test(p2): command/flag-injection containment for name/url/.gitmodules (#62 P2)

tests/security_tests.rs

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 
 //! Security tests to ensure robustness against various attack vectors.
 
+use std::fs;
+
 mod common;
 use common::TestHarness;
 
@@ -98,4 +100,103 @@ mod tests {
         // Verify it worked
         assert!(harness.dir_exists("sub/-sparse/src"));
     }
+
+    /// CVE-2018-17456-class option injection: a submodule name or URL that mimics
+    /// a `git clone`/`git submodule` flag (e.g. `--upload-pack=<cmd>`) must be
+    /// treated as inert data, never as an option that triggers command execution.
+    ///
+    /// submod drives git via gix/git2 (no shell) and uses `--` before the URL/path
+    /// on the CLI last-resort path, so the payload should never run. This test is
+    /// non-vacuous: if any code path ever shelled the name/URL out unsafely, the
+    /// sentinel file would be created.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_flag_like_name_and_url_do_not_inject_commands() {
+        let harness = TestHarness::new().expect("Failed to create test harness");
+        harness.init_git_repo().expect("Failed to init git repo");
+
+        let remote_repo = harness
+            .create_test_remote("inject-remote")
+            .expect("Failed to create remote");
+        let remote_url = format!("file://{}", remote_repo.display());
+
+        // Sentinels: `touch <relative>` would land in cwd (the working tree);
+        // `touch <absolute>` would land at a fixed path. Neither must appear.
+        let rel_sentinel = harness.work_dir.join("INJECTED_BY_NAME");
+        let abs_sentinel = harness.work_dir.join("INJECTED_BY_URL");
+        assert!(!rel_sentinel.exists() && !abs_sentinel.exists());
+
+        // Flag-like NAME (passed via `--name=` so clap accepts the leading dashes).
+        let _ = harness
+            .run_submod(&[
+                "add",
+                &remote_url,
+                "--name=--upload-pack=touch INJECTED_BY_NAME",
+                "--path",
+                "lib/inj-name",
+            ])
+            .expect("Failed to run submod");
+        assert!(
+            !rel_sentinel.exists(),
+            "a flag-like submodule name must not inject a command"
+        );
+
+        // Malicious transport URL (ext:: would run a shell command if honored).
+        let evil_url = format!("ext::sh -c \"touch {}\"", abs_sentinel.display());
+        let _ = harness
+            .run_submod(&[
+                "add",
+                &evil_url,
+                "--name",
+                "inj-url",
+                "--path",
+                "lib/inj-url",
+            ])
+            .expect("Failed to run submod");
+        assert!(
+            !abs_sentinel.exists(),
+            "a malicious transport URL must not execute a command"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A hostile `.gitmodules` fed to `generate-config --from-setup` must be parsed
+    /// as data only: its url/branch values are serialized verbatim into the output
+    /// config, never executed. Non-vacuous: the generated file must actually contain
+    /// the hostile values (proving the parse path ran) while no sentinel is created.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_generate_config_from_malicious_gitmodules_does_not_execute() {
+        let harness = TestHarness::new().expect("Failed to create test harness");
+        harness.init_git_repo().expect("Failed to init git repo");
+
+        let sentinel = harness.work_dir.join("GC_INJECTED");
+        let gitmodules = format!(
+            "[submodule \"evil\"]\n\tpath = lib/evil\n\turl = ext::sh -c \"touch {}\"\n\tbranch = --upload-pack=touch {}\n",
+            sentinel.display(),
+            sentinel.display()
+        );
+        fs::write(harness.work_dir.join(".gitmodules"), gitmodules)
+            .expect("Failed to write .gitmodules");
+
+        harness
+            .run_submod(&[
+                "generate-config",
+                "--from-setup",
+                "--output",
+                "out.toml",
+                "--force",
+            ])
+            .expect("Failed to run submod");
+
+        assert!(
+            !sentinel.exists(),
+            "generate-config must not execute values read from .gitmodules"
+        );
+
+        // Non-vacuity: the hostile entry was actually parsed and captured as data.
+        let generated = fs::read_to_string(harness.work_dir.join("out.toml"))
+            .expect("generate-config should have written the output config");
+        assert!(
+            generated.contains("ext::sh -c"),
+            "expected the hostile url to be captured as inert data, got:\n{generated}"
+        );
+    }
 }