feat(seats): a granted provider key can stay out of the run, held by a loopback proxy (TASK-002 b)

cli/__tests__/seats-package.test.mjs

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ describe('packages/seats', () => {
   });
 
   test('the CLI provider proxy is the package module', () => {
-    expect(Object.keys(cliProxy).sort()).toEqual(['redactProviderMaterial', 'resolveProviderKeyFile', 'startProviderProxy']);
+    expect(Object.keys(cliProxy).sort()).toEqual(['PROVIDER_WIRES', 'redactProviderMaterial', 'resolveProviderKeyFile', 'startProviderProxy']);
     for (const name of Object.keys(cliProxy)) expect(cliProxy[name]).toBe(seatsProxy[name]);
   });
 

packages/seats/docs/record-v1.md

@@ -338,8 +338,8 @@ built in Go runs its tests with `-race` in CI.
 
 | kind | data | default actor |
 |---|---|---|
-| `credential.granted` | `{names: [NAME]}` | `system` |
-| `credential.denied` | `{name, reason}`, where `reason` is `not_granted`, `unresolved` or `too_short` (a value under 8 characters) | `system` |
+| `credential.granted` | `{names: [NAME], injected?: [NAME]}`. `injected` names the credentials a loopback provider proxy holds and adds outbound; the run's env has only that proxy's token under those names. The other names are held by the run | `system` |
+| `credential.denied` | `{name, reason}`, where `reason` is `not_granted`, `unresolved`, `too_short` (a value under 8 characters) or `no_upstream` (marked `inject` with no provider named for it) | `system` |
 
 These cover the environment credentials a run is started with. Values never
 appear here: `NAME` is an environment variable name matching

packages/seats/src/record/format.js

@@ -371,7 +371,13 @@ const CHECKS = {
     optionalArgsDigest(data, 'tool.call');
     return data;
   },
-  'credential.granted': (data) => ({ ...data, names: envNames(data.names ?? [], 'credential.granted.names') }),
+  'credential.granted': (data) => {
+    const names = envNames(data.names ?? [], 'credential.granted.names');
+    if (data.injected === undefined) return { ...data, names };
+    const injected = envNames(data.injected, 'credential.granted.injected');
+    if (!injected.every((name) => names.includes(name))) fail('credential.granted.injected must be a subset of names');
+    return { ...data, names, injected };
+  },
   'credential.denied': (data) => {
     envNames([data.name], 'credential.denied.name');
     return data;

packages/seats/src/trace/events.js

@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ export const EVENT_TYPES = Object.freeze([
   'usage', // { inputTokens?, outputTokens?, totalTokens?, cost? }  null-not-zero when unknown
   'liveness.stalled', // { idleMs, windowMs }
   'liveness.recovery', // { action: 'cancel'|'kill'|'retry', attempt }
-  'credential.granted', // { names: [...] }  names only, never values
-  'credential.denied', // { name, reason?: 'not_granted'|'unresolved'|'too_short' }
+  'credential.granted', // { names: [...], injected?: [...] }  names only, never values
+  'credential.denied', // { name, reason?: 'not_granted'|'unresolved'|'too_short'|'no_upstream' }
   'process.exited', // { code, signal }
   // Record kinds with no earlier trace name (docs/record-v1.md has the full data).
   'task.claimed', // { leaseUntil? }  mirrors the board's claim; the board stays the source of truth

packages/seats/src/valet/env.js

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { traceOf } from '../trace/events.js';
 import { runFailure } from '../failures.js';
 import { MIN_CREDENTIAL_LENGTH } from '../upstream-refusal.js';
 import { validateGrant } from './grant.js';
+import { startProviderProxy } from '../wire/provider-proxy.js';
 
 // Same spirit as the goose adapter's SAFE_ENV: locale, terminal and TLS trust
 // only. USER/LOGNAME are left out on purpose; they name the account whose
@@ -104,8 +105,8 @@ const grantIssued = (meta) => {
 };
 
 /**
- * prepareRunEnv({ grant, baseEnv, resolveSecret, root?, require?, trace?, ctx?, grantMeta? })
- *   → { env, home, cleanup, granted: [names], grantId? }
+ * prepareRunEnv({ grant, baseEnv, resolveSecret, root?, require?, trace?, ctx?, grantMeta?, upstreams? })
+ *   → { env, home, cleanup, granted: [names], injected: { NAME: { baseURL, wire } }, grantId? }
  *
  * `require` lists credential names the adapter cannot run without; one the
  * grant does not name fails the run as credential_denied before any spawn.
@@ -114,14 +115,25 @@ const grantIssued = (meta) => {
  * silently lacks its key fails later and less legibly, and a value that short
  * would slip past the refusal-text reader's redaction.
  *
+ * A credential the grant marks `inject: true` never reaches the env. The host
+ * names its provider in `upstreams[NAME]` ({ baseURL, wire }, wire defaulting
+ * to openai-chat); the run gets a loopback provider proxy holding the value in
+ * memory, env[NAME] becomes that proxy's token, and `injected[NAME].baseURL`
+ * is where the host points the CLI. cleanup() closes the proxies. One with no
+ * upstream fails as credential_denied (no_upstream) before it is resolved.
+ * The proxy listens on 127.0.0.1, so a run without the host's network
+ * (bwrap --unshare-net) cannot reach it yet.
+ *
  * Events go to `trace`, else ctx.trace: grant.issued (only with grantMeta,
- * first), then credential.granted {names} or credential.denied {name, reason}.
+ * first), then credential.granted {names, injected?} or credential.denied
+ * {name, reason}. `injected` lists the names held by a proxy; the rest of
+ * `names` are held by the run.
  * Values never enter an event or a message, and a hook that offers
- * redact(values) is handed the resolved values so the record can scrub them
- * out of agent text too.
+ * redact(values) is handed the resolved values and each proxy token, so the
+ * record can scrub them out of agent text too.
  */
 export const prepareRunEnv = async ({
-  grant, baseEnv = {}, resolveSecret, root, require: required = [], trace, ctx, grantMeta,
+  grant, baseEnv = {}, resolveSecret, root, require: required = [], trace, ctx, grantMeta, upstreams = {},
 } = {}) => {
   const valid = validateGrant(grant);
   const hook = trace && typeof trace.emit === 'function' ? trace : traceOf(ctx);
@@ -132,6 +144,7 @@ export const prepareRunEnv = async ({
     not_granted: 'is not in the run grant',
     unresolved: 'could not be resolved',
     too_short: `resolved to a value shorter than ${MIN_CREDENTIAL_LENGTH} characters`,
+    no_upstream: 'is marked inject, but the host named no upstream for it',
   };
   const deny = (name, reason, values) => {
     hook.emit('credential.denied', { name, reason });
@@ -143,11 +156,18 @@ export const prepareRunEnv = async ({
   if (missing) throw deny(missing, 'not_granted', []);
 
   const { home, dirs } = await makeHome(root);
-  const cleanup = () => rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  const proxies = [];
+  const cleanup = async () => {
+    await Promise.all(proxies.splice(0).map((proxy) => proxy.close()));
+    await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  };
   const env = { ...pickBaseEnv(baseEnv, realHomes), HOME: home, ...dirs };
   const values = [];
+  const injected = {};
   try {
     for (const spec of valid.credentials) {
+      const upstream = spec.inject ? upstreams[spec.name] : undefined;
+      if (spec.inject && !upstream) throw deny(spec.name, 'no_upstream', values);
       let value;
       // A resolver's error text may quote the secret it failed on; drop it.
       try { value = await resolveOne(spec, { baseEnv, resolveSecret }); } catch { value = undefined; }
@@ -156,14 +176,26 @@ export const prepareRunEnv = async ({
       // refusal-text reader would not redact it. Refuse it here, before spawn.
       if (value.length < MIN_CREDENTIAL_LENGTH) throw deny(spec.name, 'too_short', values);
       values.push(value);
-      env[spec.name] = value;
+      if (upstream) {
+        const wire = upstream.wire ?? 'openai-chat';
+        const proxy = await startProviderProxy({
+          provider: { baseURL: upstream.baseURL }, keyMaterial: value, wire, adapterLabel: 'Valet',
+        });
+        proxies.push(proxy);
+        env[spec.name] = proxy.token;
+        injected[spec.name] = { baseURL: proxy.baseURL, wire };
+      } else {
+        env[spec.name] = value;
+      }
     }
   } catch (error) {
     await cleanup();
     throw error;
   }
-  if (typeof hook.redact === 'function') hook.redact(values);
+  // A proxy token authorizes provider calls until cleanup, so the record scrubs it too.
+  if (typeof hook.redact === 'function') hook.redact([...values, ...proxies.map((proxy) => proxy.token)]);
   const names = valid.credentials.map((c) => c.name);
-  hook.emit('credential.granted', { names });
-  return { env, home, cleanup, granted: names, ...(issued ? { grantId: issued.grantId } : {}) };
+  const proxied = Object.keys(injected);
+  hook.emit('credential.granted', proxied.length ? { names, injected: proxied } : { names });
+  return { env, home, cleanup, granted: names, injected, ...(issued ? { grantId: issued.grantId } : {}) };
 };

packages/seats/src/valet/grant.js

@@ -3,14 +3,18 @@
  * and which tool calls it may make without asking, only after asking, or never.
  *
  *   {
- *     credentials: [{ name: 'OPENAI_API_KEY', from: 'env'|'file'|'resolver', ref? }],
+ *     credentials: [{ name: 'OPENAI_API_KEY', from: 'env'|'file'|'resolver', ref?, inject? }],
  *     tools: { allow: [pattern], ask: [pattern], deny: [pattern] },
  *   }
  *
  * `from: 'env'` copies baseEnv[ref ?? name]; `from: 'file'` reads the absolute
  * path in `ref`; `from: 'resolver'` asks the host's resolveSecret(name, spec),
  * with `ref` as an opaque hint for it.
  *
+ * `inject: true` keeps the value out of the run: its env gets a per-run proxy
+ * token under the name instead, and a loopback provider proxy adds the real
+ * key to outbound requests. Default false: the run holds the value.
+ *
  * A tool pattern is `<kind>` or `<kind>:<title glob>`, where kind is one of
  * ACP's ToolKind values or `*`. `execute` matches every execute call;
  * `execute:git status*` matches execute calls whose title starts that way;
@@ -61,8 +65,8 @@ const parsePattern = (pattern, where) => {
 const validateCredential = (credential, index, seen) => {
   const where = `credentials[${index}]`;
   if (!isPlainObject(credential)) fail(`${where} must be an object`);
-  refuseUnknownKeys(credential, ['name', 'from', 'ref'], `${where}.`);
-  const { name, from, ref } = credential;
+  refuseUnknownKeys(credential, ['name', 'from', 'ref', 'inject'], `${where}.`);
+  const { name, from, ref, inject } = credential;
   if (typeof name !== 'string' || !ENV_NAME.test(name)) fail(`${where}.name must be an ENV_NAME (A-Z, 0-9, _)`);
   if (RESERVED_NAME.test(name)) fail(`${where}.name ${name} is reserved for the run env`);
   if (seen.has(name)) fail(`${where}.name ${name} is granted twice`);
@@ -71,7 +75,8 @@ const validateCredential = (credential, index, seen) => {
   if (ref !== undefined && (typeof ref !== 'string' || !ref)) fail(`${where}.ref must be a non-empty string`);
   if (from === 'env' && ref !== undefined && !ENV_NAME.test(ref)) fail(`${where}.ref must be an ENV_NAME for from: env`);
   if (from === 'file' && (ref === undefined || !ref.startsWith('/'))) fail(`${where}.ref must be an absolute path for from: file`);
-  return Object.freeze(ref === undefined ? { name, from } : { name, from, ref });
+  if (inject !== undefined && typeof inject !== 'boolean') fail(`${where}.inject must be true or false`);
+  return Object.freeze({ name, from, ...(ref === undefined ? {} : { ref }), ...(inject ? { inject } : {}) });
 };
 
 /** Validate and freeze a grant. Throws on the first problem; never repairs one. */

packages/seats/src/wire/provider-proxy.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { Transform } from 'node:stream';
 import { StringDecoder } from 'node:string_decoder';
-/** The per-spawn loopback proxy shared by OpenAI-compatible CLI adapters. */
+/** The per-spawn loopback proxy that holds a provider key for a CLI (OpenAI chat, Anthropic Messages, OpenAI Responses). */
 import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';
 import { constants as fsConstants, realpathSync } from 'fs';
 import { createServer, request as httpRequest } from 'http';
@@ -167,11 +167,30 @@ const readProviderKey = async (keyFile, adapterLabel) => {
   }
 };
 
+// The routes a CLI on each wire may call, relative to the configured base
+// path, and the header the real key goes out in. Anything else is refused.
+const WIRES = Object.freeze({
+  'openai-chat': { routes: [['POST', 'chat/completions'], ['GET', 'models']], auth: 'bearer' },
+  'anthropic-messages': {
+    routes: [['POST', 'v1/messages'], ['POST', 'v1/messages/count_tokens'], ['GET', 'v1/models']],
+    auth: 'x-api-key',
+  },
+  'openai-responses': { routes: [['POST', 'responses'], ['GET', 'models']], auth: 'bearer' },
+});
+export const PROVIDER_WIRES = Object.freeze(Object.keys(WIRES));
+
+const presents = (value, expected) => {
+  const supplied = Buffer.from(typeof value === 'string' ? value : '');
+  return supplied.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(supplied, expected);
+};
+
 export const startProviderProxy = async ({
-  provider, keyFile, keyMaterial, tokenFile, socketPath, isolatedPort, adapterLabel = 'OpenCode',
+  provider, keyFile, keyMaterial, tokenFile, socketPath, isolatedPort, adapterLabel = 'OpenCode', wire = 'openai-chat',
   // When set, every completion must request this model and be served by it.
   pinnedModel,
 }) => {
+  const wireSpec = WIRES[wire];
+  if (!wireSpec) throw new Error(`${adapterLabel} provider wire must be one of ${PROVIDER_WIRES.join(', ')}`);
   if (pinnedModel !== undefined && (typeof pinnedModel !== 'string' || !pinnedModel.trim())) {
     throw new Error(`${adapterLabel} pinnedModel must be a non-empty string`);
   }
@@ -189,8 +208,13 @@ export const startProviderProxy = async ({
   const upstreamKey = keyMaterial === undefined ? await readProviderKey(keyFile, adapterLabel) : keyMaterial;
   if (typeof upstreamKey !== 'string' || !upstreamKey || /[\r\n]/.test(upstreamKey)) throw new Error('Invalid provider key');
   const proxyToken = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
-  await writeFile(tokenFile, proxyToken, { encoding: 'utf8', mode: 0o600 });
-  await chmod(tokenFile, 0o600);
+  // A caller that hands the token to its child in memory needs no file.
+  if (tokenFile) {
+    await writeFile(tokenFile, proxyToken, { encoding: 'utf8', mode: 0o600 });
+    await chmod(tokenFile, 0o600);
+  }
+  const bearerToken = Buffer.from(`Bearer ${proxyToken}`);
+  const bareToken = Buffer.from(proxyToken);
 
   const logRefusedRequest = (method, requestPath) => {
     let normalizedPath = '/';
@@ -204,29 +228,34 @@ export const startProviderProxy = async ({
     process.stderr.write(`[${adapterLabel.toLowerCase()}] provider proxy refused ${safeMethod} ${normalizedPath}\n`);
   };
 
+  // A refusal answers before the request body has been read. A keep-alive
+  // client that reuses that socket can have its next request reset, so every
+  // refusal on every wire also closes the connection.
+  const refuse = (incoming, outgoing, status, headers = {}, body = undefined) => {
+    incoming.resume();
+    outgoing.writeHead(status, { ...headers, connection: 'close' });
+    outgoing.end(body);
+  };
+
   const server = createServer((incoming, outgoing) => {
-    const supplied = Buffer.from(incoming.headers.authorization || '');
-    const expected = Buffer.from(`Bearer ${proxyToken}`);
-    if (supplied.length !== expected.length || !timingSafeEqual(supplied, expected)) {
-      incoming.resume();
-      outgoing.writeHead(401).end();
+    // Anthropic clients send their key as x-api-key, the others as a Bearer.
+    if (!presents(incoming.headers.authorization, bearerToken)
+      && !presents(incoming.headers['x-api-key'], bareToken)) {
+      refuse(incoming, outgoing, 401);
       return;
     }
     if (!['GET', 'POST'].includes(incoming.method || '')) {
-      incoming.resume();
-      outgoing.writeHead(405).end();
+      refuse(incoming, outgoing, 405);
       return;
     }
     const rejectRoute = (path) => {
       logRefusedRequest(incoming.method, path);
-      incoming.resume();
-      outgoing.writeHead(403, { 'content-type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8' });
-      outgoing.end(`Unsupported provider request: ${incoming.method || 'UNKNOWN'} ${path}`);
+      refuse(incoming, outgoing, 403, { 'content-type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8' },
+        `Unsupported provider request: ${incoming.method || 'UNKNOWN'} ${path}`);
     };
     const rejectBadRequest = () => {
       logRefusedRequest(incoming.method, incoming.url);
-      incoming.resume();
-      outgoing.writeHead(400).end();
+      refuse(incoming, outgoing, 400);
     };
 
     let target;
@@ -241,8 +270,8 @@ export const startProviderProxy = async ({
         return;
       }
       // The CLI owns this local request path, so never use it as an outbound
-      // URL. The OpenAI-compatible chat provider needs only these fixed routes;
-      // parse the incoming URL against a loopback sentinel, then select a
+      // URL. Each wire needs only the fixed routes in WIRES; parse the
+      // incoming URL against a loopback sentinel, then select a
       // constant endpoint after matching the configured base path exactly.
       // This keeps a CLI request from turning the proxy into an arbitrary
       // path/URL fetcher (including paths on a local provider host).
@@ -252,17 +281,13 @@ export const startProviderProxy = async ({
         return;
       }
       const configuredPath = basePath === '/' ? '' : basePath;
-      let endpoint;
-      if (incoming.method === 'POST'
-        && requested.pathname === `${configuredPath}/chat/completions`) {
-        endpoint = 'chat/completions';
-      } else if (incoming.method === 'GET'
-        && requested.pathname === `${configuredPath}/models`) {
-        endpoint = 'models';
-      } else {
+      const route = wireSpec.routes.find(([method, path]) => incoming.method === method
+        && requested.pathname === `${configuredPath}/${path}`);
+      if (!route) {
         rejectRoute(requested.pathname);
         return;
       }
+      const endpoint = route[1];
       target = {
         path: `${configuredPath}/${endpoint}`,
         protocol: upstream.protocol,
@@ -281,7 +306,8 @@ export const startProviderProxy = async ({
         'proxy-authorization', 'te', 'trailer', 'transfer-encoding', 'upgrade',
         'x-api-key',
       ].includes(name.toLowerCase())));
-    headers.authorization = `Bearer ${upstreamKey}`;
+    if (wireSpec.auth === 'x-api-key') headers['x-api-key'] = upstreamKey;
+    else headers.authorization = `Bearer ${upstreamKey}`;
     headers.host = target.host;
     headers['accept-encoding'] = 'identity';
     const pinned = pinnedModel !== undefined && target.path.endsWith('/chat/completions');
@@ -378,6 +404,12 @@ export const startProviderProxy = async ({
     });
   });
 
+  // A WebSocket client (codex on the Responses wire) falls back to HTTP SSE on
+  // 426. Nothing is relayed over an upgrade, so no token check is needed first.
+  server.on('upgrade', (_incoming, socket) => {
+    socket.end('HTTP/1.1 426 Upgrade Required\r\nconnection: close\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\n\r\n');
+  });
+
   await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
     server.once('error', reject);
     const started = () => {
@@ -399,6 +431,7 @@ export const startProviderProxy = async ({
   const proxyBaseURL = new URL(upstream.pathname, `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`).toString();
   return {
     baseURL: proxyBaseURL,
+    token: proxyToken,
     tokenFile,
     socketPath,
     port,