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feat: AgentCore AWS provisioning and adapter - #6597
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GPT 5.6 Review — ✅ no blocking findingsGPT 5.6 completed its review of This comment is updated in place on each push. Review detailsNo findings. False positive or not applicable? A repository writer can comment: |
Design Review (Fable 5) — 🟡 CONCERNSDesign-level review of Design review complete. I inspected the full diff (adapter, bootstrap swap, IAM/boundary changes, CFN template, launch plumbing, docs) against the PR's stated scope. Design-Verdict: CONCERNS Sound staged slice; the single union successor boundary quietly gives login-posture instances a ceiling that includes the verbs login exists to forbid. Watch
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| "Effect": "Allow", | ||
| "Action": [ | ||
| "bedrock-agentcore:GetWorkloadAccessToken", | ||
| "bedrock-agentcore:GetWorkloadAccessTokenForUserId", |
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[P1] Remove caller-chosen user impersonation from the instance role. The agent process inherits these instance credentials, so prompt-injected code can call GetWorkloadAccessTokenForUserId directly for an arbitrary user; the implementation itself never needs this action. The same role also receives SynchronizeGatewayTargets on every Gateway, turning a read-only Settings catalog into account-wide mutation authority available to the agent. Remove both actions from the instance policies, boundary, and CloudFormation mirror, or move mutation behind credentials the agent process cannot access.
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Land the inert AWS extra and launch-path identity so later Gateway and login PRs have something to attach to. Default-off: no policy or env posture means no boto3, no extra install, no adapter swap. Workload gateway_mcp_spec returns the https hostname and does not import the SigV4 proxy; that rewrite belongs in the next PR.
resolved_* reads the composed ceiling first. Workload Allow is GetWorkloadAccessToken only; UserId stays on the login Deny. Inspect is Get/List/GetTarget — no Synchronize. Dashboard launch stays none.
Problem / Motivation
PR 3 of 6 in the AgentCore stack. The optional AWS extra, CloudFormation identity, and instance IAM need their own review before SigV4, consent, or Settings UI land.
Why it matters
Provisioning and credential resolution are a different trust boundary from the localhost proxy and from OAuth attach. Mixing them hid wiring gaps in #6387. This PR is merge-safe and inert: no Gateway inject, no SigV4 listen, no login consent.
What changed (motivation → approach → change)
Goal: land the adapter later PRs attach to, without turning the data plane on.
kirocrew[agentcore]extra (boto3) andinstall.sh --agentcoreplatform/agentcore_aws.py: opted-in adapter, WAT vending, extra ensure, policy-over-env resolution. Reusesagentcore_schemavalidators; does not import SigV4agent_identityonly whenopted_in()and the extra is importable. Does not changeprofileAgentCorePosture=none|workload|login(defaultnone) createsAWS::BedrockAgentCore::WorkloadIdentityand writes launch envkirocrew-ec2-boundary-agentcore. Launcher Policy.json never carriesInvokeGateway--agentcore-posture/--agentcore-gateway-url; dashboard launch staysnoneNot in this PR: SigV4 proxy, MCP inject, login withhold/consent, Settings identity UI.
gateway_mcp_spec()returns the https Gateway hostname.Stacked on #6595 (principal).
Tests
test/test_agentcore_aws.py: import does not load boto3 or SigV4; opted-in requires posture or name+flag; policy beats env; workload spec is the https URL; WAT / inbound JWT; probe discards the token; bootstrapensure_extrawhen opted intest/test_agentcore_iam_posture.py: launcher has no Invoke; workload vs login instance SIDs; successor boundary union; CLI/API labeled siblingplatform/agentcore_aws.py::ensure_extraLocal: 220 passed on the AWS/IAM/cloud suites; spawn-audit allowlist tests passed.
Manual verification
N/A — inert without a configured posture and the extra. Default launch stays
none. Unit coverage is the verification.Related Issues
Stack after #6595. Supersedes the AWS/CFN/IAM slice of #6387.
Checklist
cloud.md,platform-context.md,governance.md,install.md)UserData now sed-escapes
%→%%in the Gateway URL before writing the systemdEnvironment=line, so a percent-encoded path survives daemon-reload.