Please report security problems privately, never in a public issue, pull request or discussion.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: the Report a
vulnerability button on the repository's
Security tab.
If that is not available to you, email the maintainer at
imertkaradayi@gmail.com with pando security in the subject.
Include what you found, the version (pando --version), your OS, and the
steps that show it. You will get an answer within a week. Once a fix is
out, the advisory is published with credit to you unless you would
rather not be named.
pando is pre-1.0. Security fixes go into the latest version only.
pando runs commands on a developer's machine and reaches into servers they own, so these are the areas that matter most:
- Writing where it should not. pando promises never to write into a
repository; everything lives under
~/.pando. A way to make it write elsewhere, or follow a link out of its own tree, is in scope. - Dropping data it did not make. Namespaced mode makes and drops
databases and Redis slots in the developer's own servers. Anything that
gets
rm,doctoror a start to drop, flush or overwrite data pando did not create is in scope. - Credentials. Database logins pando keeps are stored with mode 0600
and handed to clients through the environment, never a command line. A
leak of a secret into logs,
doctor,signals, JSON output, a shell history or another user's reach is in scope. - Command injection through a branch name, a worktree name, a pull request's title or branch, a config value or a recipe.
- Sharing.
shareexposes a running worktree at a public URL. Anything that exposes more than the worktree the developer chose, or keeps it exposed afterunshareorstop, is in scope.
A project's own pando.toml, recipes and hooks are code the developer
chose to run, the same as a Makefile; that they run commands is not a
vulnerability.