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MCP sign-in: the popup's Allow survives a second Approve load; Deny is final; refresh hardening - #192
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The hosted MCP server (the agent-registry-mcp Worker) had no documentation outside docs/chatgpt-plugin/, and the worker code cited a "SPEC §N" that did not exist in the repo. - MCP_CONNECTOR_SPEC.md (new, repo root), sectioned to match the code's §0–§10 citations: isolation, CORS, the OAuth 2.1 authorization server (RFC 9728/8414 metadata, public DCR, PKCE S256, RFC 8707), magic-link sign-in with the same-browser binding, tokens and refresh rotation, the optional-bearer /mcp transport, the 11 tools with annotations, draft_task_link bounds, rate limits, the variable table, tests and local dev. The three worker headers now point to it. - Hosted vs local wherever MCP is described: README (MCP section, architecture, discovery), packages/mcp README, a new section in packages/api README, agent.json for_agents.mcp_server.hosted, llms.txt via the positioning sync template, /docs/agents, GettingStarted and a ChatGPT & claude.ai card on /integrations. - Stale facts fixed: the stdio server has 26 tools (was 23 in README, GettingStarted, agent.json); packages/mcp README version 0.7.2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Merge origin/main (#163 MCP acquisition attribution): README keeps the hosted/local split and carries #163's --source github tags and analytics note; CHANGELOG is the union. Licensing: five src/mcp files said "PROPRIETARY control-plane", but LICENSING.md lists the MCP OAuth worker under the Apache-2.0 registry API (everything outside src/control/), a deliberate entry. The headers now match LICENSING.md and note that the worker imports owner lookup and email from the proprietary src/control/ subtree. The spec states the same. Go-live: mcp.basedagents.ai is NXDOMAIN. CI's Deploy MCP Worker attaches the zone route but creates no DNS, so the hosted server has never been reachable. Documented the one-time proxied `mcp` record in spec §1, the ChatGPT runbook (step 0), wrangler.mcp.toml and the API README. The spec also covers #163: OAuth-only hosted attribution (hosted:<client_id>, source/campaign/acquisition_id on the connector URL, owner identity never written) and the ACQUISITION_ANALYTICS switch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
#164) - The hosted browse_tasks described "default: open" but sent no status, so the API's own default (everything but cancelled/expired) leaked claimed, submitted and verified tasks into "find paid work". It now sends status=open unless the caller picks one. Test added. - Local dev in the spec (§10), the API README and the ChatGPT runbook: apply the D1 migrations locally first (the MCP config declares none; both configs share the database id), and override MCP_ISSUER and MCP_RESOURCE_URL to localhost so OAuth discovery doesn't advertise the production endpoints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
With mcp.basedagents.ai now resolving, a production smoke test showed every read tool failing with "BasedAgents API returned 522". The API answers 200 directly, but a Worker's fetch() to a hostname on its own zone (api.basedagents.ai on basedagents.ai) skips that zone's Worker routes and goes to the placeholder origin behind the DNS record, which Cloudflare answers with 522. Reproduced twice on get_chain_status and browse_tasks. - wrangler.mcp.toml: [[services]] binding API -> agent-registry-api. `wrangler deploy --dry-run` confirms env.API resolves. - handler.ts: apiFetch goes through env.API when bound, else the existing public fetch (tests, local dev). The client's token still never crosses. New test: with the binding present, reads use it and never call global fetch. - Docs (spec §5/§8/§9, API README, ChatGPT runbook, CHANGELOG): the binding is required, not a scaling nicety. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
ChatGPT mixed auth ("OAuth or no authentication"), per OpenAI's custom
MCP and Apps SDK auth docs:
- tools/list: every tool declares a top-level securitySchemes, noauth
for the reads and draft_task_link, and oauth2 with scope board:post
for post_to_board.
- An unlinked or under-scoped post_to_board answers an isError tool
result with _meta["mcp/www_authenticate"] (insufficient_scope,
scope="board:post"). That is ChatGPT's account-link trigger. It
replaces the transport 401, which ChatGPT reads as the connection
failing. A dead presented token stays a 401, for refresh.
- The server instructions open with a self-contained tool map in the
first 512 chars.
Greptile on #164:
- P1: binding requests carried no client IP, so the API's per-IP
limits collapsed into one 'unknown' bucket. The caller's edge-set IP
is now forwarded as CF-Connecting-IP and X-Forwarded-For. Only this
Worker reaches the API over the binding, and the edge overwrites any
client-supplied CF-Connecting-IP. Test added.
- P2: local dev now runs the API Worker beside the MCP Worker (8787 and
8788), which wrangler's dev registry connects, with issuer and
resource on 8788.
The runbook carries the exact ChatGPT form settings. Tests 99/99.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
CHANGELOG union: main's CLI entry and this branch's entries both kept. No other overlap (#168 touches only packages/sdk). MCP tests 99/99, typecheck, sync checks and lint clean on the merged tree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
OpenAI's plugin portal imports a ZIP (plugin.json + mcp.json + assets) and
shows the imported listing read-only, so the copy-paste metadata.json is
replaced by a generated package:
- sync-positioning §10 now writes docs/chatgpt-plugin/package/plugin.json
(full Agent Plugins manifest: interface, review test cases, release
notes), package/mcp.json, and test-cases.md from the positioning block.
- scripts/build-chatgpt-plugin.mjs zips the package with the 512px icon as
logo and composerIcon into docs/chatgpt-plugin/dist/ (gitignored),
refusing a stale package or an out-of-spec icon.
- New listing copy ("Hire AI agents, find paid work"), prompts and test
cases; draft_task_link and the instructions now name QA/test-my-MCP asks.
- check-positioning covers the new surfaces; runbook and CHANGELOG updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa # Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # docs/chatgpt-plugin/README.md # packages/api/src/mcp/chatgpt.json # packages/web/src/content/positioning.ts
…site The "verify delivered work" golden prompt asked for the newest task, which is usually open and has no receipt. It now asks for the most recent verified task, and the expected behaviour names the status filter. The runbook says the build needs the zip CLI. (Greptile on #171) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
The plugin portal's challenge token goes in OPENAI_APPS_CHALLENGE in wrangler.mcp.toml, so the MCP worker serves it at mcp.basedagents.ai/.well-known/openai-apps-challenge. The same token is also a static file on the apex (text/plain via _headers), in case the portal verifies basedagents.ai itself. It's public plain text, not a secret. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
agent-registry-mcp shipped with no secrets. Without MCP_SIGNING_SECRET, /oauth/authorize fails closed with "authorization server misconfigured"; without RESEND_API_KEY, magic links only reach the log. The runbook now lists both, with the wrangler commands and the dashboard path, before domain verification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
deferSend swallowed every error, so a wrong RESEND_API_KEY failed with no trace. Sign-in links were minted but never mailed. The response still doesn't change (low-enumeration), but the failure is now console.error'd for wrangler tail. The runbook says the Resend secret is a real re_ key, not the random signing string, and how to see the failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
The portal's scan flagged post_to_board as openWorldHint: false while it writes to a public board. It now sets openWorldHint: true, and the test pins the hint: only post_to_board is open-world. The spec and the annotation comment match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
A rejecting sender now covers the catch in deferSend. The response is still the same "Check your email" page. waitUntil gets one promise that resolves rather than rejecting, and console.error carries the provider's message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Auditing an MCP server is the plugin's best use case, and the connector had no tool for it. - scan_mcp_server: security-scans an MCP server or agent tool from its npm or PyPI package or GitHub repo through /v1/scan. It reuses the stored report unless asked to rescan, and relays the scanner's own errors. Annotated open-world and not read-only, because a scan downloads third-party code and stores a public report. - draft_audit_request: prefilled link to the Agent Compatibility Audit intake, with the price from the live catalog. Nothing is submitted from MCP. The console intake now prefills its descriptive fields from the query string, and a signed-in visitor's redirect keeps the query. - The ChatGPT listing, review test cases, release notes and server instructions lead with "audit my MCP server". Spec, READMEs, agent.json and the runbook list the 13 tools. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa # Conflicts: # MCP_CONNECTOR_SPEC.md # packages/api/src/mcp/handler.test.ts
… matches Greptile on #175: - An unprefixed GET /v1/scan/:name falls back to any source's row with that name, so npm "requests" could come back as pypi:requests. Lookups are now always source-prefixed, and a report from another source is ignored and triggers a scan. A test covers the pypi-vs-npm case. - draft_audit_request validates URLs the way IntakeSchema does (new URL, https, no embedded credentials) instead of a regex. It accepts @ in paths and rejects https://? and user:pw@ hosts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
new URL() accepts HTTPS://Host, but the console's prefill keeps only lowercase https:// values, so such a URL vanished from the form. The tool now passes on u.href (lowercase scheme and host), and the test covers it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
OpenAI's plugin review "couldn't complete an automated assessment" of the privacy policy. /privacy and /terms were SPA routes, so a crawler that doesn't run JS got the app shell (the homepage's agent block) and no policy. Both are now prerendered with their own title, description and canonical, and they're in the sitemap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
The policy only described the agent registry, so ChatGPT's review had nothing to assess for the plugin. A new section covers, as the code does: - tool calls: arguments aren't stored, except a confirmed board post and a requested public scan report; - account connection: the email is used for lookup and the Resend link and isn't stored by the flow; hashed tokens (1 h access, 30 d refresh); one 10-minute cookie; - pseudonymous usage attribution for connected apps (daily counts deleted after 400 days); - no sale, ads or training, and how to disconnect or delete. The IP section no longer says addresses are "not stored": rate-limit counters keep them (SHA-256 on the MCP server, as-is on the API), plus an app-registration hash. Data Sharing lists Cloudflare, Resend and Google Analytics, and that scans fetch from npm, PyPI or GitHub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
…reptile on #178) oauth_clients.reg_ip_hash sits beside the client_id, and tokens tie that client_id to the owner, so "not linked to accounts" overstated it. The text now says the IP-based rate-limit counters aren't linked, and that the registration hash can be linked to you once you connect that app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
The portal blocks submission until plugin.json carries extensions.com.openai.review.demo_recording_url. positioning gains chatgpt.demoRecordingUrl (https only, checked at sync). plugin.json includes it once set, and the ZIP build warns while it's empty. The runbook says where it goes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
ChatGPT reported "Missing OAuth callback data" after a successful sign-in. It opens /oauth/authorize in a popup and expects the redirect back there, but the emailed link opens a new tab. Approving in that tab redirected into a window without ChatGPT's pending state, so the minted code was never collected. - The "check your email" page polls the new GET /oauth/status (2.5 s, up to 15 min) and moves to the new GET /oauth/approve on "ready". A no-JS "continue" link goes there too. - /oauth/continue (the link tab) still consumes the challenge and enforces the same-browser cookie, then says to return to the original window, with an "Approve here instead" fallback. It no longer renders the Allow form. - Both endpoints answer only for the request in the signed cookie. Approve still needs an owner bound by a same-browser link click, so the login-fixation binding is unchanged. - The tests walk continue → approve → decision. New tests cover the handoff (pending → ready → done, with state preserved), cookieless and forged requests, and a link clicked in another browser. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
The portal blocks submission without review.demo_recording_url, so it now points at the Loom walkthrough. The plugin.json is re-synced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
OpenAI's review couldn't confirm the category ("Productivity") and asked
for the listing to explain one main purpose. It had mixed hiring, paid work
and audits.
- Short description: "Audit MCP servers and agents". The long description
leads with the security scan and the agent compatibility audit, then
agent trust checks. The task marketplace follows as a secondary use.
- Category: Developer Tools. Prompts, capabilities, keywords, test-case
order, release notes and server instructions follow the same order.
- draft_task_link drops "test my MCP server" and points audits to
scan_mcp_server or draft_audit_request, so the tools don't overlap.
- The initialize test expects the new opening line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
The plugin review asked to remove pricing, subscription offers and promotions from the description. These are gone from every listing field: - bounty, USDC, escrow and "price" in the long description; - "payouts" in the capabilities; - "usdc bounty" and "paid tasks" in the keywords; - "paid" in the release notes. plugin.json's top-level description had reused the site subhead, which mentions USDC and "paid". It now has its own text, chatgpt.packageDescription. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
review.demo_recording_url now points at the re-recorded Loom walkthrough, which follows the audit-first listing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa # Conflicts: # packages/web/src/content/positioning.ts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
…s a second Approve load The sign-in popup and the email-link tab share the mcp_authreq cookie, and every /oauth/approve load minted a new CSRF token into it. Loading the page a second time (the link tab's fallback link, a reload) failed the Allow form already showing in the popup, leaving only the email tab's Allow, which returns to ChatGPT without its pending state. - approvePage reuses the cookie's CSRF token for the request it names and mints one only when the cookie has none. - The email tab's fallback reads "Approve in this tab instead" and warns the app may not finish connecting from there. - /oauth/token sends Cache-Control: no-store and Pragma: no-cache on every response (RFC 6749 5.1) and logs refused refreshes with their status and a client-id prefix. - The MCP handler answers ping with an empty result. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
…sh token Two findings from an adversarial review of the shared-CSRF change: - Deny now consumes the authorization request before redirecting with access_denied. With one CSRF token per request, an Allow form still open in another window could otherwise mint a code after the user denied; polling windows now see 'done'. - rotateRefreshToken takes the presented client_id and checks it before consuming the token. A mismatch returns invalid_client and leaves the token usable by its own client, instead of consuming it unreturned and turning the owner's next refresh into a 'reused' chain revocation. The refusal is logged like every other failed refresh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
…age-8ac6bq # Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md
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Brings in the MCP sign-in popup fix (#192). CHANGELOG.md conflicted only because both sides added an entry at the top of Unreleased; both are kept. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HUEV4Uf69wpKrB7GQqEQiX
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Summary
Fixes a sign-in bug in the hosted MCP's OAuth flow that could strand OpenAI's plugin reviewers. It also tightens two edge cases found while reviewing that fix. This is a server-only change: tool definitions and server instructions are untouched, so it doesn't affect the plugin submission currently in review.
The bug
The sign-in popup (where ChatGPT waits) and the email-link tab share the
mcp_authreqcookie, and every load of/oauth/approveminted a new CSRF token into it.If the Approve page loaded a second time, the Allow button already showing in the popup failed with
csrf validation failed. That happened when someone clicked "Approve here instead" in the email tab, or reloaded.The only Allow still working was then the one in the email tab. That one redirects to ChatGPT without its pending state, so the code is never exchanged and the connection never finishes.
Changes (
packages/api/src/mcp/)approvePagereuses the token the request's signed cookie already carries, and mints one only if the cookie has none. The token stays bound to the signed, HttpOnly, host-only cookie and itsauthreq_id.access_denied. With a shared token, an Allow form still open in another window could otherwise mint a code after the user denied. Polling windows now seedone.client_idno longer burns a refresh token.rotateRefreshTokentakes the presentedclient_idand checks it before consuming the token. A mismatch returnsinvalid_clientand leaves the token usable by its own client./oauth/tokenresponses are never cached. Every response, success or error, carriesCache-Control: no-storeandPragma: no-cache(RFC 6749 §5.1).[oauth] refresh failedis logged with its status (reused,invalidorclient_mismatch) and an 8-character client-id prefix, so a connection that drops after its 1-hour token is visible inwrangler tail.pingreturns an empty result, as MCP 2025-06-18 requires. It used to return -32601.MCP_CONNECTOR_SPEC.md§3/§4 and the CHANGELOG describe the new behaviour.How this was found
I traced the full popup flow while diagnosing why the plugin portal's Connect seemed stuck. That symptom turned out to be on OpenAI's side: the portal never requested
/oauth/authorize. The CSRF bug was found in that trace. The Deny andclient_idfindings came from an adversarial review of the first fix. Each was confirmed by reproducing it in a scratch copy of the tests.Test plan
client_idrefresh is refused, then the right client's refresh succeeds (both the store and the endpoint).no-store.pingreturns{}.packages/api: 1288 tests pass (75 files) on the tree merged with currentmain.npm run typecheck,npm run lint(0 errors; the one warning is in untouchedroutes/probe.ts),npm run lint:words,sync-positioning --check.curl -s -X POST https://mcp.basedagents.ai/mcp -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"ping"}'returns{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{}}.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01K5VPBCqJw8VrBa7GrLboYa
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