Cryptographic discovery · post-quantum risk assessment · migration planning.
You cannot migrate what you cannot see.
CRYPTONEX scans a software estate — source code, dependency manifests, certificates, compiled binaries and container images — and answers four questions an organisation needs before it can move to post-quantum cryptography:
- What cryptography do we have, and where? — a complete, evidence-backed inventory.
- How exposed is it to a future quantum computer? — per-asset quantum-risk classification + Mosca's inequality.
- Which of it is dangerous today, regardless of quantum? — 28 CWE-mapped cryptographic-misuse rules.
- What do we replace it with, and in what order? — PQC / hybrid recommendations sequenced into migration waves.
It runs fully offline (built for air-gapped networks), emits a standards-compliant CycloneDX 1.6 Cryptographic Bill of Materials, a SARIF report for CI, an executive PDF/HTML report, and ships an interactive local web console.
Context. Built for Smart India Hackathon 2026, Problem Statement 26164 ("Enterprise Cryptographic Discovery & Analysis Tool"), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO). India's National Quantum Mission mandates cryptographic inventories for defence, power, telecom and BFSI by December 2027 — this is the tool that produces one.
Public-key cryptography — RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman — protects almost everything: HTTPS, UPI, Aadhaar, VPNs, code signing. In 1994 Peter Shor showed that a large enough quantum computer breaks all of it, completely. Symmetric crypto (AES) and hashes are only weakened.
The threat is a today problem, not a 2035 problem, because of Harvest Now, Decrypt Later: an adversary records your encrypted traffic now and decrypts it once a quantum computer exists. Anything that must stay secret for a decade is already exposed.
The fix — NIST's ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) — is standardised and ready. The hard part is the first step: you can't replace cryptography you don't know you have, and it is scattered across code, dependencies, certificates, binaries and container images with no single inventory.
DISCOVER ASSESS RECOMMEND & PLAN
┌──────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────┐
│ source (13 langs) │ │ quantum status │ │ PQC / hybrid target │
│ dependencies (9 eco) │──▶│ safe / weakened / │──▶│ ML-KEM · ML-DSA · SLH-DSA │
│ certificates & keys │ │ vulnerable / broken │ │ NIST category · libs · effort│
│ binaries (ELF/PE) │ │ Mosca: X + Y > Z − now │ │ migration waves │
│ container images │ │ business criticality │ │ India NQM roadmap phase │
│ hand-rolled crypto │ │ HNDL exposure │ │ crypto-agility index │
│ 28 misuse rules │ │ risk score 0–100 │ │ quantum-risk timeline │
└──────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────┘
| Weaknesses (crypto-misuse findings) | Post-quantum readiness |
|---|---|
 |
 |
docker build -t cryptonex:local .
mkdir -p cryptonex-out
docker run --rm --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \
-v "/path/to/your/repo":/scan:ro -v "$PWD/cryptonex-out":/out \
cryptonex:local scan /scan --out /out
# then explore it in the browser:
docker run --rm -p 8713:8713 -v "$PWD/cryptonex-out":/out \
cryptonex:local serve --result /out/result.jsonpython -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
cryptonex scan /path/to/your/repo # → cryptonex-out/{cbom.json, report.html, result.json}
cryptonex serve # → http://localhost:8713 (scan from the browser too)
cryptonex kb # knowledge-base inventory
pytest -q # 39 testsThere is no upload — scans run entirely on your machine. The console's "Upload a
.zip" tab just unpacks the archive into a local temp folder and scans it there.
Full walkthrough for your own code: ANALYZE_YOUR_CODE.md.
cryptonex scan <path|image.tar>
--out DIR output directory (default: cryptonex-out)
--format cbom,json,report,sarif
--crqc-year 2032 Z — assumed year a quantum computer can run Shor
--x N --y N override Mosca X (data secrecy) / Y (migration time)
--scanners source,dependency,certificate,misuse,container,binary
--fail-on weakened|vulnerable|broken non-zero exit for a CI merge gate
--no-timestamp deterministic, byte-identical CBOM
cryptonex serve [--result cryptonex-out/result.json] [--port 8713]
cryptonex kb
cryptonex version
| File | What it is | Use it for |
|---|---|---|
cbom.json |
CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM — every asset with cryptoProperties, a dependency graph, a vulnerabilities array (misuse findings), and cryptonex:* risk / agility properties. Deterministic serial number. |
Feed a GRC platform, an auditor, or a later migration tool. The interchange format. |
report.html / report.pdf |
Executive & audit report — posture grade, top risks, HNDL exposure, per-critical-asset evidence vs. assessment breakdown, post-quantum readiness, migration waves, methodology & limitations. | Leadership / auditor / submission. |
results.sarif |
SARIF 2.1.0 — one rule per misuse type and per quantum class, security-severity set for code-scanning UIs. |
CI PR annotations + merge gate. |
result.json |
The full ScanResult. |
SIEM / data lake / the console. |
Pipeline + hexagonal core + plugin scanners. The domain/ package is pure — no I/O,
no framework imports — and holds the risk math. All cryptographic knowledge is
versioned YAML under cryptonex/knowledge/, so a new algorithm, library, advisory or
detection rule is a data change, not a code change.
CLI / web console
│
▼
Orchestrator ──▶ scanners (source · dependency · certificate · misuse · container · binary)
│ │ RawFinding[] + SecurityFinding[]
▼ ▼
normalize (identity, dedup, dependency graph)
▼
enrich (algorithm → quantum status → lifetime → criticality → recommendation → Mosca)
▼
posture + PQC-readiness analytics
▼
reporters (CycloneDX CBOM · SARIF · PDF/HTML · JSON)
Every asset carries an AssessmentBasis so a reviewer can tell fact from heuristic:
| Layer | Example | Trust |
|---|---|---|
| Observed | RSA-4096, at pki/root-ca/root-ca.crt, detected by the certificate collector, confidence confirmed |
evidence-backed |
| Knowledge base | vulnerable — Shor's algorithm recovers the private key by factoring the modulus; recommend SLH-DSA (rule rec.sig.longlived) |
deterministic, cited |
| Inferred | criticality critical — pki(+22), root-ca(+15), external(+30), ca-key(+15), data:SECRET |
heuristic — verify before acting |
| Assumed | X 20y + Y 5y = 25 vs Z(2032) − 2026 = 6 → exposed ~19y |
operator-configurable; not a prediction |
CRYPTONEX does not claim to discover organisational truth about data sensitivity or
business criticality — it infers a starting point from path and configuration signals and
says so, in the console, the report, and the CBOM (cryptonex:*Basis properties).
| Algorithm families | 42 — RSA · ECC · DH · AES · 3DES · SHA-1/2/3 · ChaCha20 · Camellia · ARIA · SM2/3/4 · GOST · ML-KEM · ML-DSA · SLH-DSA · FN-DSA · HQC · XMSS · LMS |
| Source detection rules | 162 across 13 languages — Python, Java/Kotlin, JavaScript/TypeScript, C#, Rust, PHP, Ruby, Swift, Go, C/C++, config (nginx / Apache / HAProxy / Postfix / IPsec / sshd_config), shell |
| Dependency ecosystems | 9 — pip, npm, Maven/Gradle, Go, Cargo, NuGet, RubyGems, Composer, CocoaPods |
| Crypto libraries catalogued | 80 with end-of-life / advisory flags |
| CVE / RUSTSEC / GHSA advisories | 13 — matched by version range (CVE-2022-29217 PyJWT, CVE-2020-26160 dgrijalva/jwt-go, RUSTSEC-2023-0071 rsa crate, …) |
| Crypto-misuse / threat rules | 28 — disabled TLS verification, ECB, static IV, hardcoded keys, weak RNG, RSA < 2048, JWT alg:none, legacy TLS/SSH config, non-constant-time MAC compare, fixed ECDSA nonce, … |
| Hand-rolled-crypto fingerprints | 28 — AES S-box, SHA/MD5 tables, Blowfish P-array, DES/GOST/SM4 S-boxes, NIST P-256 / Curve25519 primes, ChaCha20 σ, bcrypt magic, BLAKE2b IV |
| PQC recommendation rules | 9 — RSA/ECDSA sign → ML-DSA-65 · roots of trust → SLH-DSA · key exchange → ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid (TLS 1.3 / RFC 9370) · 3DES → AES-256-GCM · PBKDF2-SHA1 → Argon2id |
cryptonex kb prints the live inventory.
scripts/benchmark.py clones seven well-known projects, scans each, and writes a summary
plus a precision spot-check sheet (docs/benchmark/). Scans complete
in seconds; test-fixture crypto is separated from production crypto.
| repo | assets (test) | findings (test) | grade | time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pyjwt |
1 (12) | 2 (16) | A | 0.5s |
paramiko |
5 (20) | 4 (13) | A | 1.1s |
python-jose |
9 (2) | 0 (11) | A | 0.3s |
golang-jwt |
3 (11) | 5 (1) | A | 0.2s |
pyca/cryptography |
21 (10) | 31 (98) | A | 4.6s |
| Capability | CRYPTONEX | IBM Guardium Quantum Safe | SandboxAQ | cbomkit (OSS) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source-code discovery | ✅ 13 langs | ✅ | partial | ✅ 3 langs |
| Dependency discovery | ✅ 9 ecosystems | ✅ | – | – |
| Certificate / key discovery | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | – |
| Binary discovery | ✅ (lief) |
✅ | – | – |
| Container-image discovery | ✅ (offline, layer-merge) | ✅ | – | ✅ (theia) |
| Crypto-misuse / threat finding | ✅ 28 CWE-mapped rules | partial | – | – |
| Quantum risk + Mosca | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | flag only |
| PQC / hybrid recommendation | ✅ | partial | partial | – |
| Crypto-agility index + migration waves | ✅ | partial | – | – |
| India NQM roadmap mapping | ✅ | – | – | – |
| CycloneDX CBOM + SARIF | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | CBOM only |
| Fully offline / air-gapped | ✅ | – (SaaS) | – (SaaS) | self-host |
| Cost | free | $$$ | $$$ | free |
Two artefact types from the problem statement need live infrastructure access and are
opt-in scanners behind the same plugin interface — HARDWARE_MODULE and
CLOUD_SERVICE are already in the model. See
docs/ROADMAP_HSM_CLOUD.md.
| Collector | Needs | Offline test double |
|---|---|---|
| HSM / TPM (PKCS#11) | python-pkcs11, the vendor module, a slot PIN |
SoftHSM2 |
| Cloud KMS (AWS / Azure / GCP) | cloud SDKs, a read-only role | moto / LocalStack |
Detection is currently regex + constant-fingerprint based (the M0 layer); AST / tree-sitter analysis is the next precision layer and slots in behind the same scanner interface.
cryptonex/
cli.py Typer CLI
domain/ pure — models, Mosca + risk math, recommendation, posture,
PQC-readiness analytics, path heuristics
knowledge/ versioned YAML — algorithms, aliases, libraries, advisories,
pqc_mapping, policy, constants, misuse, rules/<lang>.yaml
scanners/ source · dependency · certificate · misuse · container · binary
core/ orchestrator · normalize · enrich
reporters/ cbom · report · sarif · json
gui/streamlit_app.py the web console
tests/ 39 tests + a synthetic "vulnerable-repo" corpus (13 languages)
+ a docker-save image tar
scripts/benchmark.py real-OSS benchmark harness
docs/ CAPABILITIES · DEMO · HOW_TO_PRESENT · ROADMAP_HSM_CLOUD · benchmark
Dockerfile · compose.yaml · Makefile
| Doc | Contents |
|---|---|
ANALYZE_YOUR_CODE.md |
Point CRYPTONEX at your own codebase — every way to run it |
docs/CAPABILITIES.md |
Full capability list + comparison detail |
docs/DEMO.md |
5-minute demo script (verified on Docker) |
docs/HOW_TO_PRESENT.md |
Framing, the one-asset demo spine, judge Q&A |
docs/ROADMAP_HSM_CLOUD.md |
The two remaining collectors — exact build plan |
BUILD_STATUS.md |
What's built, knowledge-base counts, changelog |
Apache-2.0.