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GPT 5.6 Review (fork) — 🔴 changes requested (blocking)Reviewed 1 of 1 blocking finding(s) are security-class and were withheld from adjudication, so the blocking verdict stands. BLOCKING -- src/kiro_crew/dashboard/handlers/files.py:6084 -- Slash-dense credentials bypass egress redaction Adjudication (Opus 4.8) — is blocking on each finding proportionate?F1 is fenced (credential-exposure class), so my verdict set is UPHOLD-FENCED / FLAG. Conditions confirmed in this run:
Recovery / no-new-exposure: the identical key is also unredacted on any ordinary deep path product-wide ( Rarity / remedy: exposure requires a real 40-char AWS-secret-shaped credential to be the literal nested directory structure of a project root under Complete record, genuine acceptable residual, no new product-wide exposure → FLAG (finding still blocks; this only pre-drafts the override rationale). 🏷️ Fenced finding(s) machine-flagged as likely edge caseThe security fence keeps these findings blocking regardless of adjudication; the only clearance path is a human override recorded by a repository writer, who must independently verify a rationale before recording it — it is machine-authored, and a wrong override on a security-class finding ships exactly the class the fence exists to stop. (This lane's comment deliberately carries no override command.)
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Design Review (Fable 5, fork) — ✅ PASSDesign-level review of Design-Verdict: PASS Verify on a real Mac that [DESIGN-REVIEWED] c56e4c7 |
First Principles Review (Fable 5, fork) — ✅ PASSPremise-level review of First-Principles-Verdict: PASS Verify on a real Mac that non-root users cannot create chosen ids under Not justified as shipped
What this change shipsInventory (7 items) — 6 justifiedIntent: FIX — macOS projects under the per-user temp root render as
[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] c56e4c7 |
Opus 4.8 Review (fork) — ✅ no blocking findingsReviewed |
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Re the BLOCKING finding on Reproduced. On a prefix that is not self-flagged (an ordinary Darwin id carrying an underscore, so the #6905 false positive is out of the picture), a 38-character directory name is redacted by But it drops no detection. Why not revert. That restores the defect the PR exists to fix. I also measured the natural middle ground — giving the scan boundary context from the prefix — and it is worse, because the OS id is itself high-entropy and any overlapping window inherits it: 39 characters of context re-redacts ~50% of ordinary project names, and even a 2-character Pinned by Separately, the Design and First Principles reviews were right about |
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`_redact_project_path` handed the canonical redactor only the text after
the Darwin temp prefix, so a 40-character window that begins at the
prefix's trailing `T` was never evaluated. An AWS secret key may contain
`/`, so `T/` plus 38 user-controlled characters is a well-formed 40-byte
key rather than a window that merely borrows OS bytes -- and that class
produced `redact(path) != path` while the helper returned `path`
unchanged, weakening the canonical output policy instead of narrowing a
false positive.
Move the split one byte earlier: preserve everything above the trailing
`T`, and hand `T` plus the suffix to the canonical redactor. The
high-entropy `[a-z0-9]{2}/[a-z0-9_]{30}` id still never enters the scan,
which is what the exemption exists for, so the kirodotdev#6905 false positive
cannot return.
Measured over 300 samples each of ordinary project names, pytest temp-dir
names, truncated sha-256 digests and uuid hex, under both a self-flagged
and a non-self-flagged prefix: the boundary byte costs zero additional
redactions. The only names it newly redacts are uniformly-random 38-char
base64 runs, which the canonical redactor already redacts on this path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Rebased onto current Premise re-verified on current main firstThis branch is three weeks old and the redactor moved underneath it, so the defect was re-confirmed against
Both are whole-path losses on output that was only meant to have secrets removed, so the premise is alive. With this branch applied, Conflicts resolvedTwo files conflicted; both are "main restructured the same lines", not a disagreement about behaviour. In both cases main's side was kept and this branch's single change re-applied on top.
All seven call sites are on the wrapper after the rebase: Narrowing checked, since this is a security helperThe wrapper must only ever redact less for this one path shape, never redact less of anything that is actually a credential. Checked directly against
No case was found where the wrapper preserves something Tests and gatesRun from a clean clone of
Verification before pushing: |
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Review round on the rebased head, answered on F1 (BLOCKING, security-fenced) — Darwin exemption applied on every platformAccepted, fixed. The fix is the one the finding names: I did not route this to a human override on the adjudicator's "residual is plausibly acceptable" reading. The adjudication is sound as far as it goes — a 40-char Tests: the Darwin-arm cases now flip F2 (FINDING) — deleting
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Round 2 F1 — disagreed, no code changeThe finding is technically accurate about which window is unscanned, and I am not disputing that. I am disputing the fix, because the window it names is the one the helper's own docstring already identifies as the terminating case, and the requested remedy reintroduces the exact defect this PR exists to fix. Why the window is different in kind from the two already conceded. The earlier boundary findings ( That distinction is the stated stopping rule in the docstring, not a line drawn now:
Why the requested fix cannot be implemented. "Scan and redact every 40-byte window crossing the boundary" requires feeding real id bytes to the detector. Measured on the current tree: An ordinary Darwin project path under an all-alphanumeric temp id comes back So the choice here is not fix-versus-ignore. It is: accept a residual no caller can reach, or ship a redactor that mangles ordinary macOS project paths in the Files tab. I am taking the first, which is also what the adjudicator's FLAG rationale recommends. What this leaves. The security fence keeps the lane red regardless, and clearing it needs a human override recorded by a repository writer who has independently verified the rationale. That decision is not mine to record, so I am stopping here rather than pushing a third concession of the same argument — the previous two each produced the next round's finding, and a fourth would drag the OS id into the scan. Everything else on this head is green: the round-1 findings are fixed on |
Review round on the rebased head raised one blocking finding and one test-strength finding. Both are taken. BLOCKING -- the exemption regex carried no platform guard, so the helper withheld its two-component region from the credential scan on every OS. Off Darwin `/private/var/folders/<id>/T` names nothing the OS owns: a caller who can choose a project directory can choose those bytes outright and put a credential-shaped run in the one region the helper never scans. Gate the exemption on `platform_compat.IS_MACOS` so the canonical redactor decides alone everywhere else. This also keeps the exemption exactly as wide as the false positive it was measured against. The Darwin-arm tests now flip `platform_compat.IS_MACOS` through an `as_darwin` fixture rather than asserting a branch that only runs on one runner, and two new cases pin the off-Darwin arm: the helper is the canonical redactor byte for byte, and the self-flagged id is redacted there instead of preserved. Both fail with the guard removed. FINDING -- deleting the prefix regex's `(?=/|\Z)` lookahead left every added case green, so the boundary was unproven: a caller-chosen segment merely STARTING with `T` would have been exempted. The similar-path test is now parametrized over `/Tevil/project` and `/Tevil` alongside the too-wide id, and both new cases fail with the lookahead deleted. DOCSTRING ACCURACY -- re-measuring the boundary contract found one claim in it too strong. It said the two rejected splits each produced a class where `redact(path) != path` while the helper returned `path` unchanged, implying the shipped split produces none. It produces one, at roughly 3 in 1000 sampled caller layouts: a 40-char key carrying more than `_SECRET_MAX_SLASHES` separators. Standalone such a key is masked, because a 40-char run is the token somebody wrote and the separator ceiling is deliberately not applied to it; prepending `/T` makes the scanned run longer than one whole key, which is the condition that switches the ceiling on, and every window is then declined. That residual is not a weakening, and the control says why: the same key also survives the canonical redactor on an ordinary deep path with no exemption anywhere near it -- 387/400 sampled keys on `/srv/<key>`, 400/400 on `/<key>`. The separator ceiling loses slash-dense keys everywhere in the product, so the helper is no weaker than the treatment the same key already gets elsewhere. Canonical's hit on the full temp-root path comes from an id-straddling window clearing the ceiling -- it masks the key via the very false positive this exemption removes, not by recognising it. The docstring now states that residual and its control, and a new test pins the property as an EQUIVALENCE against the ordinary-path behaviour rather than blessing an outcome, so it fails if either side moves. It fails with the exemption removed. No behaviour change on macOS, and no change to the split.
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Override request for the one fenced finding — verified independently, not taken on faithF1 I re-ran the measurement rather than trusting the previous pass's prose, and one of that pass's claims turned out to be wrong. Both results are below; the second is the one the request rests on. What I measuredHarnesses are untracked under 1. The previous pass's cost argument was false. It said feeding the boundary window to the detector "re-mangles ordinary macOS project paths". Measured over 1,200 ordinary temp-project paths (plain/hyphenated/snake names, nested names,
So conceding one byte is free. The cost only appears from k≈5 and becomes the original bug at canonical. Do not clear this finding on the "one more byte re-mangles paths" rationale — it does not hold at one byte. The split's real justification is reachability, below. 2. The finding is real and is not a new exposure. The current head's own docstring and
Every key that the detector actually masks is still masked here: 0/29,900 caller layouts of at-or-below-ceiling keys survive the helper. Why the suggested fix is declined"Redact the user-controlled suffix independently" only helps by removing the ceiling's fragment rule, which is a global redactor change. That was rejected previously with 200k-sample evidence (it revives a 2.555% real-key false-negative rate), and it is not this PR's surface. The adjudicator reached the same conclusion independently. What a repository writer needs to doPlease satisfy yourself of the control numbers above ( Every other lane on this head is green: Design Review PASS, First Principles PASS, Opus 4.8 no blocking findings, |
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/ai-review override gpt c56e4c7: Verified independently, no new exposure: the >3-slash ceiling applies only when the run is LONGER than _SECRET_KEY_LEN (redaction.py:798,810), so the same 40-char slash-dense key already survives redact() on any prefixed path (measured 400/400 on /, 388/400 on /home/runner/work/), while 0/12000 at-or-below-ceiling layouts leak through the helper that canonical masks. The parity test pins that equivalence; the only fix weakens the global redactor. Residual accepted by the maintainer. Recording this after reproducing the control against the redactor at this head rather than accepting the request's prose. What I ran, and what it showed:
The requested fix — redacting the suffix independently — only helps by removing the fragment separator rule, which is a global redactor change rejected previously on 200k-sample evidence (2.555% real-key false-negative rate), and is not this PR's surface. Opus 4.8 reached the same conclusion and machine-flagged the finding as an edge case; the security fence is what kept it blocking. For the record: I am not relying on the "conceding one more byte re-mangles ordinary macOS paths" rationale. The request itself reports that measurement as falsified (k=1 costs 0/600, the same as k=0), and it is not load-bearing here. The ground for this override is reachability — the residual is a product-wide property of the redactor's fragment ceiling, not something this helper introduces. |
Human judgment recorded@iamwhatever marked the gpt AI finding as false positive, not applicable, or explicitly accepted for
This decision applies only to this commit. A new push requires a new judgment. |
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Human judgment recorded, but the following reviewer lane(s) could not be re-run automatically: GPT 5.6. Re-run the lane's latest workflow run for |
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Thanks @leonlaiyc for this fix! The change is continuing in #14880 (an in-repo replacement) with you credited as co-author. It's all green there, so we're closing this one as superseded. Really appreciate the contribution. |
Problem / Motivation
The dashboard's project-git endpoints echo an absolute repository path back to the UI through
security.redact(). On macOS that destroys ordinary paths:GET /api/project/gitreturnsrepoRootandpathas the literal string[REDACTED: credential], so the activity panel shows a redaction marker where the repository root should be.redact()'s_BARE_SECRET_RUN_REdeliberately includes/in its character class, because real credentials (base64, OAuth/PKCE material) contain slashes. A POSIX path is therefore scanned as one token. macOS's per-user temporary root has the fixed shape/private/var/folders/<2 chars>/<30 chars>/T/…, which yields a 63-character run whose 40-character window clears every entropy and structural gate.Measured against this branch's base commit, using the production redactor:
The repository has hit this twice before and worked around it in the test layer both times, never in production:
test/test_project_git.pydeleted its two happy-path tests, leaving a comment stating the defect "is still present and is now unobserved" and that the remedy is "a path-specific sanitizer at the call site" — explicitly not a change to the redactor./tmprepo-wide, which removed the symptom for tests only.Neither touched the endpoint. This PR implements the call-site sanitizer that comment specified.
Why it matters
mkdtemp— is rendered as[REDACTED: credential]in the activity panel. The in-code comment athandlers/files.pyclaiming "A normal path is unchanged" was false on that platform.The redactor itself is deliberately left alone. The prior investigation recorded in that comment tried and rejected three redactor-level fixes with evidence — a path-shape guard leaked a real AWS key containing two slashes, splitting the run on
/missed every real key, and a window slash-count threshold leaked 2.555% of otherwise-caught keys over 200k samples. Weakening a credential redactor so a path renders is the wrong trade, so the fix belongs at the call site.What changed (motivation → approach → change)
Symptom → a fixed-shape, OS-owned path prefix is indistinguishable from a high-entropy bare secret to a slash-tolerant detector. Root cause → the endpoint applies the generic bare-secret redactor to a value it already knows is a filesystem path. Change → give those call sites a path-aware wrapper that exempts only the OS-owned prefix and still sends everything an agent can influence through the canonical redactor.
src/kiro_crew/dashboard/handlers/files.py:_MACOS_TEMP_PROJECT_PREFIX_RE, anchored at\A, matching exactly/private/var/folders/[a-z0-9]{2}/[a-z0-9_]{30}/Tfollowed by/or end-of-string. Both variable components are OS-owned and fixed-width. The lookahead is load-bearing: without it an attacker-chosen segment such as…/Tevil/would be swallowed by the exemption._redact_project_path(path). No match → returnsredact(path), so every non-Darwin-shaped path keeps today's behaviour byte-for-byte. On a match → returns the prefix up to but excluding its trailing/T, concatenated withredact()applied to that/Tplus the entire remaining suffix. See Boundary contract below for why the split sits at exactly that point.api_project_git(repoRoot, the"Not a directory"400 body, and the success envelope'spath), and toapi_project_git_status'srepoRoot. The latter is included because its own comment already promises it "goes through the same redaction as api_project_git" — fixing only the first endpoint would have silently falsified that.Deliberately unchanged:
branch,head, and the repo-relative file paths in the status response stay on bareredact()— they are not absolute paths and carry no OS-owned prefix. The SEL audit trail continues to record the real, unredacted path, and a test pins that.Two in-code comments that the change made inaccurate are corrected in the same commit.
/api/project/treeis now included. An earlier revision left it out as a separate endpoint with its own response contract. Two reviewers independently counted it and were right that the reason did not distinguish anything: the wrapper is byte-identical toredact()off-Darwin, so applying it there changes no contract, and a macOS user's Files tab still rendered[REDACTED: credential]where the project root belongs. Bothrootegress sites inapi_project_tree— the not-a-directory early return and the listing response — now use_redact_project_path. That is the whole class in this file: six absolute-path egress sites, six fixed. The listedpathsstay on bareredact(), correctly — they are project-relative and carry no OS-owned prefix.Boundary contract — where the split goes, and why it stops there. The exact-head review raised this twice and was right both times. The history matters because it is what fixes the shape of the argument, not just the byte count:
11b9d5famatch.group(0) + redact(path[match.end():])cded733cprefix[:-1] + redact(prefix[-1] + …)/beforeTa3b5ad1eprefix[:-2] + redact(prefix[-2:] + …)The governing fact is that an AWS secret key may itself contain
/. So a 40-byte window is a real credential candidate whenever every one of its bytes is either a fixed literal or user-controlled — it is not disqualified by "borrowing OS bytes", which is the reasoning both earlier revisions rested on. Both leaks were the same defect: a class wherei.e. the helper weakening the canonical output policy rather than narrowing a false positive. Two concrete fixtures, both accepted by
_looks_like_secret_keystanding alone, now pin it:Why this is not "one more byte" a third time. The prefix regex is
/private/var/folders/[a-z0-9]{2}/[a-z0-9_]{30}/T— it ends in the fixed literal/T, and everything to the left of that literal is the OS-generated id. Scanning/T+ suffix therefore covers every window composed entirely of fixed or user-controlled bytes, and there is no next byte to concede: a window reaching further left necessarily contains id bytes, which the OS generates and no caller can choose. The recursion terminates at a stateable boundary rather than at wherever the last review stopped looking.That boundary is also what the exemption is for. The id is high-entropy and self-flagging —
redact()removes it on its own account — so letting it into the scan is exactly the #6905 false positive this PR exists to fix. The review's suggested full revert (return redact(path)) does precisely that.Measured cost of the second boundary byte — 300 samples per corpus, under both a self-flagged and a non-self-flagged prefix (n=600 each). "canonical" is
redact()on the whole path, i.e. today's pre-PR behaviour.prefix[-1](1 byte)prefix[-2:](2 bytes)The second byte costs zero additional redactions on every realistic corpus — identical to the one-byte split. The only class it newly redacts is uniformly-random base64 of 37–38 characters, where canonical already removes 562/600 and 571/600 on this same path, so the boundary stays strictly narrower than canonical rather than becoming a second policy. The 300s in the canonical column are the defect itself: every self-flagged-prefix path.
Two corrections to my own earlier replies on this thread, since both are now on the record. (1) I argued a ≤ 38-character user-controlled run is below the classifier's exact-40 minimum and so costs no detection — that is the reasoning the
/-in-keys fact defeats, and it was wrong at both byte positions. (2) I claimed a 2-characterT/boundary "re-redacts ~85% of opaque 38-character directory names (pytest temp dirs, hashes)". That figure came from a uniformly-random base64 corpus and was generalised to corpora it had never been run against; re-measured, both are 0 (table above).docs/system-specs/modules/learn-cron-dashboard.mdis updated so the "Project git" entry describes the split accurately instead of claiming all four fields pass through plainredact, and the "Project tree" entry no longer saysrootand every path alike pass throughredact.Tests
New, in
test/test_project_git.py— these are what actually prove the fix, and they use hardcoded macOS-shaped strings, so they exercise the exemption identically on every platform:test_macos_temp_root_is_not_mistaken_for_a_bare_secret— a macOS temp project root survives byte-for-byte.test_macos_temp_root_still_redacts_a_secret_in_the_suffix— security negative control: anAKIA…key in the user-controlled suffix is still redacted. Asserts both that the key is absent and that a redaction marker is present.test_other_paths_still_use_the_canonical_redactor— patchesredactand asserts a non-Darwin path reaches it verbatim, exactly once.test_similar_macos_path_with_the_wrong_id_width_is_not_exempt— negative control on the regex: a 31-character id (one over the fixed width) is not exempted and falls through to the canonical redactor, pinning that the exemption is shape-exact rather than a prefix heuristic.New, in
test/test_project_git.py, classTestMacosPrefixBoundary— the boundary contract above, stated as properties rather than examples:test_a_credential_spanning_the_prefix_boundary_is_redacted— both blocking findings, pinned. Runs theT/and/T/fixtures above: each is asserted to be a credential by_looks_like_secret_keystanding alone, then asserted removed by BOTH the canonical redactor and the helper, under both prefixes. Asserting both halves means a regression cannot pass by making the canonical side stop firing. Red-before against11b9d5fa's helper: 3 failed, 17 passed. Red-before againstcded733c's one-byte helper: 2 failed, 18 passed —AssertionError: boundary credential survived: /private/var/folders/6r/zyxvpxvq6csfxvn_n0000000000000/T/EqV8ib8HDy88YtDtXbiufMdI8X2Y4rUmer/BH.test_the_two_fixture_prefixes_behave_as_documented— establishes the two controls. An all-alphanumeric temp id is self-flagged (the fix(dashboard): preserve macOS temp project paths #6905 defect); an ordinary id carrying an underscore is not, because the underscore falls outside the bare-secret character class. The second control is what lets the boundary property be measured independently of the false positive this PR fixes.test_neither_boundary_name_is_a_secret_standing_alone— both fixture names are under 40 characters and unflagged bare; they differ only in what their own leading separator buys them.test_a_38_char_name_is_judged_on_its_own_boundary_window— replaces the earliertest_a_38_char_name_is_kept_and_was_never_classifiable, whose premise the review overturned. Being under 40 characters is not what decides such a name; the window actually evaluated isT/plus the name. This fixture clears the classifier's gates and is now removed, while the OS-owned id above the boundary is still preserved byte-for-byte.test_ordinary_project_names_survive_under_both_prefixes— the false-positive control, covering the boundary. Seven ordinary names — including a pytest temp-dir shape, a 38-character hex digest, and a 37-character one, the length that reaches 40 only via/T/and is therefore exactly what the second boundary byte exposes — plus the bare prefix with no suffix, under both prefixes. This is the assertion that breaks if the boundary is ever widened into the OS id.test_the_os_owned_id_never_enters_the_scan— why the exemption exists at all: the self-flagged id is removed by the canonical redactor on its own account and must stay out of the scan.test_a_39_char_name_is_still_scanned_with_its_separator— under both prefixes.test_a_real_credential_never_survives_the_split— the security invariant, 12 cases: three real credential shapes × four placements, each asserted detectable standing alone first, then asserted absent under both prefixes.test_the_exemption_is_exactly_prefix_plus_canonical_suffix— the whole contract as an identity: everything above the trailing/Tis preserved byte-for-byte, and/Tplus the tail equalsredact()of the same. The split point itself is asserted (boundary == "/T") rather than assumed, so the exemption cannot drift into a second redaction policy.Mutation-checked: widening the exemption to return the path unchanged fails this class across every credential placement; reverting to the original split fails three of its tests, and reverting just the second boundary byte fails two. No half of the contract is vacuously green.
New, in
test/test_project_tree.py:test_not_a_directory_root_takes_the_path_aware_redactor— the early-return arm. Reached with a real non-directory rather than by patchingos.path.isdir, which is process-global and breaks unrelated lazy imports.test_listing_root_takes_the_path_aware_redactor— the listing arm, pinned on the call because the two redactors agree off-Darwin, plus an assertion that the listing itself still works.New, in
test/test_project_git_status_log.py:test_repo_root_uses_the_path_aware_redactor— pins the parity the neighbouring comment promises. Red-before on this branch with only that one line reverted:AssertionError: assert 0 == 1(the wrapper is never reached).Also restored:
test_returns_branch_for_repoandtest_finds_repo_root_from_subdirectory, deleted when the endpoint defect was first documented. To be precise about what this is and is not — these two pass on macOS because of #5366's temp-base redirect, not because of this production change; pytest'stmp_pathresolves under/private/tmp, which the new regex intentionally does not match. They are restored here because this PR removes the comment that justified deleting them, and they recover the lost coverage of branch labelling and repo-root walk-up. They are not evidence for the fix; the four tests above are.Three pre-existing assertions relaxed from
.startswith("<")to"<" in: with a preserved prefix the redacted value no longer begins at index 0 on a Darwin-shaped path. Theendswith(">")half is retained, so each still proves the tail passed through the patched redactor.Results on head
a3b5ad1e(Python 3.10.6, Windows):test_project_git.py+test_project_tree.py+test_security.py+test_project_git_status_log.py+test_log_redaction.py+test_redaction_mirror_parity.py+test_redact_meta_snapshot.py— 1107 passed, 19 skipped, 0 failed.TestHomeDirTargetsCache::test_second_call_does_not_rebuild, whole-file only, andTestIsSensitiveBashCommand::test_chained_cd_expansions_do_not_blow_up_the_gate, a wall-clock guard). Recorded rather than omitted; it is not being claimed as attributed.test_project_tree.py::test_vanished_directory_response_is_redacted(pre-existing, untouched by this PR) monkeypatches the process-globalos.path.isdir, which breaks a lazy numpy C-extension import during teardown on this Windows box. Verified at this branch's base: that test alone reports1 passed, 1 errorthere too. The new tree tests deliberately avoid that patch.WinError 1314symlink-privilege failures intest_file_download.py/test_file_raw.py, reproduced identically on a pristineorigin/mainworktree at this branch's own base. Inherited local environment limitation; neither file has any path to the diff.Gates green on head
a3b5ad1e:mypy --platform linuxon the changed handler (no issues), black baseline gate (scripts/check_black_formatting.py, 5 files in scope, no new offenders), isort, flake8, docs-lint, lockdown-before-publish, brand-name, changelog-history, focus-cue.Manual verification
N/A — unit coverage sufficient: the defect is a deterministic pure-string transformation of a response field, and the exemption's positive case, secret-bearing suffix, boundary windows, wrong-width shape, attacker-chosen
T…segment, and non-Darwin fallthrough are each pinned by a test that runs identically on every platform.On the
## Screenshots / videosection, deleted above: the rendered surfaces (the activity panel's branch label and the Files tab's project tree) do change for a macOS user —[REDACTED: credential]becomes the real path — so this is not a no-visual-delta change and is not being claimed as one. What changes is one string in a JSON response, with no layout, component, or style change; and the delta is reproducible only on Darwin, which this branch was developed and tested on Windows. Rather than stage a synthetic screenshot that would not be evidence of the platform-specific behaviour, the before/after is given as the redactor's actual output at the base commit and on this head, in Problem / Motivation above. A macOS reviewer can confirm it directly by opening any project whose realpath is under/private/var/folders/…/T/.Related Issues
No filed issue. The defect was documented in-tree by the comment this PR removes from
test/test_project_git.py, which recorded it as "still present and now unobserved" and specified the call-site sanitizer implemented here.Checklist
feat|fix|docs|refactor|perf|test|chore|ci|build|revert: ...)Contribution License Agreement
Pattern harvest
Rule candidate: review-prompt / semgrep — a bare-secret detector whose character class includes
/cannot be handed a filesystem path, because an OS-owned path prefix scans as one high-entropy token; the fix belongs at the call site as a path-aware wrapper that exempts only a fixed-shape, OS-generated prefix, and the exemption must be split at the last fixed literal in that prefix so every window composed entirely of fixed or caller-controlled bytes is still scanned — an exemption that leavesredact(p) != pwhilewrapper(p) == pis weakening the policy, not narrowing a false positive.Section appended by a maintainer to satisfy the
PR Hygienegate, which began requiring a Pattern harvest section onfix:PRs after this PR was opened. No other part of this description, and nothing on the branch, was touched.