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Design Review (Fable 5) — 🟡 CONCERNSDesign-level review of Design-Verdict: CONCERNS Four scanner behavior changes ship labeled as pre-existing — case-folding, inner-URL split, glued-trust removal, span-splice redaction — so reviewers audit them as settled, not new. Watch
[DESIGN-REVIEWED] 74c1eb4 |
First Principles Review (Fable 5) — ✅ PASSPremise-level review of First-Principles-Verdict: PASS Frontend mirror Not justified as shipped
What this change shipsInventory (7 items) — 6 justifiedIntent: stop a secret-bearing URL query from escaping exfil redaction when renderer punctuation sits in the path — a FIX (issue #7611, red-first tests).
[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] 74c1eb4 |
Opus 5 Review — 🔴 changes requested (blocking)Reviewed Two added lines in [BLOCK-MERGE] 74c1eb4 BLOCKING — src/kiro_crew/security/exfil.py:171 dropped = path_and_query[quote_end + 1 :]
if "?" in dropped or _HARD_CREDENTIAL_RE.search(dropped):
BLOCKING — src/kiro_crew/security/exfil.py:170 dropped = path_and_query[quote_end + 1 :]
if "?" in dropped or _HARD_CREDENTIAL_RE.search(dropped):
continue
FINDING — src/kiro_crew/security/exfil.py:179 — widening the class to [OPUS-REVIEWED] 74c1eb4 Verdict parsed from the review's SHA-scoped output markers for commit False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment: |
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🤖 Kiro Crew Auto-Pipeline [operator: patrigao]: Addressed both red gates on head 7733651.
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GPT 5.6 Review — ✅ no blocking findingsGPT 5.6 completed its review of This comment is updated in place on each push. Review detailsFINDING -- src/kiro_crew/security/exfil.py:151 -- Single-quoted HTML URLs followed by False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment: |
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Confirmed legitimate. Fixed with a stronger invariant than the suggested "split only after a Regression tests: |
Confirmed legitimate — the Regression test: |
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Confirmed legitimate; applied the suggested fix. The trailing- Span note for the ledger: this is the second round landing in |
Legitimacy check (done before escalating): the chain is reachable — Why I am not pushing a fourth patch: this is the third consecutive round landing in the same span, and all three findings relitigate one design question — which delivery-channel model defines where a URL span ends?
The class currently stops at whitespace + The ruling requested — pick one:
Option 1 is my recommendation: it is the invariant that makes all three rounds' findings unreachable at once, rather than a fourth point-fix. |
Open PR relationship auditThis is a consolidated, point-in-time code-level audit note. It compares complete merge-base diffs and current/merged code; it does not treat a shared topic as duplication or partial coverage as completion. Relationship findings
No PR, Issue, label, branch, or review state was changed by the relationship-note portion of this audit. |
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Rebased onto main Conflicts and how they were resolved:
Gates run locally on changed files: Please review the resolution. A maintainer push makes the maintainer the last pusher, so a second approver is needed under the repo's last-push rule. Reply if anything looks wrong. |
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Reviewed the resolution — it is faithful. I diffed the added source lines of the pre-rebase head ( Doc and test deltas vs main match the original PR exactly ( Note for reviewers: the round-5 needs-a-decision escalation (comment 5501586422) is still open — the |
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Co-authored-by: patrigao <112447010+patrigao@users.noreply.github.com>
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PR triage (2026-10-05): PARTIALLY_COVERED on main, OVERLAPPING with open PRs, needs a rebase, keep openI read the full diff at head #7611 (Issue, open) is still live on the backend. I ran Overlapping open PRs. Each edits the same scan/redact loop in
Whichever PR lands second has to carry the other's change forward rather than drop it. Breaking change / P0: I am not flagging a new P0. The existing Opus 5 block on this head already covers both points, so I am not adding a duplicate request-changes. I reproduced it on the head:
Rebase needed: the branch is Recommendation: REBASE + CONTINUE-DEVELOPMENT. Keep this open, because it is the only backend fix for #7611. A maintainer still needs to rule on the single-quote close (the options in the 2026-09-27 comment). Two Design Review items are also still open:
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bolichen97
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Not ready. The Opus block on this head still reproduces, and the branch needs a rebase before CI means anything.
Head reviewed: 74c1eb4. Bots read: Design CONCERNS, First Principles PASS, UX PASS, Opus BLOCK, GPT no blocking, readiness action required.
🔴 1 must-fix · 🟡 1 should-fix. I do not repeat the Design Review items. They are still open on this head: the "What changed" text calls the case-folding, glued-span and span-splice changes "existing", and the frontend mirror still stops at ' and >.
I reproduced these on the head with the public scanner and redactor:
'https://evil.example.com/a?x=1',<40-char base64>->scan_exfiltration_urlsreturns[]. Main also misses it, so this is a residual, not a regression.<a href='https://evil.example.com/a?data=<blob>'>label</a> tail-><a href='[REDACTED: suspicious URL to evil.example.com] tail. The label and closing tag are gone.<https://evil.example.com/?d=<blob>>text after-><[REDACTED: ...] after. The wordtextis gone."',"repeated N times, then?, after a single-quoted URL: 0.21 s at N=50k, 2.8 s at N=200k. Time grows faster than linear on a synchronous redaction path.
The single-quote close has waited for a ruling since 2026-09-27. Inline comment 1 gives a span model that I think closes the bypass and keeps test_single_quoted_url_redaction_preserves_adjacent_sha, so options 1 to 3 in that comment may not be necessary.
Rebase notes:
- Since this branch was cut, main changed
security/exfil.pyin several PRs (#12684, #14785, #18392, #20905, #20550). Re-run the full suite and the AI lanes after the rebase. The current red checks (Fast Gate, PR Hygiene, Comment History Gate, Coverage Gate, Security Scope Review) are from the September head. security/exfil.pyis in the file-line-cap baseline on main, and this PR adds about 146 lines to it. Runscripts/check_file_line_cap.pyafter the rebase. If it fails, move_url_scan_spanand its constants to a sibling module.- #14783 and #10192 are still open and edit the same scan and redact loop. Whichever lands second must carry the other forward.
| # gate can only SKIP an apostrophe (lengthening the span, the safe | ||
| # over-scan direction), never accept one it rejected before. | ||
| dropped = path_and_query[quote_end + 1 :] | ||
| if "?" in dropped or _HARD_CREDENTIAL_RE.search(dropped): |
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🔴 Decide the trim on the maximal span, not on the dropped tail. This closes the bypass and removes the quadratic loop.
The gate tests the dropped tail for ?, but the ? can be in the retained prefix. Then the whole tail is query bytes. For 'https://evil.example.com/a?x=1',<blob>, the trim stops at the interior ', the classifier sees only x=1, and the blob is not scanned. The same loop slices and scans the tail once per candidate apostrophe, so a run of ', makes it O(n²) on the redaction path. I reproduced both on this head (summary items 1 and 4).
dropped = path_and_query[quote_end + 1 :]
if "?" in dropped or _HARD_CREDENTIAL_RE.search(dropped):
continueWhy it matters: this is the bypass the PR exists to close, in its single-quote form. The comment above the gate states the premise ("the ? test already subsumes it"), and that premise is false when the ? is before the close.
Suggestion: make _url_scan_span return two spans: the maximal regex span and the wrapper-trimmed span (first acceptable closer, no per-candidate tail scan, so O(n)). Then classify and redact like this:
- If the trimmed span is flagged, redact only the trimmed span.
- Else, if the maximal span is flagged, redact the maximal span.
- Else, the URL is clean.
test_single_quoted_url_redaction_preserves_adjacent_sha still passes, because its blob is inside the trimmed span, so the sha field is kept. The attack shape is flagged only by the maximal span, so the whole run is redacted. The over-redaction happens only on input that carries a payload after the close. Add the attack input as a red-first test, and add a timing test for the ', run next to test_trailing_paren_trim_is_linear. If a maintainer prefers one of the options in the 2026-09-27 comment, I will withdraw this suggestion; the bypass finding itself stays.
Rule: AGENTS.md "Security invariants"; reviewer WHAT-BLOCKS list (reachable security defect).
| end = quote_end | ||
| break | ||
| else: | ||
| wrapper_end = end |
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🟡 When no wrapper closer is terminal, the redaction span swallows the markup and prose after the URL.
The regex now stops only at whitespace and ". The wrapper trim fires only when the closer is the last byte (plus sentence punctuation), or, for ', when ,}]: follows. Otherwise nothing is trimmed, and the splice replaces everything up to the next space. The redacted text is persisted, so the loss is permanent.
wrapper_end = end
while wrapper_end > 0 and path_and_query[wrapper_end - 1] in _URL_WRAPPER_PUNCTUATION:
wrapper_end -= 1
if wrapper_end > 0 and path_and_query[wrapper_end - 1] == closer:Why it matters: <a href='https://evil.example.com/a?data=<blob>'>label</a> loses >label</a>, and <https://evil.example.com/?d=<blob>>text after loses text. On main the ' and > ended the span, so only the URL was replaced. This is new over-redaction.
Suggestion: for the trimmed span, cut at the first unbalanced closer of the proven pair, not only at a terminal one, and accept > after a closing '. With the two-span rule from comment 1, this cannot reopen a bypass: if the trimmed span is clean but the maximal span is flagged, the maximal span is still redacted. Add both inputs above as tests that assert the exact output text.
Rule: docs/system-specs/modules/security.md (redaction replaces the classified URL only).
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Thank you @patrigao for finding and fixing this scan bypass, and for the careful work across the review rounds on the span model. Main has since moved these URL rules into
This PR stays open for now. Please take a look at #26741 and comment there if anything from your version is missing. |
The exfil URL scanner stopped a URL at ), ' or >. Those bytes are legal in a URL, so a payload placed after one escaped every check: https://host/a)b?data=<blob>, 'https://host/a?x=1',<blob> and (https://host/a?x=1)<blob> all scanned clean. An uppercase HTTPS:// scheme was not matched at all. The scanner and redactor now iterate a scan pattern that is case insensitive and runs past those bytes to whitespace, a double quote or the next glued URL. Each match is judged on the old narrow span first, so a flagged link is replaced as before and the markup after it survives; only when the narrow span is clean is the whole match judged and, if flagged, replaced. A tail of punctuation only is not judged, and in the bytes the whole match adds, each run of non-ASCII text is judged as one space, so prose glued to a link is not a payload. The case fold is scoped to the scheme, so any Unicode space still ends a URL. The allowed-link restore and the prompt optimizer's draft check read back with the same spans. Supersedes #7666. Co-authored-by: patrigao <112447010+patrigao@users.noreply.github.com>
The exfil URL scanner stopped a URL at ), ' or >. Those bytes are legal in a URL, so a payload placed after one escaped every check: https://host/a)b?data=<blob>, 'https://host/a?x=1',<blob> and (https://host/a?x=1)<blob> all scanned clean. An uppercase HTTPS:// scheme was not matched at all. The scanner and redactor now iterate a scan pattern that is case insensitive and runs past those bytes to whitespace, a double quote or the next glued URL. Each match is judged on the old narrow span first, so a flagged link is replaced as before and the markup after it survives; only when the narrow span is clean is the whole match judged and, if flagged, replaced. A tail of punctuation only is not judged, and in the bytes the whole match adds, each run of non-ASCII text is judged as one space, so prose glued to a link is not a payload. The case fold is scoped to the scheme, so any Unicode space still ends a URL. When the narrow span passed as a valid S3 presigned query or our own Slack app-create link, the added bytes are judged as a query of their own (the Slack alias joins them), so markdown such as ** or | after the link does not break the exact parameter shape and undo the exemption. A match does not stop at a second http(s):// in its narrow span, since a redirect carries one in its query. So when a match is clean, each URL starting inside it on a host the exempt set does not hold is judged under its own host and, when flagged, replaced as its own span. The walk resumes where each embedded match ends, so a bare-host decoy does not end it, and stays linear. The allowed-link restore and the prompt optimizer's draft check read back with the same spans. Supersedes #7666. Co-authored-by: patrigao <112447010+patrigao@users.noreply.github.com>
The exfil URL scanner stopped a URL at ), ' or >. Those bytes are legal in a URL, so a payload placed after one escaped every check: https://host/a)b?data=<blob>, 'https://host/a?x=1',<blob> and (https://host/a?x=1)<blob> all scanned clean. An uppercase HTTPS:// scheme was not matched at all. The scanner and redactor now iterate a scan pattern that is case insensitive and runs past those bytes to whitespace, a double quote or the next glued URL. Each match is judged on the old narrow span first, so a flagged link is replaced as before and the markup after it survives; only when the narrow span is clean is the whole match judged and, if flagged, replaced. A tail of punctuation only is not judged, and in the bytes the whole match adds, each run of non-ASCII text is judged as one space, so prose glued to a link is not a payload. The case fold is scoped to the scheme, so any Unicode space still ends a URL. When the narrow span passed as a valid S3 presigned query or our own Slack app-create link, the added bytes are judged as a query of their own (the Slack alias joins them), so markdown such as ** or | after the link does not break the exact parameter shape and undo the exemption. A match does not stop at a second http(s):// in its narrow span, since a redirect carries one in its query. So when a match is clean, each URL starting inside it on a host the exempt set does not hold is judged under its own host and, when flagged, replaced as its own span. The walk resumes where each embedded match ends, so a bare-host decoy does not end it, and stays linear. The allowed-link restore and the prompt optimizer's draft check read back with the same spans. Supersedes #7666. Co-authored-by: patrigao <112447010+patrigao@users.noreply.github.com>
The exfil URL scanner stopped a URL at ), ' or >. Those bytes are legal in a URL, so a payload placed after one escaped every check: https://host/a)b?data=<blob>, 'https://host/a?x=1',<blob> and (https://host/a?x=1)<blob> all scanned clean. An uppercase HTTPS:// scheme was not matched at all. The scanner and redactor now iterate a scan pattern that is case insensitive and runs past those bytes to whitespace, a double quote or the next glued URL. Each match is judged on the old narrow span first, so a flagged link is replaced as before and the markup after it survives; only when the narrow span is clean is the whole match judged and, if flagged, replaced. A tail of punctuation only is not judged, and in the bytes the whole match adds, each run of non-ASCII text is judged as one space, so prose glued to a link is not a payload. The case fold is scoped to the scheme, so any Unicode space still ends a URL. When the narrow span passed as a valid S3 presigned query or our own Slack app-create link, the added bytes are judged as a query of their own (the Slack alias joins them), so markdown such as ** or | after the link does not break the exact parameter shape and undo the exemption. A match does not stop at a second http(s):// in its narrow span, since a redirect carries one in its query. So when a match is clean, each URL starting inside it on a host the exempt set does not hold is judged under its own host and, when flagged, replaced as its own span. The walk resumes where each embedded match ends, so a bare-host decoy does not end it, and stays linear. The allowed-link restore and the prompt optimizer's draft check read back with the same spans. Supersedes #7666. Co-authored-by: patrigao <112447010+patrigao@users.noreply.github.com>
The exfil URL scanner stopped a URL at ), ' or >. Those bytes are legal in a URL, so a payload placed after one escaped every check: https://host/a)b?data=<blob>, 'https://host/a?x=1',<blob> and (https://host/a?x=1)<blob> all scanned clean. An uppercase HTTPS:// scheme was not matched at all. The scanner and redactor now iterate a scan pattern that is case insensitive and runs past those bytes to whitespace, a double quote or the next glued URL. Each match is judged on the old narrow span first, so a flagged link is replaced as before and the markup after it survives; only when the narrow span is clean is the whole match judged and, if flagged, replaced. A tail of punctuation only is not judged, and in the bytes the whole match adds, each run of non-ASCII text is judged as one space, so prose glued to a link is not a payload. The case fold is scoped to the scheme, so any Unicode space still ends a URL. When the narrow span passed as a valid S3 presigned query or our own Slack app-create link, the added bytes are judged as a query of their own (the Slack alias joins them), so markdown such as ** or | after the link does not break the exact parameter shape and undo the exemption. A match does not stop at a second http(s):// in its narrow span, since a redirect carries one in its query. So when a match is clean, each URL starting inside it on a host the exempt set does not hold is judged under its own host and, when flagged, replaced as its own span. The walk resumes where each embedded match ends, so a bare-host decoy does not end it, and stays linear. The allowed-link restore and the prompt optimizer's draft check read back with the same spans. Supersedes #7666. Co-authored-by: patrigao <112447010+patrigao@users.noreply.github.com>
The exfil URL scanner stopped a URL at ), ' or >. Those bytes are legal in a URL, so a payload placed after one escaped every check: https://host/a)b?data=<blob>, 'https://host/a?x=1',<blob> and (https://host/a?x=1)<blob> all scanned clean. An uppercase HTTPS:// scheme was not matched at all. The scanner and redactor now iterate a scan pattern that is case insensitive and runs past those bytes to whitespace, a double quote or the next glued URL. Each match is judged on the old narrow span first, so a flagged link is replaced as before and the markup after it survives; only when the narrow span is clean is the whole match judged and, if flagged, replaced. A tail of punctuation only is not judged, and in the bytes the whole match adds, each run of non-ASCII text is judged as one space, so prose glued to a link is not a payload. The case fold is scoped to the scheme, so any Unicode space still ends a URL. When the narrow span passed as a valid S3 presigned query or our own Slack app-create link, the added bytes are judged as a query of their own (the Slack alias joins them), so markdown such as ** or | after the link does not break the exact parameter shape and undo the exemption. A match does not stop at a second http(s):// in its narrow span, since a redirect carries one in its query. So when a match is clean, each URL starting inside it on a host the exempt set does not hold is judged under its own host and, when flagged, replaced as its own span. The walk resumes where each embedded match ends, so a bare-host decoy does not end it, and stays linear. The allowed-link restore and the prompt optimizer's draft check read back with the same spans. Supersedes #7666. Co-authored-by: w <w@k.local> Co-authored-by: patrigao <112447010+patrigao@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem / Motivation
The exfiltration URL scanner could stop before a secret-bearing query.
_URL_REtreated punctuation used by renderers as URL terminators, so input such as<a href="https://evil.example/a<b?data=<blob>">matched only through/a. The later query escaped every credential and entropy check.The same class previously affected parentheses and apostrophes in paths. A scanner needs the maximal suspicious span, not the narrower span an emitter or linkifier chooses to render.
Why it matters
Provider- and model-controlled text passes through
redact_exfiltration_urlsbefore reaching users. One punctuation byte could hide a credential-like query and let the original URL survive redaction.What changed (motivation → approach → change)
src/kiro_crew/security/exfil.pynow gives_URL_REonly two hard terminators: whitespace and double quote. Single quotes, parentheses, angle brackets, and backticks remain URL content during classification. The double quote still bounds quoted HTML attributes and compact structured fields. Ambiguous prose is over-scanned rather than leaving payload bytes unscanned._url_scan_spanapplies one terminal wrapper-pair rule to(...),'...',<...>, and backtick pairs. It removes at most one structurally proven closer. Distinct closers must outnumber their opener inside the match, so balanced URL content stays included. The existing delimiter-only quote suffix and wrapper-closer-through-punctuation rules remain intact. This keeps<https://host/path?data=<blob>>, backtick-wrapped URLs, and[x](url).wrappers outside the replacement span while still scanning their URL content.The existing host-bearing inner-URL boundary, glued-span trust removal, ASCII case-folding, raw-IP host coverage, host-only query coverage, and right-to-left span replacement remain part of the same scanner model.
docs/system-specs/modules/security.mddocuments the terminal wrapper-pair invariant.Tests
test/test_security.pyadds red-first coverage for raw HTML URLs containing<,>, and backtick before a query. It also proves angle-autolink and backtick wrappers are part of the maximal regex match but remain outside the redaction span.The accumulated controls still cover interior apostrophes, markdown closers followed by punctuation, bare trailing-parenthesis length accounting, wrapper-only suffixes, glued URLs, uppercase schemes, and exact span replacement.
test/test_source_providers.pykeeps the provider-data entry point covered.Validation after rebasing onto current
main: 1,708 tests passed (test/test_security.py: 1,047;test/test_source_providers.py: 661). Black 26.3.1, isort, and flake8 passed on the changed Python files.Manual verification
N/A — unit coverage exercises both classification and exact redaction spans through the public scanner and provider-data entry point.
Related Issues
Fixes #7611
Pattern harvest
Rule candidate: review-prompt
Pattern: a scanner reused an emitter's punctuation boundaries, so legal or renderer-specific delimiters truncated inspection before a sensitive suffix.
Checklist
feat|fix|docs|refactor|perf|test|chore|ci|build|revert: ...)