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docs(rfc): propose discovery-registry governance - #16007
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GPT 6.1 Review (fork) — ✅ no blocking findingsReviewed Review detailsNo findings. |
Design Review (Opus 5.5, fork) — ✅ PASSDesign-level review of Design-Verdict: PASS Check that the README's provenance paragraph gets an "added … verified against [DESIGN-REVIEWED] 3c8c679 Description read[DESCRIPTION-READ] 0525a016ee9d9a4b0c070532e93466708e985c4b89977515b911f2667f05d5ef That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 1 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with |
Opus 5.5 Review (fork) — ✅ no blocking findingsReviewed |
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Rebased onto current
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Reviewed, not approving (crew-pr-reviewer). This is a governance RFC. Merging it reads as accepting the policy, which is a maintainer decision. |
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Rebased again: main added another RFC index row and the README conflicted. New head |
Record a draft RFC asking whether external discovery-registry admission belongs in the public governance ceiling or stays edition-only, and add its row to the RFC index. Documentation only. Refs kirodotdev#12677
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dodgeblaster
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Stewarding review (sweep triage) — RFC fits the data model; the one open question is correctly a maintainer call.
I verified the RFC's premises and its proposed shape against current main (41987ae89b). The doc is accurate and the proposed design is consistent with the governance data model and the repo's own invariants. Scoped notes below, then the two things that keep this review at request-changes rather than approve.
The premises hold on main
- No discovery-registry row exists in the catalog —
SCOPE_CATALOGnow lives insrc/kiro_crew/platform/governance_parts/catalog.py, andregistriesis absent (the host-matched rulesets arenetwork.egressatcatalog.py:127). DefaultExternalAccessPolicy.admits_registrystill returnsTrueunconditionally (src/kiro_crew/platform/defaults.py:459-460), so the public build cannot narrow registry admission fromsecurity_policy.jsontoday. The premise is intact.
The proposed shape fits the model and the invariants
- It is a pure data-row add:
ScopeSpec(RULESET, matcher="host"), reusing the existinghostmatcher (_match_host/_MATCHERSinsrc/kiro_crew/platform/governance_parts/matching.py:98,129) and_url_hostextraction (matching.py:193). No new matcher, no evaluator edit — consistent withAGENTS.md:128("adding a scope is aSCOPE_CATALOGdata change, never an evaluator edit") and the append-only nature ofregister_scope(catalog.py:400). CONTRACT_VERSIONstays1(src/kiro_crew/platform/context.py:80): adding a catalog row does not change the companion contract, so the RFC's implicit "no bump" is correct.- The hostless-input semantics are right:
_url_hostreturns""for a URL with no network host, and undermode:"allow"an empty string matches only a catch-all like*— the RFC states this. - Placing the shared check in
_shared.admits_registry(tightest-wins over the edition policy) rather than only inDefaultExternalAccessPolicyis the correct layering, since an edition replaces theexternal_accessslot wholesale (src/kiro_crew/platform/context.py). The RFC calls this out. - The next-gateway-start timing choice (lazy per-process catalog caches, no live invalidation) mirrors the
agent_backendrestart contract rather than inventing live revocation. Reasonable and documented.
Why request-changes, not approve
- Merge state. The PR is
CONFLICTINGand ~104 commits behindmain; only the fork author (hkrishg-aws) can rebase and resolve. As a fork PR this is review-only on our side — we neither push to the branch nor merge it. - It is a
draft-status RFC with a live open question. By the RFC's own exit criterion ("acceptance is explicit, not inferred from merge"), it should not be approved-to-merge while the single governance decision is unanswered: does external discovery-registry admission belong in the public governance ceiling (one host-keyedregistriesrow), or should it stay edition-only? That is a security-policy product decision for the maintainers — it changes what operators of the public build can allow/deny. Nothing in the code settles it; recording it underdocs/decisions/(or accepting the RFC non-draft) is the gate.
No code defects to fix in the doc itself. This stays open pending the maintainer's ceiling-vs-edition ruling and the author's rebase.
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For information, not a ruling on this RFC: the open question here (public governance policy vs edition-only) is covered by the accepted enterprise-edition RFC, which lists "Extension sources" as the governed key An implementation is up as draft #28530. It follows the design agreed in #12677's comments: one host-matched key judged on the host of Thank you @hkrishg-aws for the design work here and in #12677, and for the offer to write it. Review on #28530 is very welcome. |
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Closing this RFC as superseded by #28530. The gap this RFC raised. The public build had no governance key for the skill and MCP discovery registries.
How #28530 closes it. The policy question this RFC left open (public governance ceiling or edition-only) is settled by the enterprise-edition RFC appendix. #28530 implements the design agreed in #12677:
Thanks @dodgeblaster for taking the design from #12677 and this RFC into the implementation. I've reviewed and approved #28530, with one non-blocking suggestion ( |
Problem / Motivation
Goal: Record the proposal and request a maintainer decision on whether an
operator can restrict external discovery registries through the public
governance ceiling rather than an edition adapter.
The public default registry policy admits every registry
(
DefaultExternalAccessPolicy.admits_registryinsrc/kiro_crew/platform/defaults.py),and the built-in catalog has no discovery-registry scope (
SCOPE_CATALOGinsrc/kiro_crew/platform/governance.py).Repository evidence is measured at the RFC's
audited-atrevision.Why it matters
An operator cannot express this admission restriction in the existing public
security-policy document. The edition seam can express it today
(
ExternalAccessPolicyinsrc/kiro_crew/platform/interfaces.py); the RFC asks whether that boundaryis intentional, and records the shared-catalog and restart costs of changing it.
Not a goal
What changed (motivation → approach → change)
docs/request-for-change/rfc-discovery-registry-governance.md, statusdraft.behavior as shipped.
_url_host(api_base)extraction, the shared admissiongate with tightest-wins, explicit no-external-registry-floor semantics, and a
next-start guarantee with the lazy-first-use qualification.
record acceptance (the "Status vocabulary" section of
docs/request-for-change/README.md).Backwards compatibility
Compatible: documentation only. No code, configuration defaults, or runtime
permissions change.
Tests
No runtime tests added, documentation only.
python3 scripts/docs_lint.pypasseson main with both files in place, and the repository's PR-description checker passes.
Manual verification
The RFC's code references, four external admission call sites, lazy caches,
matcher behavior, and
agent_backendsemantics/timing were checked againstlocal main at the RFC's
audited-atrevision. No gateway behavior or live CI was exercised.Related Issues
Refs #12677
narrowed design.
validation defect. Its #14004
work is not changed or duplicated here.
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