test(p2): command/flag-injection containment for name/url/.gitmodules (#62 P2)#74
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…modules (#62 P2) security_tests.rs had only 2 tests (both the same `-`-prefixed-path vector). The #62 audit (P2) calls out missing command/flag-injection and malicious-.gitmodules coverage. Adds two characterization tests proving submod's no-shell design holds end-to-end: - test_flag_like_name_and_url_do_not_inject_commands: a CVE-2018-17456-class `--upload-pack=<cmd>` payload as a submodule NAME, and an `ext::sh -c` payload as the URL, must never execute. Sentinel files (relative in the worktree, absolute) are asserted absent. Non-vacuous: an unsafe shell-out would create them. - test_generate_config_from_malicious_gitmodules_does_not_execute: a hostile .gitmodules fed to `generate-config --from-setup` is parsed as data only — no sentinel is created, and the generated config provably contains the hostile values as inert strings (so the parse path actually ran). Behavior probed against the real binary first (both vectors are already safe; these lock that in). Full suite 557 pass; fmt + clippy clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T8D5ZK1473YCiZkbueAY2X
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What
tests/security_tests.rshad only 2 tests, both the same vector (a path component starting with-). The #62 audit (P2) flags missing command/flag injection via URL or name (CVE-2018-17456 class) and malicious.gitmodulesfed togenerate-config. This adds two characterization tests that prove submod's no-shell design holds end-to-end.Tests
test_flag_like_name_and_url_do_not_inject_commands— a--upload-pack=touch <sentinel>payload passed as a submodule name (via--name=so clap accepts the leading dashes), and anext::sh -c "touch <sentinel>"payload passed as the URL. Both sentinels (relative-in-worktree and absolute) are asserted absent. submod drives git via gix/git2 (no shell) and---guards url/path on the CLI fallback, so nothing executes. Non-vacuous: an unsafe shell-out would create the sentinel.test_generate_config_from_malicious_gitmodules_does_not_execute— a hostile.gitmodules(ext:: url,--upload-pack=branch) fed togenerate-config --from-setup. No sentinel is created, and the generated config provably contains the hostile values as inert data strings — proving the parse path actually ran (non-vacuous).Both vectors were probed against the real binary first and are already safe; these tests lock that behavior in.
Verification
Full suite 557 pass, 0 fail;
cargo fmt+clippy --all-features --testsclean.Scope / follow-ups
Remaining P2 (separate PRs): symlink-escape containment; remaining
assert!(!stderr.is_empty())sites + wide||error-message disjunctions + exit-code assertions; root-no-op permission/lock tests; idempotency/partial-failure (add-twice, delete-nonexistent, failed-add-leaves-no-partial-state).🤖 Generated with Claude Code