itself advertises (ids are the wire
values, Qoder's display names are the labels) and refuses ids it did not
advertise. The catalog is re-read on every session, on an unknown-id refusal
(one refresh, then refuse) and, for the picker, through a TTL refresh that runs
a handshake-only probe (no prompt, no model call) and fails closed: a failed
probe keeps the last snapshot and never widens it.
Also: `~/.qoder/.auth` is declared as the (inferred, never read) credential
leaf; qoder joins the independent-setup list so onboarding offers it.
Capability sets that were not measured (compaction, steering, eviction,
session sharing, ...) stay out.
Evidence is committed as scrubbed live frame corpora (1.1.67 handshake,
pinned ask, load replay with and without a tool call, the 17-model catalog, an
unpinned bypass control, session-array MCP ask) and documented per version in
harness-onboarding.md, including that the docs' "PreToolUse allow skips the
permission pipeline" is not what 1.1.17 or 1.1.67 do for an `ask` rule.
Supersedes kirodotdev#15038. Refs kirodotdev#13803.
Problem / Motivation
Goal: Kiro Crew knows the Qoder CLI as an ACP backend it can name, install-check and describe, without yet offering it as a choice, so the follow-up that makes it selectable starts from a measured wire contract instead of a guess.
Qoder CLI serves ACP natively (
qodercli --acp, a flag its--helpdoes not list), which makes it a natural fit for the single-binary shape opencode, goose and deepseek already use. #13803 asks for it as a backend. Today a policy author cannot name it, the install probe cannot tell an operator what is missing, and a session persisted against it would be recorded as a kiro session.Making it selectable is a separate decision: the automation on #13803 routed the roadmap question to a human, and two things that decide the tool-approval gate are still unmeasured (below). This PR lands everything that does not depend on those answers.
Why it matters
qodertoday, and the backend status endpoint returns a row for it, which the existing Agent Backend panel renders (it already handles a backend it has not heard of). The host-contract column says plainly what has and has not been measured.modes/configOptions, the permission round trip) are committed as a replayable corpus, so the selectability work is measured against a fixed record.Not a goal
BASELINE_SELECTABLE_BACKENDS.Routing.UNVERIFIED.qodercli loginstores its login was not located, and a leaf written from documentation fences a path nobody checked.What changed (motivation → approach → change)
Approach. The docs (
harness-onboarding.md) already describe a KNOWN-but-unrouted harness:register_selectable_backendrefuses anUNVERIFIEDrouting, so KNOWN is not enough to reach the switch. Qoder takes that path rather than borrowing a neighbour's mechanism.What the binary does (qodercli 1.1.17, driven live).
session/newis refused with -32000Authentication requireduntil the client sendsauthenticateforqodercli-login.modes(default"Prompts for approval",acceptEdits,bypassPermissions,plan),models, andconfigOptionsformode,modelandreasoning_effort.defaultmode a mutating shell command raisessession/request_permission(optionsproceed_always_and_save,proceed_once,cancel), and answeringcancelstops it. A read-only command ran with no request.Change.
agent_sdk/backends.py:ACP_BACKEND_QODERinACP_BACKENDS_KNOWNandPOLICY_ID_BY_BACKEND; oneACP_BACKEND_LAUNCHrow (qodercli --acp,QODERCLI_BIN,npm i -g @qoder-ai/qodercli), which the shared resolver, install probe and gate label read; an explicitRouting.UNVERIFIEDrow. It is left out of every capability set and out of the baseline.acp/client.py: an_is_qoderspawn arm that resolves the launch and then refuses, so the id cannot fall through to the kiro-cli arm and run under the wrong identity.acp/types.py,providers/acp.py,acp_backends.py: provider label,is_qoder_backend, re-exports.agent_sdk/host_auth.py: an auth declaration with no credential leaf and nosigned_out_signature(the harness's text is the SDK's generic prefix, which goose's auth answer also carries).providers/mirrors/registry.py: MCP projectionno-channel, naming the channel that would have to be measured.agent-host-contract.md; a "Worked example: the Qoder harness" inharness-onboarding.mdwith the checklist that makes it selectable; a live frame corpus (test/fixtures/acp_frames/qoder/handshake-live.jsonl,turn-live.jsonl, ids scrubbed) and its README row.acp_launch_capturegainedREFUSED_AT_SPAWN_BACKENDSso the launch golden records a refusing harness's refusal;test_acp_deepseek_backend::test_no_known_backend_is_unverifiednow expects exactly{qoder}.No frontend file changes: the existing Agent Backend panel renders the new row from the status endpoint.
Backwards compatibility
Compatible: this adds one known id and rejects, renames or removes nothing. A
config.jsonnamingqoderalready degrades to the default backend with a log, before and after this PR, because the id is not selectable.Tests
test/test_acp_qoder_backend.py(new): the id is known but not offered; a config naming it degrades to the default; policy id and provider label resolve; the launch record (qodercli --acp, override variable, install command, protocol version); routing readsUNVERIFIEDandINDETERMINATE; no credential leaf is claimed; the MCP projection isno-channel; the install probe names the binary and command;register_selectable_backendrefuses it and leaves both registries untouched.qoder/handshake-liveandqoder/turn-livewith committed snapshots;test_every_backend_covers_the_required_frame_kindsreaches all seven classes live.test_acp_launch_goldens(arefusedentry),test_agent_backend_editable(NOT_SHIPPED_SELECTABLEnames qoder with the reason),test_agent_sdk_capabilities,test_agent_sdk_backend_install,test_acp_backend_kas(exactly one predicate holds),test_compaction_other_backends(UNCLASSIFIED),test_cli_doctor(no-channel set),test_agent_host_contract_parity.test_acp_runtime.pyKAS-readiness tests, which fail identically on unmodifiedorigin/mainon the author's macOS machine (event-loop errors), so they are not caused by this change; CI is the gate for them. Also clean: black, isort, flake8,mypy --platform linuxon the touched sources, and the black, subprocess-encoding, harness-parity and agent-SDK-boundary gates.Manual verification
Driven against a real
qodercli1.1.17 (logged in), with a small script speaking JSON-RPC over stdio:initialize,authenticate,session/new,session/set_config_option, and adefault-mode prompt on the free Flash model in which thesession/request_permissionwas answered withcancel. The corpus fixtures are slices of those recordings.Still to be measured, and the reason this PR does not make it selectable:
session/request_permissionis raised.qodercli loginstores its login (to declare the credential leaf).Related Issues
Refs #13803
Checklist
feat|fix|docs|style|refactor|perf|test|chore|ci|build|revert: ...)Contribution License Agreement