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Quest-Claim: 85ba48ba03d4ea7b
…Linux and macOS The helper no longer passes --no-sandbox. On Linux it first checks, as Chromium does, that the kernel lets the studio's user make a user namespace and another inside it, and fails every browser source saying what to allow where it cannot, rather than let the browser abort. On macOS each helper app enters its Seatbelt sandbox through CEF's libcef_sandbox.dylib before it loads CEF's framework. A browser test proves a page's renderer cannot reach a file the helper can, through its moved root on Linux and its Seatbelt policy on macOS. The nightly software render job allows the studio user namespaces with the AppArmor profile the README gives for Ubuntu. Windows stays in quest/m1/browser-sandbox.md, behind browser sources on Windows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Works on quest/m1/browser-sandbox.md: Linux and macOS land here; Windows stays in the quest, behind Browser sources on Windows.
Problem
Every platform started CEF with
--no-sandbox, so a page that exploited a renderer bug (a hostile page, or an overlay site that got compromised) ran with the creator's full rights: their files, keys, and stream credentials. The README told users to add only pages they trust.Approach
--no-sandbox. Each page's renderer, and CEF's GPU and utility processes, run in Chromium's own sandbox.moq_scene::browser::sandbox::check(new,rs/moq-scene/src/browser/sandbox.rs) asks the kernel the same question Chromium does before CEF starts: in a forked child, make a user namespace, map the user into it, and make another inside it. Where the kernel refuses (Ubuntu's AppArmor since 23.10, auser.max_user_namespacesof 0), or the studio runs as root, the helper fails with a reason saying what to allow, and every browser source shows it. No page ever renders unsandboxed, and the browser never reaches Chromium's ownNo usable sandbox!abort.libcef_sandbox.dylib(cef::sandbox::Sandbox) before it loads CEF's framework, as CEF's sample helpers do. CEF moved from the staticcef_sandbox.athe quest named to this dylib, which the bundle already carries in the framework'sLibraries, so nothing links in andsign.shneeds no change: the existingallow-jitentitlements suffice (the bundle job's browser tests show it).a_renderer_cannot_read_the_user_s_fileswrites a file outside the profile and checks that the helper can reach it and no renderer can: on Linux by looking through/proc/<pid>/root, which the sandbox moves to a dead thread'sfdinfo; on macOS by asking Seatbelt withsandbox_check(pid, "file-read-data", path).Impact
cef; the Flatpak has none.)sandboxis private tomoq_scene::browser). Wire: none.Decisions
Taken without the maintainer, each one a review can undo:
chrome-sandboxfallback is not counted on: it takes root to install, and the copy CEF leaves beside the binary is not setuid. A user who installs it setuid still gets the namespace check's failure. Recommendation: keep, as the Plan recommended; Ubuntu's own guidance is the AppArmor profile.Credentials::CanCreateProcessInNewUserNS(nestedCLONE_NEWUSERwith the user mapped) minus its capability drop, which no mainline kernel's answer depends on.cef::sandbox::Sandboxpanics if the bundle lackslibcef_sandbox.dylibor Seatbelt refuses; every bundle has it, so a panic there is a broken bundle, and loud.sysctl kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0, so it tests what the README tells users to do.Validation
just render-sw's way. The renderer under test shows the sandbox: root/proc/<pid>/fdinfoof an exited thread,Seccomp: 2,NoNewPrivs: 1, nested PID namespaces.--no-sandboxput back,a_renderer_cannot_read_the_user_s_filesfails (renderer … reads …/stream-key) on both fedora and nixos; without it, it passes.a_click_reaches_the_pagestaying black past its 20 s wait on a loaded host (the CARLA demo and CI runners share it; that run's every test ran 2 to 4 times slower), and it passed three times more on its own. With sway's pixman renderer, or on fedora's AMD iGPU through the dev shell's Mesa, the GPU path draws black with or without the sandbox, so neither says anything about it.bwrap --unshare-user --disable-userns, a page fails at once withbrowser: Chromium sandboxes pages in user namespaces, and this system refuses to make a user namespace: allow them, as the README describes for browser sources on Linux.just cipasses locally.Follow-ups
just cihas failed onmainsince 2026-11-19 with two macOS-only compile errors (IOSurfaceRef::idin amach.rstest, deadids incontrols.rs), found when this branch's nightly hit them. No open decisions.Models
Size: L
Implementer: Claude Code, claude-opus-5-5, unknown effort
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Review
Rewritten by
quest reviewafter each round.Head: d46d481
Base: origin/main at 9b77182
Risk: high,
it changes .github/workflows/nightly.yml, which is always high: workflows run with the repository's secrets and decide what merges and shipsClassified: high by the always-high paths
Reviewer: Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, xhigh effort
Session:
01a1fbc1-f0b6-7b03-a430-c4d24e56c96e, round 1Score: 8/10,
Source inspection found no actionable defects, but builds and tests were not run, leaving runtime behavior unverified.Rounds: 1; first round 0; findings 0: fixed 0, refuted 0, open 0
Findings: none
Reviewer: Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, high effort, shadow
Session:
01a1fbc1-f0b6-7ae2-9a73-dad5715d85ff, round 1Score: 9/10,
No actionable defects were found; the source changes appear sound, but builds, tests, and platform runtime behavior were not independently verified.Rounds: 1; first round 0; findings 0: fixed 0, refuted 0, open 0
Findings: none