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fix(git): keep agent-writable global git config out of host-side git - #24824

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fix/global-gitconfig-isolation
Oct 27, 2026
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iamwhatever merged 1 commit into
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fix/global-gitconfig-isolation

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@iamwhatever

@iamwhatever iamwhatever commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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Problem / Motivation

Goal: A sandboxed agent cannot make the gateway's own git run a program by editing the user's global or system git config or attributes files.

A sandboxed agent runs as the gateway's user. The sandbox does not mask ~/.gitconfig, $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/config, ~/.config/git/attributes, or a Homebrew $(prefix)/etc/gitconfig. The file-tool write gate does not refuse them either. Host-side git reads those files for every repository.

The fixed-key pins in git_neutralizer_env already beat a planted core.fsmonitor or core.sshCommand. They cannot reach a repo-NAMED driver. Measured on main with git 2.47: [filter "evil"] smudge = <script> in ~/.gitconfig plus * filter=evil in ~/.config/git/attributes runs the script on the update path's git reset --hard, with git_command_env() in force. repo_exec_config_reason does not catch it, because it only probes the repository's own scopes. url.<x>.insteadOf, include.path, http.proxy / http.sslCAInfo and the multi-valued core.gitProxy in global config reach the fetch the same way.

Why it matters

Every user who runs the gateway's git update path is exposed. A prompt-injected agent writes two files in its own home, and the gateway runs the agent's program as the user, outside the sandbox. Sibling PRs close the repository-local half: #24808 (update check) and #24812 (sandbox seals on .git). This PR closes the global/system half for every caller of git_command_env.

Not a goal

What changed (motivation → approach → change)

Root cause: git_command_env() built a clean env for host git but still let git read the user's global and system files. Those files sit where the agent can write.

Change, in platform/update_governance.py, plus one call site in slack/gateway_runtime/update_apply.py. A new _git_home_config_isolation_env(env) is folded into git_command_env():

  • GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=<null device>. This replaces both ~/.gitconfig and the XDG config file, so the whole global include chain is gone. It also overrides an inherited GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL.

  • GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1 drops the system config, which a Homebrew install leaves user-writable.

  • core.attributesFile=<null device>, appended after the existing GIT_CONFIG_* pins so no index moves. Git's default attributes path ($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/attributes) does not come from config, so dropping global config alone does not drop it. Without the pin, a global attributes line can still arm a driver the repository defines.

  • GIT_ATTR_NOSYSTEM=1 drops the system attributes file.

  • safe.directory is the one key carried over. Git honours it only from system, global and command-line config, so dropping those files would make every update git call fail with "dubious ownership" on a checkout owned by another user (for example, a container running as root over a bind-mounted clone). _protected_safe_directories() reads the values with git config --system/--global --includes -z --get-all safe.directory (following include.path, as git does) and appends them as command-line config, in git's order. The read runs nothing, and the value is a path, not a program. An agent that plants safe.directory=* gains nothing it did not have before this PR. A failed read forwards nothing, so git refuses the checkout.

  • The safe.directory read is reused for 60 s per set of variables that move those files (HOME, XDG_CONFIG_HOME, GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL, ...). Every git_command_env() call lands there, and some run on the gateway's event loop.

  • Source pin: each path judges the URL its own fetch connects to. resolve_remote_url(proj, fetch_env=...) now takes the environment the update fetch runs with (a required keyword), and resolves the branch, its tracked remote and ls-remote --get-url under exactly that env. Each caller keeps ONE variable and passes it to both the pin check and the fetch, so they cannot drift. The gateway auto-update (slack/gateway_runtime/update_apply.py) and the route check that decides it (platform/update_capability.py) pass git_command_env(), so an agent-planted global url.<x>.insteadOf can neither redirect that fetch nor dress up an unapproved origin for its pin. kirocrew update (cli_server_update.py) and the dashboard update (dashboard/handlers/updates_apply.py) pass None: their fetch inherits the process env (now passed as env= from the same variable) and applies the operator's own rewrite, and the pin judges that rewritten URL, as before. A URL a fetch will not use is never judged. update_blocked_reason is unchanged.

  • docs/system-specs/modules/governance.md describes the per-path rule.

  • slack/gateway_runtime/update_apply.py: _auto_apply_update builds _git_env in subprocess_executor() rather than inline, because git_command_env() may now run the short safe.directory read and that function runs on the gateway's event loop. The function's other git work already runs there the same way.

  • Per OS: on Linux and macOS the system files are dropped too (GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM, GIT_ATTR_NOSYSTEM). On Windows they are kept. Git for Windows stores what it needs there (http.sslBackend/http.sslCAInfo, core.autocrlf, core.longpaths) under Program Files, which a standard install leaves admin-only. Global config is dropped on every OS.

git_neutralizer_env() itself is unchanged.

Trade-off: host-side isolation (this PR) vs a sandbox seal.

  • A sandbox seal would cover every host git caller at once. It does not hold on its own, though. A bind seal needs an existing file, so absent files (~/.gitconfig, ~/.config/git/attributes) would have to be created in the user's home. A seal covers a NAME, so a dotfile manager's symlinked ~/.gitconfig target, and every include.path target, stay writable through their other names. An inherited GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL can point anywhere. The sandbox also leaves the rest of $HOME writable, ~/.bashrc included. Sealing two git files would not make home a write boundary, and it would widen the overlap with fix(sandbox): write-protect git control files in the gateway's checkout #24812's launcher and planner changes.
  • Host-side isolation needs no new mounts. It covers the symlink, include, XDG, inherited-env and system cases in one place, and in-sandbox git does not change at all. It covers only callers that use git_command_env. The sweep PR moves the remaining host callers onto it.

Conflict note: #24808 adds lines in the same function, right after env.update(git_neutralizer_env()). This PR adds one line there too. Whichever lands second gets a trivial textual conflict; both changes should be kept.

Adversarial review (a fresh subagent that saw only the diff, ran real git 2.47): the change holds against global, XDG, include, symlink, inherited-env, system and attributes plants. It also holds against a repo-local core.attributesFile, because the command-scope pin outranks it. Residuals it named, none added by this PR:

  • git older than 2.32 ignores GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL, and older than 2.31 ignores GIT_CONFIG_COUNT. Every existing pin in git_neutralizer_env already relies on 2.31+. No minimum git version is enforced today; a version gate would be a separate change.
  • An inherited GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS outranks the pins. It comes from the gateway's own environment, which the agent cannot set. The same was true before this PR.
  • GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR matters only for init/clone. No git_command_env caller runs either.
  • ~/.ssh/config (read by ssh, not git) and an agent-writable PATH entry are outside git config. fix(updates): neutralize repo-local git exec config in the update check #24808 pins PATH.

Backwards compatibility

Compatible: every caller of git_command_env on main runs fetch, ls-remote, rev-parse, status, diff, config --get, merge --ff-only and reset --hard. None of those needs a commit identity.

The diff takes away the user's global and system git settings for these calls:

Reader: src/kiro_crew/platform/update_governance.py:_git_probe -- release -- probes read repository scopes only; test_governance_updates.py passes
Reader: src/kiro_crew/slack/gateway_runtime/update_apply.py:_git_env -- release -- fetch/status/reset need no global key; status already ignores untracked lines; test_slack_gateway_update_apply.py passes
Reader: src/kiro_crew/slack/gateway.py:git_command_env -- release -- same update-path commands; test_gateway_restart_uses_respawn_executable.py passes

Settings a user keeps in global config that these calls no longer see:

  • http.proxy / http.sslCAInfo: a proxy still works through https_proxy, which git reads from the environment. A CA bundle set only in gitconfig no longer applies. That is intended, because an agent could plant one.
  • safe.directory is kept (see above).
  • Windows keeps its system gitconfig (see above). A per-user Git for Windows install leaves that file user-writable; that residual is accepted. The exploit tests are POSIX-only because the planted programs are sh scripts; the Windows arm is tested on the env it builds.
  • A custom core.excludesFile: the default ~/.config/git/ignore is still read. The gateway's dirty check already skips untracked lines.
  • user.name / user.email: no caller commits. A future caller that commits must pass identity explicitly (the tests show how).

Tests

test/test_git_command_env_home_config.py. Every exploit test first proves the plant FIRES under a plain env, then proves it does not fire under git_command_env():

  • Global core.fsmonitor on git status.
  • Global core.sshCommand on ls-remote ssh://….
  • Global filter.<x>.smudge plus global attributes, on reset --hard. This is the gap on main.
  • $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/config plus attributes, with no ~/.gitconfig.
  • A clean ~/.gitconfig whose include.path names a planted file.
  • A symlinked ~/.gitconfig.
  • An inherited GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL naming a planted file.
  • An inherited GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM naming a planted file (the user-writable system file).
  • A global attributes line arming a repo-defined driver. This proves the core.attributesFile pin on its own.
  • The env entries, the appended pin index and count, os.environ left untouched, and a commit with explicit identity still working.
  • safe.directory: global values are forwarded in order, including one behind include.path (fails without --includes). A checkout git sees as another user's (via git's GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER knob) fails without the value and opens with it. Forwarding that key does not reopen a filter driver planted in the same file.
  • The safe.directory read is reused inside its window.
  • Source pin, per path: for both envs the judged URL equals what a fetch run with that env resolves; a rewrite-only pin (git@good.example:*) passes on the CLI and dashboard path; a rewrite onto an unpinned host is refused on the CLI and dashboard path; the same agent-planted rewrite cannot redirect the gateway's isolated fetch; a planted reverse rewrite cannot dress up an evil origin for the gateway; a home branch.<name>.remote is judged on the dashboard path. Four of these fail if fetch_env is ignored.
  • Per-OS arms: POSIX sets GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM/GIT_ATTR_NOSYSTEM; Windows does not (fails if the arm is removed). Both drop global config.
  • test/spawn_audit_helpers.py allowlists the new read-only git config spawn, _read_protected_safe_directories, with its reason.
  • test_governance_updates.py, test_dashboard_updates_coverage_apply.py, test_gateway_restart_uses_respawn_executable.py, test_cli_server_more_coverage.py: calls and stand-ins take the new fetch_env keyword.

Proof: PROVEN test/test_git_command_env_home_config.py::TestPlantedGlobalConfigDoesNotRun::test_global_filter_driver_with_global_attributes, test_xdg_config_and_attributes, test_include_path_chain, test_inherited_git_config_global, test_inherited_system_config (head e4b4a5d)

The fsmonitor, sshCommand and symlink tests still pass with the fix reverted, because the existing fixed-key pins already cover them. They stay as regression markers.

Also run: test_governance_updates.py, test_file_line_cap.py, test_ratchet_scope.py, test_slack_gateway_update_apply.py, test_update_check_install_aware_auto_apply.py, test_gateway_restart_uses_respawn_executable.py. Every test file that references the update path, plus test_spawn_audit.py and test_git_maintenance_ratchet.py, was run: 6261 passed, 26 skipped.

Manual verification

N/A. The tests run real git against planted files in a fake $HOME, which is the manual check.

Inputs considered, and how each was handled:

Input Handled Tested
~/.gitconfig GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL yes
symlinked ~/.gitconfig GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL yes
$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/config GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL yes
include.path / includeIf chain from global GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL yes (include.path)
inherited GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL overridden yes
/etc/gitconfig, Homebrew prefix GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM yes (via GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM)
~/.config/git/attributes core.attributesFile pin yes
system gitattributes GIT_ATTR_NOSYSTEM env asserted only; the path is compiled in
~/.config/git/ignore still read n/a: execs nothing
GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS / GIT_SSH_COMMAND in the gateway env unchanged n/a: gateway env, not agent-writable

Base-red, not from this PR: test/test_crew_log_fullscan_guard.py::test_a_warm_session_read_that_earns_a_savepoint_reads_only_the_gap fails XPASS(strict) on the base commit without this diff. Its fix is open as #24774.

Related Issues

Refs #24808, #24812

Sibling sweep

Swept: git grep -n "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL|git_command_env" -- src/
Sibling: src/kiro_crew/code_fingerprint.py -- not affected -- already sets GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL to the null device and GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM
Sibling: src/kiro_crew/apps/registry_pipeline/subprocess_env.py -- not affected -- already sets GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL to the null device and GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM
Sibling: src/kiro_crew/apps/builtins/auto_improvement/backend/clone_setup.py -- not affected -- its _git_env already isolates global and system config
Sibling: src/kiro_crew/apps/builtins/design_critique/backend/routes.py -- not affected -- already points GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL at the null device for its clone
Sibling: src/kiro_crew/dashboard/handlers/updates_check.py -- tracked in #24808
Sibling: src/kiro_crew/cli_server_update.py -- tracked in the host-git sweep PR, which moves it onto git_command_env

Pattern harvest

Rule candidate: review-prompt
Pattern: host-side git env that pins config keys but still reads GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL / system config from an agent-writable home

Checklist

  • At most two commits (one is the norm), with a Conventional Commits title (feat|fix|docs|style|refactor|perf|test|chore|ci|build|revert: ...)
  • Existing tests pass and new tests added for new functionality
  • Self-review completed; code follows project style guidelines
  • Documentation updated (if applicable)
  • No secrets, credentials, or internal references in the diff

Contribution License Agreement

Contributed under the project's Apache-2.0 license.

@iamwhatever
iamwhatever requested review from a team and KiroCrewCaptain as code owners October 27, 2026 09:12
@github-actions github-actions Bot added the readiness: checking Automated validation is still running label Oct 27, 2026
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UX Review (Opus 5.5) — ⏭️ skipped

Revision e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09 touches no user-facing surface (no changes under website/ or committed screenshots), so the UX review was skipped. Does not block merge.

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Design Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

Design-level review of e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09 — updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

Design-Verdict: PASS

No design-level blocker: every resolve_remote_url caller now passes the same environment to the pin check and its fetch, and the isolation sits in the one shared env builder.

Notes

  • Credentials and TLS settings may stop reaching the gateway auto-update fetch. With global config dropped (and system config dropped on Linux and macOS), git no longer reads a credential.helper or http.sslCAInfo kept there. That includes macOS osxkeychain, which lives in the system config. So an HTTPS fetch of a private fork, or one behind a corporate CA, now fails where it used to work. The description covers the proxy case (https_proxy) but not these two. A revert fixes it, so this doesn't block, but it should be listed as a known loss in the docstring/governance spec.
  • _git_route calls git_command_env() separately from _auto_apply_update. Both build the same env, so they agree today, but it is a second construction of the "same env" the PR promises to keep in one variable per path.

[DESIGN-REVIEWED] e4b4a5d

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] 5b9fb3141788cb8437313a96eb2b8aacf3973f20bd96bbf738abb7a412b5eff4

That sha256 names everything this verdict read: the PR description, plus the 1 evidence file(s) the workflow collected from it and handed this review. It covers that evidence because the media strip replaces every attachment URL with the same placeholder, so an edit swapping one attachment for another would leave the description's captured text identical while what this review judged changed. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh over the same inputs; if it differs, the description or that evidence changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from either is unproven.

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First Principles Review (Opus 5.5) — ✅ PASS

Premise-level review of e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09 — why this exists and whether the shipped surface is the smallest honest version. Updated in place on each push. A BLOCK verdict blocks PR readiness; PASS does not.

First-Principles-Verdict: PASS

Nothing blocks. The home-config isolation is backed by a new test that fails on base, and each rider follows from it. Two premises are inherited.

Notes

  • Item 3 — inherited: the 60 s safe.directory cache rests on "some run on the gateway's event loop", with no measured cost, and the one event-loop caller this PR names (_auto_apply_update) now builds the env off the loop. Subtraction: delete _safe_directory_cache, _SAFE_DIRECTORY_TTL_SECS and _SAFE_DIRECTORY_CACHE_VARS, and read on each call.
  • Item 6 — inherited: the claim that Git for Windows keeps its system gitconfig "under Program Files, which a standard install leaves admin-only" was not verified on Windows. It is on the update path, not boot. If it is wrong, the Windows system-file plant stays open.

What this change ships

Inventory (8 items) — 6 justified

Intent: stop a sandboxed agent from making the gateway's host-side git run a program it planted in the user's global or system git config or attributes files. FIX.

  1. Host git under git_command_env ignores global config, system config and attributes files — justified
  2. Operator's system/global safe.directory values are still honoured, read by a git config child — justified
  3. That read is reused for 60 s per HOME/XDG/GIT_CONFIG_* set — rides along, inherited
  4. Gateway auto-update source pin judges the URL its isolated fetch uses (no planted insteadOf) — justified
  5. resolve_remote_url requires fetch_env; CLI and dashboard updates pass None to both pin and fetch — justified
  6. Windows keeps system git config and attributes — inherited platform premise
  7. Gateway auto-update builds its git env in an executor, off the event loop — justified
  8. A global http.proxy/excludesFile/user.* no longer applies to update git — justified

[FIRST-PRINCIPLES-REVIEWED] e4b4a5d

Description read

[DESCRIPTION-READ] 9d2b83274d7c0daaaf51c789fe094e680808c097b1ea5461ff773cb4d692ee1c

That sha256 names the PR description this verdict read. Recompute it with .github/scripts/pr-description-capture.sh; if it differs, the description changed after this verdict was formed and any finding drawn from the description is unproven.

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GPT 6.1 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

GPT 6.1 completed its review of e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09 and found no blocking issues.

This comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.
[GPT-REVIEWED] e4b4a5d

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override gpt e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09 false-positive: <reason, 20 to 500 characters>

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Opus 5.5 Review — ✅ no blocking findings

Reviewed e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09 — this comment is updated in place on each push.

Review details

No findings.

[OPUS-REVIEWED] e4b4a5d

Verdict parsed from the review's SHA-scoped output markers for commit e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09.

False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment:
/ai-review override fable e4b4a5d2c96974851cd32b73284759e08c2f9e09 false-positive: <reason, 20 to 500 characters>

@iamwhatever
iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/global-gitconfig-isolation branch 6 times, most recently from d970e18 to 9162627 Compare October 27, 2026 10:42
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/global-gitconfig-isolation branch from 9162627 to 695ff2e Compare October 27, 2026 11:00
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/global-gitconfig-isolation branch from 695ff2e to 6304dfe Compare October 27, 2026 11:55
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/global-gitconfig-isolation branch from 6304dfe to 1c06811 Compare October 27, 2026 12:45
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention labels Oct 27, 2026
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention and removed readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026
A sandboxed agent can write ~/.gitconfig, the XDG git config and attributes files, and a user-writable system gitconfig. Host-side git read them for every repository, and a repo-named driver there (filter.<x>.smudge plus a global attributes line) ran a program on the update's reset --hard. git_command_env now points GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL at the null device, drops the system files on POSIX (GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM, GIT_ATTR_NOSYSTEM), pins core.attributesFile, and forwards only the system/global safe.directory values. resolve_remote_url now takes the env the update fetch runs with, and each caller passes one variable to both the source-pin check and the fetch, so the pin judges the URL that fetch will connect to.
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever force-pushed the fix/global-gitconfig-isolation branch from 1c06811 to e4b4a5d Compare October 27, 2026 13:17
@github-actions github-actions Bot added readiness: checking Automated validation is still running readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision and removed readiness: action required A blocking check or review needs attention readiness: checking Automated validation is still running labels Oct 27, 2026

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Approving e4b4a5d.

I ran the new module and every update-path suite it touches against real git 2.50.1 (426 passed), and mutated the attributes pin, GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL, GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM, the --includes read and the fetch_env plumbing one at a time; each turns named tests red. The env is built from a copy, so the user's own git outside the gateway is untouched, credential.helper/core.sshCommand were already pinned off on the gateway path so no new auth loss there, and safe.directory survives in git's order. The per-path source pin (one variable for the check and the fetch) is the right shape. Windows was checked against source only: GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=os.devnull matches what code_fingerprint.py and the registry pipeline already do there, and keeping the system file is a reasonable call.

Non-blocking follow-ups:

  • Coordination with #24822: that PR introduces git_command_env(human_transport=True) so a human-started update keeps the operator's credential helper and core.sshCommand. With this isolation applied unconditionally, those settings are never read from ~/.gitconfig or the system file (Apple git's osxkeychain lives in the system file), so human_transport becomes inert and a private-remote kirocrew update / dashboard update would fail. Whichever PR lands second should decide whether human_transport also keeps those two keys (e.g. by reading them the way safe.directory is read and forwarding them as command-line config) and should switch the CLI/dashboard fetch_env from None to the env their fetch then actually runs with.
  • Until #24822 lands, the CLI reset --hard and the dashboard merge still run with the inherited env, so the goal sentence holds only for git_command_env callers. The PR says so; worth keeping in mind for the merge order.
  • Test redundancy: every filter-driver exploit test plants a global attributes file, so removing GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL leaves them all green (the core.attributesFile pin alone defeats them). A case that arms a global filter.<x>.smudge from repository attributes (.git/info/attributes) would pin GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL's exec-blocking role independently. Same for test_inherited_system_config and GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM.
  • Backwards compatibility could also list the operator's own url.<x>.insteadOf among the settings the gateway auto-update no longer sees (the governance spec covers it, the PR body list does not).

@iamwhatever
iamwhatever enabled auto-merge (squash) October 27, 2026 18:20
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever merged commit 2f958df into main Oct 27, 2026
120 of 128 checks passed
@iamwhatever
iamwhatever deleted the fix/global-gitconfig-isolation branch October 27, 2026 18:21
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the readiness: passed Eligible automated validation passed for the current revision label Oct 27, 2026
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