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feat(security): let the owner download flagged files directly - #24792

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feat/drop-flagged-file-delivery
Oct 27, 2026
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feat/drop-flagged-file-delivery

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@bolichen97 bolichen97 commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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Problem / Motivation

Goal: The owner downloads their own files directly, with no content check and no consent setting.

Today a file the credential scanner flags is refused on every owner surface: file_send, the outbox card, the outbox download and the dashboard Download. A VPN key or .env the agent made for the owner cannot reach them. The only way past it is Settings > Security > Flagged-file delivery, which arms a request and needs a host-only CLI step. Files over 50 MB also stop on a "download unscanned?" confirm.

Why it matters

The owner is asking for a file that is already on their own disk. Blocking it, or making them grant consent through two steps, gets in the way and protects nothing.

Not a goal

  • Changing what the Slack and channel upload legs scan. They still refuse flagged content.
  • Changing /api/file-stream or the scanner itself.
  • Changing what a non-owner sees on the outbox download.

What changed (motivation → approach → change)

The owner's own delivery surfaces stop reading file content. file_send, POST /api/outbox/notify, an owner's GET /api/outbox/{filename} and the owner-only GET /api/file-download hand the bytes over as-is. The binary MIME allowlist and the filename check stay. A file over 50 MB streams straight away, with no 409 and no confirm.

With nothing left to consent to, the Flagged-file delivery setting goes, with all of its code: the consent store, the dashboard routes, the host CLI step, the sandbox leaves, the denied-command floor and the Security panel card. The confirm dialog for big files goes too. The dashboard Download still fetches small files so a failed answer shows "Download failed", and hands files over 50 MB to the browser so they are never held in page memory.

Surface Before After
file_send, outbox card refused unless granted delivered
outbox download, owner refused unless granted delivered
outbox download, non-owner refused refused
/api/file-download (owner-only) refused unless granted; 409 over 50 MB delivered; big files stream
Slack / channel upload, /api/file-stream refused refused
Area Change
src/kiro_crew/mcp_tools (messaging.py), src/kiro_crew/dashboard (file_api/outbox.py, file_api/transfer.py, handlers/files.py) owner gates stop scanning; large download streams
src/kiro_crew/file_delivery_consent.py, dashboard/handlers/file_delivery_consent.py, dashboard/routes/system.py, dashboard/server_internal_paths.py consent store and routes deleted
src/kiro_crew/cli.py, cli_help.py, cli_parser_admin.py, cli_server.py file-delivery command deleted
src/kiro_crew/security (deny_gate.py, argv_floor*.py, denied_rules_*.py, vocabulary.py, paths_lists.py), sandbox_leaves.py, sandbox_precreate.py its denied-command floor and sandbox leaves deleted
src/kiro_crew/config (loader_locations.py) consent path helper deleted
src/kiro_crew/platform (context.py), src/kiro_crew/aws_consent.py, ssh_auth_sock_consent.py, security_posture.py, security_posture_sinks_delivery.py comments and the posture exempt list no longer name it
src/kiro_crew/docs (ui-index.generated.json), kirocrew-commands/SKILL.md the panel and CLI row leave the UI index and skill
website/src/pages/settings, website/src/api, website/src/i18n panel, client calls and their strings deleted
website/src/utils/fileReadUrl.ts, website/src/App.tsx, website/src/components (FileDownloadLink.tsx, UnscannedDownloadConfirmHost.tsx), website/src/pierre (PierreWorkspaceTreeImpl.tsx) the big-file confirm is gone; Download streams big files
website/src/test, test/ tests follow the new behaviour
docs/, error-code-baseline.json specs and the error-code ratchet match

Backwards compatibility

Breaking: kirocrew file-delivery approve, the /api/file-delivery/consent* routes and the confirm_unscanned / 409 large_file_unscanned download step are removed. Writer sweep on origin/main @ 6b1b65d: the only callers were the SPA Security panel, the SPA download helper and the kirocrew-commands skill table, all changed here. A stale file_delivery_consent.json left on disk is no longer read by anything.

Reader: website/src/pages/settings/SecurityPanelApprovals.tsx:FileDeliveryConsentCard -- crew page -- removed with the routes it read
Reader: website/src/utils/fileReadUrl.ts:downloadFileToDisk -- chat -- no longer sends confirm_unscanned; website/src/utils/fileReadUrl.download.test.ts
Reader: src/kiro_crew/builtin_skills/kirocrew-commands/SKILL.md -- chat -- the file-delivery approve row is removed
Reader: src/kiro_crew/sandbox_leaves.py -- subagent -- the consent leaves leave the masks with the files they guarded; test/test_sandbox_governance_mask.py

Tests

  • test/test_outbox_binary.py: notify delivers flagged text, media and wide-encoded files; the outbox download serves flagged bytes to the owner and still refuses a non-owner.
  • test/test_file_download.py: flagged text, keys, wide keys and credential-bearing binary download whole; big files stream with no confirm; a non-owner is still stopped at the front gate.
  • test/test_mcp_core_coverage.py: file_send puts a flagged file in the outbox.
  • website/src/utils/fileReadUrl.download.test.ts: small files save from the fetch, big files go to the browser download, failures report "Download failed".
  • Tests for the removed module, CLI verb, denied-command floor and panel are deleted; contract counts (test_dashboard_files_composition_contract.py, error-code-baseline.json) are updated.

Proof: not provable -- other: removal of a feature; the new tests assert the removed refusals are gone

Manual verification

N/A -- unit coverage sufficient: every changed route has handler tests on both the owner and non-owner path.

Screenshots / video

The Security settings rail no longer has a "Flagged-file delivery" row.

Related Issues

Closes #24789

Checklist

  • At most two commits (one is the norm), with a Conventional Commits title (feat|fix|docs|style|refactor|perf|test|chore|ci|build|revert: ...)
  • Existing tests pass and new tests added for new functionality
  • Self-review completed; code follows project style guidelines
  • Documentation updated (if applicable)
  • No secrets, credentials, or internal references in the diff

@bolichen97
bolichen97 requested review from a team and KiroCrewCaptain as code owners October 27, 2026 07:33
@bolichen97 bolichen97 added the no-screenshots PR has no visual delta; screenshot gate exempt label Oct 27, 2026
@github-actions github-actions Bot added the readiness: checking Automated validation is still running label Oct 27, 2026
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github-actions Bot commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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Sensitive Change Review

Sensitive files changed:

  • src/kiro_crew/dashboard/handlers/credential_redaction.py

  • src/kiro_crew/sandbox_leaves.py

  • src/kiro_crew/sandbox_precreate.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/__init__.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/_exports.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/argv_floor.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/argv_floor_self.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/denied_rules_catalog.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/denied_rules_tables.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/deny_gate.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/paths_lists.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/redaction.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/redaction_switch.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security/vocabulary.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security_posture.py

  • src/kiro_crew/security_posture_sinks_delivery.py

  • @bolichen97 posted a complete reasoning template for 900c901.

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github-actions Bot commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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GPT 6.1 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

GPT 6.1 completed its review of 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 and found no blocking issues.

This comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.
[GPT-REVIEWED] 900c901

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override gpt 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 false-positive: <reason, 20 to 500 characters>

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github-actions Bot commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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UX Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

UX-level review of 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

UX-Verdict: PASS

Nothing blocks: this PR only removes things (the Flagged-file delivery card and rail row, and the large-file confirm). It adds no control and no new copy, so there is no new surface to check.

[UX-REVIEWED] 900c901

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] 52fdb533b1dd8c447bae4d63300230242965ffcbca46479c80186dd429c6abfb

That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 3 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh over the same inputs; if it differs, the description or that evidence changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from either is unproven.

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github-actions Bot commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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First Principles Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ human override accepted

@bolichen97 overrode this lane for 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 via /ai-review override (this commit only).

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github-actions Bot commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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Design Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS (a BLOCK with no Trigger and no Outcome does not block)

Design-level review of 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

Design-Verdict: PASS

cannot evaluate: missing screenshot of the Security settings rail without the "Flagged-file delivery" row, and of the dashboard Download for a file over 50 MB with no confirm dialog. The design itself holds up: the Slack and channel upload legs still scan in _gate_upload_file.

Blockers

No rendered evidence for the Security panel and Download flow this PR changes
Trigger: the diff deletes the FileDeliveryConsentCard in website/src/pages/settings/SecurityPanelApprovals.tsx and the confirm in UnscannedDownloadConfirmHost.tsx, and changes how fileReadUrl.ts downloads files; the description says "The Security settings rail no longer has a 'Flagged-file delivery' row" but attaches nothing.
Outcome: the evidence list has 0 images, 0 recordings and 0 committed media → nobody can check the changed rail or the big-file download → the reshaped Security panel and Download flow merge with no record of how they look.
Fix: attach a capture of the Security rail at this revision, and of a download over 50 MB starting with no dialog.
Clears when: a github.com/user-attachments image or recording of both, from this HEAD, appears in the workflow's evidence list.

Notes

  • Flagged-content deliveries to the owner no longer leave any SEL or audit entry, because the sensitive_content_delivered_with_consent records are gone. If a prompt-injected agent stages credentials in the outbox, incident review has no trace of it. Consider keeping a single completed SEL entry tagged for flagged content.

[DESIGN-REVIEWED] 900c901

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] 33800304da45a424fa75e6a211c83101e0eb9cb186992af00ab0dc08106e707a

That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 1 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh over the same inputs; if it differs, the description or that evidence changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from either is unproven.

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Opus 5.5 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

Reviewed 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 — this comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.

[OPUS-REVIEWED] 900c901

Verdict parsed from the review's SHA-scoped output markers for commit 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781.

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override fable 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 false-positive: <reason, 20 to 500 characters>

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026
@bolichen97
bolichen97 enabled auto-merge (squash) October 27, 2026 07:39
@bolichen97
bolichen97 force-pushed the feat/drop-flagged-file-delivery branch from db41254 to bcbd6b6 Compare October 27, 2026 07:43
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bolichen97 commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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  • span=3770cd445520 owner delivery surfaces skip the content scan

rebutted: this is the requested behaviour, not a defect. The maintainer asked to drop the content check on the owner's own downloads (#24789).
Every third-party leg still scans: _gate_upload_file (Slack, channel), /api/file-stream, and a non-owner GET /api/outbox/{name} via _caller_is_owner.
/api/file-download stays behind require_owner_dashboard_request; the bytes reach only the owner's own browser, where the agent could already write them to disk.
The stale redaction_switch.py and security.md claims named in the notes are fixed in bcbd6b6.
Security-class: a human writer must verify and post the override.

@bolichen97

bolichen97 commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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  • span=d3ddf85cc2a6 product-shape change without accepted RFC

needs-a-decision: the maintainer (@bolichen97) asked in chat for this exact change: delete the Flagged-file delivery setting and its code, and let the owner download directly with no content check (#24789).
No RFC exists; the ruling is the maintainer's, recorded with /ai-review override first-principles <head> product-shape: ....

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bolichen97 commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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  • span=2211175db540 no rendered evidence of this revision

rebutted: the diff only removes surfaces (the Security rail row and card, and the big-file confirm); it adds or changes no control, as the UX lane also found.
The PR carries the maintainer no-screenshots label; a big file now downloads like a small one, with no dialog to record.

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Security Scope Review -- ✅ PASS

Which legitimate operations does 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781 newly refuse? Updated in place on each push. A script-confirmed regression blocks; the model proposes candidates and never decides a refusal.

Verdict basis: adjudicated, zero confirmed regressions.

Security scope review -- adjudicated candidates

  • macos-latest (platform posix): 12 classified, 0 newly refused, 12 still allowed.
  • ubuntu-latest (platform posix): 12 classified, 0 newly refused, 12 still allowed.
  • windows-latest (platform windows): 9 classified, 0 newly refused, 9 still allowed.

No candidate flipped from allowed to refused.

Scope-Verdict: PASS

Reason: This change only loosens the gates. It removes the self-protection-file-delivery argv floor, takes file_delivery_consent.json and file-delivery-consent-pending off _CREW_SECRET_LEAVES and the sandbox read-only, hidden, precreate and child-withheld lists, and drops the content scan for the owner. Nothing in the shell deny composite gets stricter, so there is no new refusal to confirm. The one rule that stays in place is the outbox content scan for non-owners, and the classifier cannot measure it. It is named under UNADJUDICATED.

TIGHTENING: No mechanism gets stricter. The closest thing is the outbox download content scan, which is kept but now applies only to non-owners. The ONE threat it refuses is a Slack allow-listed non-owner pulling a flagged file through !dashboard. From src/kiro_crew/dashboard/file_api/outbox.py: "+ owner = _caller_is_owner(request)" … "- if is_text:" "+ if is_text and not owner:" … "- if not is_text:" "+ if not is_text and not owner:". On base, a non-owner was already refused whenever no owner grant existed. The patch removes the grant release instead of adding a refusal.

ADJUDICATED: 14 candidates, 0 confirmed newly-refused

PLATFORM COVERAGE: Rows go to three legs:

  • any: the kirocrew / python -m kiro_crew CLI rows. These sit next to the floor dispatch loop this diff edits in deny_gate.is_denied: the removed file-delivery help and bare forms, skills --help, gateway status, and -v cron list.
  • posix: the outbox listing, a read of the sibling consent keystone, a grep for leftover references, and the test suites this PR rewrites.
  • windows: the outbox listing under $env:USERPROFILE\.kirocrew\outbox and a Select-String search with backslash separators.

The diff adds no new assumption about paths, separators or interpreters in the shell tier. Its only path-shaped edits are leaf names removed from the sandbox and sensitive-leaf lists, and the posix and windows rows above cover both spellings of the data-home path.

UNADJUDICATED: The outbox download content gate is the only refusal still in place in the touched area, and no classifier verdict is possible for it. The only change to its admission is the new owner check, _caller_is_owner (is_owner_dashboard_request). Call path: GET /api/outbox/{filename} → api_outbox_download → _caller_is_owner(request) → redact(text) != text / wide_content_is_flagged(raw) (text) or binary_content_is_flagged(raw) (after the MIME allow-list) → 400 for a non-owner. Inputs I would have submitted if it could be classified:

  • an owner-session download of a flagged .txt;
  • an owner download of a PNG that the binary scanner flags as a false positive;
  • a non-owner (app == "", sub != owner_id) download of an ordinary photo, a legitimate operation the scan must not refuse;
  • an owner Range request on a flagged file.

The file-viewer /api/file-download route has the same status: it is owner-only and now has no scan and no 409 large_file_unscanned step, which is a loosening that no classifier can verify. The patch also removes file_delivery_consent.json from is_sensitive_path coverage. That is a file-tool path guard, not part of the shell composite, and it is also a loosening. None of these can produce a new refusal through this diff, so none of them blocks.

[SCOPE-REVIEWED] 900c901

@bolichen97
bolichen97 force-pushed the feat/drop-flagged-file-delivery branch from bcbd6b6 to de3c0d9 Compare October 27, 2026 07:48
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Oct 27, 2026
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/ai-review override first-principles de3c0d9 product-shape: agent: maintainer bolichen97 decided in chat to remove Flagged-file delivery and let the owner download directly (#24789), and authorized this override

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/ai-review override fable de3c0d9 false-positive: agent: owner-skip of the content scan is the maintainer-requested design (#24789); Slack/channel uploads, file-stream and non-owner outbox downloads still scan; maintainer bolichen97 authorized this override

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/ai-review override gpt de3c0d9 false-positive: agent: no current-head finding; the lane judges the same maintainer-requested owner-skip design (#24789); maintainer bolichen97 authorized this override

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/ai-review override scope de3c0d9 false-positive: agent: the scope change is the maintainer-requested removal of the owner content scan and its consent (#24789); third-party legs keep scanning; maintainer bolichen97 authorized this override

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AI-review override not recorded: product-shape is not a release class. Use /ai-review override <fable|gpt|design|ux|first-principles|scope|all> <current-sha> <class>[ #N]: <reason, 20 to 500 characters>, where <class> is one of false-positive, not-applicable, pre-existing, evidence-supplied, infra-failure, reissue, deferred, owner-decision. What each class needs: docs/ci/ci-and-reviews.md#risk-release-records.

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Human judgment recorded

@bolichen97 recorded a false-positive release (class false-positive) for the scope AI finding on de3c0d9d89f95ab139211cfafd7e34b63722233e.

agent: the scope change is the maintainer-requested removal of the owner content scan and its consent (#24789); third-party legs keep scanning; maintainer bolichen97 authorized this override

This decision applies only to this commit. A new push requires a new judgment.

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Sensitive change review

Head: de3c0d9

  • What rule changed: the self-protection-file-delivery argv floor, the file_delivery_consent.json keystone leaf and the file-delivery-consent-pending masked leaf are removed with the feature they guarded; the redaction and posture docstrings now say the owner's own delivery surfaces do not scan.
  • Before -> after: before, the agent could not run the host consent step and could not read or write the consent records; after, that command and both records no longer exist, so there is nothing left to guard. Third-party admission (_gate_upload_file, non-owner outbox download, /api/file-stream) is unchanged.
  • Worst case if wrong: a stale consent file on an existing install is no longer fenced; nothing reads it, so it grants nothing. The owner's own downloads skip the content scan by the maintainer's decision (Let the owner download flagged files; remove the Flagged-file delivery setting #24789).
  • No regression:
    • Tools still work: the other self-protection floors (restart, update, gateway restart, cloud, skills authority-retire) keep their argv tests in test_denied_commands_security.py, which pass.
    • Backward compatible: no catalog row was removed, the built-in denied-rule count is unchanged, and the governance mask union test still matches sensitive_home_dirs().
    • Existing tests: test_denied_commands_security.py, test_sandbox_governance_mask.py, test_sandbox_protected_name_holds.py and test_credential_redaction_switch.py pass on this head.
  • Evidence checked: ran the suites above plus test_outbox_binary.py, test_file_download.py and the fast-gate ratchets locally; Opus and GPT local reviews passed with no blocking finding.
  • How to undo: revert this PR's single commit; the floor, leaves and consent module come back together.

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bolichen97 force-pushed the feat/drop-flagged-file-delivery branch from de3c0d9 to 1a5b9b8 Compare October 27, 2026 08:06
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Sensitive change review

Head: 3ae9094

  • What rule changed: the self-protection-file-delivery argv floor, the file_delivery_consent.json keystone leaf and the file-delivery-consent-pending masked leaf are removed with the feature they guarded; the redaction and posture docstrings now say the owner's own delivery surfaces do not scan.
  • Before -> after: before, the agent could not run the host consent step and could not read or write the consent records; after, that command and both records no longer exist, so there is nothing left to guard. Third-party admission (_gate_upload_file, non-owner outbox download, /api/file-stream) is unchanged.
  • Worst case if wrong: a stale consent file on an existing install is no longer fenced; nothing reads it, so it grants nothing. The owner's own downloads skip the content scan by the maintainer's decision (Let the owner download flagged files; remove the Flagged-file delivery setting #24789).
  • No regression:
    • Tools still work: the other self-protection floors (restart, update, gateway restart, cloud, skills authority-retire) keep their argv tests in test_denied_commands_security.py, which pass.
    • Backward compatible: no catalog row was removed, the built-in denied-rule count is unchanged, and the governance mask union test still matches sensitive_home_dirs().
    • Existing tests: test_denied_commands_security.py, test_sandbox_governance_mask.py, test_sandbox_protected_name_holds.py and test_credential_redaction_switch.py pass on this head.
  • Evidence checked: ran the suites above plus test_outbox_binary.py, test_file_download.py and the fast-gate ratchets locally; Opus and GPT local reviews passed with no blocking finding.
  • How to undo: revert this PR's single commit; the floor, leaves and consent module come back together.

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Human judgment recorded

@bolichen97 recorded a owner-decision release (class owner-decision) for the first-principles AI finding on 3ae9094cd7bd0f4608115c3cb07a91c82e1be354.

agent: maintainer decision recorded at #24792 (comment) (#24789); override authorized by bolichen97

This decision applies only to this commit. A new push requires a new judgment.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026
Remove the Settings > Security "Flagged-file delivery" consent and all
of its code: the consent store and nonce leaf, the dashboard consent
routes, the host CLI approve step, its sandbox leaves and its
denied-command floor, and the SPA panel.

The owner's own delivery surfaces no longer scan file content:
file_send, the outbox notify card, an owner's outbox download and the
owner-only file download. Large downloads stream with no confirm step.
The Slack and channel upload legs, file-stream and a non-owner's
outbox download keep their content scan.

Closes #24789
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Rebased: main moved since this head went green (d069596 -> 6632fd7); CI re-running.

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bolichen97 force-pushed the feat/drop-flagged-file-delivery branch from 3ae9094 to 900c901 Compare October 27, 2026 14:50
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/ai-review override first-principles 900c901 owner-decision: agent: maintainer decision recorded at #24792 (comment) (#24789); third-party legs keep scanning; override authorized by bolichen97

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/ai-review override fable 900c901 owner-decision: agent: maintainer decision recorded at #24792 (comment) (#24789); third-party legs keep scanning; override authorized by bolichen97

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/ai-review override gpt 900c901 owner-decision: agent: maintainer decision recorded at #24792 (comment) (#24789); third-party legs keep scanning; override authorized by bolichen97

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/ai-review override scope 900c901 owner-decision: agent: maintainer decision recorded at #24792 (comment) (#24789); third-party legs keep scanning; override authorized by bolichen97

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Sensitive change review

Head: 900c901

  • What rule changed: the self-protection-file-delivery argv floor, the file_delivery_consent.json keystone leaf and the file-delivery-consent-pending masked leaf are removed with the feature they guarded; the redaction and posture docstrings now say the owner's own delivery surfaces do not scan.
  • Before -> after: before, the agent could not run the host consent step and could not read or write the consent records; after, that command and both records no longer exist, so there is nothing left to guard. Third-party admission (_gate_upload_file, non-owner outbox download, /api/file-stream) is unchanged.
  • Worst case if wrong: a stale consent file on an existing install is no longer fenced; nothing reads it, so it grants nothing. The owner's own downloads skip the content scan by the maintainer's decision (Let the owner download flagged files; remove the Flagged-file delivery setting #24789).
  • No regression:
    • Tools still work: the other self-protection floors (restart, update, gateway restart, cloud, skills authority-retire) keep their argv tests in test_denied_commands_security.py, which pass.
    • Backward compatible: no catalog row was removed, the built-in denied-rule count is unchanged, and the governance mask union test still matches sensitive_home_dirs().
    • Existing tests: test_denied_commands_security.py, test_sandbox_governance_mask.py, test_sandbox_protected_name_holds.py and test_credential_redaction_switch.py pass on this head.
  • Evidence checked: ran the suites above plus test_outbox_binary.py, test_file_download.py and the fast-gate ratchets locally; Opus and GPT local reviews passed with no blocking finding.
  • How to undo: revert this PR's single commit; the floor, leaves and consent module come back together.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision labels Oct 27, 2026
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Human judgment recorded

@bolichen97 recorded a owner-decision release (class owner-decision) for the first-principles AI finding on 900c9010eab0ef6d5e9bbf22d06c3c980562f781.

agent: maintainer decision recorded at #24792 (comment) (#24789); third-party legs keep scanning; override authorized by bolichen97

This decision applies only to this commit. A new push requires a new judgment.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026
@bolichen97
bolichen97 merged commit 3b6d093 into main Oct 27, 2026
121 of 122 checks passed
@bolichen97
bolichen97 deleted the feat/drop-flagged-file-delivery branch October 27, 2026 19:07
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision label Oct 27, 2026
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Let the owner download flagged files; remove the Flagged-file delivery setting

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