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## Summary
Fix Settings deep links such as /settings?tab=deployment opening
Profile, plus related Case and Responder navigation defects.
## Root causes and changes
- Settings ignored the query string via useState('profile'). All 15
sections now read the URL.
- CaseWorkspace read the tab only at mount. Tab clicks, query changes,
investigation transitions and browser history now stay synchronized.
- Responder redirected every legacy shortcut to Triage. New shortcuts
use canonical routes; existing Cases and On-call links redirect
correctly.
A shared useUrlTab hook validates tabs, preserves other query parameters
and fragments, supports Reload/Back/Forward, and avoids duplicate
history entries. Settings adds Suspense and active controls expose
aria-current.
## Testing
Verified on 7b5788d:
- Lint: passed, 0 errors / 95 existing warnings; no new warnings.
- TypeScript: passed.
- Production and Storybook builds: passed.
- Vitest: 121 files / 1,199 tests passed; coverage gate passed.
- E2E: 13 passed / 1 pre-existing skipped. All 6 new browser tests and 5
new HTTP tests passed without retries.
- CodeQL: passed, no new alerts in changed code.
- Ruff lint/format and mypy baseline: passed.
Negative controls reproduced the original failures on the unchanged
base. HTTP assertions use the existing HTML parser; both initial CodeQL
test-regex findings are resolved.
Validation logs and CI links: #5
## Checklist
- [x] Bug fix with regression tests and research notes
- [x] No new lint warnings, dependencies or workflow changes
- [x] DCO sign-off included
- [x] Contribution guidance in beenuar#353 followed; this does not close beenuar#353
- [x] Eval harness not applicable (frontend navigation only)
---------
Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@users.noreply.github.com>
) ## Summary The browser stores a refresh token but never calls POST /api/v1/auth/refresh. The first protected 401 deletes both tokens, so the default 30-minute access expiry discards a usable seven-day refresh credential. ## Type of change - [x] Bug fix - [x] Documentation update ## Related issues None filed. ## Changes - Share refresh and one-time replay across JSON, streams, downloads and authenticated fetch callers. - Preserve method, body, headers, tenant and cancellation. Keep recoverable credentials on transient failures. - Prevent pending requests from restoring a logged-out session or replaying under a different login. - Align responder guards with shared JWT validity and refresh availability. - Restore the missing Explain proxy rewrite exposed by the route gate. - Add regression tests, real HTTP/API/PostgreSQL checks and CHANGELOG. Token lifetimes, backend security checks and dependencies are unchanged. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests added and updated - [x] Local integration tests passed - [ ] Rendered-browser manual test | Check | Local result | | --- | --- | | Web suite | 1,194 passed across 122 files | | TypeScript and production build | Passed | | ESLint | 0 errors, 95 warnings identical to base | | Live API/PostgreSQL session suite | 10 passed, 0 skipped | | Production client, real HTTP | 4 passed; base client fails; restored fix passes | | Ruff check/format and mypy baseline | Passed | | Console route/wire/auth-header gates | Passed | | Attribution, naming and whitespace gates | Passed | HTTP verification uses real API authentication and PostgreSQL, simulated browser storage/navigation, and disabled unrelated lifespan workers. It is not rendered-browser, complete-stack or operator-deployment validation. Remote CI has not run. Full root cause, design and verification details: docs/research/session-refresh.md. ## Screenshots Not applicable: session transport behavior only. ## Checklist - [x] Style, self-review and regression coverage complete - [x] Documentation and CHANGELOG updated - [x] No new lint warnings - [x] Diff checked for credentials - [x] DCO signed off ## Eval harness - [x] Not applicable: no substrate, playbook packs, detections, prompts or eval inputs changed Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@users.noreply.github.com>
…r#1822) (beenuar#1823) Closes beenuar#1822. Verified before changing anything: `services/agents/app/api/metrics.py` `_authorise` compares against `METRICS_TOKEN` and answers 401 with 'metrics endpoint requires METRICS_TOKEN outside development' when it is unset — and in `docker-compose.yml` only the **api** service received the variable; the agents block had no occurrence. So on a default deployment every scrape of `:15002/metrics` got 401, exactly as @pitimon reported (their compose override + agents recreate confirmed the fix shape in their deployment). One line plus a comment: the agents environment now carries the same `METRICS_TOKEN: ${METRICS_TOKEN:-}` passthrough the api block already had. `docker compose config` validates locally. The changelog entry lands in the consolidated changelog-integrity PR alongside this wave's other entries. (Branch created via the API: git-protocol pushes are currently refused with 403 on this machine while REST writes work — same constraint as previously recorded.)
…#1821) (beenuar#1824) Closes beenuar#1821. Verified before changing anything: `record_poll_failure` does `error_count + 1` and `record_poll_success`'s values dict never touched the column — @pitimon's reported case (a static '19 errors' for days beside a fresh `last_sync` and +237k ingested events) is exactly what a lifetime counter produces and what a consecutive counter cannot. Took the reporter's **option 1**: `error_count` now means *consecutive failed polls since the last success* — success writes 0, failure increments. That matches how the fleet panel presents the number (current condition beside `last_sync`), and the zero-when-healthy rendering already hides the badge on healthy rows. Two tests pin the semantics at the only two writers (success resets to 0; failure still increments), asserted against the compiled UPDATE statements. 49 connector tests pass locally including the full scheduler suite; ruff format clean. Changelog entry lands in the consolidated changelog-integrity PR for this wave.
…loses beenuar#1820) (beenuar#1825) Closes beenuar#1820. @pitimon asked the right question — deliberate exclusion or not yet reached? — and the honest answer is **neither defensible**: the gate listed wazuh among the unclassified debt ('requests a capped page and never follows a continuation'), and the docstring's deliberate-cap rationale ('drop the polling interval, not chase a single huge batch') is the exact argument this repo has rejected elsewhere, because the cut is silent and the abutting windows mean the overflow is never re-requested by anything. **The fix**: `_search` — the one executor both fetch paths share — now follows `search_after` (OpenSearch's documented continuation for sorted queries) to the end of the window, appending a `_doc` tiebreaker so equal timestamps cannot skip or repeat rows across pages. Properties, matching the paging doctrine: the opening page keeps the existing never-raise contract exactly (request error / non-200 / bad JSON → `[]` + the existing wazuh.* warnings); a failed later page **keeps what was read** (`connector.paging.next_page_*`); a full page whose last hit carries no sort values stops rather than looping on an uncontinuable read; and the 25-page bound announces itself (`page_cap_reached`) with the data-loss consequence stated. Both alert and vulnerability-findings reads page identically through the one loop. Docstrings now say what is true; the old rationale is kept as history rather than deleted. **Gate**: `MAX_UNCLASSIFIED` falls 49 → 48 and the audit now counts wazuh among the followers (43 follow, 1 reviewed, 48 unclassified — verified locally). **Tests**: 9 new transport-level cases (multi-page read with `search_after` echo verification, tiebreaker presence, short-page end, failed/transport-error later pages keeping partials, opening failure still `[]`, sortless full page stopping safely, page-cap bound, and the vulnerability path paging) plus the existing wazuh connector suite and gate tests — 46 pass locally; ruff format clean. Changelog entry lands in the consolidated changelog-integrity PR for this wave. (Branch created via the API — git-protocol pushes currently 403 on this machine while REST works.)
## Summary The Agentmetry inbox template drops optional source context needed to investigate a finding. Preserve selected account provenance, supporting-event references, recorder coverage and MCP schema observations under `finding.evidence.agentmetry`, keeping reported account claims separate from `actor.user` and excluding full account email and opaque account/user IDs. Existing field paths, the activity/finding split, the severity ladder and the OCSF 1.1.0 declaration remain unchanged. ## Type of change - [x] Bug fix - [x] Documentation update ## Related discussion beenuar#1577 ## Changes - Extend `agentmetry.yaml` with selected optional context mappings rather than copying the raw payload. - Add `agentmetry_context_test.go` regressions for supporting-event references, host-wide correlation, reported account provenance, partial/unknown claims, zero/false/empty coverage values and MCP schema states. - Document field destinations, privacy boundaries and investigation limits; extend the existing claim-matrix row with the mapping coverage. ## Testing and scope The committed regressions use the inbox JSON decoder, embedded template and normalized JSON serialization. They cover field selection and routing, without claiming that a supporting event arrived or that a reported account identifies the person who made a call. Source-event references must be scoped by tenant and host; host-wide findings can reference multiple sessions. The required upstream CI checks must complete before merge. These mapping regressions do not establish current-release full-stack compatibility, finding persistence, retrieval, UI pivots or source-trail verification. The existing dated manual-run caveat is retained. ## Checklist - [x] Unit regression tests added - [x] Documentation updated - [x] Self-review completed - [x] Sensitive data and credentials checked in the diff ## Eval harness - [x] Not applicable: this PR does not touch substrate, playbooks, detections or eval inputs. Signed-off-by: Ioannis L. <44038245+blitzcrieg1@users.noreply.github.com>
…nuar#1819) (beenuar#1828) Carries beenuar#1819 by @knowlet — the capability is exactly right and reviewed well; the carry exists because two required checks failed on content a fork branch can't be amended from here. **What the PR does (as reviewed):** copilot's chat transports bind three read-only tools (alerts, one record by UUID, Fusion entity risk) that forward the **caller's own** authorization and tenant to the core API — the API remains the authority, no LLM argument or page context can choose a URL, credential or tenant; `kind` is enum-bound and `record_id` round-trips `uuid.UUID` with a response-echo check; entity paths are percent-encoded with `safe=''`; redirects disabled, reads bounded, failures answer as explicit unavailability. The text cache is disabled when tools are bound (a cached prose answer must not impersonate a live read), a truncated tool loop no longer publishes the last raw lookup as a conclusion, and the Fusion risk endpoints return **503 instead of a fabricated empty queue** — the exact honest-failure doctrine this repo enforces. Big test surface: read boundaries (223 lines), live reads, API filter tests, provenance. **Corrections relative to beenuar#1819 as submitted (the two failing required checks, reproduced locally before fixing):** 1. *No competitor product named*: seven vendor-name mentions in prose/docstrings/test strings reworded neutrally (the gate's own suggested phrasing); test semantics unchanged — the renamed source value appears only at its insert site. 2. *Python — Lint & Type-check*: the import-boundary test's finder now subclasses `importlib.abc.MetaPathFinder` and carries the ABC's own `find_spec` signature — the two `arg-type` findings (and the `override` finding the first fix shape would have left) against the mypy baseline. **Verified locally:** competitor gate 0 · ruff lint + format clean over services/agents + services/api · `check_mypy_baseline` OK (no tree got worse) · 62 passed / 1 skipped across the five agents suites (import-boundary, read-boundaries, fallback-honesty, agent-identity, vaid). The DB-backed live suites get their grade in CI. Authorship preserved via co-author trailer; the contribution credit stays with @knowlet. --------- Co-authored-by: knowlet <knowlet@users.noreply.github.com>
…t that shipped four times (beenuar#1827) **The defect class:** a fix PR writes its entry under an empty `[Unreleased]`, a release promotes the section, and when the PR merges after the tag, git's three-way merge anchors the entry by context — inside the released section. Main then claims a fix the tagged artifact does not contain. Four measured instances: Datadog into `[23.0.0]` (hand-corrected in beenuar#1805), Cortex and Trend into `[23.1.0]` (corrected here), and — found by running the new gate — a post-tag credit line in `[22.1.0]`. **The gate:** `scripts/check_changelog_frozen.py` compares the newest five released sections byte-for-byte against the `CHANGELOG.md` committed at each section's own tag. Mismatch prints a unified diff; an unresolvable tag is an explicit failure, not a skip; zero comparisons refuses as vacuous. `--self-test` injects drift in every direction; nine unit tests cover the parser and auditor. **Run against the pre-fix tree it exits 1 naming `[23.1.0]` and showing both drifted entries** — the gate found real drift before it ever went green, including the `[22.1.0]` instance nobody knew about. **Wiring:** unconditional workflow (no `paths:` filter — the drift lands via merges whose own diffs touch only `[Unreleased]`, so a filter would never fire), self-test before gate, and the context added to `.github/required-checks.json`. Per the documented order, branch protection gains the context **after** this merges (manifest first; a manifest briefly ahead of protection reds nothing). **The corrections, by doctrine rather than convenience:** - Cortex/Trend entries move to `[Unreleased]`, where the next release will truthfully carry them. - `[22.2.0]` and `[22.1.0]` are spliced verbatim from their tags; the `[22.1.0]` post-tag credit line relocates to `.github/CREDITS.md` (@rudycelekli keeps the credit on the surface built to stay current — released sections are frozen). - `[Unreleased]` gains this wave's reconciled entries: beenuar#1817 (tab deep links), beenuar#1823 (agents METRICS_TOKEN), beenuar#1824 (error_count reset), beenuar#1825 (Wazuh search_after), each crediting its reporter/author. - CREDITS rows: @pitimon (three high-signal reports) and @knowlet's row extended (beenuar#1817, beenuar#1818). **Local verification:** gate self-test 6/6; gate OK on the corrected tree (5 of 5 sections verified); 9/9 unit tests; ruff format clean; attribution, competitor-name and required-check-substance gates all pass locally. Merges **after** beenuar#1823/beenuar#1824/beenuar#1825 so its `[Unreleased]` entries describe merged reality.
…pendabot alerts) (beenuar#1829) Resolves Dependabot alerts beenuar#232 beenuar#233 beenuar#234 beenuar#235 — all four advisories (Ed25519 small-order acceptance, two TLS-client crash paths, ReDoS in header trimming) name **1.4.3** as the first patched version, and `apps/mobile` resolved 1.4.2 through its existing `>=1.4.1` override floor. The floor moves to `>=1.4.3` and the mobile lock re-resolves: delta audited, **exactly one package moved** (`node-forge` 1.4.2 → 1.4.3 at both import sites). The override remains scoped to the mobile app's own lockfile (excluded from the root workspace), per the scoped-floor convention. Alert handling after merge: the four alerts should close on the next dependency-graph sync — if they lag, they stay open as 'fixed and awaiting the SBOM', not dismissed.
…eck (CodeQL beenuar#1129) (beenuar#1830) Addresses the one open code-scanning alert, [beenuar#1129](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/security/code-scanning/1129) (`js/file-access-to-http`, warning/medium) on `scripts/check_session_refresh_live.mjs:50`. **What the alert sees:** fixture-file data (the expired access token) flowing into an outbound request. **What it cannot see:** that flow is the harness's negative control — the token is signed by the isolated API precisely so the live 401 can be asserted — and the destination is already pinned to loopback by an assertion on `fixture.base_url` before any request is made (file data cannot choose a non-loopback URL). **The change:** the token is now validated as a structurally well-formed JWT (three base64url segments) before any request — a genuine harness improvement (a malformed fixture fails at the door with a named reason instead of as a confusing 401-assertion three calls later), and the strongest shape constraint available for a value that must flow. **Disposition if the alert persists:** this repo has measured that inline guards and `codeql[...]` markers frequently do not satisfy this tracker (documented in `tests/isolation/test_sso_live.py` and `services/agents/app/hunt/from_report.py`). If beenuar#1129 is still open after this merges, it gets dismissed as a false positive with this reasoning on the alert — the documented disposition — rather than contorting the harness.
## Summary Adds a **Sophos Central** connector (`sophos_central`, category `edr`), one of the most widely deployed endpoint and server protection platforms and absent from the catalogue. It reads Sophos Central alerts through the SIEM Integration API (`GET /siem/v1/alerts`), the same feed Sophos's own SIEM integration reads. The operator enters a client ID and secret and nothing else: the tenant and its data region are discovered from the credential, and partner or organization credentials work by naming one tenant. The window is read to the end, the vendor's 24-hour lookback limit is respected, and Sophos's three severities are kept as published. ## Type of change - [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to not work as expected) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Refactor / tech debt - [ ] CI / infra change ## Related issues Part of beenuar#356 (connector wishlist). This doesn't close it, because the wishlist stays open by design. ## Changes - **The vendor contract.** It comes from Sophos's developer portal: [getting started (tenant)](https://developer.sophos.com/getting-started-tenant), [getting started (partner)](https://developer.sophos.com/getting-started) and the [alerts route reference](https://developer.sophos.com/reference/siem-v1/alerts/get-alerts/). Sophos's own `Sophos-Central-SIEM-Integration` client resolves tenants and pages the same way. - `services/connectors/app/connectors/sophos_central.py` (new): - **Auth.** OAuth2 client credentials at `https://id.sophos.com/api/v2/oauth2/token` with `scope=token`. The token is cached with a minute of headroom and renewed once on a 401. - **Tenant discovery.** `GET https://api.central.sophos.com/whoami/v1` tells the connector what kind of credential it has. - A credential with `idType: tenant` reads the `apiHosts.dataRegion` that whoami names. If a configured `tenant_id` names a different tenant, the connector refuses and says why. - A partner or organization credential has no data region of its own, so `tenant_id` is required. The connector looks the tenant up through `/{idType}/v1/tenants/{id}` with `X-Partner-ID` or `X-Organization-ID` and reads its `apiHost`. - `tenant_id` is validated as a UUID in the constructor, because it is interpolated into a request path. A bad value becomes a 422 with the reason. - **The bearer token stays with Sophos.** The data region host comes from a response, so the egress guard, which vets configured values, never sees it. The host must be `https` under `sophos.com`, and it is rebuilt from the scheme, host and port that were checked before the token is sent there. - **Reading the window to the end.** Pages are read at `limit=1000` (the documented maximum; the minimum is 200) through `read_token_pages` with `more_field="has_more"`. Following pages send `cursor` without `from_date`, as Sophos's client does. A refused opening request raises, so the scheduler records a failed poll rather than a quiet one. A later page failing keeps the pages already read, and the 25-page bound is announced when it binds. - **The 24-hour ceiling.** `from_date` "must be within last 24 hours". The scheduler's outage backfill asks for up to exactly 24 hours, which the API would refuse outright. A longer window is shortened to just under the limit and logged as `sophos_central.window_shortened`. - **Normalization.** The canonical envelope carries the vendor record under `raw_event`. `description` becomes the title, `location` the hostname, `source` the actor (`n/a` is no user), `data.source_info.ip` the source IP and `data.ips_threat.remote_ip` the destination IP. `threat`, `type`, the endpoint id and the endpoint type are kept. - **Severity.** Sophos publishes `LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH` and nothing above. These map straight through, so nothing is ever `critical`. Any other value carries no severity rather than a guess. - `services/connectors/app/connectors/_paging.py`: `read_token_pages` gains an opt-in `more_field`. Sophos returns `next_cursor` on its last page too, so ending on the token alone would re-request the final page up to the page cap. When `more_field` is set, the read ends as soon as that flag is not `True`. Existing callers are unchanged. - `services/ingest/internal/normalizer/ocsf_classes.go`: `sophos_central` is filed at 2001 Security Finding, so its alerts promote, and `check_ocsf_class_coverage.py --check` stays at 42 generic connectors. - `plugins/sophos-central/plugin.yaml` plus `pnpm marketplace:sync` output. - `apps/docs/docs/connectors/sophos-central.md`, generated by `generate_connector_docs.py`. The human-notes section covers: - getting the credential - partner and organization tenants - what is read and the 24-hour limit - the severity table - a troubleshooting table keyed on the connector's own error messages - Regenerated derived artefacts: - connector counts (`generate_connector_count.py`) - the `ConnectorType` union - the catalog fallback - the conformance matrix - `llms.txt` - corpus stats - The connector figures in `AGENTS.md` and the count row in `docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md` were updated by hand. - `CHANGELOG.md`: entry under Unreleased → Added. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests added / updated - [ ] Integration tests pass locally - [x] Manually tested (describe steps below) <details> <summary>Manual test steps</summary> 1. `services/connectors/tests/connectors/test_sophos_central.py` (54 tests) drives the real connector through an `httpx.MockTransport` that serves Sophos ID, the global API and a data region. It covers: - registration and schema - the token request's form body - whoami-to-data-region routing with `X-Tenant-ID` - partner and organization lookups with their scope headers - the missing and mismatched tenant messages - refusal of non-Sophos, plain-http and look-alike data region hosts, and the host being rebuilt from its checked parts - all pages arriving, with `cursor` replacing `from_date` - `has_more: false` ending the read beside a cursor - a failed later page keeping earlier pages - the page cap being announced - the 24-hour clamp being logged - a refused opening request raising - a lapsed token being renewed once - the normalized envelope and the three-tier severity ladder Direct tests of `more_field` on the shared reader are included. 2. Negative control: with the `more_field` check removed from `read_token_pages`, 11 of the tests fail. 3. `pytest tests/` in `services/connectors`: 1596 passed and 3 failed in `test_ticket_sync_loop.py`. Those 3 fail identically on an untouched `main` checkout, because the machine I tested on has no DNS for the hostname they resolve. 4. These all report OK: - `check_connector_paging.py`, `check_connector_profiles.py`, `check_ocsf_class_coverage.py --check` and `check_connector_404_conflation.py` - `connector_conformance.py --check` and the `--check` mode of every connector generator (count, types, docs, catalog fallback) - `build_marketplace.py --check`, `curate_detections.py --check`, `generate_llms_txt.py --check` and `generate_corpus_stats.py --check` - `check_changelog_frozen.py`, `check_repo_self_links.py`, `check_competitor_names.py` and `check_attribution.py --all` 5. `ruff check` and `ruff format --check .` with ruff 0.16.10, and `check_mypy_baseline.py` with mypy alone on Python 3.11: no tree got worse. I didn't run the Go change locally. It is one entry in the class table, and `TestEveryDeclaredConnectorHasAnOCSFDecision` in CI checks it, along with the Python mirror `check_ocsf_class_coverage.py`, which passes. No live Sophos Central tenant was used. The contract is the vendor's published reference and its own SIEM client. </details> ## Screenshots (if UI changes) Not applicable. The connector appears in the existing catalog grid and wizard through the registry. ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the style guidelines of this project (`ruff`, `eslint`, `gofmt`) - [x] I have performed a self-review of my own code - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally - [x] I have updated documentation as needed (README, CHANGELOG, CONTRIBUTING) - [x] My changes do not introduce new linter warnings - [x] I have checked for sensitive data / credentials in my diff ## Eval harness (required for substrate / playbook / detection changes) - [x] Not applicable — this PR does not touch substrate, playbooks, detections, or eval inputs - [ ] No axis regressed - [ ] An axis regressed; rationale and follow-up are described in the Summary above Signed-off-by: Asish Kumar <officialasishkumar@gmail.com>
…g and investigation The confidence scorer already recognises feed-sourced TI hits — _ti_contribution counts misp/otx/taxii/kev/virustotal, and alert_enricher._SOURCE_TO_TI_KEY maps those source names into the keys it reads. But nothing populates the feed slots: services/threatintel's poll loop ingests TAXII/MISP/OTX/KEV into OpenSearch/Qdrant/Neo4j (read by the TI page, attribution and semantic memory), while the alert scorer reads fused.enrichments, which only the enrichment service and the tenant IOC store write. So a feed match never moves an alert's confidence and never surfaces in an investigation — the otx/misp/taxii scorer slots are a dead scaffold. Per the system design, services/enrichment is the per-IOC lookup layer and services/threatintel is the feed + IOC/actor search API. This keeps OTX a threatintel feed and adds one enrichment provider that asks threatintel per IOC, rather than a second OTX client or a feed->store bridge: - enrichment gets a ThreatIntelClient that calls threatintel's existing GET /api/v1/iocs/search?value=<ioc> (service-token + X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID auth) on IP/domain/url/hash. A hit is emitted under the matching feed's own source name (otx/misp/...), so the existing _SOURCE_TO_TI_KEY lifts it into the scorer with no scorer change. One provider covers every feed. Two propagation gaps had to be closed for the provider to fire — both pre-existing "tenant was available but not passed" cases: - fusion AlertEnricher now carries the alert's tenant on each /enrich/bulk item (the provider needs it for threatintel's service auth; the enrichment cache is tenant-scoped anyway). - agents enrich_ioc now forwards the run's tenant, bound by default_registry's closure exactly like lookup_file_hash — it is not an LLM-visible argument (the tool schema still lists only ioc_value/ioc_type), so "the tenant is never a parameter a model can set" holds. Without this the feed-lookup fired in scoring but no-oped in investigations. Tests: threatintel_test.go drives the client through httptest (a feed hit emits the source names + classification, a no-match returns nil, an empty token or absent tenant no-ops); test_alert_enricher.py pins that every bulk item carries the tenant; test_investigator_enrichment_tool.py pins that enrich_ioc forwards the bound tenant. Signed-off-by: Kyrylo N <98964984+43n51c@users.noreply.github.com>
…enuar#1833, closes beenuar#1832) (beenuar#1836) Carries beenuar#1833 by @officialasishkumar, which reviewed **sound** on every security axis — the RFC 7396-at-depth-one merge under a row lock, stored secret leaves kept as vault tokens with only newly-typed values encrypted (pinned by `test_merged_secrets_keep_their_tokens_and_only_new_values_are_encrypted`), and the retirement of the documented delete-and-re-add footgun that loses the id, checkpoint, counters and push token. **Why the carry:** the required check *Verify docs/openapi.yaml is up to date* fails deterministically on beenuar#1833 — the request-model change alters the published spec and the committed `docs/openapi.yaml` wasn't regenerated — and fork branches can't be pushed to from this repository. This branch is beenuar#1833 byte-identical plus the regenerated spec (23 insertions, verified with `export_openapi.py --check`). The other ten failures on beenuar#1833 were the runner-fleet DNS outage, not the diff. **Verified locally:** ruff lint + format clean · mypy baseline OK · merge-semantics tests 10 passed / 3 skipped (DB-backed skips per the probe convention) · spec check green. Closes beenuar#1832. Authorship preserved via co-author trailer. Co-authored-by: Asish Kumar <officialasishkumar@gmail.com>
…rries beenuar#1831) (beenuar#1835) Carries beenuar#1831 by @43n51c — a textbook exists-but-unwired find: the enrichment service read all three API keys in its config and did nothing with any of them, so an operator setting `SHODAN_API_KEY`/`URLSCAN_API_KEY`/`IPINFO_API_KEY` got silent no-ops while `PortInfo` sat documented as 'detected by Shodan' with nothing filling it. The three clients, their wiring, compose/env docs, and transport-level tests are his work, byte-identical except one correction below. **The security correction (why the carry exists):** Go's `*url.Error` stringifies the full URL it failed on, so a credential in the query string reaches the logs through any `%w`-wrapped transport error — a timeout would have logged `?token=<secret>` / `?key=<secret>`. - **IPInfo**: the token moves to the vendor-supported `Authorization: Bearer` header (the same choice as the Cyble and Mandiant clients in the same package); the URL carries no secret at all. Test updated to pin the header. - **Shodan**: the vendor contract requires `?key=` in the URL, so the error path now redacts the query before wrapping, pinned by a new test asserting a transport error never carries the key and does carry the `key=REDACTED` marker. - **URLScan** already used its `API-Key` header correctly — untouched. **Verified locally:** `go build`, `go vet`, full enricher test package green; `gofmt` clean. Fork branches can't be pushed to from this repository, hence the carry; authorship preserved via co-author trailer so the credit stays with @43n51c. CHANGELOG entry lands at the next reconciliation alongside this wave's others. Co-authored-by: 43n51c <43n51c@users.noreply.github.com>
…quest-forgery) CodeQL flagged the threatintel lookup as request forgery: the IOC value is attacker-influenced alert data and fmt.Sprintf folds it into one tainted string, which the taint tracker cannot see QueryEscape confining to the query. Constructing through url.URL with url.Values keeps the scheme, host and path from operator config and a package constant, so the tainted value provably never reaches the authority. Also resolves the docker-compose env-block conflict with the enrichers merged in beenuar#1835 and records the feature under [Unreleased].
feat(enrichment): per-IOC threat-intel feed lookup, wired into scoring and investigation (carries beenuar#1838)
Cuts **v23.2.0** — the community-capability release. Everything in it merged to `main` since the v23.1.0 tag; this PR is the release surfaces plus two honesty fixes found while cutting it. ## Release content (already on main) - **Sophos Central connector** (beenuar#1834, @officialasishkumar), **console connector editing** (beenuar#1836 carrying beenuar#1833, same contributor, closes beenuar#1832), **Shodan/URLScan/IPInfo enrichers** (beenuar#1835 carrying beenuar#1831, @43n51c). - Paging-to-the-end-of-the-window fixes for Cortex XDR/XSIAM (beenuar#1815), Trend Vision One (beenuar#1816 carrying beenuar#1814) and the Wazuh indexer (beenuar#1825, reported in beenuar#1820 by @pitimon). - Copilot grounding (beenuar#1828 carrying beenuar#1819, @knowlet), session renewal (beenuar#1818), tab deep links (beenuar#1817), `METRICS_TOKEN` passthrough (beenuar#1823, closes beenuar#1822), `error_count` semantics (beenuar#1824, closes beenuar#1821), Agentmetry context (beenuar#1826, @blitzcrieg1), changelog-freeze gate (beenuar#1827), node-forge floor (beenuar#1829), session-check hardening (beenuar#1830). ## What this PR changes - **CHANGELOG**: `[Unreleased]` promoted to `[23.2.0] - 2026-11-11`; five entries added for merged work that had none (enrichers, copilot grounding, Agentmetry, node-forge, session-check script). - **Freeze-gate fix**: `check_changelog_frozen.py` failed its own release PR by design — the promoted section's tag cannot exist until after the merge. The newest section, only when it equals `VERSION` and only until its tag exists, now reports an explicit `PENDING` state; every other untagged section stays fatal, and the moment the tag exists the section is compared like any other. Four new tests pin each bound; self-test extended to ten cases. - **Honest plugin floor**: the Sophos manifest claimed `min_aisoc_version: "23.1.0"`, an artifact that does not contain the connector — corrected to `23.2.0`, marketplace mirrors re-synced. - **Surfaces**: `VERSION` 23.2.0, web `package.json`, chart `7.21.0` / `appVersion v23.2.0`, README badge, `RELEASES.md` TL;DR + What's new (11 defects fixed here, 50 across the last three releases, dependency advisories excluded), `docs/openapi.yaml` re-exported (version string only), `llms.txt`/`llms-full.txt` regenerated, scoreboard row re-graded live at `d1bbafa8` (0.97). After merge: tag `v23.2.0` on the merge commit; `release.yml` publishes the GitHub release from the `[23.2.0]` section and pushes images. Neither `stable` channel moves (v22 generation; a minor may not cross a major without the dispatch).
Keep the bundled Ollama defaults while allowing provider-native OpenAI, Anthropic and Bedrock credentials. Normalize blank optional settings, forward AWS authentication options, and recreate the gateway on upgrade. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
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| const login = await authApi.login(fixture.email, fixture.password); | ||
| assert.equal(login.user.id, fixture.user_id); | ||
| const expired = await realFetch(`${origin}/api/v1/auth/me`, { | ||
| headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${fixture.expired_access_token}` }, |
Cover the pinned gateway's actual HTTP transport with isolated profile, IMDSv2, metadata-disabled, bearer-denied, and blank endpoint cases. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
Exercise the loaded model and mounted file separately, then prove that restoring generic credentials or removing recreation reproduces each fault. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
Record pinned LiteLLM evidence and distinguish deployment gateway routing from the Explain and automatic-triage BYOK overrides. Document inherited fields, probe limitations, and separate gateway/provider credentials. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
Populate ephemeral runner refs for unchanged changelog and chart-version gates. Forks do not inherit upstream tags; no remote refs are modified. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
Replace the untyped heterogeneous capture dictionary with a typed call record and assert that the wrapper delegates exactly once. This resolves the new var-annotated finding without widening the mypy baseline. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
Document that custom BYOK can use AWS's explicit OpenAI-compatible endpoint for supported models, while Anthropic still requires the native gateway route. Keep bearer-key compatibility separate from native SigV4 support and label live-account acceptance as pending. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
| self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stdout + result.stderr) | ||
| return result.stdout.strip() | ||
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| def state(expected_hash: str) -> dict: |
Fork checkout only fetches tags from the contributor repository. Load the canonical release tags in the upgrade job so both historical schemas are available before exercising the existing migration and data-survival checks. Keep all assertions and remote refs unchanged. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
Document LiteLLM in default CORE and require explicit hosted model routing. Normalize whitespace-only provider keys while preserving explicit empty keys for unauthenticated compatible endpoints. Cover both providers through the pinned gateway and guard against unsetting a working keyless configuration. Signed-off-by: Albert Hsieh <knowlet@pm.me>
11 of 19 tasks
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Summary
Validation-only draft in the contributor fork; intended target: beenuar/AiSOC:main. Branch base: 4d8790e. Use the upstream three-dot comparison to review the proposed patch; this fork PR also contains inherited upstream history. Upstream creation via the integration previously returned HTTP 403.
Restore provider-native authentication and configuration reloads for the Compose LiteLLM gateway, preserving default CORE/Ollama startup and existing task aliases. This includes Bedrock bearer and AWS credential-chain support, plus whitespace normalization that preserves keyless compatible endpoints.
Type of change
Related issues
Contribution guidance: beenuar#353. No issue is auto-closed.
Changes
Deployment scope
Runtime changes cover docker-compose.yml and its overlays; docker-compose.prod.yml inherits the wrapper. infra/helm/aisoc is unchanged: its entrypoint, environment/configuration and model defaults have not been ported. Passing Helm render checks is not Helm runtime acceptance of this fix.
Testing
Current head: f9abe7d.
Fork CI checkout: 39e2908, merging that head into fork base 8a06f2e. These results do not establish acceptance of a new merge with upstream main.
Evidence:
The gateway job pulled ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.102.1 and executed the wrapper's /app/docker/prod_entrypoint.sh through real proxy/reload tests. No separate image-filesystem listing is claimed. It also ran base docker compose config --quiet. AWS profiles were exercised through a real read-only Docker mount; a combined base + aws-profile overlay config command is not asserted by that job.
Local evidence: 14 passed, 18 Docker-gated skips; Ruff 0.16.8 passed; mypy 2.4.1 full baseline passed with no new findings. Reverting whitespace normalization reproduced the expected failures. Local Docker absence is not reported as a pass.
Fixtures use synthetic credentials and no external network. Live AWS/model access, production deployment and real tenant BYOK acceptance remain pending.
Manual test steps
Pending deployment acceptance:
Screenshots (if UI changes)
No visual UI changes.
Checklist
ruff,eslint,gofmt)Eval harness (required for substrate / playbook / detection changes)
Before (paste
scripts/run_evals.pyoutput on base branch)After (paste
scripts/run_evals.pyoutput on this branch)Operational risk and rollback
Recreation briefly interrupts in-flight requests. Image-tag changes require rerunning the gateway image/reload suite to revalidate /app/docker/prod_entrypoint.sh. The AWS profile mount is opt-in. Revert the patch and recreate the gateway to restore the previous behavior, including its credential/configuration defects.