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fix(apps): re-consent pre-feature installs that declare sessionApproval - #22067

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fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval
Oct 21, 2026
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fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval

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@iamwhatever iamwhatever commented Oct 19, 2026 •

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Problem / Motivation

Goal: An app installed before permissions.sessionApproval existed, whose manifest already declares it, asks for consent after a host upgrade instead of silently gaining control of the user's sessions.

The older host ignored permissions.sessionApproval, so such an app was installed and enabled with no consent moment. Its installed.json has no sessionApprovalConsentPending key. After the upgrade the new parser reads the flag as granted, the record says enabled: true, and app_can_manage_session_approvals returns True. The two widen gates (update_app, register_external_app) never fire, because the manifest did not change; only the parser did.

Why it matters

The session-control grant lets an app approve or deny tool calls in the user's own sessions. A grant nobody consented to is a trust-boundary hole for every user who upgrades with such an app installed.

Not a goal

What changed (motivation → approach → change)

Symptom: a pre-feature install that declares sessionApproval holds the grant with no consent. Cause: every record this host writes carries sessionApprovalConsentPending (to_dict keeps every bool), but a record from the older host has no key, and the reader defaulted that to "not pending".

The refusal lives on the read side, so the grant is never live, before or after start-up:

  • _read_installed (manager_records.py) marks a record pending when the key is absent AND the live manifest declares sessionApproval. Absence is only ever read toward "pending", never toward "consented".

  • app_can_manage_session_approvals (permissions.py) decides from one manifest read and one record read: it passes the manifest that showed the grant into _read_installed(..., manifest=), so a second manifest read cannot clear "pending". It refuses a pending, disabled or unreadable record; the later enablement read can only refuse. Three route-test fixtures that fake an enabled app (test_app_route_trust_gate.py, test_dashboard_session_meta.py, test_dashboard_sessions_named.py) now also fake its record.

  • _write_installed (manager_records.py) judges the record on disk, not the caller's copy: it never turns one with no consent key, or one already pending, into "no consent needed" unless the write is enable_app's consent write (session_approval_consent=True), the live manifest is readable and does not declare the grant, and with no manifest at all it leaves a missing consent key missing rather than writing "no consent needed". So no save path (disable, an unreadable manifest, an early update, a race) records a consent that was not given.

  • update_app (manager_install.py) reads the record against its one old-manifest read, since the replacement record lands in a new tree. A failed register_external_app (manager_external.py) restores the record's prior bytes, so its rollback cannot add a consent key.

  • docs/system-specs/modules/app-kit-platform.md describes the key-less rule, the writer rule and the post-readiness reconcile.

The persisted reconcile runs after readiness, off the event loop, so boot does no new work (no-new-work-on-gateway-boot-path):

  • manager_activation.py: session_approval_consent_candidates() lists such records, plus any that read both enabled and pending (a key-less record another writer saved first), read-only. mark_session_approval_consent_pending(name) re-checks one record on disk, writes enabled=False, sessionApprovalConsentPending=True and audits session_approval_widened with caller app_boot. The write adds the key, so each record is handled once; a record uninstalled or consented since the listing is left alone.
  • New apps/session_consent.py: reconcile_after_ready() handles each candidate under app_lifecycle_lock(name), so no install, update, uninstall, enable or disable of that app interleaves. Under the lock it re-checks the record and runs the disable route's bounded startup-hook preflight; a still-running hook defers the app to the next start. For an enabled app it then runs teardown_app_runtime, the same teardown the disable route runs, so boot-started backends, hooks and gateway-owned registrations stop. Then it marks the record, and rebuilds the agent spec once if anything changed. It never raises.
  • run() (service_boot.py) starts it as a tracked asyncio.create_task right after the KIROCREW_READY print, beside the checkout warning, and skips it in test mode like that neighbour. File work runs in asyncio.to_thread.

The user re-enables through the existing disclosure surface (enable_app(..., session_approval_consent=True)), the same path a fresh install uses.

Backwards compatibility

Compatible: records written by this host always carry the key and are read exactly as before; only a key-less record whose manifest declares sessionApproval changes.

The diff disables such an app just after start-up, so it takes away its enabled state. Readers of that state and of the pending flag:

Reader: src/kiro_crew/apps/permissions.py:app_can_manage_session_approvals -- app -- refuses while pending; test_boot_disables_and_marks_pending_until_consent
Reader: src/kiro_crew/apps/manager_activation.py:enable_app -- crew page -- requires session_approval_consent while pending; test_disabled_pre_feature_record_still_needs_consent
Reader: src/kiro_crew/apps/routes.py:_app_may_run_after_install -- crew page -- a pending app's resources do not start, the same as after a widening update
Reader: src/kiro_crew/apps/manager_lookup.py:is_app_enabled -- app -- reads the persisted enabled: false; test_boot_disables_and_marks_pending_until_consent
Reader: src/kiro_crew/apps/manager_lookup.py:list_apps -- crew page -- shows sessionApprovalConsentPending: true, so the app page offers the consent step; test_grant_is_refused_before_boot_reconciles

Tests

test/test_app_session_approval_preconsent.py writes a pre-feature installed.json (no key) beside a manifest that declares sessionApproval:

  • test_grant_is_refused_before_boot_reconciles: grant refused and record reads pending before start-up runs.
  • test_boot_disables_and_marks_pending_until_consent: the post-readiness step disables the app, persists pending, audits app_boot / session_approval_widened; plain enable is refused; enable with consent restores the grant; a second run leaves it alone.
  • test_boot_rebuilds_the_agent_spec_only_when_it_disabled_an_app: the step rebuilds the spec once after disabling an app, and not when nothing changed.
  • test_a_failed_spec_rebuild_keeps_the_app_disabled: a failing rebuild does not undo the disable.
  • test_a_later_manifest_read_cannot_clear_pending: manifest reads of granted, missing, granted still refuse.
  • test_first_run_setup_leaves_the_scan_to_after_readiness: run_first_run_setup (before readiness) does not touch the record; the grant is still refused.
  • test_gateway_schedules_the_reconcile_after_readiness: run() schedules the step after the KIROCREW_READY print, and _init_services does not.
  • test_boot_stops_a_running_app_before_marking_it: teardown runs while the record still reads enabled. test_boot_skips_teardown_for_an_app_already_off: no teardown for a disabled record, which still needs consent.
  • test_an_uninstall_holding_the_lock_is_not_undone: with the app's lifecycle lock held, the reconcile waits; an uninstall inside the lock is not undone and nothing is torn down.
  • test_an_app_consented_while_waiting_is_not_torn_down and test_a_stuck_startup_hook_defers_the_app: the under-lock re-check and the bounded preflight.
  • test_consent_on_an_enabled_pre_feature_record_is_written: enable_app(..., session_approval_consent=True) on an enabled key-less record writes the consent instead of answering "already enabled" (manager_activation.py).
  • test_a_pending_record_saved_before_boot_is_still_disabled: a key-less record that another writer saved (now enabled and pending) is still torn down and disabled; the candidate check selects that shape too.
  • test_a_save_with_a_broken_manifest_keeps_consent_needed: a key-less app with a broken app.json is disabled; after the manifest is fixed, a plain enable still asks for consent and the grant stays refused until consent. test_a_save_of_a_no_grant_record_records_no_consent_step: an app without the grant is not made to ask. test_a_stale_copy_written_back_cannot_clear_pending_on_disk: a stale copy saved over a pending record keeps it pending until a consent write. test_an_update_after_a_failed_manifest_read_keeps_consent_needed and test_a_failed_reregistration_restores_the_key_less_record: a manifest read that fails once cannot let an update or a rolled-back re-registration record "no consent needed".
  • test_marking_an_uninstalled_app_recreates_nothing and test_marking_a_consented_app_leaves_it_alone: the per-record re-check.
  • test_app_permissions.py::test_unreadable_record_is_denied_even_when_enabled_reads_true: a record read that fails is a refusal, even if the enabled read says yes.
  • test_pre_feature_app_without_the_grant_is_untouched and test_record_with_the_key_is_trusted_as_written: no change for apps without the grant or for records this host wrote.

Each fix was proven by neutering it: the read-side check (grant tests fail), the manifest pass-through, the lifecycle lock (race test fails) and the teardown branch (teardown test fails). Determinism: the file passed 10/10 repeated runs and in reversed test order; the two race tests wait on the lock's waiter list through async_wait_until and on the task through await_until, both bounded by the runner's budget. The tests use no wall clock or network; waits use the repo's bounded kiro_crew.testing.wait helpers.

Manual verification

N/A — the post-readiness step and the read check are covered on a real temp data home by the tests above; there is no UI change.

Related Issues

Closes #11447

Follow-up: #22118 — serialize installed.json writers so a stale save (for example a dev-mode toggle) cannot undo a sessionApproval consent-pending mark. That race is already on main; this PR does not widen it.

Pattern harvest

Not generalizable: the defect is specific to one record field added after installs existed; the fix reads its absence fail-closed at the one reader.

Checklist

  • At most two commits (one is the norm), with a Conventional Commits title
  • Existing tests pass and new tests added for new functionality
  • Self-review completed; code follows project style guidelines
  • Documentation updated (if applicable)
  • No secrets, credentials, or internal references in the diff

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UX Review (Opus 5.5) — ⏭️ skipped

Revision f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc touches no user-facing surface (no changes under website/ or committed screenshots), so the UX review was skipped. Does not block merge.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added the readiness: checking Automated validation is still running label Oct 19, 2026
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Design Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

Design-level review of f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

Design-Verdict: PASS

Nothing blocks: consent is refused on read the moment the key is missing, and the post-readiness reconcile only persists that refusal under the per-app lifecycle lock.

Notes

  • _session_approval_save_rule re-reads the record on disk and has three outcomes (as_is/pending/unrecorded) on every save, a lot of machinery for a one-time migration. Once the reconcile has written the key to every pre-feature record, consider replacing it with a simpler rule.
  • Each _read_installed of a record with no consent key now also reads the manifest. That cost lasts only until the reconcile writes the key, but an app the reconcile defers (stuck startup hook) keeps paying it on every read.

[DESIGN-REVIEWED] f2cf3c5

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] eb17140196abc6d89d4cea956e887db36cbcd3cd54faf3e1ca91d3084096e826

That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 1 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh over the same inputs; if it differs, the description or that evidence changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from either is unproven.

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First Principles Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

Premise-level review of f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc — why this exists and whether the shipped surface is the smallest honest version. Updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

First-Principles-Verdict: PASS

The fix is aimed at the cause: a missing consent key is now read as "pending". One rider duplicates protection the PR adds elsewhere.

Notes

  • Item 5 — duplicate of _session_approval_save_rule (manager_records.py): the PR's own spec text says the save rule already stops "a stale copy written back by a rollback" from recording consent. The byte-for-byte prior_meta_text restore in register_external_app guards the same hazard a second time. Subtraction: delete prior_meta_text/meta_path and the atomic_write(meta_path, prior_meta_text) branch, and keep _write_installed(name, existing).
  • Item 4 — oversized: _session_approval_save_rule has three outcomes (as_is/pending/unrecorded). _read_installed already sets pending in memory for every writer that reads first, so "unrecorded" exists only for the missing-manifest case. Subtraction: replace "unrecorded" with "pending" and drop the body.pop(...) branch, which fails closed the same way.

What this change ships

Inventory (8 items) — 6 justified

Intent: stop a pre-upgrade app from holding session control the user never consented to. FIX.

  1. A key-less record whose manifest declares sessionApproval reads as pending, so the grant is refused — justified
  2. The permission check refuses a pending, disabled or unreadable record, using one manifest read — justified
  3. Enabling an app that reads enabled but pending now records consent instead of "already enabled" — justified
  4. Saves never turn a key-less or pending record into "consented" — oversized
  5. A failed external registration restores the prior record bytes — duplicate of _session_approval_save_rule
  6. After readiness, such apps are stopped, disabled, marked pending and audited as app_boot; the agent spec is rebuilt — justified
  7. update_app reads the record against the old manifest — justified
  8. Three route-test fixtures also fake the app's record — justified

[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] f2cf3c5

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] 64bee0ff07b595c34b63cdaec3e6ee39efc216360421ddee689c05d9cac2f9b8

That sha256 names the PR description this verdict read. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh; if it differs, the description changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from the description is unproven.

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GPT 6.1 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

GPT 6.1 completed its review of f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc and found no blocking issues.

This comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.
[GPT-REVIEWED] f2cf3c5

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override gpt f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc: <one-sentence reason>

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Opus 5.5 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

Reviewed f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc — this comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.

[OPUS-REVIEWED] f2cf3c5

Verdict parsed from the review's SHA-scoped output markers for commit f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc.

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override fable f2cf3c581fabeba209262a3be3de85d251b23efc: <one-sentence reason>

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 19, 2026
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch from cc3bc91 to 38783df Compare October 19, 2026 05:30
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Oct 19, 2026
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Answers to the review of cc3bc91, now superseded by 38783df:

  • GPT 6.1 (no-new-work-on-gateway-boot-path): fixed. The consent reconcile and its spec rebuild no longer run before the socket binds. agent.reconcile_session_approval_after_ready runs as a tracked asyncio.to_thread task in service_boot.run() after the KIROCREW_READY print. test_gateway_schedules_the_reconcile_after_readiness pins the order.
  • First Principles (item 5, to_thread around run_first_run_setup): fixed by reverting that hunk; _init_services matches main.
  • Design (PASS punchline on the to_thread move): the move is gone. The only off-loop step is the new post-readiness task, which uses no loop objects.

Local GPT review of later heads also found two read-side races in app_can_manage_session_approvals (an unreadable record, and a second manifest read). Both are fixed: the check now decides from one manifest read and one record read and fails closed.

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  • Check that no released host recorded sessionApproval consent without writing sessionApprovalConsentPending: checked, none did.

The flag and the key arrived in one commit, 5824e04 (#11192). Before it the parser ignored sessionApproval, so no consent existed to record.
From that commit InstalledApp.to_dict keeps every bool, so every record any host wrote since then carries the key. Only pre-feature records lack it, and those never had a consent moment.

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  • What the session routes allow between KIROCREW_READY and the reconcile: nothing for a key-less record.

Every session route reads the grant through slot_ownership.session_grant / read_session_grant, which call app_can_manage_session_approvals (chat_send via deny_app_session_control, slot_approval, live_turn, app_admission).
That check refuses a key-less record whose manifest declares the grant, from one manifest read and one record read, so the window before the post-ready task grants nothing. test_grant_is_refused_before_boot_reconciles and test_a_later_manifest_read_cannot_clear_pending pin it.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Oct 19, 2026
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iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch from 38783df to 3f0cc52 Compare October 19, 2026 06:06
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iamwhatever commented Oct 19, 2026 •

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self-added: yes
mechanism: per-app app_lifecycle_lock around the post-ready reconcile

  • Serialize reconciliation with app lifecycle operations (span=9e0ff6efa6e7): fixed in 3f0cc52.

Fixed. New apps/session_consent.py reconcile_after_ready runs on the event loop and handles each candidate under app_lifecycle_lock(name), the lock install, update, uninstall, enable and disable take.
Under the lock it re-checks the record on disk first; mark_session_approval_consent_pending re-checks again before writing, so an uninstalled app is never recreated.
test_an_uninstall_holding_the_lock_is_not_undone holds the lock, removes the app, releases, and asserts no installed.json and no teardown.

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iamwhatever commented Oct 19, 2026 •

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self-added: yes
mechanism: disable-route teardown before marking the record

  • Pre-feature app's backend and registrations keep running after the reconcile (span=0ed02426a134): fixed in 3f0cc52.

Fixed. For an enabled candidate, reconcile_after_ready runs teardown_app_runtime(name, info), the same teardown handle_disable_app runs, under app_lifecycle_lock and after the disable route's bounded startup-hook preflight.
Teardown runs while the record still reads enabled, matching the disable route; then the record is marked pending and disabled, and the agent spec is rebuilt.
test_boot_stops_a_running_app_before_marking_it pins the order.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 19, 2026
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iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch from 3f0cc52 to 96bdb41 Compare October 19, 2026 06:15
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First Principles on 3f0cc52 (item 6, zero consumers): applied the subtraction in 96bdb41. reconcile_session_approval_consent and its manager.py re-export are deleted; its two tests now run the gateway coroutine session_consent.reconcile_after_ready. git grep reconcile_session_approval_consent finds nothing. The same push rewords one comment in apps/session_consent.py that the Comment History Gate flagged.

@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention label Oct 19, 2026
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iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch from c08493a to 8dd0a0c Compare October 19, 2026 16:38
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Rebased onto main (88914fd) to clear a merge conflict; conflict-only, no code or design change. The one conflict was the sorted import list in src/kiro_crew/apps/manager.py, where main added _scan_installed_app_config_keys beside this PR's _session_approval_consent_unrecorded; both are kept. Related tests pass (932). New head 8dd0a0c. The open design question stays with the maintainer.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge labels Oct 19, 2026
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iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch from 8dd0a0c to 56161f8 Compare October 21, 2026 07:11
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Rebased onto main (5f803ab) to pick up the red-main fix #22178; the Await Fast Gate, Harness Parity and Coverage Gate reds came from the old base. Rebase only: no conflict and no code or design change. Related tests pass (932) and the harness-parity gate passes locally. New head 56161f8. The open design question stays with the maintainer.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 21, 2026
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iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch from 56161f8 to f5c447e Compare October 21, 2026 09:01
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iamwhatever commented Oct 21, 2026 •

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self-added: yes
mechanism: one save rule for the consent key; a missing app.json leaves the key unrecorded

  • An app with no app.json is marked waiting for sessionApproval consent after any save and disabled at boot (span=d5b8a736b65b): fixed in f5c447e.

Fixed. manager_records._session_approval_save_rule reads the on-disk record once and checks for app.json once: with no app.json a key-less record keeps its key absent instead of being forced pending, and the boot candidate check only selects enabled+pending records whose live manifest declares sessionApproval.
A manifest that exists but cannot be read still keeps consent pending, and a key-less record whose manifest returns with the grant still asks for consent.
test_an_app_with_no_manifest_is_not_made_to_ask pins this case; test_a_save_while_the_manifest_is_gone_records_no_consent and test_a_manifest_returning_during_a_save_records_no_consent pin the manifest-absent saves.
The same push fixes the two CI test failures: the facade TYPE_CHECKING list now names the new helper, and the config-key scan reads each manifest once.

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iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch from f5c447e to f2cf3c5 Compare October 21, 2026 10:49
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Rebased onto main (ef0ec3d) to pick up the CI skip fix #22717 (for #22697), which caused this PR's Coverage Gate 'skipped -- failing closed'. Rebase only: no conflict and no code change. Related tests pass (918). New head f2cf3c5.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 21, 2026
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  • Item 4: replace the save rule's "unrecorded" outcome with "pending": rebutted, kept as is.

Writing pending=True for a key-less record with no app.json reopens the Opus defect fixed in this PR: a self-managed app registered without a manifest would then need consent to enable, so the CLI and MCP enable paths would refuse it for a grant it never declares.
"unrecorded" keeps the key absent, which reads as not pending while there is no manifest and as pending once a manifest that declares the grant returns. test_an_app_with_no_manifest_is_not_made_to_ask and test_a_save_while_the_manifest_is_gone_records_no_consent pin both halves.

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  • Item 5: the byte-for-byte prior_meta_text restore in register_external_app duplicates the save rule: rebutted, kept as is.

The save rule alone would keep that rollback fail-closed, but it writes pending=True into a record that had no key, so a failed registration still changes the record. Restoring the prior bytes makes a failed registration leave the record exactly as it was, which is what a rollback promises.
Removing it is a design change on a PR handed to the maintainer; the maintainer can still take the subtraction.

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Review-ready at head f2cf3c5: PR Readiness passed, Coverage Gate passed, GPT and Opus raised no findings, and Design and First Principles both PASS. Every review item has its own disposition (19 records, no rule violations). Main has moved one commit since, in docs/system-specs/modules/side.md only, which this PR does not touch. The follow-up writer race is tracked in #22118. Waiting on a maintainer review; nothing is merged, approved or set to auto-merge.

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Approving on f2cf3c5, taking option 1 from the handoff: land now. The read side fails closed on key-less, pending, disabled and unreadable records, and rollback restores prior bytes. The unserialized installed.json writer race is pre-existing on main and stays tracked in #22118.

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bolichen97 merged commit 610c683 into main Oct 21, 2026
104 of 105 checks passed
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bolichen97 deleted the fix/11447-boot-reconsent-session-approval branch October 21, 2026 13:31
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision label Oct 21, 2026
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Apps: re-consent pre-feature installs that already declare permissions.sessionApproval on host upgrade

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