Skip to content

fix: keep the key when redacting an aws key-value credential - #32401

Merged
KiroCrewCaptain merged 1 commit into
mainfrom
fix/22576-aws-kv-redaction-keeps-key
Nov 17, 2026
Merged

KiroCrewCaptain merged 1 commit into
mainfrom
fix/22576-aws-kv-redaction-keeps-key

Conversation

@bolichen97

@bolichen97 bolichen97 commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Problem / Motivation

Goal: Redacting an AWS key-value credential keeps the key name and replaces only the value, so a JSON document or config line holding one keeps its shape after redaction.

The three AWS key-value branches of the credential redactor (aws_secret_access_key / SecretAccessKey, aws_session_token / SessionToken, aws_access_key_id / AccessKeyId) replace their whole match, key included. {"aws_secret_access_key": "SECRET", "region": "x"} becomes {"[REDACTED: credential]", "region": "x"}: the document no longer parses, and the reader cannot tell which field was removed.

Builds on #28522 by @dodgeblaster.

Why it matters

Anyone who opens an AWS credentials file, an STS or CloudFormation JSON output, or a config holding an AWS key through the dashboard or a tool result gets a document that no longer parses, so the Files view reports a valid file as invalid JSON and the agent reads a broken document.

Not a goal

What changed (motivation → approach → change)

The backend half of this fix has landed on main by another route: the rule-table redactor (#37408) replaced pass 1 and masks only the value of an AWS key-value credential, so {"aws_secret_access_key": "<secret>"} keeps its key and still parses. The rebase onto it takes main's side for security/redaction.py and its tests.

What is left is the dashboard mirror. sanitizeLlmOutput (the approval prompt's label, the workflow run labels) reads the backend's output aws_secret_access_key = [REDACTED: credential] as a key assignment with a raw value and rewrites it to [REDACTED] credential], dropping the key the backend kept and garbling the tag. Its key-assignment reader now leaves a value that is already a backend tag as written.

Where Before After
website/src/utils/sanitize.ts, CredentialScan.keyAssignment aws_secret_access_key = [REDACTED: credential] becomes [REDACTED] credential] left as written, also after an opening quote (JSON-escaped or not) and for [REDACTED: encoded credential]
the same reader, raw value aws_secret_access_key = abc becomes [REDACTED] unchanged

The security spec's frontend sanitizer bullet says the same.

Backwards compatibility

Compatible: every raw value after an AWS key is still redacted, at the same span; only a value that is already a backend tag, which holds no secret, is now left as written.

Removes nothing: the sanitizer stops rewriting a backend placeholder and masks every value it masked before.

Tests

  • website/src/test/sanitizeCredentials.test.ts: a value the backend already replaced with its tag (plain, single-quoted, the encoded-credential tag, and a JSON-escaped quote inside a serialized string) is left as written; a raw value after the same key is still redacted.
  • The backend tests this PR used to change now carry main's versions unchanged, and main's rule-table cases pin the kept key for the JSON, JSON-escaped, Python-dict and INI spellings.

Proof: not provable -- frontend test (prove.py runs Python only)

Manual verification

N/A — unit coverage sufficient: the change is one reader of a pure string function, and the new test fails on main (the tag is rewritten to [REDACTED] credential]) and passes on this head.

Screenshots / video

The earlier captures showed a transcript whose AWS keys the backend now keeps on main, so they no longer show this diff and are removed. This diff changes only the text of an approval prompt label or a workflow run label that holds an already-redacted AWS key, which the new test pins; it touches no component, page or style.

Related Issues

Closes #22576

Sibling sweep

Swept: git grep -nE "SecretAccessKey|aws_secret_access_key|token|secret" -- website/src/utils/ src/kiro_crew/security/redaction_structured/
Sibling: website/src/utils/sanitize.ts -- changed here
Sibling: src/kiro_crew/security/redaction_structured/table.py -- not affected -- main's AWS label rows mask only the value and leave an exact tag alone
Sibling: website/src/utils/errorReport.ts -- not affected -- its generic secret and token replacer (redactSecrets, run after sanitizeLlmOutput on a workflow run error) keeps the key; it rewrites only the first word of a backend tag

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: review-prompt
Pattern: a redactor's mirror that re-reads the other side's output must treat that side's placeholder as a value already redacted, or it garbles the tag and drops the key the other side kept.

Checklist

  • At most two commits (one is the norm), with a Conventional Commits title (feat|fix|docs|style|refactor|perf|test|chore|ci|build|revert: ...)
  • Existing tests pass and new tests added for new functionality
  • Self-review completed; code follows project style guidelines
  • Documentation updated (if applicable)
  • No secrets, credentials, or internal references in the diff

Contribution License Agreement

Contributions are accepted under the project's Apache-2.0 license; see the Licensing section of CONTRIBUTING.md.

@bolichen97
bolichen97 requested review from a team and KiroCrewCaptain as code owners November 7, 2026 15:06
@bolichen97
bolichen97 enabled auto-merge (squash) November 7, 2026 15:14
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge labels Nov 7, 2026
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Sensitive Change Review

  • No sensitive path changed; nothing to check.

@bolichen97
bolichen97 force-pushed the fix/22576-aws-kv-redaction-keeps-key branch from 9c1eb17 to c50c057 Compare November 7, 2026 18:59
@bolichen97

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author

Rebased: main moved in docs/system-specs/modules/security.md, test/test_security_gate_liveness.py since this head went green (d27a5fd -> 21597a3); CI re-running.

The rebase conflicted on the security package line budget, now stacked on main's new value, and the amend moves the two backend tag literals in the dashboard scan into the startsWith comparisons so the i18n gate no longer reads them as copy, and adds one test that a tag with more bytes glued after it does not keep them visible.

[operator: bolichen97]

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Nov 7, 2026
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

UX Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

UX-level review of 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6 — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

UX-Verdict: PASS

Nothing to check. The diff only changes how the sanitizer treats a value the backend already redacted. It adds or changes no control, and a missing screenshot is no gap here.

Notes

  • After this change a label can show two placeholder spellings next to each other: [REDACTED: credential] where the backend redacted the value, and [REDACTED] where the frontend did (sanitize.ts). If both should read the same to users, make the frontend mask use the backend's tag.

[UX-REVIEWED] 1c6ae05

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] d933b427f79025b7047c2e048c53ada076e0daf6b08b22bc5af0e9205a267b41

That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 3 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh over the same inputs; if it differs, the description or that evidence changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from either is unproven.

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

First Principles Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

Premise-level review of 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6 — why this exists and whether the shipped surface is the smallest honest version. Updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

First-Principles-Verdict: PASS

One mechanism-level fix with a linked issue (#22576) and a test that fails on main. It adds no new surface.

What this change ships

Inventory (3 items) — 3 justified

Intent: in the dashboard, an approval or workflow-run label that holds an AWS key the backend already redacted keeps the key name and the backend's tag, instead of being garbled to [REDACTED] credential]. This is a FIX.

  1. An AWS key assignment whose value is already [REDACTED: credential] or [REDACTED: encoded credential] (bare, quoted, or with a JSON-escaped quote) is left as written by the frontend sanitizer — justified
  2. A raw value after the same AWS key is still masked at the same span — justified
  3. The security spec's frontend-sanitizer bullet and the comment above the scan now describe this intended difference — justified

[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] 1c6ae05

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] a6851011f290bd13851540a3b0dfa68f69934a36810a91a0016d2f9124d8e54c

That sha256 names the PR description this verdict read. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh; if it differs, the description changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from the description is unproven.

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Design Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

Design-level review of 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6 — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

Design-Verdict: PASS

Nothing blocks: the fix is small, sits in the one reader that mangled the backend's tag, and is safe because it only skips placeholders, which hold no secret.

Notes

  • The skip now depends on the exact text of the backend's tags ([REDACTED: credential], [REDACTED: encoded credential]). If the backend ever renames a tag, the mirror goes back to mangling it without any test failing. Consider pinning the tag strings in test_redaction_mirror_parity.py, which already reads both sides.

[DESIGN-REVIEWED] 1c6ae05

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] ab2bb85a725a333803990aea15de32b9033c315d71bc0f7871723c7bf2e69fb8

That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 1 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh over the same inputs; if it differs, the description or that evidence changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from either is unproven.

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

GPT 6.1 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

GPT 6.1 completed its review of 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6 and found no blocking issues.

This comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.
[GPT-REVIEWED] 1c6ae05

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override gpt 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6 false-positive: <reason, 20 to 500 characters>

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Security Scope Review -- ✅ PASS

Which legitimate operations does 4e73899681f89d90b8a95e97d71a2f1b8b97b0da newly refuse? Updated in place on each push. A script-confirmed regression blocks; the model proposes candidates and never decides a refusal.

Verdict basis: adjudicated, zero confirmed regressions.

Security scope review -- adjudicated candidates

  • macos-latest (platform posix): 11 classified, 0 newly refused, 11 still allowed.
  • ubuntu-latest (platform posix): 11 classified, 0 newly refused, 11 still allowed.
  • windows-latest (platform windows): 5 classified, 0 newly refused, 5 still allowed.

No candidate flipped from allowed to refused.

Scope-Verdict: PASS

Reason: Nothing here tightens a shell rule. The diff makes output redaction looser: pass 1 now keeps the AWS key-value label and replaces only the value, and it skips a value that is already a credential tag. No shell deny tier calls _credential_redaction_plan. The only places exfil code calls redact_credentials are the blocked-link record retention checks (_credential_clean, _blocked_link_safe_domain), and those can now only pass more input unchanged. The record and dashboard-side changes are outside what the classifier can rule on, so they are named under UNADJUDICATED below.

TIGHTENING: There isn't one. The patch narrows the pass-1 redacted span and adds a skip: start = m.start() + len(label) / if label and _value_is_a_tag(text, start, m.end()): continue # already redacted. On the dashboard side, sanitize.ts adds if (this.text.startsWith('[REDACTED: credential]', open) ... return -1. Both make redaction refuse less. The patch names no threat it now refuses.

ADJUDICATED: 16 candidates written. The confirmed newly-refused count is not available to this review: no verdicts have come back yet, so I report no regressions.

PLATFORM COVERAGE: I wrote rows for posix and windows. The diff assumes no path, separator, interpreter or environment variable. The posix rows cover the AWS CLI credential-view commands that the credential-sources record recommends, grep over ~/.aws/credentials and the logs, and the maintainers' pytest and vitest runs for the changed tests. The windows rows cover the same operations in Windows spelling: aws.exe, findstr with %USERPROFILE%\.aws\credentials, test\... paths, and npx.cmd. These check that commands naming the AWS label keys still pass the exfil tier on both hosts. I wrote no any rows, because every row names an executable or a path.

UNADJUDICATED:

  • Pass-1 redactor (security/redaction.py::_credential_redaction_plan / redact_credentials_with_records). Input reaches it from any output surface through redact_credentials(), and from exfil record retention through exfil._credential_clean → redact_credentials(value)[0] != value. The guard's direction is looser, so a newly refused input is unlikely. Inputs I would have submitted:
    • an AWS CLI credentials file printed by cat ~/.aws/credentials
    • a compact JSON STS get-session-token response
    • output that was already redacted and is redacted again
    • a blocked-link URL whose path holds a SecretAccessKey-labelled value that is already a tag
  • Dashboard sanitizer (website/src/utils/sanitize.ts::CredentialScan). Input reaches it through the dashboard chat render → sanitizeCredentials. It now leaves a value that is already a backend tag as written. Inputs I would have submitted:
    • an aws_secret_access_key=[REDACTED] credential] line
    • a JSON-escaped quoted tag value
    • a value glued after a tag ([REDACTED:credential]hunter2), which must still be replaced
  • Credential record label (CredentialMatch.label, now ""). A consumer that showed the label (for example the credential-sources record in test_credential_sources.py) no longer gets it from the record. The label is now in the redacted text instead. Whether every consumer copes with that is a behaviour question no shell row can express.

[SCOPE-REVIEWED] 4e73899

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 7, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Opus 5.5 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

Reviewed 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6 — this comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.

[OPUS-REVIEWED] 1c6ae05

Verdict parsed from the review's SHA-scoped output markers for commit 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6.

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override fable 1c6ae0581e440bac2dd24e5390c7c6887da0cfd6 false-positive: <reason, 20 to 500 characters>

@github-actions github-actions Bot added merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision labels Nov 7, 2026
@bolichen97
bolichen97 force-pushed the fix/22576-aws-kv-redaction-keeps-key branch from c50c057 to fc0c4a2 Compare November 8, 2026 00:19
@bolichen97

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author

[operator: bolichen97] Rebased onto main fe2d88c to clear the merge conflict (head fc0c4a2).

  • test/test_security_gate_liveness.py: main raised the security package line budget by 31 for text_redaction.ends_plain_sentence, this PR by 27. Kept both raises: 35,063, which is the measured package size.
  • The macOS shard 6 red on the old head c50c057 was test_deb_one_liner_reaches_sudo_only_on_a_matching_download[True], the macOS sha256sum flake tracked in Flaky: test_deb_one_liner_reaches_sudo_only_on_a_matching_download fails on macOS with BSD sha256sum #32526. This PR does not touch that code.
  • Local gate on the changed test files passed (1146 tests), and local GPT and Opus reviews passed with no findings.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Nov 8, 2026
@bolichen97
bolichen97 force-pushed the fix/22576-aws-kv-redaction-keeps-key branch from fc0c4a2 to 4e73899 Compare November 8, 2026 01:24
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention label Nov 8, 2026
@bolichen97

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author

[operator: bolichen97] New head 4e73899 (rebased onto main 273fa43). It fixes both blocking findings the GPT 6.1 and Opus 5.5 lanes raised on fc0c4a2, in _value_is_a_tag (src/kiro_crew/security/redaction.py).

  • Cause: the check looked at the bytes after the tag. A path's ~<digest> suffix (GPT) and a JSON escape such as \n (Opus) did not count as a value end, so an already-redacted value was redacted again. Two sibling paths then collapsed to one, and the JSON string came out garbled.
  • Fix: the check now reads only the matched value. The value class stops at the tag's space, so whatever follows the tag no longer matters. A tag with bytes glued on inside the value ([REDACTED:credential]hunter2xyz) is still redacted. The JSON-escaped-quote case keeps its earlier, stricter rule. No pattern changed, and no rule became looser on a real secret.
  • Red/green tests: test_a_tag_stays_put_whatever_follows_it, test_a_json_string_holding_a_tag_and_an_escape_is_a_fixed_point and test_two_aws_labelled_sibling_paths_stay_distinct fail on fc0c4a2 (26 cases) and pass now.
  • The security package line budget is now 35,070, which is the measured size.
  • Local gate: the changed and redaction test files passed (1420 tests). Local GPT and Opus reviews passed on 6988293854, which is the same patch before this rebase.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Nov 8, 2026
@bolichen97

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author
  • span=be5fce1c4c0f: kept AWS label makes redacted text match the credential scanner

needs-a-decision: the finding is real. The PR keeps the AWS key name, so key=[REDACTED: credential] still matches iter_credential_matches, and gates that rescan redacted text refuse text that holds no secret.
The fix that keeps the scanner and the redactor in agreement changes what every caller of the shared scanner refuses. That is a security-gate change, so it waits for a maintainer decision.
No code change and no override on this head. The head stays frozen until the decision.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added the merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge label Nov 8, 2026
@dodgeblaster

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Thanks for picking this up and carrying it to main. One gap I found while comparing it with #28522, which I'm closing in favour of this PR:

The batch pass keeps the key, but the stream redactor's fail-closed drop still takes it. When a streamed AWS value outgrows the holdback ceiling, StreamRedactor.feed() in src/kiro_crew/security/text_redaction.py drops from i onward (L554 at 4e73899). For an AWS carrier, i is the start of the key, so the label goes with the value, and the streamed output doesn't match the batch output. Your "Not a goal" list already names this, so take it as an offer rather than a defect.

On head 4e73899, for example:

{"AccessKeyId":"<value past the ceiling>","region":"x"}
  batch:  {"AccessKeyId":"[REDACTED: credential]","region":"x"}
  stream: {[REDACTED: credential]","region":"x"}

Offer. #28522 handles this in about 30 lines:

  • _STRUCTURE_CHARS / _only_structure (L196-L204).

  • A label-keeping branch just before the drop (L553-L573). It moves i to the value's start only when all of these hold:

    • the AWS carrier is the only armed one;
    • nothing is glued after it;
    • it has a separator;
    • the bytes between the drop start and the key are only JSON punctuation ({ [ , " ') or whitespace.

    When the value's closing quote has already arrived, it also keeps that quote buffered. Any other drop (one that starts earlier in an unbroken run, or a nested or glued carrier) keeps the whole fail-closed drop, so a cut can never land inside a run that might hold a secret.

You're welcome to take it in directly.

What actually differs. I ran #28522's tests against this branch at 4e73899. Every case that passes on both is left out:

  • test/test_aws_key_value_redaction.py: 45 cases fail here and pass on fix(security): keep the key when redacting an AWS key-value credential #28522, all from the stream ceiling:

    • test_a_value_past_the_stream_ceiling_keeps_its_label_like_the_batch_pass: 30 cases. They cover aws_secret_access_key, SessionToken and AccessKeyId, in JSON, line and end-of-text layouts, fed in chunks of 1, 7 or 64 characters, plus one whole-text feed for each key in the end-of-text layout. The stream output loses the key.
    • test_a_closed_value_past_the_stream_ceiling_keeps_its_closing_quote: 15 cases. They cover the same three keys, fed whole or in chunks of 1, 7, 64 or 5400 characters. The output loses the key and the closing quote, so the JSON no longer parses.
  • website/src/test/sanitizeCredentials.test.ts: 14 cases in the dashboard mirror, also out of scope here by your list. They fail here and pass on fix(security): keep the key when redacting an AWS key-value credential #28522:

    • replaces only the value after <key> and leaves a <key> value the backend already redacted unchanged, for all six key spellings. Here, <key>=[REDACTED] becomes [REDACTED].
    • still redacts a value that only starts like a tag.
    • redacts a secret glued after a whole tag.

    One more failure in that file is left out because it comes from the base, not the AWS change: our copy of a JWS test predates fix: stop redacting hostnames that contain eyJ as a jwt #31997.

Everything else passes on this branch: the other 292 backend cases (across test_aws_key_value_redaction.py and test_stream_redactor_aws_keyed.py) and the other 8 frontend cases.

@bolichen97

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author

[operator: bolichen97] Thanks for comparing the two, and for closing #28522 in favour of this one.

I'm keeping the stream ceiling out of this PR. Its Not a goal list names both the stream redactor's over-ceiling drop and the dashboard mirror's own redaction of a raw value, and the goal stays as written. Your label-keeping branch before the drop (_only_structure and the four conditions you list), with its 45 stream cases and the 14 sanitizeCredentials cases, is the right fix for that gap. It fits a PR of its own once this one lands, and I'd welcome it.

One thing still holds this PR: the Opus finding above. With the key kept, aws_secret_access_key=[REDACTED: credential] still matches iter_credential_matches, so a gate that redacts and then rescans refuses text that holds no secret. Fixing that changes what the shared scanner refuses, so the next push waits for a maintainer decision on it.

@bolichen97

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author

[operator: bolichen97] Status on head 4e73899:

The backend redactor now keeps an AWS key's label and masks only its
value, so {"aws_secret_access_key": "<secret>", "region": "x"} keeps
its key and still parses. The dashboard sanitizer read that output as
a raw key assignment: sanitizeLlmOutput turned
aws_secret_access_key=[REDACTED: credential] into
[REDACTED] credential], dropping the key the backend kept and garbling
the tag on the approval prompt and the workflow run labels.

The sanitizer's key-assignment reader now leaves a value that is
already a backend tag, after an opening quote that may be JSON-escaped,
as written. A raw value is still redacted. The security spec's frontend
sanitizer bullet says the same.

Builds on #28522 by @dodgeblaster.

Closes #22576

Co-authored-by: Gary Jennings <garysjennings@gmail.com>
@bolichen97
bolichen97 force-pushed the fix/22576-aws-kv-redaction-keeps-key branch from 4e73899 to 1c6ae05 Compare November 17, 2026 10:27
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Nov 17, 2026
@bolichen97

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author

[operator: bolichen97] Rebased onto current main to resolve the merge conflict in src/kiro_crew/security/redaction.py, docs/system-specs/modules/security.md, test/test_credential_prefilter.py, test/test_credential_sources.py, test/test_dashboard_chat_pagination_suffix.py, test/test_redact_memory_control_split.py, test/test_redaction_credential_records.py, test/test_security_gate_liveness.py, test/test_stream_redactor_aws_keyed.py and one message render test.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision and removed merge conflict Branch has merge conflicts with its base — author must resolve before merge readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Nov 17, 2026

@KiroCrewCaptain KiroCrewCaptain left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

I reviewed head 1c6ae05, which changes only the dashboard sanitizer's AWS key-assignment reader, its test, and one line of the security spec. The old pattern stopped at the space inside the backend's tag, so skipping a value that is already a tag uncovers nothing that was masked before. I checked that the AWS keys, key assignments and JSON fields that follow are still redacted. The sanitizer suites pass on this head, and the new test fails against main's sanitizer, so it really pins the fix. I found nothing that blocks.

@KiroCrewCaptain
KiroCrewCaptain merged commit df31a4c into main Nov 17, 2026
101 of 106 checks passed
@KiroCrewCaptain
KiroCrewCaptain deleted the fix/22576-aws-kv-redaction-keeps-key branch November 17, 2026 11:48
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision label Nov 17, 2026
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

AWS key-value redaction branches collapse the JSON key (same defect as #13873, deferred from #21488)

3 participants